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  Science	  has	  brought	  both	  great	  benefits	  and	  numerous	  hazards	  to	  humankind.	  It	  affects	  our	  social	  relations,	  comprising	  those	  nearby	  and	  the	  many	  we	  never	  get	  to	  see.	  Now,	  more	  than	  ever	  before,	  technology	  is	  influencing	  the	  way	  we	  live	  our	  daily	   lives.	   The	   shape	   and	   direction	   taken	   by	   science	   and	   the	   technologies	  developed	  in	  its	  wake	  are	  however	  something	  we	  can	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  control	  or	  at	   least	   attempt	   to	   steer	  with	  more	  or	   less	   success.	  A	  variety	  of	   incentives	   can	  align	  scientific	  progress	  with	  pre-­‐established	  targets.	  Yet,	   increasingly	  scientific	  agendas	   are	   being	   shaped	   by	   market	   incentives.	   In	   order	   to	   make	   scientific	  research	   lucrative	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   are	   granted	   to	   those	   who	   meet	  certain	   criteria	   that	   are	   defined	   by	   law.	   Exclusive	   rights	   have	   aroused	   fierce	  controversies	  for	  innovation	  in	  such	  vital	  areas	  as	  the	  life	  sciences.	  In	  a	  world	  of	  extreme	  inequalities	  this	  way	  of	  “incentivizing”	  innovation	  is	  bound	  to	  clash	  with	  deeply	  rooted	  notions	  of	  justice.	  	  Realizing	   that	   the	   direction	   science	   takes	   is	   something	  we	   can	   steer,	   creates	   a	  moral	  obligation	   to	  align	   the	  course	  of	  science	  more	  closely	  with	   the	  benefit	  of	  the	  larger	  global	  population.	  This	  demand	  however	  already	  reveals	  a	  normative	  position	  and	  as	  such,	  maintenance,	  deviation	  or	  intensification	  thereof	  becomes	  something	  that	  has	  to	  be	  justified.	  The	  liberties	  of	  some	  will	  clash	  with	  the	  rights	  of	  others.	  	  	  
Background	  of	  the	  research	  project	  	  Whilst	   states	   leaders	   from	   all	   around	   the	   world	   gathered	   in	   1994	   to	   sign	   the	  Trade-­‐related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   Agreement,	   few	   realized	  the	   enormous	   consequences	   this	   will	   have	   on	   everyday	   life.	   The	   binding	  agreement	   made	   minimum	   intellectual	   property	   standards	   mandatory	   for	   all	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  member	  states.	  The	  agreement	  has	  strong	  power,	  as	  it	  is	   backed	   with	   an	   arbitration	   system	   to	   penalize	   non-­‐compliers	   with	   trade	  sanctions.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   protection	   of	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   is	   now	  effectively	   a	   worldwide	   system	   calls	   traditional	   justifications	   of	   intellectual	  property	  protection	  into	  question	  and	  raises	  new	  ethical	   issues,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  global	  justice.	  	  Another	  prominent	  trend	  in	  recent	  decades	  has	  been	  the	  progressive	   enlargement	   of	   the	   subject	   matter	   that	   can	   be	   brought	   under	  intellectual	   property	   protection.	   The	   domain	   of	   patentable	   subject	   matter,	   for	  example,	   has	   been	   extended	   to	   include	   gene	   sequences,	   cultured	   cell	   lines	   and	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tissues,	   live	   organisms,	   computer	   programs	   and	   also	   (in	   the	   United	   States	   at	  least)	  new	  business	  methods.	  As	   intellectual	  property	   rights	   increasingly	  cover	  the	   strategic	   information-­‐intensive	   assets	   of	   the	   new	   knowledge-­‐based	  bioeconomy	   (like	   seeds,	   food,	   medicines	   and	   diagnostic	   tools),	   they	   become	  deeply	   implicated	   in	   the	   essential	   requirements	   for	   the	   sustenance	   and	  flourishing	  of	  human	  life.	  	  The	  discussion	  on	  intellectual	  property	  in	  the	  life	  sciences	  and	  global	  justice	  has	  primarily	   concentrated	   on	   two	   issues:	   accessibility	   and	   availability	   of	   the	  resulting	   objects	   of	   innovative	   efforts.1	  Accessibility	  means	   in	   this	   context	   that	  innovations	  should	  be	  accessible	  to	  those	  who	  urgently	  need	  them.	  Availability	  is	  a	   term	   used	   to	   discuss	   the	   problem	   of	   a	   highly	   skewed	   allocation	   of	   research	  efforts,	   as	   exemplified	   in	   the	   well-­‐known	   “10-­‐90	   gap”	   in	   pharmaceutical	  research,	   where	   no	   more	   than	   10	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   entire	   research	   effort	   is	  reportedly	   devoted	   to	   finding	   cures	   for	   diseases	   that	   afflict	   90	   per	   cent	   of	   the	  world’s	  population.	  Similar	  gaps	  exist	  in	  other	  fields	  of	  research.	  While	  it	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  innovators	  should	  be	  fairly	  remunerated,	  allowing	  access	   to	   only	   those	   who	   pay	   the	   established	   prices	   is	   controversial	   for	   such	  objects	   as	   vital	   medicines.	   After	   the	   successful	   eradication	   of	   such	   dreadful	  diseases	  as	  smallpox	  the	  scientific	  community	  finds	  itself	  under	  huge	  pressure	  to	  repeat	  earlier	  achievements	  by	  making	  medicines	  available	  for	  other	  diseases	  as	  well.	   The	   suffering	   of	   millions	   of	   people	   is	   not	   perceived	   anymore	   as	   an	  inevitable	   burden	   on	   daily	   life	   that	   we	   are	   not	   capable	   to	   curb.	   Similarly	  technological	  solutions	  are	  sought	  for	  countless	  other	  social	  problems,	  be	  it	  food	  security,	  pollution	  control	  or	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  and	  adaptation.2	  	  Although	  those	  first	  two	  allocation	  problems	  –	  accessibility	  and	  availability	  –	  are	  far	  from	  solved,	  two	  further	  issues	  that	  are	  somewhat	  neglected	  in	  the	  discussion	  also	   deserve	   attention:	   the	   highly	   unequal	   distribution	   of	   intellectual	   property	  rights	   themselves	   and	   the	  manner	   those	   exclusive	   rights	   affect	   the	   practice	   of	  science.	  The	   highly	   unequal	   distribution	   of	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   between	   the	  Global	   North	   and	   the	   Global	   South	   can	   be	   identified	   as	   the	   third	   distributive	  justice	   problem	   raised	   by	   intellectual	   property	   regimes. 3 	  Such	   extreme	  inequalities	   have	   a	   negative	   effect	   on	   multiple	   dimensions.	   First,	   the	   divide	  between	  technology	  receivers	  and	  technology	  producers	  widens,	  thus	  creating	  a	  situation	  where	  financial	  flows	  occur	  mostly	  one	  way:	  from	  the	  Global	  South	  to	  the	  Global	  North.4	  Second,	  people	  who	  regularly	  use	   the	  system	  are	  placed	   in	  a	  position	  of	  advantage	  due	  to	  their	  greater	  legal	  expertise	  on	  what	  is	  patentable	  and	   what	   is	   not.	   A	   number	   of	   institutions	   have	   used	   their	   legal	   expertise	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  cf.	  Pogge	  (2005)	  2	  cf.	  Acharya	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  3	  cf.	  DeCamp	  (2007)	  4	  cf.	  De	  Schutter	  (2011)	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acquire	  patents	  on	   foreign	   inventions	   that	  were	  not	  or	   insufficiently	  protected.	  This	   is	   a	   phenomenon	   that	   in	   the	   life	   sciences	   is	   widely	   known	   as	   biopiracy.	  Especially	   indigenous	   innovators	   are	   vulnerable	   to	   such	   abusive	   practices	   and	  thereby	  lose	  an	  opportunity	  to	  be	  recognized	  and	  rewarded	  for	  their	  creativity.	  Third,	   managing	   a	   vast	   patent	   portfolio	   gives	   companies	   some	   control	   over	  follow-­‐up	   innovations.	   Newcomers	   are	   often	   in	   a	   position	   of	   disadvantage,	   as	  they	   may	   have	   to	   spend	   considerable	   funds	   in	   acquiring	   licenses.	   This	   is	  generally	   a	   problem	   for	   companies	   and	   research	   institutions	   with	   smaller	  budgets.5	  Patents	  may	  even	  discourage	  or	  stifle	  follow-­‐on	  innovation,	  contrary	  to	  their	  official	  rationale.	  	  Intellectual	  property	  has	  had	  also	  a	  strong	  effect	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  science.	  First,	  it	   has	   profoundly	   strengthened	   the	   belief	   that	   science	   can	   and	   should	   be	   self-­‐financeable.	  This	  has	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  all	  types	  of	  scientific	  work	  that	  cannot	  be	   protected	   by	   intellectual	   property,	  most	   prominently:	   rediscovery,	  much	   of	  indigenous	   innovation,	   fundamental	   research	   and	   incremental	   innovation.	  Second,	  favouring	  one	  type	  of	  scientific	  work	  over	  other	  forms	  implies	  that	  one	  has	  a	  greater	  societal	  value	  than	  the	  other.	  In	  many	  cases	  this	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	   social	   utility	   –	   many	   individuals	   and	   communities	   who	   provide	   vital	  services	  to	  society	  are	  widely	  misrecognized	  for	  their	  work.	  Additionally,	  one	  has	  to	   keep	   in	   mind	   that	   most	   people	   do	   not	   have	   the	   resources	   to	   apply	   for	  intellectual	   property	   protection.	   Third,	   intellectual	   property	   demands	   that	  innovation	   offers	   products	   that	   are	   homogeneous,	   something	   that	   disfavours	  indigenous	   innovation	   and	   is	   a	   disincentive	   for	   the	   maintenance	   of	  agrobiodiversity.6	  Innovators	   who	   primarily	   produce	   a	   heterogeneous	   output	  are	  less	  attractive	  research	  partners	  to	  collaborate	  with.	  	  	  
Research	  questions	  	  The	  vast	  problems	  and	  opportunities	  raised	  by	  the	  intellectual	  property	  regimes	  in	   the	   life	   sciences	   give	   rise	   to	   a	  number	  of	   questions.	  However,	   a	  major	   issue	  that	   is	   inadequately	   addressed	   in	   the	   discussion	   is	   the	   necessity	   to	   make	  research	   and	   technology	   development	   a	   more	   inclusive	   endeavour.	   Since	   this	  matter	  is	  worthy	  of	  more	  scholarly	  attention	  I	  have	  decided	  to	  make	  it	  central	  by	  building	   the	   following	   six	   main	   research	   questions	   around	   this	   topic.	   First,	   I	  deemed	  it	  necessary	  to	  offer	  a	  brief	  exposition	  of	  the	  main	  ethical	  arguments	  that	  justify	  access	  to	  innovation	  and	  demand	  that	  technological	  solutions	  that	  address	  the	   problems	   of	   the	   poor	   become	   available.	   An	   over-­‐emphasis	   on	   access	   and	  availability	   made	   me	   however	   ponder	   a	   world	   where	   scientific	   participation	  possibilities	   are	   deliberatively	   left	   aside.	   This	   led	   to	   the	   formulation	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  cf.	  Eppinger	  and	  Vladova	  (2013)	  6	  On	  the	  problem	  of	  industrial	  agricultural	  innovation	  and	  genetic	  erosion,	  see	  De	  Schutter	  (2011)	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second	  question.	  In	  the	  third	  question	  I	  articulate	  the	  main	  problems	  brought	  up	  by	   highly	   unequal	   formal	   research	   capacities	   distributions	   between	   the	   Global	  North	   and	   the	   Global	   South	   with	   a	   corresponding	   pattern	   in	   the	   allocation	   of	  intellectual	   property	   rights.	   To	   counter	   arguments	   coming	   from	   neoliberal	  quarters	   I	   found	   it	   necessary	   to	   criticize	   conventional	   methods	   to	   judge	   the	  quality	   and	   quantity	   of	   research	   outputs.	   Hence	   the	   fourth	   question.	   The	   fifth	  point	   I	   want	   to	   bring	   into	   discussion	   is	   a	   specific	   problem	   raised	   by	   the	   way	  intellectual	  property	  affects	  scientific	  practice:	  the	  fate	  of	  traditional	  knowledge.	  Much	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  becomes	  lost	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  incentives	  to	  continue	  its	   development.	   The	   last	   question	   raised	   wraps	   up	   the	   thesis	   by	   evaluating	  amendment	  proposals.	  Verbatim,	  the	  guiding	  research	  questions	  are:	  	  	   1. What	  are	  the	  main	  ethical	  theories	  that	  justify	  fairer	  access	  to	  innovation?	  This	  question	  addresses	   the	  different	   theories	  used	  to	   justify	  access	  and	  availability	  of	  innovations	  for	  those	  in	  need.	  2. Should	   one	   consider	   scientific	   participation	   possibilities	   as	   a	   luxury	   to	   be	  
left	   aside	   until	   subsistence	   rights	   for	   the	   great	   majority	   of	   people	   are	  
secured?	   Access	   to	   innovation	   and	   sufficient	   research	   attention	  (availability	  of	  solutions)	  can	  be	  justified	  under	  subsistence	  rights.	  Efforts	  to	  make	  science	  more	  inclusive	  are	  often	  left	  aside	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  subsistence	  rights	  take	  precedence.	  	  3. Should	  extreme	  inequalities	  in	  research	  capacities	  between	  the	  Global	  South	  
and	   the	   Global	   North	   be	   fought	   even	   when	   the	   objects	   of	   innovation	   are	  
made	  accessible	  worldwide?	   Since	   inequalities	   in	   research	   capacities	  will	  unavoidably	   affect	   the	   allocation	   of	   exclusive	   rights,	   this	   question	  addresses	   the	   third	   distributive	   justice	   problem:	   the	   negative	   impact	   of	  highly	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights.	  	  4. What	  are	  the	  benefits	  to	  be	  expected	  from	  research	  and	  innovation	  and	  how	  
do	   we	   judge	   that	   the	   international	   system	   of	   science	   and	   technology	   is	  
working	   properly?	   Is	   the	   number	   of	   patents	   an	   appropriate	   metric	   for	  measuring	   innovative	   output?	   Different	   inventions	   that	   have	   the	   same	  function	  often	  vary	  strongly	  in	  terms	  of	  positive	  and	  negative	  side	  effects.	  How	   do	   we	   make	   sure	   that	   innovations	   with	   the	   most	   valuable	  externalities	  are	  made	  available	  to	  the	  poor?	  5. How	   can	   we	   secure	   the	   moral	   and	   material	   interests	   of	   indigenous	  
innovators	   using	   the	   current	   intellectual	   property	   regimes?	   Much	   of	  indigenous	   creative	   efforts	   are	   not	   patentable.	   Incentivizing	   indigenous	  innovation	   as	   a	   parallel	   system	   of	   innovation	   would	   make	   the	   current	  science	   and	   innovation	   practice	   (the	   earlier	   mentioned	   fourth	   issue)	  much	   more	   inclusive	   by	   facilitating	   the	   participation	   of	   those	   who	  currently	  are	  underrepresented.	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6. Is	   there,	   among	   the	   various	   proposals	   that	   have	   been	  brought	   forward	   to	  
enhance	   the	   global	   justice	   of	   the	   international	   intellectual	   property	   and	  
research	  system,	  any	  amendment	  proposal	  that	  should	  be	  clearly	  favoured?	  An	   evaluation	   is	   needed	   to	   identify	   which	   amendment	   proposal	   best	  addresses	  the	  issues	  of	  access	  to	  and	  availability	  of	  objects	  of	  innovation,	  reduces	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  highly	  unequal	  distribution	  of	   intellectual	  property	  rights	  and	  is	  conducive	  to	  good	  science	  and	  innovation	  practices.	  	  	  Having	   introduced	   the	   questions,	   I	   will	   move	   on	   by	   explaining	   the	   research	  methodology	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  
Research	  methodology	  	  Insights	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  questions	  were	  gained	  by	  an	  extensive	  study	  of	  literature.	   In	   the	  selection	  of	  material	   I	  made	  sure	  that	  works	   from	  all	  relevant	  disciplines	   were	   included.	   Most	   of	   the	   analysed	   literature	   comes	   from	  philosophy,	   political	   science,	   law,	   economics	   and	   anthropology.	   To	   a	   lesser	  extent	   literature	   from	   disciplines	   such	   as	   life	   sciences,	   development	   studies,	  business	  and	  innovation	  management,	  history	  of	  science	  and	  technology,	  public	  health	  and	  engineering	  was	  also	  examined.	  	  While	  this	  is	  a	  philosophical	  thesis,	  I	  also	  used	  methods	  that	  are	  not	  commonly	  employed	   in	   the	   discipline.	   The	   thesis	   gained	   in	   strength	   by	   including	   the	  methods	  of	  empirical	  philosophy,	  a	  practice	  that	  has	  become	  fairly	  widespread	  in	  the	   Netherlands:	   conversations	   with	   stakeholders	   and	   critical	   analysis	   of	  empirical	  data.	  One	  of	  the	  highlights	  here	  was	  the	  organization	  of	  a	  networking	  conference	   in	   Brussels	   September	   2011.7	  Michiel	   Korthals	   and	   I	   organized	   the	  conference	   with	   substantial	   support	   from	   the	   Centre	   for	   Society	   and	   the	   Life	  Sciences.	   We	   brought	   together	   specialists	   from	   a	   diverse	   range	   of	   disciplines	  working	   in	   academia,	   public	   sector,	   industry	   and	   NGOs.	   This	   exceptional	  environment	   fostered	   a	   high	   level	   of	   discussions	   dealing	   with	   global	   justice	  concerns	   raised	  by	   the	   intellectual	  property	   regimes	   in	   the	   life	   sciences.	  There	  was	   ample	   room	   to	   debate	   ideas	   and	   concerns	   and	   this	   opportunity	  was	  well	  used.	  I	  gained	  immensely	  from	  discussions	  with	  the	  participants,	  some	  of	  which	  commented	   on	   later	   developed	   papers.	   Thomas	   Pogge’s	   work	   also	   was	  exemplary	  in	  showing	  how	  to	  harness	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  empirical	  data	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  ethical	  assessment.	  	  My	   involvement	   in	   several	   research	   environments	   gave	   substantial	   material	  input	   to	   the	   subject	   of	   investigation.	   Based	   at	   Wageningen	   University,	   I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Korthals	  and	  Timmermann	  (2012)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  4]	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participated	  in	  the	  interdisciplinary	  “Commons	  Seminar”	  and	  in	  a	  series	  of	  guest	  lectures,	   meetings	   and	   seminars.	   The	   university’s	   focus	   on	   agriculture	   and	  international	  development	  gave	  me	  countless	  opportunities	  to	  gain	  new	  insights	  and	   rectify	   false	  assumptions.	  Being	  also	  a	  member	  of	   interuniversity	   research	  group,	  the	  Centre	  for	  Society	  and	  the	  Life	  Sciences	  allowed	  me	  to	  discuss	  topics	  with	  people	  working	  primarily	  on	  health-­‐related	   issues.	  A	   two-­‐month	   research	  stay	   at	   the	   Brocher	   Foundation	   gave	   me	   the	   opportunity	   to	   strengthen	   the	  knowledge	   gained	   through	   extensive	   interdisciplinary	   discussions	   with	  researchers	  from	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
Overview	  of	  the	  thesis	  	  After	  this	  general	  introduction,	  the	  second	  chapter	  commences	  by	  setting	  out	  the	  major	   arguments	   for	   making	   objects	   of	   innovation	   accessible	   and	   directing	  research	  attention	  to	  make	  technological	  solutions	  for	  the	  global	  poor	  available.	  The	  research	  question	  here	  answered	  is:	  What	  are	  the	  main	  ethical	  theories	  that	  
justify	   fairer	   access	   to	   innovation?	   After	   that	   I	   state	   what	   makes	   life	   sciences	  different	  to	  other	  fields	  of	  knowledge.	  	  The	  third	  chapter	  is	  the	  main	  theoretical	  chapter.	  A	  philosophical	  interpretation	  of	  a	  segment	  of	  article	  27	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  serves	  as	  the	  centrepiece	  of	  this	  chapter	  that	  introduces	  the	  concept	  of	  global	  justice	  used	  throughout	   the	   thesis.	   The	   aim	   of	   this	   interpretative	   analysis	   is	   to	   give	   an	  extensive	  answer	  to	  the	  second	  research	  question:	  Should	  one	  consider	  scientific	  
participation	  possibilities	  as	  a	  luxury	  to	  be	  left	  aside	  until	  subsistence	  rights	  for	  the	  
great	  majority	  of	  people	  are	  secured?	  Here	  the	  consequences	  of	  prioritizing	  any	  of	  the	   two	   elements	   of	   this	   article,	   i.e.	   the	   possibility	   to	   share	   in	   scientific	  advancement	   or	   to	   benefit	   from	   access	   to	   and	   availability	   of	   objects	   of	  innovation,	  are	  analysed	  in	  regard	  to	  global	  justice.	  This	  chapter	  also	  addresses	  partly	   the	   third	   research	   question:	   Should	   extreme	   inequalities	   in	   research	  
capacities	  between	  the	  Global	  South	  and	  the	  Global	  North	  be	  fought	  even	  when	  the	  
objects	   of	   innovation	   are	   made	   accessible	   worldwide?	   Huge	   inequalities	   in	  research	   capacities	   are	   condemned	   with	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  dependency:	  the	  situation	  where	  one	  party	  is	  always	  the	  one	  “saving”	  the	  other	  through	  technological	  aid.	  	  In	   the	   fourth	   chapter	   we	   move	   from	   discussing	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   to	  offering	   a	   report	   representing	   the	   current	   state	   of	   the	   debate.	   This	   chapter	  reports	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  “Network	  Conference	  on	  Ethical	  and	  Social	  Aspects	  of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   –	   Agrifood	   and	   Health”	   held	   in	   Brussels,	  September	   2011	   and	   concludes	   by	   offering	   a	   philosophical	   reflection	   on	   the	  debate.	  This	  chapter	  turns	  around	  two	  questions:	  what	  are	  the	  main	  problems	  of	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the	   current	   intellectual	   property	   regimes?	   And,	   what	   can	   society	   do	   to	   mend	  them?	  It	  also	  provides	  some	  accounts	  on	  the	  negative	  effects	  raised	  by	  the	  high	  concentration	   of	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   among	   a	   few	  major	  multinational	  companies.	  	  After	   the	   theoretical	   framework	  and	   the	   current	   state	  of	   the	  debate	  have	  been	  presented,	  we	  continue	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  three	  proposals	  that	  seek	  to	  alleviate	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  current	  intellectual	  property	  regimes.	  Those	  proposals	  are	  the	   Access	   to	   Knowledge	   movement,	   the	   Health	   Impact	   Fund	   and	   open	  innovation	   models.	   In	   order	   to	   offer	   a	   critical	   perspective,	   each	   proposal	   is	  discussed	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   specific	   problem	   field:	   access	   to	   medicines,	   the	  promotion	   of	   climate-­‐friendly	   technologies	   and	   the	   issue	   of	   traditional	  knowledge.	  	  
Chapter	  5.	   The	   access	   to	   knowledge	  movement	   is	   discussed	   by	   using	   the	  most	  prominent	  conflicting	  issue	  with	  the	  patent	  system:	  the	  need	  to	  make	  medicines	  accessible	   for	   the	   poor	   and	   stimulate	   research	   on	   neglected	   diseases.	   The	  chapter	   offers	   a	   historical	   overview	   of	   the	   debate	   since	   the	   early	   1980s.	   The	  landmarks	   of	   the	   debate	   are	   narrated	   by	   addressing	   the	   question:	   What	  initiatives	  have	  been	  taken	  in	  making	  medicines	  available	  and	  accessible	  during	  the	  last	  thirty	  years?	  The	  chapter	  also	  evaluates	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  these	  various	  initiatives.	  	  
Chapter	  6.	   Focussing	  on	   the	   latest	  version	  of	   the	  Health	   Impact	  Fund	  proposal,	  we	  criticise	  the	  hard	  prioritarian	  position	  defended	  by	  Thomas	  Pogge	  and	  see	  it	  as	  a	  major	  hurdle	  for	  ensuring	  scientific	  participation	  possibilities	  for	  the	  global	  poor.	   As	   climate-­‐friendly	   technologies	   do	   not	   necessarily	   have	   to	   be	   rooted	   in	  industrial	  innovation	  to	  meet	  their	  target,	  excluding	  the	  stimulation	  of	  grassroots	  innovation	  becomes	  even	  harder	  to	  justify.	  Grassroots	  innovators	  are	  developing	  many	  methods	  that	  can	  be	  useful	  to	  reduce	  the	  carbon	  footprint	  in	  agriculture	  –	  stimulating	  them	  would	  not	  only	  do	  good	  to	  the	  planet	  but	  also	  support	  a	  more	  inclusive	   innovation	   system.	   This	   chapter	   responds	   to	   the	   third	   and	   fourth	  research	  question:	  Should	  extreme	  inequalities	  in	  research	  capacities	  between	  the	  
Global	  South	  and	  the	  Global	  North	  be	  fought	  even	  when	  the	  objects	  of	   innovation	  
are	  made	  accessible	  worldwide?	   And:	  What	  are	   the	  benefits	   to	  be	   expected	   from	  
research	   and	   innovation	   and	   how	   do	   we	   judge	   that	   the	   international	   system	   of	  
science	   and	   technology	   is	   working	   properly?	   A	   special	   emphasis	   on	   the	   latter	  question	   is	  given	  by	  criticizing	   the	  use	  of	  a	  unique	  metric	   (quality-­‐adjusted	   life	  years)	  to	  measure	  the	  positive	  impact	  of	  a	  whole	  group	  of	  innovations.	  Widening	  the	  circle	  of	   innovators	   is	  suggested	  as	  a	  strategy	   to	  make	  sure	   that	   inventions	  are	   brought	   up	   who	   have	   valuable	   externalities.	   I	   also	   critically	   discuss	   the	  widely	  used	  metric	  of	  the	  number	  of	  patents	  as	  a	  purportedly	  reliable	  measure	  of	  innovative	  output.	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Chapter	   7.	   Open	   innovation	   is	   not	   the	   ideal	   solution	   to	   secure	   the	   material	  interests	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	   holders.	   Using	   a	   dynamic	   concept	   of	  traditional	  knowledge,	  that	  encompasses	  all	   the	   innovation	  done	  by	  small-­‐scale	  farmers	   and	   indigenous	   communities,	   I	   argue	   that	   worse	   than	   seeing	   one’s	  profits	   opportunities	   forgo	   is	   to	   see	  one’s	   innovative	   efforts	   go	   to	  waste.	  Open	  innovation	  models	  allow	  users	  to	  secure	  their	  moral	   interests	  as	  recognized	  by	  law,	  i.e.	  the	  right	  to	  attribution	  of	  authorship	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  having	  control	  over	   the	   integrity	   of	   one’s	   work.	   In	   addition	   to	   that,	   I	   argue	   that	   another	  fundamental	  moral	  interest	  that	  is	  not	  protected	  by	  law	  can	  be	  secured	  with	  the	  use	  of	  open	  innovation	  models:	  that	  one’s	  invention	  is	  fairly	  evaluated	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  capacity	  to	  promote	  societal	  welfare.	  Those	  are	  the	  central	  arguments	  that	  provide	  an	  answer	   to	   the	   fifth	   research	  question:	  How	  can	  we	  secure	  the	  moral	  
and	   material	   interests	   of	   indigenous	   innovators	   using	   the	   current	   intellectual	  
property	  regimes?	  	  The	   final	  part	  of	   the	   thesis	   re-­‐examines	   the	   insights	  gained	  earlier	  and	   tries	   to	  see	   how	   far	   apart	   they	   are	   from	  positions	   defended	  by	   groups	   involved	   in	   the	  intellectual	  property	  and	  global	  justice	  advocacy.	  	  	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  eighth	  chapter	  is	  to	  wrap	  up	  the	  thesis	  by	  analysing	  the	  question	  Is	  
there,	  among	  the	  various	  proposals	  that	  have	  been	  brought	  forward	  to	  enhance	  the	  
global	   justice	   of	   the	   international	   intellectual	   property	   and	   research	   system,	   any	  
amendment	  proposal	  that	  should	  be	  clearly	  favoured?	  Here	  an	  assessment	  of	   six	  major	   proposals	   to	   alleviate	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   the	   current	   intellectual	  property	   regimes	   is	   made.	   Those	   include	   the	   three	   analysed	   proposals:	   the	  Health	   Impact	   Fund,	   the	  Access	   to	  Knowledge	  movement	   and	   open	   innovation	  models.	   Three	   additional	   proposals	   were	   added	   to	   make	   this	   study	   more	  extensive:	   prize	   systems	   (including	   advanced	   market	   commitments),	   South-­‐South	  partnerships	  and	  compulsory	  licenses.	  	  	  Finally,	  Chapter	  9	  will	  offer	  some	  concluding	  remarks.	  Here	  I	  will	  briefly	  discuss	  the	  answers	  to	  the	  research	  questions	  stated	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  thesis.	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   2.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Limiting	  and	  facilitating	  access	  to	  innovations	  in	  
medicine	  and	  agriculture:	  	  
a	  brief	  exposition	  of	  the	  ethical	  arguments	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  chapter	  builds	  up	  on	  material	  that	  is	  published	  in:	  	  Cristian	  Timmermann	  (2013):	  "Justifying	  pro-­‐poor	  innovation	  in	  the	  life	  sciences:	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  ethical	  landscape."	  In	  The	  ethics	  of	  consumption,	  edited	  by	  Helena	  Röcklinsberg	  and	  Per	  Sandin,	  341-­‐346.	  Wageningen:	  Wageningen	  Academic	  Publishers.	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Abstract	  	  An	  idea	  is	  a	  public	  good.	  The	  use	  of	  an	  idea	  by	  one	  person	  does	  not	  hinder	  others	  to	  benefit	   from	  the	  same	  idea.	  However	   in	  order	  to	  generate	  new	  life-­‐saving	  or	  otherwise	  socially	  useful	  ideas,	  e.g.	  inventions	  in	  the	  life	  sciences,	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	   human	   and	   material	   resources	   are	   needed.	   Powerful,	   but	   highly	   criticized	  tools	   to	  speed	  up	   the	  rate	  of	   innovation	  are	  exclusive	  rights,	  most	  prominently	  the	  use	  of	  patents	  and	  plant	  breeders’	  rights.	  Exclusive	  rights	  leave	  by	  nature	  a	  number	   of	   people	   empty-­‐handed,	   with	   starvation,	   stuntedness,	   prevalence	   of	  disease	   and	   death	   as	   preventable	   and	   everyday	   consequences.	   To	   stimulate	   a	  human	   rights	   compatible	   use	   of	   exclusive	   rights	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   moral	  frameworks	  have	  been	  developed	  for	  the	  ethical	  assessment	  of	  current	  practices.	  Most	  prominent	  in	  the	  debate	  are	  theories	  building	  on	  (1)	  utilitarian	  calculations	  of	   weighing	   benefits	   with	   Peter	   Singer	   as	   a	   prominent	   advocate,	   (2)	   Pogge’s	  vindication	  of	  compensatory	  duties	  for	  institutional	  harms,	  (3)	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis	  on	  how	  the	  current	   innovation	   incentive	  system	  fails	   to	  secure	  human	  rights	   and	   human	   capabilities	   and	   lastly	   (4)	   showing	   how	   the	   status	   quo	  nurtures	  misrecognition.	  With	  help	  of	  those	  theories	  modest	  adjustments	  as	  well	  as	  a	   thorough	  restructuring	  of	   the	   innovation	   incentive	  system	  can	  be	   justified.	  Those	   theories	   have	   the	   Herculean	   task	   of	   restraining	   well-­‐established	   ideas	  supporting	  the	  permissibility	  of	  a	  reckless	  use	  of	  property	  rights	  that	  are	  deeply	  anchored	   in	   the	   property	   law	   discourse.	   Life	   sciences	   raise	   a	   range	   of	   special	  problems	  when	  justifying	  pro-­‐poor	  innovation.	  Healthy	  people	  living	  in	  a	  society	  with	   a	   good	   sanitary	   infrastructure	   need	   far	   less	   resources	   to	   tackle	   the	   same	  health	  problems	  than	  people	  in	  places	  with	  a	  poor	  infrastructure.	  	  	  	  Keywords:	   global	   justice,	   intellectual	   property,	   benefiting	   from	   science,	   human	  rights	  	  	   	  
	   19	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  One	   of	   the	   most	   fundamental	   norms	   in	   human	   rights	   law	   is	   the	   principle	   of	  progressive	   realization	   of	   all	   human	   rights.8	  Perhaps	   the	  most	   incontrovertible	  and	   shared	   standard	   to	   measure	   progress	   towards	   achieving	   this	   goal	   is	   life	  expectancy.	   	   Since	   the	   1950ies	   a	   substantial	   rise	   in	   life	   expectancy	   can	   be	  observed	   all	   around	   the	   world.	   Contributions	   to	   this	   remarkable	   achievement	  come	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  quarters;	  however	  a	  crucial	  role	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  rapid	  development	  of	  the	  life	  sciences.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  decades,	  not	  war	  but	  disease	  was	   responsible	   for	   lowering	   the	   average	   life	   expectancy	   in	   a	   number	   of	  countries.9	  The	   AIDS	   pandemic	   has	   had	   such	   a	   devastating	   death	   toll	   that	   it	   is	  reflected	   in	   a	   considerable	   reduction	  of	   the	  national	   average	   life	   expectancy	  of	  various	   countries.	   In	   addition,	   hunger	   and	   malnutrition	   are	   endemic;	   many	  experts	  prognosticate	  that	  climate	  change	  will	  impose	  a	  further	  threat	  to	  future	  food	   security.	  The	   state	  of	   some	   countries	   is	   so	  dire	   that	   the	   term	   “developing	  country”	   does	   not	   fit	   current	   realities	   any	  more.	   For	  many	   countries	   the	   label	  “retrogressive	  societies”	  would	  be	  more	  suitable	  to	  describe	  the	  actual	  situation.	  	  The	   reduction	  of	   average	   life	   expectancy	   in	  many	   countries	   is	   an	  undisputable	  sign	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  sacred	  principles	  of	  human	  rights	  law,	  the	  principle	  of	  progressive	   realization,	   is	   being	   violated,	   demanding	   urgent	   response.	   All	  disciplines	   that	   are	   capable	   of	   delivering	   solutions	   incur	   a	  moral	   obligation	   to	  contribute	   to	   the	   alleviation	   of	   these	   problems.	   As	   science	   and	   technology	  development	  has	  in	  the	  past	  been	  able	  to	  advance	  human	  welfare	  considerably,	  it	  cannot	  exempt	  itself	  from	  the	  obligation	  to	  continue	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  present	  and	  the	  future.	  	  	  It	  has	  however	  become	  customary	   to	   incentivize	   research	  and	  development	  by	  granting	   temporary	   exclusive	   rights	   to	   innovators.	   Many	   vital	   medicines	   and	  innovations	   in	   agriculture	   are	   subject	   to	   those	   rights	   and	   sold	   at	   higher	   than	  production	  prices	  to	  allow	  innovators	  to	  recoup	  research	  and	  development	  costs.	  	  We	   will	   therefore	   examine	   the	   main	   arguments	   that	   defend	   temporary	  exclusivity	  in	  the	  first	  section.	  Since	  innovation	  in	  the	  life	  sciences	  brings	  about	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (1966),	  art.	  2.1.	  See	  also	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (1990)	  9	  cf.	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (2012)	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series	  of	  extra	  considerations	  that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed,	  we	  will	  briefly	  list	  some	  of	   these	   issues	   in	   the	   second	   part.	   The	   third	   section	   will	   analyse	   the	   ethical	  theories	  used	  to	  bring	  research	  agendas	  more	  in	  line	  with	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  poor.	  	  	  
Justifications	  for	  temporary	  exclusivity	  	  The	   function	   of	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   is	   primarily	   instrumental:	   it	   is	   a	  societal	  tool	  to	  stimulate	  innovation.	  Depending	  upon	  the	  type	  of	  creative	  work	  a	  variety	   of	   incentive	  mechanisms	   have	   been	   institutionalized.	   Examples	   thereof	  are	   copyright,	   patents,	   geographic	   indications	   and	   plant	   breeders’	   rights.	   In	  addition,	  trademarks	  are	  protected	  to	  help	  manufacturers	  maintain	  a	  clientele	  by	  providing	   products	   that	   retain	   certain	   quality	   standards	   and	   characteristics.	  Trade	   secret	   laws	   set	   some	   limitations	   on	  how	   far	   employees	   of	   one	   company	  may	  share	  their	  acquired	  knowledge	  with	  competitors.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  forms	  of	  intellectual	  property	  are	  patents.	  Having	  its	  present-­‐day	  origin	   in	  the	  second	  half	  of	   the	   fifteenth	  century	   in	  Venice,	  patents	  were	  from	  the	  beginning	  conceived	  as	  a	  public/private	  bargain.10	  Since	  its	  early	  days,	   patents	  were	   only	   granted	   to	   inventions	   that	  were	   both	   new	   and	   useful.	  The	  exclusive	  rights	  were	  also	  temporary	  and	  alienable,	  and	  the	  state	  retained	  a	  right	  to	  compulsory	  licence.	  Interesting	  is	  that	  early	  patent	  law	  required	  patent	  holders	   to	   use	   the	   patent	   (a	   basic	  working	   requirement)	   in	   order	   to	   retain	   its	  validity.11	  Only	   this	   last	   element	   has	   not	   been	   taken	   over	   by	   contemporary	  patent	  law.	  Holders	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  are	  nowadays	  in	  no	  way	  required	  to	  make	  their	  inventions	  or	  work	  publicly	  available	  and	  can	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  hinder	  third	  parties	  to	  make	  such	  efforts.12	  	  Granting	   temporary	   exclusive	   rights	   to	   innovators	   allows	   them	   to	   recoup	  research	  and	  development	  costs,	  provided	  those	  costs	  were	  reasonable	  and	  the	  product	  developed	  can	  be	  sold	  and	  finds	  a	  large	  enough	  market.	  Inventors	  who	  can	   convincingly	  persuade	   investors	   to	   advance	   research	   expenses	   are	   given	   a	  tool	   to	   secure	   returns	   to	   the	   investment	   and	   so	   be	   able	   to	   undertake	   their	  research.	  Those	  who	  have	  made	  a	  financial	  gain	  by	  making	  use	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  can,	  if	  they	  so	  wish,	  reinvest	  their	  capital	  in	  further	  research	  activities.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  May	  (2007)	  11	  idem.,	  referring	  to	  Mandich	  (1948)	  12	  Patents	  have	  nowadays	  also	  new	  uses.	  A	  so-­‐called	  destructive	  use	  of	  patents	  occurs	  when	  patent	  holders	  use	  their	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  hinder	  innovation	  and	  the	  diffusion	  of	  improved	  competing	  products.	  The	  goal	  thereof	  is	  often	  to	  keep	  a	  high	  demand	  on	  older	  profitable	  products,	  on	  new	  uses	  of	  patents	  see	  Schneider	  (2010)	  pp.	  125ff.	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The	   establishment	   of	   the	   Trade-­‐related	  Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	  Agreement 13 	  in	   1994	   introduced	   a	   system	   for	   the	   global	   enforcement	   of	  intellectual	   property	   rights	   with	   sanction	   possibilities	   for	   noncompliance.	  However,	  similarly	  to	   its	  predecessors	   in	  national	   laws,	  rights	  are	  not	  absolute.	  The	  idea	  of	  compulsory	  licenses	  is	  affirmed	  in	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement.	  The	  drafters	  of	   the	   TRIPS	   agreement	   as	   well	   as	   the	   signatories	   of	   the	   Doha	   Declaration	  acknowledge	   that	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   can	   clash	   with	   higher	   societal	  goals,	  most	  notoriously	  public	  health	  needs.	  Here	  signatories	  agreed	  that	  in	  case	  of	  conflict,	  urgent	  public	  health	  interests	  supersede	  private	  interests.14	  	  The	   globalization	   of	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   was	   not	   the	   only	   event	   that	  changed	  the	  legal	  landscape	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  during	  the	  last	  century.	  Since	  the	  second	  half	  of	  last	  century,	  exclusive	  rights	  are	  less	  seen	  as	  privileges	  and	  more	  perceived	  as	  genuine	  property	  entitlements.15	  This	  change	  in	  terminology	  is	  not	  a	   minor	   one,	   since	   property	   entitlements	   are	   far	   more	   deeply	   anchored	   in	  society.	  Opponents	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  do	  now	  not	  only	  have	  to	  fight	  entitlements	  that	  are	  conceived	  mainly	  as	   instrumental,	  but	  also	  rights	   that	   terminologically	  fall	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   property	   rights.	   Violations	   of	   the	   latter	   right	   are	  generally	   perceived	   as	   less	   acceptable.	   There	   are	   two	   major	   philosophical	  traditions	   that	   justify	  ownership	  of	  property	  by	  basing	   the	  encompassed	  rights	  on	  natural	  law	  and	  personality	  ties	  respectively.	  	  
	  
Natural	  rights.	  Following	  one	  interpretation	  of	  Locke’s	  material	  property	  theory,	  modern	   legal	   scholars	   have	   translated	   the	   notion	   of	   having	   a	   natural	   right	   to	  enjoy	  the	  fruits	  of	  one’s	  labour	  directly	  into	  having	  a	  natural	  right	  to	  intellectual	  property.16	  According	  to	  this	  theory	  there	  is	  nothing	  we	  are	  more	  entitled	  to	  call	  our	  own	  than	  our	  own	  bodies.	  Since	  we	  mix	  labour,	  something	  that	  is	  inherently	  part	  of	  our	  own	  due	  to	  the	  indispensable	  bond	  to	  our	  bodies,	  with	  the	  material	  we	  work	  with,	  we	  gain	  an	  entitlement	  to	  call	   the	  thing	  we	  mix	   labour	  with	  our	  own.17	  This	   is	   subject	   to	   two	   provisos:	   the	   resources	   we	   mix	   labour	   with	   are	  unowned	  and	  there	  is	  enough	  and	  as	  good	  left	  for	  others.18	  Retaining	  ownership	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Trade-­‐related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  Agreement	  (1994),	  hereinafter	  TRIPS	  14	  cf.	  Timmermann	  and	  Belt	  (2013)	  pp.	  51ff.	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  5]	  15	  Intellectual	  property	  as	  an	  umbrella	  concept	  dates	  back	  to	  the	  1950s.	  Copyright	  has	  been	  understood	  as	  property	  for	  a	  far	  longer	  time,	  see	  Hughes	  (2011)	  	  16	  For	  the	  complexity	  of	  this	  transition,	  see	  Hughes	  (1988)	  pp.	  296-­‐329	  and	  Drahos	  (1996)	  pp.	  41-­‐72	  17	  Locke	  (1689)	  book	  ii,	  §27-­‐28	  and	  cf.	  Widerquist	  (2010)	  pp.	  6f	  18	  Locke	  (1689)	  book	  ii,	  §27-­‐36	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titles	  is	  however	  still	  subject	  to	  a	  third	  proviso:	  non-­‐wastage	  has	  to	  be	  avoided.19	  Similarly	   to	   in	  early	  Venetian	  patent	   law,	   the	   idea	   that	  ownership	   titles	   should	  only	  cover	  objects	  that	  are	  used	  is	  present	  in	  Lockean	  property	  theories.20	  	  When	   dealing	   with	   tangibles,	   it	   makes	   sense	   to	   allow	   ownership,	   since	  harvesting	  the	  fruits	  of	  one’s	  labour	  is	  hardly	  possible	  without	  having	  control	  of	  the	   object.	   Intangible	   objects	   are	   different	   however,	   the	   object	   itself	   is	   not	  consumable,	   i.e.	   it	   can	   be	   enjoyed	   by	   a	   number	   of	   people	   at	   the	   same	   time	  without	  diminishing	  it.21	  Exclusive	  rights	  on	  the	  object	  are	  not	  necessary	  to	  enjoy	  the	   fruits	   of	   one’s	   intellectual	   labour,	   at	   least	  when	   considering	   individual	  use.	  This	  changes	  however,	  if	  under	  enjoying	  the	  fruit’s	  of	  our	  labour	  we	  also	  include	  charging	   monopoly	   rents	   from	   the	   use	   of	   the	   invented	   object.	   Recognizing	  property	  makes	  charging	  rents	  possible,	  however	  here	  we	  may	  undermine	  one	  of	  the	   main	   functions	   of	   property:	   to	   incentivize	   mixing	   labour	   with	   the	   owned	  object	   (i.e.	   improving	   the	   asset).	   As	   soon	   as	   the	   practice	   of	   rent-­‐seeking	   is	  accepted,	   it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	   idea	  of	  abuse	  of	  rights	  has	  to	  be	  specified.22	  The	  natural	  right	  tradition	  has	  close	  ties	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  desert,	  making	  issues	  of	  proportionality	  between	  benefiting	  from	  one’s	  own	  labour	  and	  gaining	  from	  the	  efforts	   of	   others	   mandatory.	   Exorbitant	   rent-­‐seeking	   may	   disincentivize	  potential	  labourers	  to	  work	  on	  further	  improving	  the	  asset.	  	  	  
Personality	  theories.	  According	  to	  Hegelian	  personality	  theories	  we	  as	  individuals	  own	   our	   character	   traits,	   talents	   and	   feelings.23	  While	   constructing	   or	   creating	  new	   objects	   we	   are	   expressing	   ourselves	   and	   certain	   traits	   of	   our	   personality	  become	  attached	  to	  the	  developed	  objects.	  Having	  control	  over	  how	  one’s	  person	  is	   perceived	   requires	   therefore	   also	   a	   certain	   power	   over	   the	   objects	   one	   has	  brought	   into	   existence.	   Property	   ownership	   is	   one	   way	   to	   have	   such	   control.	  According	  to	  Hegel	  the	  recognition	  and	  possession	  of	  property	  contribute	  to	  the	  extension	   of	   one’s	   personality. 24 	  Exclusion	   would	   be	   thus	   justified	   on	   the	  grounds	  that	  one	  sees	  the	  desired	  image	  of	  one’s	  personality	  in	  jeopardy.	  When	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  limit	  the	  diffusion	  of	  agricultural	  innovation	  or	  block	  access	  to	   essential	   medicines	   solely	   on	   these	   grounds,	   we	   will	   have	   to	   seriously	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  In	  the	  realm	  of	  intangible	  property	  we	  may	  ponder	  if	  the	  “recklessly	  suboptimal	  use	  of	  resources”	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  wastage,	  see	  Attas	  (2008)	  p.	  47	  	  20	  The	  introduction	  of	  money	  however	  makes	  the	  accumulation	  of	  wealth	  possible	  without	  spoilage.	  There	  are	  strong	  differences	  in	  opinion	  about	  the	  ultimate	  implications	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  money	  for	  Lockean	  property	  theories,	  see	  Uberti	  (2013)	  21	  cf.	  Attas	  (2008),	  pp.	  47ff	  22	  cf.	  Donselaar	  (2009)	  23	  cf.	  Moore	  (2011)	  24	  cf.	  Hughes	  (1988)	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question	   the	   social	   value	   of	   securing	   this	   interest.	   This	   type	   of	   reasoning	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  defend	  for	  objects	  other	  than	  artistic	  and	  literary	  creations.	  	  	  
Special	  challenges	  raised	  by	  the	  life	  sciences	  	  Privatizing	  knowledge	  in	  the	  life	  sciences	  raises	  a	  number	  of	  additional	  concerns.	  In	  part,	  exclusive	  rights	  hinder	  access	  to	  objects	  of	  innovation	  that	  could	  secure	  such	   essential	   rights	   as	   the	   human	   rights	   to	   health	   and	   food.	   But	   here	   the	  problems	   do	   not	   stop:	   having	   exclusive	   rights	   on	   specific	   uses	   of	   genetic	  resources	  may	  hamper	  innovation	  if	  patent	  holders	  pursue	  a	  restrictive	  licensing	  behaviour.	   Although	   the	   principle	   of	   patents	   is	   to	   make	   knowledge	   more	  accessible	   by	   giving	   patent	   holders	   greater	   control	   over	   the	   knowledge	   they	  claim	  as	   their	  own,	   there	  are	   repeated	   cases	  where	   this	   is	  not	   the	  outcome,	   as	  mentioned	   earlier.	   Through	   the	   use	   of	   temporary	   exclusive	   rights	   many	  inventions	   are	  made	   inaccessible	   regardless	   of	   what	   consumers	   are	  willing	   to	  pay.	   Compulsory	   licenses	   are	   the	   lawmaker’s	   remedy	   for	   such	   cases,	   but	   in	  practice	  they	  are	  hardly	  ever	  pursued.	  The	  public	   interest	  has	  to	  be	  substantial	  for	  such	  type	  of	  licensing	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  viable	  option.	  	  	  
Impossibility	  to	  invent	  around.	  A	  general	  additional	  advantage	  of	  patents	   is	   that	  once	   an	   invention	   proves	   profitable	   a	   number	   of	   people	   will	   be	   motivated	   in	  offering	  similar	  solutions.	  Those	  who	  do	  not	  want	  to	  acquire	  a	   license	  from	  the	  patent	  holder	  will	  attempt	  to	  provide	  a	  technical	  innovation	  that	  has	  comparable	  functions	  but	   is	  distinguishable	   enough	   to	  qualify	   as	   a	  new	   invention	  and	   thus	  also	   be	   patentable.	   The	   advantage	   hereof	   for	   society	   is	   that	   the	   original	  monopoly	  high	  prices	  are	  in	  practice	  reduced	  by	  the	  proliferation	  of	  competing	  products.	   This	   competition	   incentivizes	   the	   original	   inventor	   to	   increase	   the	  sophistication	   of	   her	   original	   product	   and	   thus	   further	   increases	   competition,	  which	  again	  brings	  an	  advantage	  to	  society.	  	  Patents	   that	   are	   closely	   tied	   to	   uses	   of	   biological	   material	   impede	   competing	  innovators	   to	   offer	   similar	   solutions	   as	   the	   requirement	   to	   obtain	   a	   license	  become	  unavoidable	  due	  to	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  genetic	  material.	  	  
Patent	  thickets.	  Some	  objects	  of	  innovations	  are	  covered	  by	  a	  number	  of	  patents.	  When	   the	   patents	   have	   different	   owners	   with	   diverging	   conceptions	   of	   the	  market	  and	  scientific	  value	  of	  each	  patent,	  we	  often	  encounter	  so-­‐called	  “patent	  thickets”.	  A	  textbook	  example	  hereof	  is	  the	  “golden	  rice”	  case.	  Licenses	  for	  nearly	  70	  patents	   had	   to	   be	   cleared	   out	   before	   the	   genetically	  modified	   rice	   could	   be	  marketed.25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  cf.	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2003)	  pp.	  231-­‐237	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Temporality	  of	  delays.	  Particularly	  in	  the	  life	  sciences	  what	  for	  some	  counts	  as	  a	  temporary	  exclusion	  means	  to	  many	  permanent	  exclusion.	  Treatment	  that	  comes	  late	  is	  often	  inefficacious.	  Late	  access	  to	  medicines	  or	  vaccines	  may	  mean	  death	  or	   the	   suffering	   of	   a	   disease.	   As	   far	   as	   public	   health	   and	   food	   security	   is	  concerned,	   it	   is	   often	   suboptimal	   to	   have	   one	   group	   having	   early	   access	   to	   an	  innovation	  and	  another	  second	  group	  to	  have	  access	  only	  after	  generics	  become	  available.	   The	   eradication	   of	   pathogens	   demands	   widespread	   simultaneous	  action.	  	  	  
Biodiversity.	   In	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   apply	   for	   patents	   or	   plant	   breeders’	   rights	  protection	  the	  object	  of	   innovation	  has	  to	  be	  stable	  and	  uniform.	  Small	   farmers	  who	   engage	   in	   seed	   exchange	   practices	   identify	   and	   select	   a	   number	   of	   plant	  varieties	  according	  to	  specific	  traits.	  This	  type	  of	  intellectual	  work	  can	  generally	  not	   be	   protected	   through	   the	   use	   of	   intellectual	   property.26	  There	   are	   thus	  incentives	  to	  innovate	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  one	  has	  a	  stable	  and	  uniform	  output.	  As	  a	   further	   problem,	   the	   selling	   of	   protected	   seed	   varieties	   is	   lucrative,	  economically	   rational	   sales	   practices	   will	   include	   a	   number	   of	   outreach	  programmes	  and	  lobbying	  activities	  to	  motivate	  farmers	  to	  use	  commercial	  seed	  varieties.	   This	   brings	   genetic	   erosion	  with	   it,	   as	  much	   of	   agrobiodiversity	   gets	  lost	  when	  farmers	  discontinue	  to	  use	  traditional	  seeds.27	  	  Biodiversity	   has	   also	   its	   negative	   counterpart,	   not	   only	   useful	   plants	   have	   a	  heterogeneous	  genetic	  makeup,	  but	  also	  pathogens.	  The	  same	  active	   ingredient	  that	  combats	  a	  pathogen	  prevalent	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  does	  sometimes	  not	  have	  the	  same	  efficacy	  with	  pathogens	  prevalent	  in	  the	  developing	  world.28	  	  
Living	  material	   reacts	   to	   its	   environment.	   One	   of	   the	   arguments	   that	   justify	   the	  existence	  of	  patents	   is	   that	   inventors	  disclose	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	   information	   in	  patent	  documents	  and	  that	  this	   information	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  public	  domain	  once	  the	  patent	  expires.	  This	  trade-­‐off	  is	  often	  called	  the	  “patent	  bargain”.	  Patent	  databases	   are	   therefore	   seen	   as	   a	   huge	   source	   of	   knowledge.	   In	   the	   legal,	  philosophical	  and	  economic	  discourse	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  knowledge	  is	  a	  good	  of	  non-­‐rivalrous	  consumption,	  meaning	  that	  knowledge	  can	  be	  enjoyed	  by	  as	  many	  people	  and	  for	  as	  long	  as	  desired	  without	  diminishing	  it.29	  Living	  organisms	  are	  however	  not	  stable.	  Climate	  change	  makes	  many	  crops	  useless.	  Organisms	  that	  are	   combated	   often	   develop	   resistance	   to	   the	   agent	   with	   whom	   it	   fights.	   The	  consequence	   of	   the	   latter	   is	   that	   many	   herbicides,	   antibiotics,	   antifungi	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  In	  some	  geographic	  areas	  this	  type	  of	  work	  might	  be	  incentivized	  through	  protected	  geographic	  indications,	  but	  this	  will	  be	  limited	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  products.	  	  	  27	  cf.	  De	  Schutter	  (2011)	  28	  One	  example	  is	  the	  vaccine	  developed	  to	  fight	  the	  human	  papillomavirus,	  see	  Timmermann	  and	  Belt	  (2013)	  fn.	  46	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  5]	  29	  cf.	  Stiglitz	  (2008)	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pesticides	   become	   ineffective	   over	   time.	   For	   whoever	   holds	   a	   patent	   for	   such	  type	   of	   objects,	   profit-­‐maximization	   would	   dictate	   to	   either	   sell	   it	   to	   a	   small	  number	   of	   high-­‐paying	   customers	   or	   to	   overexploit	   the	   active	   agent	   without	  regard	  for	  the	  development	  of	  resistance.	  In	  case	  of	  overexploitation,	  the	  active	  agent	  may	   become	   useless	   once	   temporary	   exclusive	   rights	   elapse.	   The	   public	  will	  not	  have	  an	  effective	  generic	  product	  available	  and	  be	  obliged	  to	  pay	   for	  a	  newly	  developed	  patented	  product.	  An	   incentive	  mechanism	   to	   conserve	   those	  resources	  is	  missing.30	  If	  those	  resources	  are	  not	  conserved	  the	  public	  misses	  out	  its	  share	  of	  the	  patent	  bargain:	  valuable	  knowledge	  entering	  the	  public	  domain.	  	  
Self-­‐multiplication.	   Unlike	   in	   other	   fields,	   some	   innovations	   in	   biotechnology	  have	   the	   ability	   to	   self-­‐reproduce.	   A	   prominent	   case	   is	   genetically-­‐modified	  plants	   that	   have	   genes	   inserted	   whose	   use	   is	   protected	   by	   patents.	   Who	   is	  responsible	   for	   the	   reproductive	   behaviour	   of	   plants	   protected	   by	   exclusive	  rights?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  plant	  variety	  that	  has	  a	  patented	  gene	  sequence	  a	  much-­‐debated	   court	   case	   illustrates	   the	   complexities	   involved.	  The	  Monsanto	  Canada	  
Inc.	  v.	  Schmeiser	   case	  has	   created	  a	   severe	   turmoil	  by	  deciding	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  pharmaceutical	   company.31	  Even	   by	   taking	   proper	   measures,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  avoid	  genetic	  contamination.	  	  	  
Speedy	   sharing	   of	   data	   and	   samples	   in	   global	   emergencies.	   The	   impossibility	   to	  seal	  national	  borders	  hermetically	  demand	  that	  we	  have	  responsive	  mechanisms	  to	   enable	   the	   swift	   sharing	   of	   data	   and	   samples	   concerning	   public	   health	   and	  food	   security	   threats.	  The	  world	  we	  now	   live	   in	  hosts	  many	  more	  people	   than	  ever	   before.	   Overcrowded	   prisons	   are	   already	   a	   public	   health	   hazard.32	  In	   so-­‐called	   “hotspots”	   we	   encounter	   an	   extremely	   high	   population	   density	   living	  closely	   together	   with	   animals.	   As	   those	   areas	   are	   situated	   mostly	   in	   tropical	  regions,	  this	  provides	  ideal	  conditions	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  pathogens.33	  An	  additional	   threat	   for	   the	  containment	  of	  diseases	   is	   the	  high	  mobility	  of	  people	  globally,	   which	   leads	   to	   the	   intercontinental	   propagation	   of	   diseases	   within	  hours.34	  	  Intellectual	  property	  has	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  spirit	  of	  free	  sharing.	  Countries	  who	  voluntarily	  shared	  samples	  find	  themselves	  paying	  huge	  sums	  of	  money	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  see	  generally	  Outterson	  (2005)	  31	  cf.	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2009)	  p.	  172ff.	  32	  cf.	  Møller	  et	  al.	  (2007),	  esp.	  pp.	  43-­‐83	  33	  Some	  densely	  populated	  areas	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  also	  qualify	  as	  “hotspots”,	  see	  Jones	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  34	  A	  duty	  to	  share	  data	  related	  to	  public	  health	  emergencies	  is	  defended	  by	  Langat	  et	  al.	  (2011)	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medication	   that	   could	   not	   have	   been	   developed	   without	   their	   contribution.35	  This	  is	  felt	  as	  an	  injustice	  that	  demotivates	  people	  to	  continue	  to	  share	  samples	  without	  clear	  agreements	  securing	  returns.	  	  	  
Biosafety.	   Inventions	   rarely	   affect	   only	   technology	   producers	   and	   technology	  users,	   but	   usually	   also	   society	   at	   large.	   In	   the	   case	   those	   effects	   are	   negative,	  efforts	   have	   to	   be	   made	   to	   contain	   any	   undesired	   side-­‐effects.	   Being	   able	   to	  exclusively	  exploit	  a	  technology	  in	  a	  given	  timeframe	  can	  make	  taking	  risks	  (or	  being	  risk	  adverse)	  lucrative.	  Not	  having	  basic	  needs	  secured	  makes	  people	  more	  willing	   to	   take	   risks.	  When	   research	   options	   that	   are	   affordable	   and	   far	   better	  than	  nothing	   are	   abandoned	  because	   they	  do	  not	  meet	   the	   safety	   standards	  of	  the	  Global	  North,	  harmonization	  of	  safety	  standards	  becomes	  a	  justice	  problem.	  Biosafety	   regulation	   also	   affects	   the	   abovementioned	   patent	   bargain.	   Data	  submitted	   to	   biosafety	   regulation	   agencies	   is	   increasingly	   considered	   a	   private	  good 36 	  and	   thus	   rarely	   accessible	   for	   independent	   testing	   by	   non-­‐public	  institutions.	   Once	   exclusive	   rights	   elapse,	   a	  much	  wider	   range	   of	   stakeholders	  examines	  the	  submitted	  data.	  Many	  pesticides	  that	  were	  protected	  by	  exclusive	  rights	   thus	   become	   prohibited	   by	   the	   time	   generic	   versions	   can	   be	   freely	  manufactured	   because	   of	   more	   extensive	   biosafety	   control.	   Farmers	   are	   thus	  compelled	  to	  buy	  new	  products	  that	  are	  covered	  by	  patent	  rights.	  	  	  
Incentivizing	  innovation	  and	  cosmopolitan	  conceptions	  of	  justice	  	  Hardly	  anyone	  would	  nowadays	  endorse	  Leibniz’	   statement	   that	  we	   live	   in	   the	  best	  of	  all	  possible	  worlds,	  at	  least	  when	  taking	  political	  realities	  as	  constitutive.	  There	  is	  ample	  room	  to	  make	  this	  world	  a	  better	  place.	  First,	  we	  live	  in	  a	  world	  of	  extreme	   inequalities.	   To	   take	   an	   example,	   in	   1999	   the	   total	   gross	   domestic	  product	  of	  all	  low	  income	  countries	  added	  to	  166,8	  billion	  dollars	  shared	  among	  a	   population	   of	   636	  million	   people.37	  At	   the	   same	   time	   the	   279	  million	   people	  living	   in	   the	  United	   States	   spent	  116,2	  billion	  dollars	   on	   alcohol	   alone.38	  There	  are	   enough	   resources	   in	   the	   world	   to	   eradicate	   severe	   poverty.	   In	   relation	   to	  hunger,	  it	  is	  long	  known,	  that	  misdistribution	  and	  not	  an	  absolute	  food	  shortage	  is	   the	   main	   cause	   of	   famine. 39 	  Second,	   many	   of	   the	   global	   institutional	  arrangements	  predominantly	  benefit	  the	  richer	  countries	  of	  the	  world	  and	  come	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  In	  2007	  Indonesia	  stopped	  providing	  flu	  samples	  because	  the	  government	  feared	  that	  industry	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  would	  develop	  vaccines	  without	  providing	  any	  returns	  for	  the	  country,	  see	  The	  Royal	  Society	  (2012)	  p.	  18	  36	  cf.	  FAO	  &	  WHO	  (2010)	  pp.	  24f.	  37	  Data	  taken	  from	  databank.worldbank.org	  38	  Foster	  et	  al.	  (2003),	  population	  number	  taken	  from	  databank.worldbank.org	  39	  Sen	  (1981)	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at	  a	  significant	  concrete	  and	  opportunity	  cost	   for	  the	  poor.40	  Third,	  science	  and	  technology	   could	   be	   incentivized	   in	   a	   way	   that	   would	   far	   better	   benefit	   those	  with	   the	   most	   urgent	   needs.	   The	   life	   sciences,	   being	   tightly	   linked	   to	   food	  security	   and	   global	   health,	   have	   a	   gigantic	  mission	   in	   developing	   solutions	   for	  those	  in	  need.	  	  Reducing	   suffering	   around	   the	   world	   to	   less	   disgraceful	   levels	   is	   a	   Herculean	  task.	  We	  currently	  face	  an	  annual	  death	  toll	  of	  18	  million	  people	  worldwide	  from	  poverty-­‐related	   causes	   that	   is	   largely	   avoidable.41	  It	   is	   estimated	   that	  12,5%	  of	  the	  world	  population	  is	  undernourished.42	  Vitamin	  and	  mineral	  deficiencies	  are	  causing	  irreparable	  damages	  to	  the	  health	  of	  hundreds	  of	  millions,	  hindering	  full	  brain	   development	   and	   causing	   blindness.43	  All	   those	   facts	   are	   not	   new,	   and	  society	   as	   a	   whole	   has	   developed	   a	   certain	   apathy	   to	   see	   behind	   those	   evils	  merely	  numbers.	  	  An	   increased	   global	   population	   has	   also	   made	   it	   mandatory	   to	   live	   more	  sustainable	  lifestyles.	  Climate	  change	  is	  threatening	  future	  food	  security.44	  Rising	  average	  temperatures	  enlarge	  the	  area	  where	  tropical	  diseases	  are	  prevalent.	  As	  those	  diseases	  are	  neglected	   in	  pharmaceutical	   research	  we	  will	  be	   confronted	  with	   a	   severe	   global	   health	   problem.	   Pollution	   is	   affecting	   many	   areas	   in	   the	  world	  with	  severe	  effects	  on	  public	  health.	  	  Even	  after	  acknowledging	   that	   tackling	   those	  problems	  could	   take	  more	   than	  a	  generation	  of	  well-­‐intentioned	  people,	  we	  can	  still	  retain	  a	  glimpse	  of	  optimism	  and	  recall	  some	  of	  the	  remarkable	  achievements	  humankind	  made	  with	  the	  help	  of	  life	  sciences.45	  Over	  the	  past	  50	  years	  yields	  in	  agriculture	  have	  been	  increased	  by	  over	  130%.46	  The	  world	  is	  now	  feeding	  many	  more	  people	  than	  at	  any	  time	  in	  history.47	  Some	   deadly	   diseases,	   such	   as	   smallpox	   are	   considered	   eradicated,48	  polio	   is	   close	   to	   be	   completely	   eradicated	   and	   others	   are	   not	   a	   threat	   to	   life	  anymore.49	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  cf.	  Pogge	  (2008b,	  2010b)	  41	  Pogge	  (2008b),	  p.	  2	  42	  FAO	  WFP	  and	  IFAD	  (2012)	  p.	  8	  43	  Over	  30%	  of	  the	  world	  population	  suffers	  micronutrient	  deficiencies,	  see	  idem	  p.	  23	  44	  Cline	  (2007).	  On	  problems	  making	  agricultural	  innovation	  accessible	  for	  climate	  change	  adaptation,	  see	  Timmermann	  et	  al.	  (2010).	  45	  Systematic	  observations	  and	  experimentations	  made	  by	  people	  living	  in	  indigenous	  communities	  are	  also	  considered	  scientific	  unless	  specified	  otherwise.	  46	  Baulcombe	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  47	  De	  Schutter	  (2011),	  p.	  305	  48	  Flory	  and	  Kitcher	  (2004)	  p.	  42	  49	  Details	  about	  the	  current	  program	  of	  worldwide	  polio	  eradication	  can	  be	  found	  under	  http://www.polioeradication.org/	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The	   current	   institutional	   order	   is	   designed	   in	   such	   a	   way,	   that	   the	   mere	  participation	  in	  it	  makes	  people	  responsible	  of	  harming	  others.50	  By	  paying	  taxes	  and	   buying	   new	   products	   we	   sustain	   a	   market	   economy	   that	   has	   substantial	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  poor.	  Nonetheless,	  those	  who	  come	  up	  with	  technological	  innovations	  are	  not	  the	  only	  ones	  maintaining	  such	  regimes	  nor	  can	  they	  be	  fully	  blamed	  for	  the	  harms	  the	  poor	  are	  facing.	  Out	  of	  fairness,	  they	  should	  not	  be	  the	  only	   ones	   burdened	   with	   addressing	   global	   welfare	   problems.	   Further,	   global	  poverty	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  caused	  by	  a	  single	  generation.	  	  Important	   is	   to	  mention	   that	   it	   is	   essential	   to	   human	   nature	   to	   improve	   one’s	  living	   situation	   and	  we	   also	   recognize	   this	   as	   a	   human	   right.51	  Making	   a	   single	  generation	   pay	   for	   all	   the	   negligence	   of	   past	   generations	   also	   raises	   issues	   of	  justice.	   Over-­‐burdening	   one	   generation	   will	   limit	   their	   possibility	   to	   improve	  their	  own	  situation.	  	  	  
Weighing	  benefits.	   People	  who	  are	  below	  a	   certain	  welfare	   threshold	  are	  much	  easier	  to	  satisfy	  than	  those	  who	  already	  live	   in	  prosperity.	  To	  take	  a	  very	  basic	  example:	  giving	  one	  euro	  to	  the	  person	  earning	  a	  hundred	  euros	  a	  day	  will	  not	  significantly	  enhance	  her	  well-­‐being.	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  giving	  the	  same	  euro	  to	  one	  of	  the	  many	  people	  who	  earns	  one	  euro	  a	  day	  will	  significantly	  help	  her.	  This	  is	  reason	  enough	  to	  prefer	  the	  latter	  person	  as	  a	  recipient	  for	  most	  utilitarians.52	  Maximizing	   global	   welfare	   would	   require	   distributing	   resources	   to	   those	   who	  can	  convert	  them	  in	  welfare	  more	  efficiently.	  People	  who	  are	  in	  severe	  distress	  can	   already	   be	   helped	   with	   minor	   attentions.	   Having	   reached	   a	   threshold	   of	  welfare,	  people	  become	  increasingly	  less	  efficient	  in	  transforming	  resources	  into	  happiness.	  	  Transferring	   this	   principle	   to	   the	   subject	   of	   innovation,	   a	   thinker	   like	   Peter	  Singer	  would	  condemn	  the	  situation	  where	  research	  efforts	  are	  spent	  to	  produce	  an	  additional	  shaving	  cream	  for	  an	  already	  large	  menu	  of	  product	  choices,	  while	  diseases	   that	   afflict	   the	   lives	   of	  millions	   of	   people	   receive	  hardly	   any	   scientific	  attention.	  A	  situation	  where	  90%	  of	  the	  global	  resources	  are	  spent	  in	  addressing	  the	  health	  problems	  of	  10%	  of	  the	  world	  population	  becomes	  unacceptable,	  as	  it	  is	  a	  highly	  inefficient	  form	  of	  increasing	  aggregated	  global	  welfare.53	  	  	  
Compensatory	  duties.	  Our	  global	  trade	  regimes,	  especially	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement,	  disproportionally	   benefit	   the	   developed	   world	   while	   adding	   significant	  disadvantages	   for	   the	  poor.	  The	  democratic	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  has	   been	   severely	   criticized.	   The	   negotiation	   documents	  were	   so	   complex	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  cf.	  Pogge	  (2008b)	  51	  UDHR,	  art.	  11.1	  52	  see	  generally	  for	  this	  type	  of	  reasoning	  Singer	  (1993)	  53	  cf.	  Drugs	  for	  Neglected	  Diseases	  Working	  Group	  (2001)	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they	  could	  hardly	  be	  analysed	  by	  countries	  lacking	  strong	  legal	  expertise.54	  With	  this	   treaty,	   Pogge	   argues,	   developed	   countries	   have	  made	   themselves	   guilty	   of	  imposing	   a	   harmful	   regime	   on	   others,	   thus	   violating	   the	   negative	   duty	   not	   to	  inflict	   harm.	   Continuing	  with	   politics	   as	   usual	   demands	   from	  us	   compensatory	  duties.	  Therefore	  we	  are	  obliged	  to	  establish	  institutions	  whose	  positive	  effects	  outweigh	   the	   negative	   effects	   caused	   by	   existing	   institutions.	   Thomas	   Pogge’s	  most	  well-­‐known	  example	  of	  such	  type	  of	  institutions	  is	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund.	  This	   proposal	   seeks	   to	   collect	   sufficient	   funds	   to	   remunerate	   pharmaceutical	  companies	  through	  a	  mechanism	  that	  maximizes	  the	  quality-­‐adjusted	   life	  years	  of	  newly	  developed	  medicines.	  Through	  this	  fund	  accessibility	  and	  availability	  of	  medicines	  could	  be	  improved	  for	  the	  poor.	  	  A	   similar	   line	   of	   thinking	   is	   prevalent	   in	   climate	   change	  negotiations.	  Harming	  others	   through	   carbon	   emissions	   is	   seen	   as	   inevitable.	   Nevertheless	   harming	  without	  compensating	  is	  judged	  as	  worse	  than	  harming	  while	  compensating.	  The	  transfer	   of	   technology	   is	   often	   presented	   and	   demanded	   as	   a	   form	   of	  compensation.	  	  
Basic	  rights.	  Before	  being	  able	  to	  enjoy	  a	  wider	  set	  of	  liberties	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  have	   some	   basic	   needs	  met.	   Subsistence,	   security	   and	   liberty	   are	   all	   elements	  that	  fall	  under	  the	  category	  of	  basic	  rights.55	  Entitlements	  such	  as	  freedom	  from	  hunger	  and	  disease	  are	  examples	  of	  those	  rights.	  The	  basic	  rights	  doctrine	  aims	  at	   securing	   subsistence	   needs	   at	   a	   very	   elemental	   level,	   standards	  well	   below	  thresholds	   aimed	   by	   the	   International	   Bill	   of	   Rights56.	   While	   freedom	   from	  hunger	   is	   targeted	   by	   the	   basic	   rights	   doctrine,	   the	   International	   Covenant	   on	  Social,	  Economic	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  article	  12.1	   seeks	   to	  guarantee	  not	  only	  a	  freedom	  from	  hunger,	  but	  also	  a	  right	  to	  adequate	  food.	  An	  official	  comment	  on	  the	   right	   to	   adequate	   food	   states	   explicitly	   that	   this	   right	   shall	   “not	   be	  interpreted	   in	   a	   narrow	  or	   restrictive	   sense	  which	   equates	   it	  with	   a	  minimum	  package	  of	  calories,	  proteins	  and	  other	  specific	  nutrients”57.	  This	  comment	  states	  that	   cultural	   and	   consumer	   acceptability	   should	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration.58	  Similarly	  the	  right	  to	  health	  is	  also	  not	  interpreted	  as	  freedom	  from	  disease,	  but	  as	  the	  right	  to	  the	  highest	  attainable	  standard	  of	  physical	  and	  mental	  health.59	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  cf.	  Drahos	  and	  Braithwaite	  (2003),	  pp.	  esp.	  133-­‐149	  and	  Pogge	  (2008b)	  pp.	  1-­‐32	  55	  cf.	  Shue	  (1996)	  p.	  9.	  However	  Henry	  Shue’s	  approach	  is	  distinctive,	  since	  he	  considers	  a	  right	  to	  participation	  also	  as	  a	  basic	  right,	  see	  idem	  pp.	  65-­‐87.	  56	  As	  commonplace	  in	  the	  literature,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  term	  International	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  to	  encompass	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (1948),	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (1966)	  and	  the	  International	  Covenant	  of	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (1966).	  	  57	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (1999)	  §	  6	  58	  idem	  §	  11	  59	  cf.	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (2000)	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A	   person	   can	   start	   to	   regularly	   enjoy	   other	   rights	   once	   her	   basic	   rights	   are	  considered	   secured.	  The	  basic	   rights	  doctrine	   seeks	   to	   secure	   the	   fundamental	  freedoms	  and	  entitlements	  for	  a	  person	  to	  be	  able	  to	  play	  a	  constructive	  role	  in	  society,	   without	   taking	   into	   consideration	   if	   the	   role	   played	   is	   the	   one	   the	  individual	  had	  in	  mind	  or	  wishes	  to	  continue	  to	  play.	  Important	  is	  here	  that	  the	  individual	  is	  physically	  able	  to	  undertake	  this	  function.	  However,	  limiting	  duties	  to	  safeguard	  only	  such	  basic	  necessities	  is	  strongly	  criticized.	  We	  do	  not	  need	  to	  abide	   by	   such	   extreme	   positions.	   In	   relation	   to	   food	   Amartya	   Sen	   has	  demonstrated	   that	   not	   scarcity	   but	   misdistribution	   is	   the	   principal	   cause	   of	  famine.60	  There	   are	   enough	   resources	   to	   considerably	   expand	   the	   freedoms	  people	  can	  pursue.	  	  As	  far	  as	  innovation	  is	  concerned,	  the	  basic	  rights	  doctrine	  is	  a	  powerful	  tool	  to	  argue	   that	   access	   to	   some	   innovations	   takes	   precedence	   over	   the	   material	  interests	  of	   innovators.	  There	  are	  however	   some	   limitations.	  The	   link	  between	  the	  object	  of	  innovation	  and	  the	  intended	  outcome	  has	  to	  be	  strong,	  e.g.	  as	  far	  as	  health	   is	   concerned	   a	   medicine	   has	   to	   be	   crucial	   to	   recover	   from	   a	   disease.	  Objects	   that	  would	  considerably	   improve	   living	  conditions	  but	  are	  not	  vital	   for	  subsistence	   would	   still	   have	   to	   be	   balanced	   with	   other	   rights	   and	   interests	  according	   to	   this	   doctrine.	   As	   long	   as	   an	   object	   of	   innovation	   is	   necessary	   to	  ensure	  subsistence	  society	  can	  make	  claims	  on	  it,	  this	  counts	  also	  for	  objects	  that	  become	  available	   in	  the	  future.	  The	  World	  Health	  Organization,	  working	  with	  a	  concept	   of	   essential	   medicines,	   still	   demands	   access	   to	   new	   medicines	   and	  repeatedly	   states	   the	   need	   for	   further	   research.	   The	   Organization	   constantly	  reviews	  its	  list,	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  state	  of	  knowledge	  and	  innovation	  as	  well	  as	  the	  propagation	  of	  pathogens	  and	  disorders.61	  	  	  
Human	  rights	  and	  capabilities.	   The	  human	   rights	  discourse	   and	   the	   capabilities	  approach	   are	   interested	   in	   securing	   considerably	   more	   than	   just	   subsistence	  needs	  and	  freedom	  from	  repression.	  The	  two	  approaches	  have	  some	  differences,	  but	   offering	  opportunities	   to	  develop	   for	  people	   and	   communities	   is	   central	   in	  both	  discourses.62	  Development	  is	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  flourishing	  and	  this	   in	   multiple	   dimensions.	   People	   should	   also	   have	   the	   opportunities	   to	  participate	   in	   scientific	   and	   cultural	   life,	   benefit	   from	   the	   advancement	   of	  science,	  express	  themselves	  freely,	  enjoy	  leisure	  time,	  have	  a	  say	  on	  matters	  that	  affect	   their	   lives,	   among	   others.	  When	   addressing	   such	   an	   ample	   catalogue	   of	  rights,	  the	  opportunities	  innovation	  has	  to	  secure	  these	  rights	  will	  also	  be	  much	  larger.	  Access	   to	  many	  more	  objects	  can	  be	  claimed	   in	  virtue	  of	   their	  ability	   to	  enhance	  full	  human	  functioning.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Sen	  (1981)	  61	  cf.	  WHO	  Expert	  Committee	  on	  the	  Selection	  Use	  of	  Essential	  Medicines	  (2012)	  62	  cf.	  Nussbaum	  (1997)	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A	   wider	   catalogue	   of	   rights	   that	   have	   to	   be	   pursued	   as	   a	   whole	   also	   enlists	  science	  to	  fulfilling	  many	  more	  tasks.	  It	  demands	  solutions	  for	  the	  problems	  that	  afflict	  the	  needy.63	  Living	  in	  a	  world	  where	  science	  and	  technology	  play	  such	  an	  enormous	  role	  also	  creates	   an	   ethical	   obligation	   to	   make	   science	   and	   the	   development	   of	  technologies	   a	   more	   inclusive	   endeavour.	   There	   are	   a	   series	   of	   arguments	   to	  justify	   openness.	   Helping	   others	   by	   developing	   products	  with	   the	   use	   of	   one’s	  intellect	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   central	   human	   capability.64	  Participating	   in	   such	  endeavours	  allows	  people	  to	  get	  appropriate	  knowledge	  to	  judge	  those	  projects	  and	  assess	  some	  of	  the	  risks	  involved.	  Educating	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  citizens	  to	  such	  expertise	  is	  vital	  for	  a	  society’s	  self-­‐determination.	  Science	  is	  also	  part	  of	  cultural	   life	  and	  as	  such	  human	  right	   law	  protects	  a	  right	  to	  participate	   in	  such	  endeavours.65	  It	   becomes	   important	   to	   recall	   that	   the	   International	   Bill	   of	   Rights	   has	   global	  legitimacy.	  The	   rights	   enshrined	   in	   the	   International	  Covenant	  on	  Political	   and	  Civil	  Rights,	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  and	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   are	   based	   on	   agreement.	   A	  general	   agreement	   on	   the	   fundamental	   rights	   and	   entitlements	   of	   all	   human	  beings	   should	   have	   to	   help	   each	   one	   to	   pursue	   their	   ideal	   of	   a	   good	   life	   in	  harmony	  with	  others	  worldwide.	  Extensive	  as	   those	  rights	  are,	  extensive	   is	   the	  agreement	  on	  people	  being	  entitled	  to	  them.	  Human	  rights	  law	  and	  many	  international	  organizations	  have	  been	  very	  clear	  on	  the	   importance	  of	   technical	  and	  scientific	   international	  cooperation.	  The	  harms	  that	   afflict	   the	   poor	   and	   major	   environmental	   problems	   cannot	   be	   seen	   as	  problems	  that	  solely	  perturb	  the	  countries	  where	  those	  issues	  are	  present.66	  	  	  
Recognition	  theories.	   The	   fundamental	   concept	  behind	   recognition	   theories	   can	  be	   found	   in	   Hegel’s	  memorable	  words	   “they	   recognize	   each	   other	   as	  mutually	  recognizing	  one	  another”.67	  It	  is	  hardly	  surprising,	  then,	  that	  this	  small	  statement	  has	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  countless	  scholars.	  According	  to	  an	  interpretation	  of	   this	   passage,	   action	   that	   nurtures	   recognition	   has	   to	   be	   simultaneous,	  reciprocal,	   transitive,	   reflexive	   and	   symmetrical.68	  Hence,	   a	   distinctive	   trait	   of	  this	  approach	  is	  the	  possibility	  to	  condemn	  relations	  of	  dependency	  and	  of	  one-­‐sided	   influence.	  A	   contemporary	   representative	  of	   this	   tradition,	  Nancy	  Fraser,	  has	   specified	   the	   importance	   of	   being	   able	   to	   participate	   as	   a	   peer.69	  In	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  cf.	  Korthals	  and	  Timmermann	  (2012)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  4]	  64	  Timmermann	  (2013)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  3]	  65	  cf.	  Shaheed	  (2012)	  66	  This	  point	  has	  been	  reaffirmed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  declarations	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  perhaps	  most	  prominently	  by	  the	  UN	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals.	  	  67	  Hegel	  (1807/1970)	  68	  Limmer	  (2005)	  69	  cf.	  Fraser	  (1998)	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context	   of	   science	   and	   technology	   development	   this	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	  making	   research	   efforts	   more	   inclusive,	   in	   formally	   recognizing	   parties	   that	  where	   vital	   in	   bringing	   out	   a	   new	   product	   and	   in	   not	   systematically	  discriminating	   certain	   research	   contributions	   without	   good	   arguments.	  Therefore,	   recognition	   theories	   are	   a	   powerful	   tool	   to	   demand	   that	   inventive	  capacities	   of	   indigenous	   communities	   are	   publicly	   recognized.	   Making	   the	  possibility	   of	  mutual	   influence	   imperative	   provides	   a	   justification	   for	   capacity-­‐building	  efforts.	  	  	  
(Re)claiming	   the	   commons.	   In	   the	   realm	   of	   science	   and	   technology,	   innovation	  rarely	  comes	  out	  of	  thin	  air.	  Access	  to	  prior	  knowledge	  and	  data	  is	  vital	   for	  the	  inventive	  mind	  and	  we	  greatly	  rely	  on	  what	  previous	  researchers	  have	  observed,	  catalogued,	   described,	   refuted,	   discovered	   and	   invented.	   Setting	   boundaries	   to	  the	   use	   of	   knowledge	   and	   biomaterials	   by	   granting	   exclusive	   rights	   becomes	  increasingly	   restrictive	   for	   competing	   researchers.	   Many	   researchers	   from	  poorer	   institutes	   or	   those	  whose	   research	   area	  has	   a	  high	  patent	  density	  have	  insurmountable	   hurdles	   to	   overcome.	   Creative	   artists	   encounter	   similar	  constraints	   when	   making	   remixes	   or	   collages.	   This	   general	   problem	   has	  motivated	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  to	  defend	  the	  public	  domain	  and	  common-­‐pool	  resources,	   in	  order	  to	  secure	  the	  “building	  blocks”	   for	   future	  creativity.70	  Those	  “building	   blocks”	   are	   essential	   for	   the	   continuous	   improvement	   of	   living	  conditions	  and	  to	  secure	  creative	  liberty.	  	  	  
Scientific	  values.	  A	  widely	  shared	  conception	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  scientific	  ethos	  has	  been	   propounded	   by	   Robert	  Merton.	   He	  mentions	   four	   elements:	   communism	  (later	   communalism,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	   community-­‐centred),	   universalism,	  disinterestedness	  and	  organized	  scepticism.71	  Especially	  philosophers	  of	  science	  have	   been	   accusing	   intellectual	   property	   for	   corrupting	   the	   scientific	   ethos.	  Intellectual	  property	  allows	  one	   to	  block	  access	   to	   the	  datasets	  on	  which	  one’s	  scientific	  contribution	  is	  based.	  Copyright	  protection	  enables	  journal	  publishers	  to	   charge	   high	   prices	   for	   subscriptions.	   Lack	   of	   access	   to	   new	   scientific	  contributions	   limits	   the	   possibility	   of	   universal	   validation.	   The	   principle	   of	  universalism	   demands	   validation	   outside	   one’s	   close	   circle	   of	   colleagues.	   A	  second	  demand	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  universalism	  is	  that	  careers	  be	  open	  to	  talents.	  Intellectual	  property	  fosters	  an	  environment	  where	  research	  avenues	  are	  barred,	  making	  it	  much	  more	  difficult	  for	  outsiders	  to	  prove	  themselves	  as	  talented.	  The	  ideal	   of	   communism	   calls	   for	   a	   common	   ownership	   of	   research	   results.	   It	  highlights	   the	   importance	   previous	   findings	   have	   for	   future	   knowledge	  production.	  Recognition	  and	  esteem	  of	  individual	  contributors	  is	  something	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  cf.	  e.g.	  for	  music	  see	  Boyle	  (2008)	  pp.	  122-­‐159,	  for	  synthetic	  biology	  see	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2012)	  71	  Merton	  (1973),	  and	  cf.	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2010)	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is	   still	   considered	   prudential,	   since	   they	   function	   as	   incentives.	  Here	   again	   the	  power	  patent	  holders	  have	  to	  control	   follow-­‐up	  innovation	  is	  something	  that	   is	  condemned	  by	   followers	  of	   this	   tradition.	  They	   further	  point	   out	   that	  both	   the	  ideals	  of	  disinterestedness	  and	  organized	  scepticism	  are	  difficult	  to	  follow	  when	  financial	   stakes	   are	   high.72	  By	  making	   specific	   scientific	   innovations	   profitable,	  intellectual	  property	  creates	  an	  environment	  where	  people	  over-­‐	  or	  undervalue	  certain	  inventions	  for	  other	  than	  scientific	  reasons.73	  	  In	   the	   pro-­‐poor	   innovation	   context	   the	   Mertonian	   scientific	   ethos	   demands	  research	  results	  to	  be	  accessible	  for	  all,	  not	  forgetting	  research	  institutes	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  Knowledge	  should	  not	  be	  locked-­‐up	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  profitability	   of	   obsolete	   products	   or	   second-­‐best	   solutions.	   Arguably,	   some	  followers	   of	   this	   scientific	   ethos	  would	   also	   demand	   a	   fairer	   evaluation	   of	   the	  value	  of	  traditional	  knowledge.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  This	  article	  examined	  the	  main	  arguments	  used	  to	  justify	  knowledge	  protection,	  that	   is,	   to	   withhold	   knowledge	   from	   the	   public	   domain	   (even	   if	   “only”	  temporarily).	  Then,	  some	  peculiarities	   that	  have	   to	  be	   taken	   into	  consideration	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  life	  sciences	  were	  addressed.	  The	  third	  section	  discussed	  the	  central	  ethical	  theories	  used	  to	  justify	  pro-­‐poor	  innovation.	  	  It	   is	   difficult	   to	   say	  which	   ethical	   theory	   should	   be	   favoured.	   I	   am	   inclined	   to	  believe	  that	  advocating	  the	  use	  of	  a	  particular	  theory	  would	  stifle	  the	  discussion	  and	   should	   therefore	   be	   avoided.	   A	   plurality	   of	   ethical	   approaches	   is	   the	   best	  way	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  heterogeneity	  in	  human	  needs	  and	  cravings.	  Personally,	  I	  am	  particularly	  concerned	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  scientific	  participation	  and	  thus	  have	  used	  the	  capabilities	  and	  human	  rights	  approach	  supported	  by	  some	  elements	  of	  recognition	  theories	  to	  justify	  my	  position.74	  	  Whatever	   approach	   one	   considers	   as	   prudent,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   extensively	  engage	   with	   a	   central	   issue	   mentioned	   earlier:	   we	   live	   in	   a	   world	   of	   extreme	  inequalities.	  This	  has	  enormous	  consequences	  for	  the	  poor.	  The	  poor	  do	  not	  only	  suffer	   from	   being	   poor,	   but	   also	   from	   being	   so	  much	   poorer	   than	   the	   rich:	   as	  Thomas	  Pogge	  notes,	  researchers	  from	  poorer	  countries	  have	  already	  started	  to	  shift	   agendas	   to	   address	   richer	  markets.75	  Satisfying	   sophisticated	   appetites	   of	  people	   living	   in	   the	  developed	  world	   is	  economically	  much	  more	  profitable	   for	  business	   companies	   than	   addressing	   the	   urgent	   needs	   of	   the	   poor.	   The	  developed	  world	  has	  a	  huge	  advantage	  due	   to	   its	   technological	  head-­‐start;	   this	  includes	   the	   ability	   to	   partially	   control	   follow-­‐up	   innovations	   as	   discussed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  cf.	  Flory	  and	  Kitcher	  (2004)	  pp.	  57f.	  73	  for	  examples	  on	  biomedical	  research,	  see	  Reiss	  (2010)	  74	  cf.	  Timmermann	  (2013)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  3]	  75	  On	  the	  Indian	  pharmaceutical	  industry,	  see	  Pogge	  (2008b)	  p.	  231	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earlier.	  Established	  research	  networks	  and	  sophisticated	  patented	  research	  tools	  give	   the	  developed	  world	  an	  enormous	  advantage	   to	  excel	   in	  whatever	   field	  of	  research	   is	   discovered	   in	   the	   future.76	  Under	   such	   extreme	   inequalities	   hard	  work	  and	  ingenuity	  alone	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  for	  the	  Global	  South	  to	  catch	  up.	  A	  substantial	   change	   in	   attitude	   is	   needed.	   Creativity	   and	   inventiveness	   coming	  from	  the	  Global	  South	  has	  to	  be	  valued	  for	  its	  own	  virtues	  and	  incorporated	  in	  a	  global	   innovation	   system.	   This	   way	   both	   the	   Global	   South	   and	   the	   developed	  world	  will	  mutually	  benefit	  from	  working	  together.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  cf.	  Timmermann	  and	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2012b)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  6]	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Abstract	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   intellectual	  property	  regimes	  we	  have	  currently	   in	  place	  are	  heavily	  under	  attack.	  One	  of	  the	  points	  of	  criticism	  is	  the	  interaction	  between	  two	  elements	  of	  article	   27	   of	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   the	  widely	   discussed	  issue	   of	   being	   able	   to	   benefit	   from	   scientific	   progress	   and	   the	   less	   argued	   for	  position	  of	  having	  a	  right	  to	  take	  part	  in	  scientific	  enterprises.	  To	  shine	  light	  on	  the	  question	  if	  we	  should	  balance	  the	  two	  elements	  or	  prioritize	  one	  of	  them,	  an	  exploration	  will	   be	   offered	   on	   how	  benefiting	   from	   scientific	   progress	   and	   the	  ability	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   advancement	   of	   science	   relate	   to	   securing	   human	  capabilities.	  A	  different	  perspective	  to	  the	  question	  will	  be	  gained	  by	  identifying	  the	   problem	   as	   an	   issue	   of	   misrecognition,	   especially	   the	   failure	   to	   recognize	  many	  willing	  collaboration	  partners	  in	  scientific	  research	  as	  peers.	  Lastly,	  I	  will	  argue	   that	   cooperative	   justice	   requires	   that	   if	  we	  have	  an	   innovation	   incentive	  system	   that	   disproportionally	   benefits	   one	   particular	   group,	   a	   certain	   duty	   to	  counterbalance	  this	  advantage	  exists	  when	  we	  are	  relying	  on	  mutual	  cooperation	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights.	  	  	  	  Keywords:	   scientific	   participation;	   objects	   of	   innovation;	   development;	   global	  justice;	  human	  rights;	  human	  capabilities;	  recognition	  as	  peers.	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  Article	   27	   of	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   (1948,	   hereinafter	  UDHR)	  states	  “[e]veryone	  has	  the	  right	  freely	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  cultural	  life	  of	  the	  community,	  to	  enjoy	  the	  arts	  and	  to	  share	  in	  scientific	  advancement	  and	  its	  benefits.”	  In	  the	  following	  I	  will	  concentrate	  in	  the	  last	  section	  of	  this	  article,	  the	  right	  to	  share	  in	  and	  benefit	  from	  scientific	  advancement.	  This	  part	  of	  article	  27	  contains	   two	   elements,	   the	   idea	   of	   sharing	   in	   a	   particular	   endeavour	   and	   the	  possibility	  of	  enjoying	  the	  benefits	  of	  such	  type	  of	  enterprises.	  In	  this	  article	  I	  will	  conceptualize	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  two	  elements	  to	  (1)	  human	  capabilities	  and	  (2)	  ensuring	   recognition,	   then	   (3)	   discuss	   the	   effects	   on	   global	   justice	   caused	   by	  pursuing	   any	   of	   the	   two	   elements	   independently,	   and	   lastly	   (4)	   analyse	   the	  problem	   of	   cooperative	   justice	   with	   a	   special	   emphasis	   on	   the	   way	   we	   have	  chosen	  to	  incentivize	  innovation:	  intellectual	  property.	  	  The	  purpose	   of	   this	   examination	   is	   to	   highlight	   the	   effects	   on	   the	   fulfilment	   of	  human	  rights	  in	  general	  a	  potential	  prioritization	  of	  any	  of	  the	  two	  elements	  of	  this	  right	  may	  have.	  Hereby	  I	  will	  take	  the	  intellectual	  property	  regimes	  we	  have	  now	   established	   as	   the	   background	   condition	   in	   order	   to	   better	   judge	   the	  existing	   incentive	   system	   and	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   analyse	   any	   proposed	  alternative	   system.	   A	   brief	   overview	   to	   those	   regimes	   and	   their	   effect	   on	   the	  rights	  enshrined	  in	  article	  27	  will	  serve	  as	  an	  introduction.	  	  	  
Introduction	  	  Many,	   but	   certainly	   not	   all	   inventions	   we	   have	   nowadays	   on	   our	   shelves	   and	  surroundings	   came	   to	   existence	   due	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   recouping	   expensive	  research	   and	   development	   costs.	   Patents,	   most	   prominently,	   but	   also	   plant	  breeders’	   rights,	   trademarks	   and,	   in	   some	   jurisdictions	   database	   rights,	   enable	  researchers	   to	  make	   their	   investigations	   lucrative.	   These	   exclusive	   rights	   have	  become	   globally	   increasingly	   important	   after	   the	   Agreement	   on	   Trade-­‐related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  (TRIPS)	  progressively	  started	  to	  become	  effective	  worldwide	   from	  1994	  onward.	  The	  TRIPS	  agreement	  made	   it	  binding	  for	   all	   World	   Trade	   Organization	   member	   states	   to	   recognize	   intellectual	  property	   rights	   and	   allows	   trade	   sanctions	   for	   countries	   where	   violations	   of	  those	  rights	  are	  commonplace.	  Nowadays	  patent	  rights	  have	  a	  validity	  of	  mostly	  20	  years,	  while	  copyright	  lasts	  commonly	  70	  years	  after	  the	  author’s	  death.	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Granting	  a	  temporary	  exclusive	  right	  to	  innovators	  on	  their	  invention	  may	  allow	  them	  to	  recoup	  their	  prior	  expenses	  (including	  advertising	  costs)	  by	  preventing	  competitors	   to	   free-­‐ride	   on	   their	   creative	   effort.	   For	   this	   however	   to	   be	  successful,	   a	   number	   of	   conditions	   apply:	   (i)	   the	   fruits	   of	   their	   labour	   have	   to	  attract	   a	   given	  number	   of	   customers	  with	   sufficient	   purchasing	  power,	   (ii)	   the	  developed	  objects	   should	  not	   contradict	   public	  morals77,	   and	   (iii)	  meet	   certain	  minimum	   inventiveness	   and	   novelty	   criteria	   to	   be	   granted	   exclusive	   rights.	  Further,	  (iv)	  the	  possibility	  to	  attract	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  paying	  customers	  is	  higher	   for	   objects	   that	   cannot	   be	   independently	   reproduced.	   Objects	   of	  innovation	  that	  do	  not	  meet	  these	  criteria	  will	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  recouping	  their	  research	  and	  development	  costs.	  	  Relying	  primarily	  on	  this	  instrument	  for	  incentivizing	  research	  has	  two	  negative	  consequences:	   one,	   fundamental	   research	   and	   indigenous	   innovation	   are	  insufficiently	   incentivized,	   and	   two,	   refraining	   from	   using	   exclusive	   rights	   to	  recoup	   research	   and	   development	   costs	   has	   become	   a	   luxury	   many	   cannot	  afford.	  	  The	   first	   problem	   leads	   to	   future	   undersupply,	   something	   that	   has	   to	   be	  addressed	   using	   different	   incentive	   mechanisms.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   with	  fundamental	  research,	  which	  predominantly	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  is	  financed	  by	  governmental	  grants.	  Fomenting	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  tools	  for	  their	   industry	  constitutes	   a	   main	   motive	   for	   continuing	   to	   do	   so.78	  The	   case	   of	   traditional	  knowledge	  (here	  encompassing	  indigenous,	  tribal	  and	  grassroots	  innovation)	  is	  less	   fortunate,	   a	   lobby	   demanding	   funds	   seems	   unable	   to	   recruit	   sufficient	  political	   influence	   for	   this	   branch	   of	   innovation,	   leaving	   the	   support	   for	   a	  stimulating	   infrastructure	   and	   network	   in	   a	   precarious	   state.	   To	   add	   to	   this	  problem,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	  many	   people	   are	   so	   poor	   that	   they	   can	   only	  make	   use	   of	   technological	   advancement	   if	   the	   inventions	   can	   be	   reproduced	  using	  spare	  local	  resources.79	  Inaccessibility	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  scientific	  progress	  becomes	  inevitable	  when	  this	  is	  not	  deliberately	  taken	  into	  account.	  If	  research	  agendas	   are	   dictated	   according	   to	   market	   demands,	   being	   defined	   by	   the	  monetary	  size	  of	  the	  market,	  not	  the	  number	  of	  customers,	  the	  huge	  purchasing	  power	  disparities	  will	  greatly	  misrepresent	  per	  capita	  demand	  and	  thus	  people’s	  basic	  necessities.	  There	  will	  be	  no	  democratic	  setting	  of	  research	  agendas,	  which	  will	  leave	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  poor	  systematically	  unfulfilled	  when	  they	  fail	  to	  match	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  cf.	  TRIPS	  agreement	  (1994),	  article	  27(2):	  “Members	  may	  exclude	  from	  patentability	  inventions,	  the	  prevention	  within	  their	  territory	  of	  the	  commercial	  exploitation	  of	  which	  is	  necessary	  to	  protect	  ordre	  public	  or	  morality,	  including	  to	  protect	  human,	  animal	  or	  plant	  life	  or	  health	  or	  to	  avoid	  serious	  prejudice	  to	  the	  environment,	  provided	  that	  such	  exclusion	  is	  not	  made	  merely	  because	  the	  exploitation	  is	  prohibited	  by	  their	  law.”	  	  78	  cf.	  Stephan	  (2012)	  79	  cf.	  Gupta	  (2010)	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the	  ones	  of	  the	  economically	  prosperous.80	  Necessity	  may	  also	  oblige	  the	  global	  poor	   to	   use	   technologies	   that	   are	   deemed	   culturally	   unacceptable81	  or	   socially	  inadequate.	   This	   is	   a	   problem	   from	   which	   citizens	   of	   countries	   with	   strong	  democratic	  commitments	  do	  not	  escape	  either.	  People	  had	  no	  alternative	  than	  to	  accept	   certain	   technologies,	   an	   example	   being	   the	   wide	   use	   of	   genetically	  modified	  crops	   for	  animal	   feed,	  despite	   the	  wide	  public	   rejection	  of	  genetically	  modified	  organisms.82	  In	  a	  globalization	  context,	  Elizabeth	  Anderson	  notes	   that	  the	   effectiveness	   of	   contraceptive	   policies	   is	   in	   jeopardy	   in	   societies	   where	  women	  do	  not	  see	  themselves	  as	  agents	  who	  actively	  choose	  to	  have	  sex,	  which	  make	   contraception	   methods	   that	   require	   planning	   and	   daily	   use	   socially	  inadequate.83	  This	   omission	   has	   far-­‐reaching	   effects	   on	   population	   control	   and	  career	  development	  for	  women,	  particularly	  in	  non-­‐Western	  societies.	  	  While	  the	  first	  problem	  has	  been	  greatly	  discussed	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  global	  justice,84	  the	   second	   problem,	   concerning	   the	   direction	   research	   is	   taking,	   has	   gathered	  less	   attention.	  Perhaps	  most	  prominently	   the	   latter	  has	  been	  addressed	  by	   the	  free/libre	  and	  open	  source	  software	  movement.85	  	  As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   the	   societal	   recognition	   of	   intellectual	   property	   enables	  inventors	   and	   their	   financial	   backers	   or	   supporters	   to	   recoup	   their	   research	  expenses	   by	   applying	   for	   temporary	   exclusive	   rights.	   Those	   rights	   are,	   as	   the	  name	  clearly	  states,	  exclusive	  –	  by	  definition	  some	  people	  will	  not	  have	  access	  to	  the	   protected	   object	   for	   the	   limited	   period	   that	   the	   patentee	   is	   granted	   a	  monopoly	  use	  of	  his	  or	  her	  invention.	  While	  the	  open	  source	  software	  movement	  is	   primarily	   concerned	   with	   the	   malleability	   of	   the	   objects	   of	   innovation,	  particularly	   their	   adaptability	   to	  personal	  needs,	   the	   impact	  of	   exclusive	   rights	  on	  science	  and	  technological	  development	  is	  of	  much	  greater	  scope.	  Hesitation	  to	  reveal	   early	   findings	   has	   increased	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   patentability	   of	   subject	  matter,	   thus	   limiting	   scientific	   discussion	   and	   the	   spontaneous	   sharing	   of	  samples.86	  Using	  exclusive	  rights	  for	  sales	  creates	  artificial	  scarcity,	  leaving	  some	  people	  without	  the	  benefits	  of	  scientific	  progress.	  Those	  classical	  economic	  dead-­‐weights	  are	  literary	  dead-­‐weights	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  vital	  medicines87	  or	  specific	  crops	   destined	   for	   harsh	   environments.	   If	   research	   can	   only	   be	   undertaken	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  cf.	  Korthals	  and	  Timmermann	  (2012)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  4]	  81	  cf.	  Chapman	  (2009)	  82	  For	  Europe,	  see	  TNS	  Opinion	  &	  Social	  (2010).	  While	  the	  rejection	  of	  genetically	  modified	  organisms	  is	  less	  fierce	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  recent	  ballot	  on	  California’s	  Proposition	  37	  show	  that	  a	  great	  percentage	  of	  the	  state’s	  population	  wants	  to	  know	  which	  foods	  contain	  genetically	  modified	  organisms.	  	  83	  Anderson	  (2007)	  84	  see	  Pogge	  (2008b)	  85	  see	  Schoonmaker	  (2007)	  86	  cf.	  Eisenberg	  (2008)	  87	  Pogge	  (2008b)	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being	   subject	   to	   the	  use	  of	  market	   incentives	   that	   rely	  on	   intellectual	  property	  rights,	   it	   will	   inevitably	   restrict	   some	   people	   from	   enjoying	   the	   benefits	   of	  scientific	   advancement.	   As	   the	   excluded	   group	   consists	   primarily	   of	   the	   global	  poor,	  people	  with	  certain	  moral	  convictions	  might	  find	  it	  objectionable	  in	  itself	  to	  add	   to	   greater	   inequality	   by	   leaving	   the	  worst	   off	   people	   in	   a	   relative	   inferior	  position. 88 	  Promoting	   scientific	   advancement	   would	   under	   such	   conditions	  contradict	  some	  types	  of	  egalitarian	  notions	  of	  justice.	  	  Relying	  on	  market	  mechanisms	  in	  a	  world	  of	  extreme	  inequalities	  does	  not	  only	  shape	   research	   agendas	   towards	   a	   very	   particular,	   not	   democratically	   chosen,	  direction,	   but	   attracts	   the	   overwhelming	   amount	   of	   resources	   to	   one	   small	  section	  of	  science:	  the	  development	  of	  saleable	  technological	  products.	  	  The	   more	   scientists	   and	   engineers	   manage	   to	   recoup	   their	   research	   and	  development	   costs	   by	   making	   use	   of	   exclusive	   rights	   and	   thus	   become	   self-­‐sustained,	   the	   higher	   the	   pressure	   for	   others	   to	   follow	   the	   same	   procedure.	  Scientists	  and	  engineers	  who	  are	  not	  self-­‐sustained	  become	  the	  exception	  rather	  than	  the	  rule.	  Choosing	  to	  practice	  science	  that	  does	  not	  aim	  at	  making	  profits,	  or	  generally	  seeking	  for	  openness,	  becomes	  a	   luxury	  that	   is	   increasingly	  harder	  to	  defend.	  To	  escape	  this	  burden	  scientists	  and	  researchers	  continuously	  switch	  to	  research	   lines	   and	   methods	   that	   appear	   commercially	   valuable	   –	   doing	   so	  reinforces	  societal	  expectancies	  of	  science	  being	  self-­‐sustainable.	  This	  endangers	  cognitive	  diversity	  and	  we	  have	  to	  remember	  that	  science	  has	  benefited	  greatly	  from	   the	   few	   rational	   agents	  who	  due	   to	   stubbornness	  or	   self-­‐confidence	  have	  insisted	  on	  less	  prominent	  rival	  theories	  who	  have	  proven	  to	  turn	  out	  accurate.89	  A	   good	   example	   is	   Alfred	   Wegener,	   who	   after	   publishing	   his	   groundwork	   on	  plate	   tectonics	   1912	   spent	   the	   remaining	   time	   of	   his	   life	   fighting	   for	   support,	  disregarding	  the	  hostility	  with	  which	  his	  theory	  was	  received.	  He	  only	  received	  wide	  recognition	  for	  his	  great	  contribution	  in	  the	  early	  70s,	  over	  three	  decades	  after	  his	  death.90	  
	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  An	  interesting	  example	  is	  the	  technological	  progress	  in	  fuel	  efficiency	  for	  vehicles.	  If	  the	  rise	  of	  fuel	  prices	  is	  (at	  least	  slightly)	  counterbalanced	  by	  the	  availability	  of	  more	  fuel-­‐efficient	  cars,	  public	  outrage	  due	  to	  the	  unavailability	  of	  options	  is	  dampened.	  However	  this	  option	  is	  only	  available	  for	  countries	  whom	  themselves	  are	  producing	  technologies.	  Poorer	  countries	  have	  to	  continue	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  older	  fuel-­‐inefficient	  alternatives	  while	  paying	  proportionally	  much	  more	  for	  fuel.	  89	  cf.	  Kitcher	  (1990)	  90	  see	  Greene	  (1984)	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On	  the	  legal	  history	  of	  the	  article	  27	  	  The	  dominant	  reading	  among	  legal	  scholars	  of	  article	  27	  of	  the	  UDHR	  sees	  it	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  human	  right	  to	  benefit	  from	  scientific	  progress.91	  The	  emphasis	  on	   this	   specific	   dimension	   has	   pushed	   the	   right	   to	   participate	   in	   scientific	  endeavours	   into	   obscurity.	   One	   reason	   for	   such	   reading	   might	   have	   been	   the	  phrasing	  of	  what	  is	  considered	  the	  corresponding	  article	  to	  the	  UDHR	  article	  27,	  the	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	   (1966,	  hereinafter	   ICESCR)	   article	   15.1. 92 	  This	   article	   does	   not	   mention	   scientific	  participation	  unambiguously	  by	  name:	  	   The	   States	   Parties	   to	   the	   present	   Covenant	   recognize	   the	   right	   of	  everyone:	  (a) To	  take	  part	  in	  cultural	  life;	  (b) To	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	  of	  scientific	  progress	  and	  its	  applications;	  (c) To	  benefit	  from	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  moral	  and	  material	  interests	  resulting	   from	   any	   scientific,	   literary	   or	   artistic	   production	   of	  which	  he	  is	  the	  author.	  	  	  To	  see	  scientific	  life	  as	  part	  of	  being	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  enlarging	  the	  cultural	  heritage	   of	   humankind	   might	   require	   more	   interpretative	   work	   than	   legal	  scholarship	   commonly	   allows.	   First,	   one	   has	   to	   consider	   science	   as	   part	   of	   the	  cultural	  heritage	  of	  humankind.	  Conceding	  that,	  one	  has	  to	  understand	  a	  right	  to	  “take	   part”	   as	   having	   not	   only	   a	   passive	   connotation	   (being	   a	   spectator	   or	   a	  recipient)	   but	   also	   an	   active	   element	   (being	   an	   actor	   or	   contributor).	   This	  however	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   the	   thought	   of	   the	   Chinese	   delegate	   during	   the	  drafting	  sessions	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration.	  Peng-­‐chun	  Chang	  noted	  that	  “not	  only	   must	   the	   right	   to	   share	   in	   the	   benefits	   of	   scientific	   advancement	   be	  guaranteed	   to	   everyone	   but	   also	   the	   right	   to	   participate	   in	   work	   of	   scientific	  creation.	   In	   the	   arts,	   letters	   and	   sciences	   alike,	   aesthetic	   enjoyment	  had	   a	  dual	  aspect:	   a	   purely	   passive	   aspect	   when	   man	   appreciates	   beauty	   and	   an	   active	  aspect	  when	  he	  creates	  it”.93	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Examples	  of	  this	  interpretation	  are	  offered	  by	  Chapman	  (2009);	  Marks	  (2011);	  Donders	  (2011);	  and	  Plomer	  (2012).	  The	  reading	  I	  defend	  hereafter	  is	  in	  part	  shared	  by	  Shaver	  (2010).	  92	  In	  relation	  to	  food	  production,	  ICESCR	  article	  11.2(a)	  foresees	  that	  “States	  Parties	  …	  individually	  and	  through	  international	  co-­‐operation	  …	  [shall	  take	  measures	  to]	  improve	  methods	  of	  production,	  conservation	  and	  distribution	  of	  food	  by	  making	  full	  use	  of	  technical	  and	  scientific	  knowledge,	  by	  disseminating	  knowledge	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  nutrition	  and	  by	  developing	  or	  reforming	  agrarian	  systems	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  achieve	  the	  most	  efficient	  development	  and	  utilization	  of	  natural	  resources”.	  93	  Quoted	  in	  United	  Nations	  (1948),	  transcribed	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A	  contribution	  to	  science	  is	  required	  to	  take	  into	  critical	  consideration	  previous	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  to	  do	  so	  in	  a	  more	  systematic	  manner	  than	  is	  generally	  prevalent	   in	  other	   areas	  of	   cultural	   life.	   In	   science	  originality	   is	  not	   a	   virtue	   in	  itself,	  a	  laudable	  contribution	  has	  to	  consist	  in	  either	  a	  major	  revision	  of	  existing	  theory	   or	   exploring	   the	   previously	   unknown.	   Therefore	   familiarity	   with	   the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   is	   virtually	   a	   prerequisite.	   Due	   to	   those	   differences	   capacity	  building	  becomes	  mandatory	  to	  enable	  people	  to	  participate	  in	  scientific	  life.	  Understanding	  human	  rights	  primarily	  as	  a	   set	  of	  negative	  duties	  will	   favour	  a	  reading	  that	  at	  the	  most	  prohibits	  unjustifiable	  exclusion	  of	  people	  from	  cultural	  life.	   The	   history	   of	   the	   drafting	   of	   ICESCR	   article	   15.1	   suggests	   however	   that	  more	  was	  on	  the	  mind	  of	  human	  rights	  legislators	  than	  this	  minimum	  constraint.	  An	  initial	  draft94	  submitted	  by	  the	  UNESCO	  contained	  the	  following	  elements:	  	   The	   Signatory	   States	   undertake	   to	   encourage	   the	   preservation,	  development	   and	   propagation	   of	   science	   and	   culture	   by	   every	  appropriate	  means:	  (a) By	   facilitating	   for	   all	   access	   to	   manifestations	   of	   national	   and	  international	  cultural	  life,	  such	  as	  books,	  publications	  and	  works	  of	  art,	  and	  also	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  benefits	  resulting	  from	  scientific	  progress	  and	  its	  applications;	  (b) By	   preserving	   and	   protecting	   the	   inheritance	   of	   books,	   works	   of	  art	   and	   other	   monuments	   and	   objects	   of	   historic,	   scientific	   and	  cultural	  interest;	  (c) By	   assuring	   liberty	   and	   security	   to	   scholars	   and	   artists	   in	   their	  work	  and	  seeing	  that	  they	  enjoy	  material	  conditions	  necessary	  for	  research	  and	  creation;	  	  (d) By	   guaranteeing	   the	   free	   cultural	   development	   of	   racial	   and	  linguistic	  minorities.	  	  	  The	   UNESCO	   draft	   is	   far	   more	   explicit	   in	   identifying	   positive	   duties	   and	   a	  dichotomy	   between	   scientific	   and	   cultural	   life	   becomes	   harder	   to	   defend.	   This	  passage	  does	  also	  not	  lead	  us	  to	  think	  that	  being	  identified	  as	  a	  scholars	  or	  artist	  is	  a	  prospect	  limited	  to	  an	  exclusive	  group	  of	  people.	  Together	  with	  clauses	  that	  forbid	  discrimination,	  section	  (c)	  of	  the	  cited	  draft	  article	  gives	  us	  to	  understand	  that	  ensuring	   the	  basic	   circumstances	   for	  being	  able	   to	  participate	   in	   scholarly	  activities	   was	   an	   ambition	   early	   human	   rights	   legislators	   indeed	   had	   in	  mind.	  The	  Venice	   Statement	   on	   the	  Right	   to	   Enjoy	   the	  Benefits	   of	   Scientific	   Progress	  and	   its	   Applications	   issued	   2009	   by	   the	   UNESCO	   reaffirms	   this	   position,	   by	  raising	   awareness	   on	   the	   huge	   disparities	   in	   research	   capacities	   between	   the	  developed	   and	   the	   developing	   world.	   Among	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   a	   lacking	  research	  infrastructure	  count	  the	  inability	  to	  influence	  the	  direction	  of	  scientific	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Quoted	  in	  Green	  (2000)	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progress	   and	   the	   capacity	   to	   hold	   governments	   accountable	   for	   it,	   the	   lack	   of	  participation	  opportunities	  for	  citizens	  and	  difficulties	  in	  assessing	  the	  impact	  of	  science	  and	  technological	  development.95	  	  The	   sections	   that	   follow	   will	   provide	   philosophical	   arguments	   on	   why	   this	  suggested	   reading	   should	   be	   adopted.	   While	   I	   will	   continuously	   address	   the	  influence	  of	   intellectual	  property,	   this	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	   it	  being	  the	  only	   factor	   or	   the	   most	   significant	   issue	   at	   stake.	   Loss	   of	   resources	   due	   to	  corruption	   in	   educational	   and	   research	   institutes,	   the	   widespread	   refusal	   to	  educate	   women,	   missing	   or	   inaccessible	   day-­‐care	   facilities	   for	   children	  particularly	   limiting	   the	   career	   opportunities	   of	   young	  mothers,	   plus	   the	   huge	  inequalities	   in	   income,	   are	   factors	   that	   might	   have	   a	   far	   greater	   influence	   for	  scientific	   participation.	   Additionally,	   securing	   the	   freedom	   to	   move	   and	  communicate	   beyond	   national	   borders	   thus	   facilitating	   social	   encounters	   that	  can	   materialize	   in	   future	   collaborations	   is	   a	   key	   element	   to	   foster	   scientific	  advancement.	  	  	  	  
A	  human	  capabilities	  perspective	  	  The	   link	   between	   scientific	   advancement	   and	   human	   capabilities	   is	   twofold.	  Participating	   in	  scientific	  endeavours	  can	  help	  people	  reach	  certain	  capabilities	  and	   the	   fruits	   of	   such	   undertakings	   can	   provide	   technologies	   as	   well	   as	  knowledge	   that	   can	   play	   a	   substantial	   role	   in	   expanding	   human	   functioning.96	  The	   first	   aspect	   falls	   under	   the	   human	   rights	   element	   of	   sharing	   in	   scientific	  advancement,	  the	  second	  under	  benefiting	  from	  scientific	  enterprises97.	  	  Some	  objects	  of	  innovation	  help	  people	  to	  attain	  capabilities	  that	  their	  personal	  condition	   would	   not	   have	   allowed,	   e.g.	   a	   wheelchair	   greatly	   enhances	   the	  possibilities	   of	   free	   movement	   for	   a	   person	   with	   certain	   types	   of	   disabilities.	  Other	  objects	  allow	  people	  to	  restore	  their	  functioning	  to	  the	  original	  state,	  e.g.	  recover	   from	  a	  disease	  or	   rehabilitate	  one’s	  damaged	  natural	   environment.98	  A	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  UNESCO	  (2009)	  96	  The	  capability	  approach	  distinguishes	  between	  functionings	  and	  capabilities.	  Functionings	  relates	  to	  what	  one	  can	  do	  and	  be,	  e.g.	  being	  creative	  and	  contribute	  to	  knowledge.	  Capabilities	  refer	  to	  the	  opportunities	  to	  achieve	  the	  mentioned	  beings	  and	  doings,	  e.g.	  choosing	  to	  develop	  one’s	  creativity	  or	  having	  the	  freedom	  to	  undertake	  the	  necessary	  tasks	  to	  be	  able	  to	  contribute	  knowledge	  (Robeyns	  2011).	  97	  The	  link	  between	  capabilities	  and	  the	  right	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  scientific	  advancement	  has	  been	  discussed	  by	  Marks	  (2011)	  at	  great	  length.	  98	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  objects	  of	  innovation	  are	  indeed	  converted	  into	  capabilities	  or	  functioning,	  not	  only	  personal	  conversion	  factors	  (i.e.	  individual	  limitations	  or	  special	  talents)	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration,	  but	  also	  social	  and	  environmental	  conversion	  factors,	  cf.	  Robeyns	  (2005).	  Here	  design	  can	  play	  a	  bridging	  function	  to	  facilitating	  an	  effective	  conversion,	  cf.	  Oosterlaken	  (2009).	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third	   category	   of	   objects	   substantially	   facilitates	   daily	   life	   interactions	   and	  meliorates	   living	   conditions.	   We	   may	   think	   of	   the	   invention	   of	   sanitation	  systems,	   facilitating	   the	   provision	   of	   clean	  water	   and	   the	   adequate	   disposal	   of	  sewage,	  leaving	  people	  with	  substantially	  more	  spare	  time	  for	  leisure	  activities.	  Cheap	  and	  readily	  available	  paediatric	  vaccines	  have	  reduced	  the	  time	  having	  to	  be	   spent	   caring	   for	   sick	   children.	   Women,	   who	   are	   disproportionally	  overburdened	   with	   such	   tasks,	   have	   gained	   substantially	   with	   such	  improvements	   by	   having	   more	   time	   to	   pursue	   other	   goals	   in	   their	   lives.	  Communication	  technologies	  allow	  people	  to	  participate	  in	  political	  discussions	  with	   up-­‐to-­‐date	   knowledge.	   In	   sum,	   scientific	   knowledge	   coupled	   with	  engineering	   skills	   and	   understanding	   allow	   people	   to	   achieve,	   restore	   and	  facilitate	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   objects	   covered	   by	   human	   rights	   clauses	   and	  identified	   as	   central	   human	   capabilities.	   Nonetheless,	   we	   should	   be	   critical	   to	  what	  we	  empower	  people	  to	  do,	  science	  can	  be	  put	  both	  at	  service	  but	  also	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  society.	  	  	  The	   sustainable	   development	   of	   new	   technologies	   through	   scientific	  advancement	  inevitably	  raises	  the	  bar	  of	  what	  may	  be	  considered	  normal	  human	  functioning.99	  To	  take	  an	  example,	  scientific	  progress	  in	  the	  area	  of	  nutrition	  has	  shown	   us	   that	  many	   of	   the	   disorders	   once	   thought	   inevitable	   are	   traceable	   to	  specific	  micronutrients	  deficiencies,	  shifting	  many	  of	  those	  widespread	  disorders	  to	   the	   category	  of	   that	  which	   is	   preventable.	  Knowledge	  on	  what	   constitutes	   a	  better	   diet	   and	   the	   safer	   handling	   of	   food,	   such	   as	   refrigeration,	   hygiene	   and	  pasteurization,	  has	  triggered	  the	  search	  for	  technological	  solutions	  to	  overcome	  existing	   shortcomings.	   The	   development	   and	   widespread	   use	   of	   those	  technological	   solutions	   raised	   the	   level	   of	   what	   is	   considered	   normal	   human	  functioning	   by	   a	   greater	   satisfaction	   of	   physiological	   needs.	   However	   this	  improvement	   demands	   further	   research,	   as	   new	   scientific	   knowledge	   and	  technical	   knowhow	   is	   again	   needed	   to	   overcome	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   this	  change,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   maintain	   and	   regulate	   the	   technological	   products	  implemented.100	  Generally	  we	  can	  say	   that	   the	  advancement	  of	   science	  and	   the	  availability	   of	   new	   technologies	   allows	   us,	   or	   even	   obliges	   us,	   to	   periodically	  reconsider	  which	  capabilities	  society	  can	  reasonably	  facilitate	  for	  people.	  	  	  	   	  The	  capabilities	  approach	  can	  justify	  both	  a	  claim	  to	  have	  access	  to	  the	  objects	  of	  innovation	   and	   inclusion	   in	   their	   development.	   Access	   to	   those	   objects	   may	  expand	  human	  functioning	  and	  thus	  is	  of	  instrumental	  importance.	  With	  regard	  to	  inclusion	  in	  scientific	  research	  and	  technological	  development,	  the	  capabilities	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Non-­‐sustainable	  development	  will	  have	  the	  opposite	  effect.	  With	  environmental	  degradation,	  or	  deterioration	  of	  health	  in	  general,	  lesser	  functioning	  can	  be	  expected.	  A	  more	  sedentary	  life	  style	  has	  already	  lowered	  the	  threshold	  line	  of	  what	  was	  considered	  normal	  bodily	  functioning	  in	  the	  past.	  100	  cf.	  Baulcombe	  et	  al.	  (2009)	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approach	  requires	  a	  longer	  line	  of	  argument.	  Here	  participation	  can	  be	  justified	  instrumentally	  as	  it	  fosters	  the	  full	  use	  of	  one’s	  senses,	  imagination	  and	  thoughts,	  to	  use	  Nussbaum’s	  terminology.101	  Arguing	  for	  a	  right	  to	  scientific	  participation	  opportunities	   would	   have	   a	   weak	   foundation	   if	   it	   is	   solely	   based	   on	   being	   a	  vehicle	   for	   using	   or	   promoting	   one’s	   mental	   faculties.	   As	   a	   philosopher,	   I	   can	  escape	   the	   charge	   of	   narcissism	   by	   arguing	   that	   participation	   in	   scientific	  endeavours	   facilitates	   the	   use	   of	   one’s	   mental	   faculties	   in	   a	   meaningful	  manner.102	  Not	  being	  limited	  to	  engage	  in	  meaningless	  endeavours	  alone	  can	  be	  considered	   as	   a	   prerequisite	   to	   claim	   that	   one	   enjoys	   full	   human	   functioning.	  Nowadays	   it	   is	   inevitable	   that	   wanting	   it	   or	   not,	   some	   daily	   activities	   will	   be	  devoid	  of	  meaning	  or	  purpose,	  as	  some	  tedious	  tasks	  still	  have	  to	  be	  completed	  to	  meet	  our	  basic	  needs.	  We	  can	  nevertheless	   argue	   that	  being	  able	   to	   enjoy	  a	  good	  life	  requires	  that	  at	  least	  some	  aspects	  of	  life	  have	  meaning.	  A	  prosperous	  society	  that	  seeks	  to	  ensure	  human	  capabilities	  will	  have	  to	  grant	  some	  liberty	  in	  where	  a	  person	  wants	  to	  find	  meaning	  in	  her	  daily	  undertakings.	  While	  some	  can	  content	   themselves	   in	   finding	  meaning	   in	   personal	   relationships,	   other	   people	  need	   a	   certain	   social	   infrastructure	   to	   find	  meaning	   in	   their	   life.	   One	   of	   those	  social	   constructs	  where	   a	   series	   of	   people	   are	   bound	   to	   find	  meaning	   in	   their	  lives	   are	   scientific	   enterprises.103	  That	   being	   true,	   we	   could	   stipulate	   that	   a	  certain	   duty	   to	   enable	   those	   people	   to	   take	   part	   in	   such	   initiatives	  will	   fall	   to	  scientific	   enterprises	   in	   general	   by	   virtue	   of	   being	   the	   sole	   locus	  where	   those	  people	   could	   realize	   their	   concept	   of	   a	   good	   life.	   That	   the	   right	   to	   work	   is	  commonly	  understood	  as	  one	  being	   able	   to	   find	   an	   adequate	   job	   supports	   this	  perspective.104	  Recognizing	   a	   societal	   duty	   to	   facilitate	  meaningful	   interactions	  would	  direct	  all	  types	  of	  socially	  meaningful	  endeavours	  with	  a	  call	  for	  inclusion.	  Here	  we	  can	  think	  of	  duties	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  among	  groups	  of	  people	  with	  comparable	  scientific	  abilities105,	  as	  well	  as	  positive	  duties	  in	  terms	  of	  engaging	  underrepresented	  groups	  in	  scientific	  activities.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  cf.	  Nussbaum	  (1997)	  102	  To	  define	  “meaningful”	  in	  this	  context,	  we	  can	  borrow	  from	  a	  definition	  of	  “meaningful	  work”	  provided	  by	  Arneson	  (1987).	  He	  identifies	  the	  following	  characteristics:	  work	  has	  to	  be	  interesting,	  calling	  for	  intelligence	  and	  initiative,	  allow	  the	  worker	  a	  considerable	  freedom	  to	  determine	  how	  the	  work	  is	  to	  be	  done	  and	  having	  a	  democratic	  say	  on	  the	  work	  process	  as	  well	  as	  employer’s	  policies.	  I	  would	  further	  add	  that	  one’s	  work	  should	  be	  subjectively	  identifiable	  as	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  well	  functioning	  of	  society	  (provided	  this	  is	  a	  freedom	  one	  wants	  to	  pursue).	  103	  Alternatively,	  we	  can	  frame	  a	  demand	  of	  being	  included	  by	  recognizing	  that	  some	  people	  identify	  a	  scientific	  career	  as	  a	  calling	  or	  vocation	  (sich	  zur	  
Wissenschaft	  berufen	  fühlen),	  cf.	  Weber	  (1919/2002).	  	  104	  cf.	  Steinvorth	  (2009)	  105	  E.g.	  if	  our	  goal	  is	  food	  security	  and	  that	  is	  our	  main	  valuation	  criteria,	  a	  promising	  seed	  variety	  should	  not	  be	  judged	  based	  on	  its	  origin	  but	  on	  proven	  efficacy.	  Brand	  labels	  should	  not	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  assessment.	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Conceding	  a	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  science	  will	  raise	  certain	  demands	  for	  not	  only	  being	  able	   to	  undertake	   trivial	   research,	  but	  also	   to	   take	  also	  part	   in	  advanced	  scientific	   enterprises.	   Scientific	  work	   is	   one	  of	   the	   tasks	   that	   is	   affected	  by	   the	  Aristotelian	   Principle	   as	   identified	   by	   Rawls,	   meaning	   that	   while	   practicing	  science	   one	   continuously	   develops	   certain	   skills	   and	   this	   may	   lead	   to	   high	  virtuosity	  in	  a	  given	  field.106	  As	  Rawls	  states,	  “…	  human	  beings	  enjoy	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  realized	  capacities	  (their	  innate	  or	  trained	  abilities),	  and	  this	  enjoyment	  increases	  the	  more	  the	  capacity	  is	  realized,	  or	  the	  greater	  the	  complexity”107–	  in	  science	  encouraging	  the	  realization	  of	  those	  capacities	  will	  have	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  capacity-­‐building	  efforts	  as	  well	  as	  guaranteeing	  basic	  material	  needs,	  otherwise	  people	   with	   few	  means	   would	   be	   systematically	   left	   out.108	  In	   addition,	   it	   has	  been	   repeatedly	   argued	   that	   prolonged	   repetitive	   and	   dull	   work	   limits	   the	  possibilities	   to	   successfully	   engage	   in	   creative	  work	   in	   the	   future,	   and	   this	   not	  only	  professionally	  but	  also	  during	  one’s	  spare	  time.109	  	  	  More	   interesting	   is	   it	   to	   see	   inclusion	   in	   innovative	   enterprises	   as	   having	   the	  additional	   capability	   to	   actively	   care	   for	   one’s	   society,	   nature	   or	   a	   particular	  individual,	  while	  seeking	  for	  a	  solution	  by	  making	  use	  of	  one’s	  reason.	  	  There	  are	  two	  elements	  in	  showing	  concern,	  one	  being	  the	  possibility	  to	  express	  an	   emotion,	   e.g.	   sorrow,	   or	   being	   able	   to	   protest.	   While	   this	   is	   something	  Western	  societies	  now	  take	  for	  granted,	  we	  should	  not	  forget	  that	  this	  has	  been	  a	  societal	  achievement.	  However	  the	  possibility	  to	  express	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  current	   level	   of	   welfare	   or	   a	   case	   of	   misfortune	   should	   not	   be	   limited	   to	   the	  emotional	  level	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  world	  population.	  Nowadays,	  most	  people	  in	  the	  world	  can	  only	  change	  their	  current	  situation	  or	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  people	  they	  are	   concerned	  about	  by	  physical	   labour	  or	  by	  making	  use	  of	   their	  bodies.	  People	  that	  are	  unskilful	  with	  their	  bodies	  or	  whose	  body	  manifest	  endowments	  of	  scarce	  social	  appreciation,	  have	  hardly	  an	  option	  to	  do	  something	  to	  promote	  their	   cause.	   Here	   I	   do	   not	   want	   to	   put	   emphasis	   on	   actually	   succeeding,	   but	  merely	  on	  being	  able	  to	  undertake	  a	  considerable	  effort	  in	  that	  direction	  or,	  more	  colloquially,	  the	  possibility	  of	  “giving	  it	  a	  good	  try”.	  	  The	   great	   majority	   of	   the	   world’s	   population	   could	   do	   significantly	   more	   in	  helping	  the	  people	  they	  care	  about	  if	  they	  work	  in	  an	  environment	  that	  promotes	  the	  use	  of	   their	   intellectual	   faculties	  and	   facilitates	  peer	  evaluation	  of	   resulting	  ideas.	  The	  actual	  value	  of	  traditional	  knowledge,	  or	  parallel	  knowledge	  systems	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  cf.	  Rawls	  (1999),	  here	  I	  rely	  strongly	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Taylor	  (2004)	  and	  Dumitru	  (2008)	  107	  Rawls	  (1999),	  p.	  374	  108	  If	  we	  acknowledge	  John	  Harris’	  arguments	  to	  consider	  scientific	  participation	  as	  a	  duty	  (Harris	  2005;	  Chan	  and	  Harris	  2009),	  providing	  the	  necessary	  infrastructure	  will	  allow	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  people	  to	  discharge	  such	  duty,	  and	  this	  not	  only	  as	  research	  subjects	  but	  also	  as	  researching	  entities.	  109	  see	  Sayer	  (2011)	  with	  accompanying	  references.	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in	   general,	   for	   industrial	   and	   academic	   science	   is	   heavily	   debated.110	  However,	  treating	   as	   non-­‐existent	   contributions	   that	   are	   not	   using	   standardized	  nomenclature	  and	  written	  in	  customary	  “scientific	  style”	  obstructs	  the	  efforts	  of	  millions	  to	  increase	  social	  welfare.	  It	  also	  suggests	  that	  industrial	  and	  academic	  science	   has	   a	   far	   greater	   role	   in	   solving	   today’s	   problems	   than	   one	   should	  legitimately	  attribute	  it.	  	  Justifying	  inclusion	  from	  a	  capability	  “to	  actively	  care	  for	  others”	  perspective	  has	  also	  an	  additional	  advantage.	  Being	  motivated	  by	  wanting	  to	  help	  others,	  driven	  by	  a	  sense	  of	   fraternity,	  and	  choosing	  science	  as	  a	  vehicle	  to	  manifest	  concerns	  makes	  science	  a	  social	  enterprise.	  Practicing	  science	  for	  such	  a	  purpose	  has	  to	  be	  interwoven	  with	  the	  social	  context,	  demanding	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  knowledge	  of	  prior	  art	  as	   well	   as	   extensive	   research	   networks.	   Herewith	   the	   demand	   is	   to	   not	  understand	   science	   as	   a	   solitary	   occupation	   but	   emphasize	   its	   interactional	  character.	  While	  a	  sophisticated	  computer	  simulator	  could	  in	  theory	  secure	  the	  capability	  to	  use	  one’s	  senses	  and	  imagination,	  the	  possibility	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  society	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  ensuring	  the	  capability	  to	  actively	  care	  for	  others	  by	  using	  one’s	  intellect.111	  	  	  However	   the	   use	   of	   this	   capability	   has	   some	   shortcomings.	   First,	   if	   scientific	  participation	   possibilities	   are	   grounded	   on	   fulfilling	   the	   capability	   “to	   actively	  care	  for	  others”,	  those	  scientific	  enterprises	  will	  have	  to	  be	  bound	  to	  delivering	  products	   that	  directly	  benefit	  society.	  Scientists	  will	   thus	  not	  be	  able	   to	  pursue	  their	  curiosity	  as	  they	  like	  –	  a	  traditional	  scientific	   liberty	  will	  have	  to	  be	  given	  up.	   Second,	   if	   we	   ground	   inclusion	   in	   scientific	   enterprises	   on	   a	   capability	   “to	  actively	  care	  for	  others”	  we	  do	  not	  specify	  up	  to	  what	  level	  people	  have	  a	  right	  to	  be	   scientifically	   educated	  nor	   to	  which	   type	  of	   infrastructure	   they	   should	  have	  access	   to.	  At	   a	  minimum	   level,	   any	   contributor	   of	   a	   piece	   of	   knowledge	   that	   is	  absorbed	  by	  the	  scientific	  community	  is	  sharing	  in	  the	  advancement	  of	  science,	  thus	   enlarging	   the	   pool	   of	   knowledge	   from	  which	   socially	   relevant	   innovation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  cf.	  ICSU	  Study	  Group	  on	  Science	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  (2002)	  111	  We	  might	  consider	  facilitating	  wide	  scale	  migration	  of	  talented	  scientists	  to	  the	  developed	  world	  as	  a	  possible	  solution	  to	  the	  problem.	  However,	  we	  should	  test	  this	  solution	  with	  the	  liberty	  of	  being	  able	  to	  live	  in	  one’s	  social	  and	  cultural	  environment.	  Having	  to	  choose	  between	  the	  set	  of	  goods	  “family	  life,	  cultural	  and	  natural	  environment”	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  practising	  science	  on	  a	  higher	  level	  will	  question	  the	  real	  freedom	  involved	  in	  that	  choice.	  Living	  in	  a	  world	  of	  limited	  resources	  demands	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  flexibility	  on	  the	  scientist’s	  behalf,	  which	  has	  to	  be	  commensurate	  to	  the	  sophistication	  of	  the	  demanded	  infrastructure.	  We	  can	  thus	  ask	  people	  to	  move	  from	  a	  rural	  to	  an	  urban	  area	  for	  some	  highly	  specialized	  careers,	  in	  some	  cases	  even	  from	  one	  country	  to	  the	  other.	  Capacity-­‐building	  on	  tight	  budgets	  should	  aim	  at	  serving	  the	  greatest	  number	  of	  people,	  the	  selection	  of	  urban	  or	  rural	  locations	  for	  setting	  up	  research	  infrastructure	  should	  underlie	  this	  principle.	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can	  be	  developed.	  An	  indigenous	  community	  who	  has	  been	  victim	  of	  biopiracy	  is	  sharing	  in	  scientific	  advancement,	  even	  if	  deprived	  from	  moral	  interests	  such	  as	  attribution	  of	  authorship	  and	  eventual	  financial	  benefits.	  	  Since	   the	   obligations	   bound	   to	   securing	   the	   right	   to	   participate	   in	   scientific	  advancement	   will	   differ	   so	   drastically	   if	   society	   has	   to	   secure	   equality	   of	  opportunity	   in	   scientific	   careers	  while	  offering	   the	  necessary	   infrastructure,	   or	  merely	  a	  fair	  scientific	  assessment	  of	  contributions	  of	  knowledge,	  we	  will	  try	  to	  gain	  additional	  insights	  using	  recognition	  theories.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Recognizing	  the	  developing	  world	  as	  a	  partner	  	  Let	   us	   assume	   that	   we	   could	   have	   a	   much	   higher	   rate	   of	   innovation	   if	   the	  developed	   world	   would	   be	   the	   sole	   provider	   of	   technological	   solutions.	   Any	  effort	   for	   capacity-­‐building	   in	   developing	   countries	   would	   be	   relinquished	   in	  order	  to	  increase	  efficiency	  in	  scientific	  production	  in	  the	  developed	  world,	  and	  this	  under	  the	  benevolent	  argument,	  that	  the	  given	  distribution	  of	  research	  and	  development	   facilities	   leads	   to	   more	   people	   being	   able	   to	   enjoy	   the	   fruits	   of	  scientific	  progress	  worldwide.	  Conceding	  that	  there	  would	  be	  substantial	  welfare	  gains,	  some	  injustices	  would	  still	  be	  left	  unresolved.	  	  The	  resulting	  type	  of	  contentious	  relationship	  fits	  normatively	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  the	  social	  problems	  of	  misrecognition,	  particularly	  the	  sort	  identified	  by	  Nancy	  Fraser	  under	  failing	  to	  recognize	  someone	  or	  a	  community	  as	  a	  peer.112	  	  The	   controversial	   issues	   surrounding	   the	   problem	   of	   recognition	   and	   its	  response	  are	   legion.	  First,	  global	  hazards	  are	  currently	  only	  tackled	  by	  a	  highly	  select	  section	  of	  the	  global	  community.	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  second	  problem,	  when	  people	  cannot	  mutually	  influence	  each	  other	  a	  biased	  perception	  of	  dependency	  is	  developed.	  Third,	   this	   feeling	  of	  dependency	   is	  not	   fully	   justified;	  humans	  by	  nature	  tend	  to	  skilfully	  adapt	  tools	  to	  their	  needs	  while	  using	  them.	  Innovation	  occurs	   everywhere	   –	   recognition	   thereof	   not.	   And	   lastly,	   some	   changes	   in	  distribution	  have	  to	  take	  place	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  future	  recognition	  as	  peers.	  	  	  I	  will	  start	  with	  the	  first	  two	  points.	  The	  world	  we	  share	  with	  poor	  and	  rich	  alike	  as	   well	   as	   our	   bodies	   that	   share	   a	   common	   constitution	   are	   vulnerable	   to	   a	  variety	  of	  similar	  threats.	  Climate	  change	  and	  AIDS/HIV	  are	  perhaps	  two	  of	  the	  most	   prominent	   global	   hazards	   we	   currently	   face.	   While	   those	   hazards	   are	  global,	   the	   development	   of	   technological	   solutions	   occurs	   only	   in	   limited	   and	  exclusive	   communities.	   As	   those	   objects	   of	   innovation	   often	   facilitate	   the	  fulfilment	   of	   basic	   needs,	   the	   resulting	   relationship	   can	   be	   labelled	   as	   one	   of	  dependency.	  A	  picture	  of	  the	  developed	  world	  rescuing	  over	  and	  over	  again	  the	  global	   poor	   from	   naturally	   occurring	   and	   self-­‐inflicted	   problems	   becomes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  cf.	  Fraser	  (1998)	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inevitable.	  This	  can	  hardly	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  relationship	  among	  equals.	  If	  people	  are	   not	   able	   to	  mutually	   assist	   each	   other	   they	  will	   inevitably	   fail	   to	   see	   each	  other	  as	  peers.	  Especially	  in	  the	  area	  of	  science	  and	  engineering	  we	  have	  a	  huge	  potential	  to	  assist	  each	  other	  notwithstanding	  cultural	  differences.	  The	  objective	  treatment	  of	  knowledge	  permits	  a	  dialogue	  that	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  culture	  would	  be	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  attain.	  	  The	  provision	  of	  a	  technical	  solution	  by	  one	  part	  of	  the	  world,	  i.e.	  the	  deliberate	  creation	  of	  a	  public	  good,	  may	  engender	  in	  the	  other	  part	  of	  the	  world	  a	  wish	  to	  reciprocate	   that	   will	   be	   difficult,	   if	   not	   impossible,	   to	   realize.	   Being	   without	  means	  might	  alleviate	  this	   felt	  burden,	  but	  nevertheless	  perpetuate	  a	  unilateral	  sense	  of	  debt.	  	  	  In	   a	   certain	   way,	   it	   is	   inevitable	   that	   some	   dependency	   endures.	   The	   mere	  existence	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  for	  inventions	  allows	  temporary	  monopolies.	  If	  the	  invention	  is	  a	  necessity	  –	  an	  object	  that	  helps	  people	  to	  secure	  their	  basic	  needs	  –	  dependency	  is	  the	  outcome.	  Nevertheless,	  we	  should	  still	  question	  a	  global	  social	  structure	   that	  systematically	   favours	  a	  specific	   type	  of	   innovation	  (i.e.	   the	  ones	  that	  are	  patentable)	  and	  innovating	  (proprietary	  research	  models)	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  grassroots	   innovation,	   advances	   in	   traditional	   farming	   and	   generally	   non-­‐proprietary	   research	   practices.	   Therefore,	   the	   traditional	   methods	   of	  incremental	  improvements	  may	  be	  a	  more	  beneficial	  approach,	  especially	  if	  they	  are	  the	  only	  ones	  feasible	  for	  the	  major	  part	  of	  the	  world’s	  population.	  	  There	   is	   a	   substantial	   difference	   between	   sustaining	   a	   group	   in	   need	   and	  perpetuating	  dependency.	  Situations	  of	  dependency	  that	  are	  preventable	  should	  not	   be	   judged	   on	   the	   same	   basis	   as	   inevitable	   dependency.	   Any	   policies	   that	  deliberately	   retard	   or	   hinder	   the	   efforts	   of	   some	   groups	   in	   gaining	   self-­‐sustainability	  should	  be	  judged	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  limit	  self-­‐determination.	  	  Awareness	  of	  one’s	  own	  or	   the	  other	  parties’	  dependency	  has	  also	  some	  major	  effects	  in	  the	  economy,	  especially	  when	  bargaining	  agreements	  or	  settling	  sales	  contracts.	   The	   history	   of	   political	   economy	   has	   shown	   us	   that	   by	   fostering	  technological	   development	   states	   can	   gain	   a	   much	   stronger	   advantage	   in	  increasing	  the	  exchange	  ratio	  of	  their	  people’s	   labour	  hours	  than	  by	  continuing	  to	   produce	   or	   extract	   traditional	   goods.113	  This	   will	   leave	   people	   who	   abstain	  from	  technological	  innovation	  in	  a	  permanent	  position	  of	  disadvantage.	  	  We	   can	   nevertheless	   think	   of	   institutional	   arrangements	   that	   could	   lift	   this	  disadvantage,	   leaving	   questions	   of	   feasibility	   completely	   aside.	   A	  world	  where	  such	  disadvantages	  are	  neutralized	  would	  still	  be	  a	  place	  where	  one	  society	  can	  offer	  products	  that	  the	  other	  society	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  produce,	  as	  it	  will	  lack	  the	  infrastructure	   and	   necessary	   know-­‐how.	   It	  will	   be	   a	   place	  where	   one	   group	   is	  obliged	   to	   engage	   in	   exchanges	   while	   the	   other	   can	   trade	   just	   if	   it	   sees	   an	  advantage	  in	  doing	  so.	  Intellectual	  property,	  creating	  artificial	  scarcity,	  not	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  cf.	  Drahos	  and	  Braithwaite	  (2003)	  and	  Galeano	  (1971/2008)	  
	   50	  
grants	  exclusive	  rights,	  but	  also	  counts	  as	  a	  publicly	  documented	  proof	  of	  being	  the	   sole	   legal	  provider	  of	   a	  given	  asset.	  This	   is	   an	  advantage	  natural	   resources	  generally	   do	   not	   have	   –	   something	   that	   comes	   at	   quite	   a	   high	   price	   when	  bargaining	   for	  a	   fairer	  deal	  and	   for	   felt	   indispensability.	   In	   terms	  of	  productive	  capacity,	  some	  states	  could	  vanish	  altogether	  without	  causing	  disruption	   in	  the	  others’	  daily	  life.	  	  	  Continuing	   with	   the	   third	   point.	   There	   is	   a	   huge	   amount	   of	   unacknowledged	  reciprocity	  for	  inventions	  placed	  in	  technology-­‐dependent	  societies.	  Developers	  of	   technologies	   gain	  many	   insights	   from	   their	  users.	   It	   lies	   in	  human	  nature	   to	  develop	  and	  adapt	  tools.	  When	  people	  start	  using	  inventions	  made	  by	  others,	  it	  will	  not	  take	  much	  time	  until	  they	  find	  new	  uses.	  In	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  true	  that	  a	  community	   is	  solely	  a	  technology	  receiver,	  and	  not	  a	  co-­‐inventor	  or	  technology	  adapter,	  inventiveness	  would	  not	  only	  have	  to	  be	  neglected,	  but	  even	  prohibited	  and	   severely	   sanctioned.	   As	   this	   is	   hardly	   enforceable,	   leaving	   aside	   its	  desirability	   as	   a	   target,	   the	   distinction	   between	   technology	   receivers	   and	  technology	   producers	   will	   always	   be	   artificial	   in	   absolute	   terms.	   Maintaining	  such	   labels	   inevitably	   leads	   to	   a	   situation	   where	   some	   inventiveness	   is	   not	  recognized	  as	  such.	  Furthermore,	   inventions	  are	  not	  placed	  in	  an	  abstract	  environment.	  Knowledge	  and	  innovative	  potential	  will	  be	  available	  in	  the	  habitat	  in	  which	  a	  technology	  is	  released.	   Rarely	   inventions	   are	   released	   in	   an	   environment	   where	   no	  predecessors	   are	   available.	   Generally	   in	   agriculture,	   new	   methods	   and	   seed	  varieties	   replace	   local	   practices	   and	   this	   is	   not	   always	   superseding	   the	  performance	  of	  earlier	  established	  systems.	  This	  tendency	  to	  ignore	  indigenous	  knowledge,	   or	   regard	   it	   in	   advance	   as	   inferior,	   is	   felt	   as	   an	   insult	   for	   many	  indigenous	   innovators.	   Often	   local	   knowledge	   is	   denied	   as	   a	   result	   of	   power	  differentials,	   the	   stronger	   party	   having	   the	   ability	   to	   decide	  whose	   knowledge	  counts	  as	   significant	  –	  an	   issue	  overly	  present	   in	  development	  projects.114	  This	  problem	  is	  accentuated	  with	  the	  tendency	  to	  treat	  indigenous	  knowledge	  as	  one	  type	  of	  knowledge	  system,	  while	   industrial	  and	  academic	  knowledge	  represent	  another	  system.	  It	   is	  common	  to	  see	  the	  two	  as	  strictly	  separated	  systems;	  that	  those	   systems	   may	   overlap	   or	   be	   of	   porous	   transition	   is	   something	   few	   take	  notice	   off.	   The	   idea	   that	   knowledge	   production	   systems	   outside	   academia	   and	  industry	   have	   to	   be	   first	   checked	   using	   scientific	  method	   is	  widespread	   in	   the	  developed	  world.115	  	  Identifying	  one	  part	  of	  the	  world	  as	  the	  one	  that	  advances	  science	  and	  develops	  technology	   and	   the	   other	   part	   of	   the	   world	   as	   mere	   recipient,	   nurtures	   an	  atmosphere	   where	   any	   person	   coming	   from	   outside	   the	   established	   circles	   is	  perceived	   as	   being	   less	   worthy	   of	   attention.	   When	   academic	   or	   industry	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  cf.	  Dübgen	  (2012)	  115	  cf.	  Agrawal	  (1995)	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emblems	  make	  a	  much	  stronger	  case	   for	   judging	   the	   time	  one	  should	   invest	   in	  critically	  analysing	  a	  new	  proposal,	  than	  past	  performances	  or	  knowledge	  of	  the	  local	  environment,	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  discrimination.	  	  	  	  And	   finally,	   setting	   aside	   enough	   resources	   for	   capacity-­‐building	   in	   order	   to	  distribute	   more	   evenly	   research	   and	   development	   facilities	   around	   the	   world	  could	  help	  remedy	  the	  here	  denounced	  situation	  of	  injustice.	  This	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  situation	   where	   every	   society	   can	   offer	   the	   other	   something	   that	   they	  momentarily	  will	   not	   be	   able	   to	   produce	   themselves.	   Even	   if	  what	   a	   society	   is	  producing	   amounts	   to	   little,	   this	   might	   be	   enough	   to	   lose	   the	   stigma	   of	   being	  labelled	  (or	   identifying	  oneself)	  as	  strictly	  dependent	  to	  the	  less	  uncomfortable	  position	  of	  being	  in	  the	  need	  of	  assistance.116	  	  Capacity-­‐building	  will	  also	  have	  to	  tackle	  another	  very	  broad	  problem:	  the	  issue	  of	   testimonial	   justice	   as	   identified	   by	   Miranda	   Fricker. 117 	  Scientists	   and	  technology	   developers	   in	   academia	   and	   industry	   adjust	   their	   work	   not	   only	  towards	   financial	   incentives,	  but	  also	   to	  reach	  peer	  recognition	  and	  gain	  group	  identity.	   The	   pursuit	   of	   this	   latter	   goal	   has	   the	   effect	   that	   a	   special	   jargon	   and	  working	   methods	   are	   developed.	   People	   not	   communicating	   in	   this	   jargon	   or	  using	  different	  methods	  become	  for	  established	  scientists	  harder	  to	  understand	  and	   to	  dialogue	  with	   than	   their	  habitual	  peers.	  Familiarity	  with	  certain	   subject	  matters	  creates	  a	  feeling	  of	  expertise,	  which	  completely	  new	  approaches	  do	  not	  provide.	  Radical	  changes	  demand	  much	  more	  concentration	   from	  the	  recipient.	  In	   order	   to	   guarantee	   fair	   evaluation,	   we	   not	   only	   have	   to	   stop	   depending	  exclusively	  on	  established	  practices,	  but	  also	  consciously	  dedicate	  more	  time	  to	  evaluate	  unfamiliar	  forms	  of	  expression.	  	  	  	  	  There	  is	  another	  element	  why	  participation	  in	  science	  is	  an	  important	  issue.	  By	  being	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  science	  one	  asserts	  a	  certain	  influence	  in	  its	  form	  and	  direction.	   Science	   and	   the	   products	   that	   become	   available	   with	   its	   progress,	  shape	  profoundly	  our	  daily	   lives;	   consistency	  with	  democratic	   values	  demands	  that	   those	  principles	  are	  dispersed	   into	   this	  sphere	   too.	  The	  direction	  research	  agendas	  take	  will	  have	  a	  strong	  effect	  on	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  future	  world.	  There	  is	  a	  democratic	  interest	  in	  having	  a	  say	  regarding	  what	  role	  technology	  should	  play	  in	  the	  future	  and	  not	  completely	  surrendered	  to	  decisions	  made	  by	  others.	  	  Proprietary	   science	   has	   made	   it	   almost	   impossible	   for	   economically	   poor	  aspiring	   participants	   to	   access	   the	   tools	   and	   fruits	   of	   scientific	   research	   and	  practice.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   it	   has	   become	   the	   predominant	  mode	   of	   practicing	  science	   and	   with	   the	   help	   of	   digital	   technologies	   this	   type	   of	   science	   has	   also	  become	   enormously	   networked.	   Despite	   the	   mentioned	   deficiencies,	   the	  protection	  of	   intellectual	  property	  rights	  has	  created	  incentives	  for	   investing	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  cf.	  Fraser	  and	  Gordon	  (1994)	  117	  Fricker	  (2007)	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research	   and	   development,	   as	   well	   as	   created	   the	   necessary	   guarantees	   for	  industry	   to	  be	   able	   to	  disclose	   information	   related	   to	   an	   invention.	  The	  patent	  system’s	   novelty	   and	   non-­‐obviousness	   requirements	   however	   are	   constantly	  pushing	   scientific	   research	   towards	   its	   limits.	   Science	   under	   this	   incentive	  mechanism	  moves	  towards	  meeting	  in	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  manner	  a	  specific	  range	   of	   research	   targets	   that	   are	   compatible	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   reaching	  patentability	   requirements	   and	   ultimately	   market	   value.	   This	   has	   the	  consequence	  that	  many	  research	  interests	  that	  are	  scientific,	  but	  fall	  outside	  the	  reach	   of	   the	   incentives	   of	   proprietary	   science,	   are	   left	   unattended	   or	   do	   not	  receive	   proper	   care.	   The	   lack	   of	   attention	   given	   to	   those	   research	   fields	   is	  vulnerable	  to	  being	  perceived	  and	  interpreted	  as	  not	  being	  of	  equivalent	  merit.	  Here	   the	  market	   has	   become	   the	   entity	   that	   selects	   research	   agendas118	  –	   in	   a	  world	  of	  extreme	  economic	  inequalities,	  a	  strongly	  undemocratic	  mechanism.	  As	  so	  few	  people	  can	  influence	  research	  agendas	  through	  scientific	  participation,	  we	  have	   to	   consider	   alternative	  models	   or	   at	   least	   offer	   a	   strong	   enough	   parallel	  system	  that	  is	  able	  to	  rebalance	  the	  overall	  innovation	  system	  to	  add	  democratic	  legitimacy	  to	  it.	  Recent	  scholarship	  offers	  a	  variety	  of	  amelioration	  proposals119	  and	   open	   innovation	   models	   have	   greatly	   enhanced	   the	   input	   possibilities	   of	  different	   communities	   and	   individuals,	   such	   as	   amateur	   and	   retired	   scientists	  and	   indigenous	   innovators.	   Especially	   the	   global	   poor	   are	   in	   dire	   need	   of	   a	  system	  that	  reviews	  science	  and	  the	  resulting	  end-­‐products	  with	  social	  welfare	  as	  the	  judging	  parameter	  and	  not	  with	  a	  sole	  emphasis	  on	  possible	  marketability.	  	  In	  the	  spirit	  of	  democratic	  principles,	  people	  should	  have	  the	  right	  to	  participate	  on	  equal	  terms	  in	  the	  decision	  over	  what	  rights	  they	  should	  have	  over	  the	  access	  possibilities,	   shape	   and	   direction	   of	   future	   technologies	   and	   science.	   Having	   a	  larger	   circle	   of	   participants	  will	   provide	   a	   higher	   diversity	   in	   end	   products.120	  Without	  this	  higher	  diversity	  people	  will	  be	  limited	  in	  having	  to	  accept	  products	  (and	  methods)	  that	  were	  already	  preselected	  by	  others	  who	  not	  necessarily	  live	  up	   to	   the	   same	   set	   of	   values	   –	   a	   situation	   where	   “real	   choice”	   has	   limited	  meaning.	   As	   a	   last	   point,	   any	   active	   exclusion	   of	   people	   will	   be	   felt	   as	   an	  offense.121	  Here	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   remove	   any	   unnecessary	   barriers	   that	   could	  hinder	   participation	   possibilities.	   Some	   barriers	   might	   still	   be	   necessary	   to	  maintain	   a	   high	   level	   of	   scientific	   output;	   here	  we	   can	   count	   elements	   such	   as	  having	   common	   nominators	   for	   naming	   natural	   and	   artificial	   objects	   and	   the	  freedom	  to	  treat	  knowledge	  instrumentally	  (something	  that	  might	  interfere	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  sacred	  knowledge)	  as	  necessary	  for	  a	  swifter	  progress.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  cf.	  O'Neill	  (1990)	  119	  examples	  are	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008),	  Love	  and	  Hubbard	  (2007)	  and	  Gupta	  (2006)	  120	  Here	  we	  may	  think	  of	  the	  reintroduction	  of	  Chinese	  traditional	  medicine	  and	  the	  new	  willingness	  to	  assess	  unfamiliar	  treatment	  methods	  after	  the	  monopoly	  standing	  of	  Western	  medicine	  was	  broken.	  	  121	  In	  this	  passage	  my	  argumentation	  is	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  Waldron	  (1998).	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  Science,	   as	   mentioned,	   can	   play	   a	   vital	   role	   in	   improving	   the	   situation	   of	   the	  world’s	  poorest,	  and	  also	  the	  wealthiest,	  people.	  Due	  to	  this	  capacity,	   there	  is	  a	  risk	  in	  seeing	  science	  as	  having	  a	  purely	  instrumental	  function.	  When	  perceiving	  science	  as	  a	  societal	  tool,	  we	  have	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  we	  affect	  the	  dynamic	  of	  scientific	   progress.	   The	   recognition-­‐seeking	   scientist	   generally	   adapts	   her	  behaviour	   to	  match	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	   agent	   whose	   recognition	   is	   aimed	  for.122	  Nowadays,	  most	  scientists	  are	  seeking	  the	  recognition	  of	  researchers	  from	  industry	  and	  academia.	  The	  moment	  scientists	  start	  to	  seek	  societal	  recognition,	  rather	  than	  only	  close	  peer	  recognition,	  research	  agendas	  change	  in	  order	  to	  aim	  at	  satisfying	  any	  diverging	  expectations.	  	  
Prioritizing	  participation	  or	  access	  	  Enjoying	   the	   benefits	   of	   scientific	   advancement	   does	   not	   constitute	   a	   single-­‐standing	   right,	   but	   allows	  up	   to	   a	   certain	   extent	   the	   fulfilment	  of	   other	  human	  rights,	  particularly	  the	  right	  to	  health	  and	  the	  right	  to	  food.	  Further,	  being	  able	  to	  share	  in	  the	  advancement	  of	  science	  for	  a	  prolonged	  time	  presupposes	  that	  the	  two	   latter	   rights	   have	   been	   met.	   A	   very	   sick	   person	   suffering	   hunger	   can	  contribute	  little	  to	  science.	  It	  can	  be	  said	  that	  one	  right	  is	  dependent	  upon	  having	  the	  other	  rights	  satisfied.123	  We	  can	  go	  even	  a	  step	  further	  and	  say	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  people	  need	  to	  have	  benefited	  from	  science	  before	  being	  able	  to	  take	  part	  in	  science.	  This	  prerequisite	  being	  twofold,	  one	  not	  only	  needs	  to	  have	  access	  to	  medicines,	  to	  take	  an	  example,	  but	  also	  have	  access	  to	  prior	  scientific	  knowledge	  for	  one’s	  input	  to	  be	  meaningful,	  this	  being	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  being	  able	  to	  access	  research	  networks	  and	  scientific	  infrastructure.	  Exceptions	  to	  this	  rule	  are	  extremely	  rare.	  	  Let	   us	   imagine	   three	   possible	   worlds.	   One,	   where	   any	   effort	   in	   incentivizing	  people	  to	  engage	  in	  science	  is	  put	  aside	  in	  order	  to	  use	  all	  available	  resources	  to	  ensure	  that	  every	  person	  can	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	  of	  existing	  fruits	  of	   innovation.	  The	   second	   is	   a	  world	  where	   it	   is	   held	   to	   be	  more	   efficient	   to	   enhance	   global	  social	  welfare	   if	   only	   one	   particular	   group	   of	   the	  world	   concentrates	   in	   taking	  part	   in	   science	   while	   everybody	   is	   allowed	   to	   benefit	   from	   this	   group’s	  contribution.	  The	  third	  scenario	  is	  a	  world	  where	  a	  special	  emphasis	  is	  made	  on	  building	  up	  scientific	  infrastructure,	  while	  neglecting	  efforts	  to	  make	  the	  fruits	  of	  scientific	  progress	  promptly	  available	  to	  the	  poor.	  Elaborating	  those	  theoretical	  worlds	  can	  give	  us	  some	  insights	  on	  how	  to	  judge	  proposals	  and	  movements	  that	  aim	  to	  alleviate	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  intellectual	  property	  regimes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  O'Neill	  (1998)	  123	  cf.	  Shue	  (1996)	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To	  clarify	  the	  controversy	  of	  prioritization,	  I	  will	  elaborate	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  such	  worlds	   starting	  with	   the	   first	   one.	  This	  position	   considers	   large-­‐scale	   scientific	  projects,	   examples	   often	   referred	   to	   are	   the	   International	   Space	   Station	   and	  particle	  accelerators,	  as	   luxuries	  civil	  society	  should	  condemn	  while	  people	  are	  massively	  dying	  from	  hunger	  and	  disease.	  Often	  ignored	  is	  that	  the	  efficacy	  and	  usefulness	   of	   a	   technology	   depends	   upon	   the	   environment	   it	   is	   placed	   into.	  Weeds,	  bacteria	  and	  other	  organisms	  develop	  resistance	  to	  agents	  that	  attempt	  to	  combat	  them	  –	  a	  phenomenon	  most	  prominently	  characterized	  by	  pathogens	  developing	   resistance	   to	   antibiotics124.	   Then	   we	   also	   have	   changing	   natural	  habitats	   due	   to	   climate	   change	   and	   raising	   pollutants	   levels.	   Stalling	   scientific	  progress	  means	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  technologies	  retrogression	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  	  This	   policy	   is	   particularly	   demanding	   for	   the	   better-­‐off	   circle	   of	   people	   among	  the	   current	   generation.	   They	   will	   not	   be	   able	   to	   improve	   their	   well-­‐being	   by	  developing	   new	   tools	   through	   scientific	   methods	   and	   this	   partly	   due	   to	   the	  previous	  generations’	  policies	  of	  not	  taking	  sufficient	  regard	  for	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  worse-­‐off.	  The	  more	  time	  is	  needed	  to	  ensure	  widespread	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  science	  the	  more	  demanding	  this	  position	  becomes	  for	  the	  better-­‐off.	  Such	   a	   standpoint	   limits	   a	   higher	   aggregate	   welfare	   in	   order	   to	   increase	   the	  welfare	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off.125	  The	  ICESCR	  states	  in	  article	  11.1	  however,	  that	  being	  able	   to	   work	   towards	   the	   “continuous	   improvement	   of	   living	   conditions”	   is	   a	  fundamental	   right.	   Arguably,	   this	   article	   would	   give	   the	   individual	   scientist	  enough	   room	   to	   better	   her	   own	   position,	   even	   in	   cases	   where	   strict	  prioritarianism	  would	  morally	  demand	  to	  focus	  one’s	  efforts	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off.	  	  	  The	   second	   situation	   is	   a	   world	   that	   aims	   at	   leaving	   people	   above	   a	   certain	  threshold	   line	   in	   terms	   of	   welfare.	   It	   can	   have	   two	   moral	   justifications.	   A	  sufficientarian	   explanation	   that	   welcomes	   the	   needy	   to	   benefit	   from	   the	  advancement	   of	   science,	   but	   sees	   participation	   in	   scientific	   enterprises	   as	  something	  beyond	  basic	  necessities	  –	  to	  put	  it	  bluntly,	  as	  a	  luxury	  people	  can	  be	  excluded	   from	  without	  moral	   scruple.	   Or,	  more	   benignly,	   explained	   by	   a	   strict	  appeal	   to	   urgency	   towards	   alleviating	   the	   position	   of	   the	   worst	   off	   while	  perceiving	  the	  availability	  of	  resources	  as	  limited.	  In	  this	  case	  capacity-­‐building	  in	   the	   poor	   regions	   of	   the	   world	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   luxury	   one	   cannot	   justify	   while	  people	  are	  starving	  or	  suffering	  diseases	  that	  science	  could	  cure	  or	  prevent.	  This	  position	   relies	   strongly	   on	   the	   assumptions	   that	   resources	   are	   limited	   and	  limited	   to	   a	   particular	   level.	   However	   one	   should	   differentiate	   between	  resources	  that	  are	  limited	  per	  se	  and	  resources	  that	  are	  limited	  due	  to	  resource	  allocation	   decisions	   that	   especially	   developed	   countries	   can	   influence	   or	   have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  cf.	  Outterson	  (2005)	  125	  cf.	  Parfit	  (1997)	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previously	  made.126	  Even	   if	   efficiency	   is	   the	   sole	   determinant	   for	   such	   a	   policy	  decision,	   one	   cannot	   escape	   as	   a	   society	   from	   having	   to	   defend	   why	   one	   has	  chosen	  to	  allocate	  insufficient	  resources	  to	  address	  both	  distresses.	  	  	  Our	   third	   hypothetical	   scenario	   is	   a	   world	   in	   which	   capacity-­‐building	   is	  prioritized	   over	   a	   widespread	   access	   to	   the	   objects	   of	   innovation.	   For	   such	  position	   to	   survive	  Rawls’	  Difference	  Principle	   capacity-­‐building	   has	   to	   lead	   to	  enough	   fruits	   to	   leave	   the	  worst-­‐off	   in	   a	   better	   position.	   As	   ensuring	   access	   is	  neglected	   under	   this	   approach	   a	   strong	   emphasis	   on	   the	   production	   of	   public	  goods	  has	  to	  be	  set	  to	  ensure	  that	  enough	  benefits	  reach	  the	  worst-­‐off,	  something	  that	  again	  will	  limit	  the	  freedom	  to	  take	  part	  in	  scientific	  advancement	  by	  having	  to	  carefully	  select	  research	  agendas.	  Capacity-­‐building	  will	  also	  have	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  inventions	  which	  can	  be	  either	  acquired	  or	  duplicated	  by	  the	  global	  poor.	  	  	  This	   position	   becomes	   highly	   controversial,	   if	   we	   take	   into	   consideration	   that	  enjoying	   the	   benefits	   of	   science	   in	   order	   to	   stay	   healthy	   or	   ensure	   one’s	  nutritional	  requirements	  is	  something	  necessary	  to	  be	  able	  to	  enjoy	  other	  rights	  and	  a	  prosperous	  life.	  Millions	  of	  people	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  share	  in	  science	  as	  malnutrition	   in	   the	   first	   years	   of	   their	   lives	   hampered	   their	   full	   brain	  development.	   In	  addition	  to	  that,	   taking	  part	   in	  scientific	  progress	   is	  a	   freedom	  only	   few	   people	   make	   use	   of,	   an	   even	   a	   tinier	   group	   would	   consider	   it	   as	   an	  essential	  part	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  one’s	  ideal	  of	  a	  good	  life.	  	  An	  outright	  reality	  check	   impedes	  us	  to	  believe	  that	  science	  on	   its	  own,	  even	   if	  heavily	   subsidized,	   could	   significantly	   improve	   the	   situation	   of	   the	   world’s	  poorest	  inhabitants.	  Great	  initiatives	  that	  foster	  grassroots	  innovation	  and	  open	  science	   will	   still	   have	   to	   be	   supported	   by	   organizations	   that	   make	   previous	  innovations	  accessible	  to	  the	  poorest	  members	  of	  society.	  	  	  Practicing	   science	   and	   being	   involved	   in	   product	   development	   encourages	   an	  active	  use	  of	  one’s	  mental	  capacities	  and	  builds	  up	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  people	  that	  become	  aware	  of	  unknown	  consequences	  and	  also	  potentials	  of	  technologies	  in	  use.	  While	   asking	  oneself	   the	  question	  of	  which	   element	   should	  be	  prioritized,	  access	   to	   the	   benefits	   or	   inclusion	   in	   meaningful	   projects,	   one	   has	   to	   keep	   in	  mind	   the	   huge	   inequalities	   and	   levels	   of	   deprivation	   people	   in	   the	  world	   face.	  Further,	  we	  should	  also	   consider	   the	  possibility	  of	   refusing	   to	  prioritize	  any	  of	  the	   two	   elements	   as	   a	   strategy.	   Facilitating	   the	   prospects	   of	   participating	   in	  scientific	   projects	   will	   primarily	   benefit	   people	   in	   the	   social	   middle	   class127.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Timmermann	  and	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2012b);	  (2013)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  5]	  criticize	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  proposal	  on	  this	  point	  for	  making	  a	  too	  broad	  commitment	  towards	  political	  feasibility.	  	  	  127	  Here	  I	  understand	  “social	  middle	  class”	  as	  the	  group	  of	  people	  who	  have	  their	  basic	  needs	  met	  and	  enjoy	  a	  small	  surplus	  that	  enables	  them	  to	  undertake	  risks	  (i.e.	  to	  try	  out	  new	  possibilities)	  without	  too	  much	  distress.	  An	  example	  would	  be	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Those	   people	   are	   not	   the	   very	   poor,	   however	   they	   are	   also	   not	   the	   main	  beneficiaries	  of	  existing	  inequalities	  nor	  do	  they	  share	  the	  full	  responsibility	  for	  the	   world’s	   institutional	   injustices.	   Developing	   and	   building	   up	   research	  infrastructure	   can	   help	   a	   significant	   number	   of	   those	   people	   to	   pursue	   their	  conception	  of	  a	  good	  life.	  However,	  the	  level	  of	  deprivation	  we	  currently	  face	  is	  extreme,	  making	  it	  justifiable	  to	  set	  aside	  such	  efforts	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  ensure	  a	  wider	  access	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  science.	  Such	  benefits	  however	  have	  to	  match	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  global	  poor,	  a	  situation	  we	  are	  currently	  very	  far	  away	  from,	  as	  the	  so-­‐called	  “10/90	  gap”	  in	  pharmaceutical	  research	  epitomizes.128	  Sharing	  benefits	  that	  only	  show	  welfare-­‐improving	  characteristics	  for	  people	  who	  already	  have	  a	  high	   standard	   of	   living	   would	   not	   substantially	   meliorate	   the	   situation	   of	   the	  worst-­‐off.	   A	   prioritarian	   position	   permits	   restricting	   scientific	   participation	  possibilities	   as	   long	   as	  doing	   so	   effectively	   raises	   the	  position	  of	   the	  worst-­‐off.	  Urgency	  makes	  high	  reductions	  of	  aggregate	  welfare	  acceptable,	  e.g.	  by	  lowering	  the	  position	  of	  best-­‐off,	   if	   this	   is	   the	  only	  way	  to	  ensure	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  people	  with	  basic	  needs	  met.	  	  	  	  
Justifying	  capacity-­‐building:	  Cooperative	  justice	  	  One	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  extending	  intellectual	  property	  protection	  globally	  is	  to	  make	  people	   be	   able	   to	   benefit	   from	   the	   fruits	   of	   their	   intellectual	   labour.	  We	   could	  even	   consider	   the	   possibility	   of	   doing	   so	   as	   a	   new	   global	   public	   good.	   This	  statement	   may	   arouse	   immediate	   controversies	   from	   different	   parties.	   Only	   a	  minority	   of	   intellectual	   labourers	   are	   able	   to	   live	   from	   the	   fruits	   of	  what	   they	  produce.	  Which	   inventions	  will	   become	   lucrative,	   and	  who	  will	   be	   able	   to	   live	  from	  them,	  has	  less	  to	  do	  with	  desert	  than	  with	  circumstances	  the	  individual	  has	  no	  control	  over.	  Coming	  up	  independently	  with	  the	  same	  invention	  the	  day	  later	  bears	  no	  fruits	  one	  has	  claims	  on.129	  Closer	  to	  reality	  would	  be	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  recognition	  of	  intellectual	  property	  amounts	  to	  a	  common	  good,	  since	  it	  merely	  allows	  some	  scientist	  to	  live	  from	  some	  of	  their	  work.	  	  The	  possibility	  of	  being	  able	   to	  generate	   income	  from	  scientific	  work	  has	  some	  great	   benefits	   for	   scientific	   independence	   and	   industry,	   but	   the	   practical	  effectuation	  of	  this	  freedom	  by	  some	  has	  considerable	  negative	  effects	  on	  others.	  What	   are	   the	   negative	   externalities	   of	   people	   enjoying	   on	   massive	   scale	   this	  opportunity?	  Here	  it	  becomes	  critical	  to	  establish	  if	  those	  negative	  externalities	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  small	  farmer	  that	  after	  securing	  her	  basic	  necessities	  has	  still	  some	  additional	  seeds	  left	  to	  test	  a	  new	  agricultural	  method.	  	  128	  This	  is	  the	  situation	  where	  only	  10%	  of	  the	  world’s	  resources	  are	  used	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  that	  primarily	  affect	  90%	  of	  the	  earth’s	  population,	  cf.	  Drugs	  for	  Neglected	  Diseases	  Working	  Group	  (2001).	  129	  cf.	  Nozick	  (1974)	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are	   due	   to	   lack	   of	   adaptation	   to	   new	   possibilities,	   i.e.	   the	   price	   of	  maintaining	  antiquated	  practices,	  or	  indeed	  amount	  to	  unfair	  advantage	  taking.	  	  Economic	   poverty,	   as	   mentioned	   throughout	   this	   article,	   limits	   participation	  under	  proprietary	  science	  models,	  thus	  hiding	  to	  the	  world	  the	  real	  potential	  the	  economic	   poor	   have	   to	   bring	   out	   innovative	   ideas	   and	   disclose	   their	   scientific	  observations.	   There	   are	   strong	   arguments	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   use	   of	   intellectual	  property	   rights	  as	   introduced	  with	   the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	   (1994)	  does	  not	  only	  amount	  to	  unfair	  advantage	  taking	  but	  that	  the	  advantageous	  position	  that	  came	  with	   the	   imposition	   of	   the	   agreement	   was	   foreseeable	   and	   some	   would	   even	  argue	   premeditated. 130 	  The	   treaty	   comes	   at	   a	   high	   price	   for	   grassroots	  innovators	  and	  people	  choosing	  to	  participate	  in	  science	  under	  a	  different	  set	  of	  principles.	   Many	   of	   those	   researchers	   are	   actively	   engaged	   in	   developing	  technical	   solutions	   for	   the	   problems	   of	   the	   poor.	   As	   fairer	   methods	   of	  incentivizing	   innovation	  are	  conceivable,131	  but	  have	  not	  been	   institutionalized,	  keeping	   our	   patent	   regime	   demands	   a	   justification	   to	   the	   people	   suffering	   its	  negative	  consequences.	  Those	  people	  are	  scientists	  and	  technology	  developers	  of	  resource-­‐scarce	  countries	  and,	  most	  severely,	  the	  global	  poor.	  	  	  Apart	   from	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   problems	   that	   affect	   the	   liberties	   of	   the	  individual	  person,	  there	  are	  some	  specific	  global	  justice	  concerns	  that	  require	  a	  structural	   reform.	   The	   intellectual	   property	   regimes	   as	   they	   stand,	   face	   the	  charge	  of	  harming	  the	  global	  poor	  and	  as	  we	  –	  the	  affluent	  citizens	  of	  the	  world	  –	  have	   established	   those	   regimes,	   we	   owe	   the	   global	   poor	   compensation.132	  The	  two	   most	   apparent	   harms,	   as	   discussed	   earlier,	   are	   caused	   by	   high	   prices	   to	  objects	   of	   innovation	   secured	   by	   the	   enforcement	   of	   exclusive	   rights	   on	   a	  worldwide	   scale,	   and	  by	   research	  agendas	   set	   to	   satisfy	   the	  wishes	  of	   the	   rich.	  Here	   harm	   is	   understood	   as	   imposing	   (and	   maintaining)	   a	   less	   favourable	  incentive	   system	   and	   this	  with	   the	   intention	   of	   gaining	   additional	   competitive	  advantages.	  Excluding	  ourselves	   from	  being	  part	  of	   the	  harming	   “we”	   is	  hardly	  possible	   as	   we	   strongly	   rely	   on	   the	   innovation	   system	   in	   our	   daily	   lives.133	  Nevertheless,	   as	   citizens	   of	   democratic	   countries	  we	   can	   counter	   this	   harm	  by	  protesting.	  As	  scientists	  and	  researchers	  we	  can	  also	  help	  by	  refusing	  to	  blindly	  rely	   on	   “big	   names”	   and	   being	  much	  more	   open	   to	   new	   currents	   of	   thoughts,	  even	   when	   format	   and	   label	   does	   not	   correspond	   to	   our	   image	   of	  professionalism.	   Living	   life	   as	   usual	   continues	   to	   strengthen	   institutional	  injustices.	  Further	  burdens	  on	  the	  global	  poor	  are	  the	  following:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  cf.	  Drahos	  and	  Braithwaite	  (2003)	  131	  such	  as	  prize	  systems,	  see	  Love	  and	  Hubbard	  (2007)	  132	  see	  Pogge	  (2009)	  133	  Pogge	  (2008b)	  accuses	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  developed	  world	  of	  complicity	  in	  the	  institutional	  harm	  done	  to	  the	  poor.	  Others	  are	  more	  hesitant	  in	  inculpating	  the	  average	  citizens,	  e.g.	  Steinhoff	  (2012).	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Patents	   are	   harsh	   on	   latecomers.	   The	   patent	   system	   is	   a	   winner-­‐take-­‐all	  arrangement;	   the	   first	   one	   to	   invent	   (or	   in	  many	   jurisdictions,	   to	   file	   a	  patent)	  gets	   all	   the	   benefits.	   The	   inventive-­‐step	   (or	   non-­‐obviousness)	   requirement	   of	  patentability	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  state	  of	  the	  art.	  It	  is	  relative	  to	  what	  the	  top	  of	  the	   field	   have	   achieved.	   This	   improves	   patent	   quality,	   but	   almost	   solely	   at	   the	  cost	  of	   the	  researchers	   that	  are	  somewhat	  behind.	  We	  can	  assume	  that	   in	  both	  cases	  the	  latecomers	  will	  mostly	  consist	  of	  researchers	  with	  less	  access	  to	  costly	  journals	   and	   expensive	   infrastructure.	   Any	   possible	   advantages	   one	  may	   come	  across	   as	   a	   latecomer	  will	   vanish	   if	   one	   is	   not	   capable	   to	   play	  under	   the	   same	  rules	   of	   the	   game	   than	   preceding	   researchers	   or	   is	   not	   endowed	   with	   a	  comparable	   set	   of	   starting	   tools.	   The	   so-­‐called	   “evergreening	   of	   patents”,	   the	  ability	   to	   continue	   to	   delay	   the	   moment	   generic	   manufacturers	   can	   enter	   the	  market	  without	  seeking	  a	   license,	   is	   something	   that	  has	   increasingly	  come	   into	  criticism.134	  	  	  
Patent	  expenses	  and	  purchasing	  power	  parity.	  About	  half	  of	  the	  world	  population	  live	  beneath	  the	  two-­‐dollar	  a	  day	  poverty	  line.	  This	  line	  takes	  into	  consideration	  purchasing	  power	  parity,	  that	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  products	  are	  much	  cheaper	  in	  poorer	  countries	  than	  in	  richer	  countries.135	  Notwithstanding	  this	  being	  false	  for	  many	  medicines,	  it	  is	  not	  true	  at	  all	  for	  the	  costs	  of	  patent	  protection.	  Developed	  world	   companies	   can	   seek	   exclusive	   rights	   for	   their	   inventions	   at	   comparable	  much	   lower	   cost	   for	   themselves	   in	   developing	   countries	   than	   companies	   from	  developing	   countries	   in	   the	   developed	  world.	   Industry	   and	   research	   institutes	  situated	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  have	  to	  acquire	  (with	  few	  exceptions)	  licenses	  for	   follow-­‐up	  research	  or	  product	  development	  at	  world	  market	  prices,	  despite	  the	   huge	   purchasing	   power	   differences.	   Here	   we	   can	   generally	   question	   the	  patent	  holder’s	  right	  to	  have	  full	  control	  over	  the	  conditions	  to	  grant	  licenses.	  	  	  
Harmonization	   of	   safety	   standards.	   Safety	   standards	   can	   be	   held	   very	   high	  without	   objections	   as	   long	   as	   there	   are	   cheaper	   alternatives	   for	   the	   poor	   or	  people	  with	  fewer	  resources	  are	  not	  excluded	  from	  the	  high	  standard	  products.	  This	   is	   not	   the	   case	   with	   much	   technological	   advancement	   in	   agriculture	   and	  medicine.	   Having	   worldwide	   standards	   that	   are	   in	   line	   with	   welfare	   levels	  experienced	   in	   developed	   countries	   leads	   to	   a	   situation	  where	  many	   less	   safe,	  but	   still	   quite	   cost-­‐effective	   and	   beneficent	   products,	   are	   not	   developed.	  Many	  research	  leads	  that	  are	  feared	  to	  not	  pass	  safety	  regulations	  are	  dismissed,	  even	  though	  they	  could	  lead	  to	  welfare	  enhancing	  products	  for	  resource	  poor	  settings	  –	  generally	  solutions	  that	  are	  much	  better	  than	  nothing	  are	  put	  aside.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  cf.	  Dwivedi	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  135	  cf.	  Pogge	  (2010b)	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The	   worldwide	   recognition	   of	   the	   current	   intellectual	   property	   standards	   has	  also	   a	   row	  of	   benefits.	   There	   is	   a	   set	   of	   goods	   –	   generally	   identified	  under	   the	  label	   “luxury	   goods”	   –	   for	   which	   excluding	   people	   appears	   to	   have	   no	  unacceptable	   consequences.	   The	   knowledge	   gained	   while	   developing	   and	  researching	  for	  those	  objects	  listed	  in	  patent	  documents	  ultimately	  becomes	  part	  of	   the	   public	   domain	   after	   a	   transition	   time.	   The	   diversity	   of	   technological	  extravagancies	  incentivized	  by	  rewards	  secured	  by	  intellectual	  property	  leads	  to	  an	  enlargement	  of	  the	  pool	  of	  knowledge.	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  people	  who	  justify	  intellectual	   property	   on	   desert-­‐based	   principles	   can	   argue	   that,	   on	   utilitarian	  terms,	   the	  more	   intellectuals	  can	   live	   from	  the	   fruits	  of	   their	   labour	   the	  better.	  Libertarians	  welcome	  lower	  taxation	  by	  not	  having	  to	  finance	  science	  programs	  that	  can	  sustain	  themselves	  through	  the	  sales	  of	  their	  developed	  products.	  	  	  Even	  after	  summing	  up	   the	  global	  benefits	  of	   intellectual	  property,	  we	  can	  still	  maintain	  that	  the	  developed	  world	  has	  imposed	  an	  innovation	  incentive	  system	  that	   disproportionally	   favours	   the	   world’s	   richest	   people.	   If	   there	   are	   some	  overall	  benefits	  of	  having	  this	  type	  of	  regimes	  established,	  justice	  demands	  that	  burdens	   and	   benefits	   are	   to	   be	   distributed	   fairly.	   In	   order	   for	   intellectual	  property	   to	   be	   recognized	   as	   such,	   members	   of	   society	   have	   to	   accept	   this	  method	   of	   incentivizing	   innovation	   as	   a	   necessity	   that	   leads	   to	   everyone’s	  advantage.	  This	  demands	  a	   clear	  balance	  between	  private	  and	  public	   interests,	  with	  both	  parties	  satisfied	  with	  the	  concessions	  made.	  When	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  intellectual	   property	   has	   to	   be	   safeguarded	   by	   extortive	   measures,	   something	  that	  has	  to	  be	  paid	  for	  by	  making	  the	  products	  of	  innovation	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	   access.	   Further,	   if	   we	   see	   global	   trade	   as	   a	   cooperative	   endeavour	   where	  everybody	  should	  benefit,	  cooperative	   justice	  would	  demand	  a	  serious	  effort	   in	  capacity-­‐building	   and	   a	   system	   that	   fairly	   evaluates	   grassroots	   innovation,	   as	  well	   as	   compensatory	  measures	   like	   the	  Health	   Impact	   Fund136.	  Meeting	   one’s	  side	   of	   a	   cooperative	   arrangement	   puts	   us	   in	   a	   much	   better	   position	   for	  demanding	  help	   in	   times	  of	   distress	   on	   terms	  of	   reciprocity	   and	  motivates	   the	  other	  partner	  in	  exploring	  further	  cooperation	  possibilities.	  	  Where	  we	  can	  rely	  on	  past	  and	  on-­‐going	  positive	  experiences,	  as	  with	  the	  cases	  of	  vaccine	  development	  and	  large-­‐scale	  immunization	  efforts,	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  programs	  and	  the	  reaffirming	  of	  existing	  commitments	  have	  shown	  great	  success,	   as	   the	   Global	   Alliance	   for	   Vaccination	   and	   Immunization	   (GAVI)	  exemplifies.	  However,	   raised	  population	   levels,	   extreme	  poverty	   and	   increased	  mobility	  demand	  urgently	  an	  even	  stronger	  commitment	  to	  work	  constructively	  together,	  since	  many	  of	  the	  global	  hazards	  we	  now	  face	  demand	  organized	  action	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  see	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	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at	  a	  global	  scale.	  Controlling	  antibiotic	  resistance137	  and	  speeding	  up	  the	  sharing	  of	  samples	  in	  times	  of	  epidemic	  outbreaks138	  are	  two	  of	  the	  many	  critical	  targets.	  	  	  Perhaps	  the	  human	  rights	  framework	  and	  the	  capabilities	  approach	  do	  not	  yield	  enough	  argumentative	  strength	  to	  establish	  claim	  rights	  that	  would	  assist	  people	  in	  becoming	  a	   scientist.	  However,	   analysing	   the	  huge	  gap	   in	   research	  potential	  between	   the	   developed	   and	   developing	   world,	   we	   have	   a	   series	   of	   arguments	  that	  lead	  us	  to	  condemn	  current	  distributions	  of	  scientific	  capacities.	  If	  one	  party	  feels	   or	   is	   perceived	   as	   dependent,	   dispensable,	   or	   even	   as	   a	   burden,	   we	   are	  certainly	   failing	   to	   meet	   the	   social	   goal	   of	   people	   living	   on	   equal	   standing.	  Enabling	   people	   to	   make	   a	   meaningful	   contribution	   helps	   to	   overcome	   this	  problem	  and	  this	  in	  a	  way	  in	  which	  both	  –	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries	  –	  can	   profit	   in	   the	   long	   run.	   Providing	   scientific	   infrastructure,	   education	   and	  access	  to	  research	  networks	  is	  a	  certain	  path	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  cf.	  Anomaly	  (2010)	  138	  cf.	  Langat	  et	  al.	  (2011)	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Abstract	  
	  Public	   goods,	   as	   well	   as	   commercial	   commodities,	   are	   affected	   by	   exclusive	  arrangements	  secured	  by	  intellectual	  property	  (IP)	  rights.	  These	  rights	  serve	  as	  an	  incentive	  to	  invest	  human	  and	  material	  capital	  in	  research	  and	  development.	  Particularly	   in	   the	   life	   sciences,	   IP	   rights	   regulate	   objects	   such	   as	   food	   and	  medicines	  that	  are	  key	  to	  securing	  human	  rights,	  especially	  the	  right	  to	  adequate	  food	   and	   the	   right	   to	   health.	   Consequently,	   IP	   serves	   private	   (economic)	   and	  public	   interests.	   Part	   of	   this	   charge	   claims	   that	   the	   current	   IP	   regime	   is	  privatizing	  the	  very	  building	  blocks	  of	  research	  and	  development	  –	  that	  used	  to	  be	  part	  of	   the	  commons.	  The	  public	  domain,	   in	  contrast	   to	   the	  private	  domain,	  may	  be	  the	  locus	  of	  much	  more	  diverse	  forms	  of	  creativity	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  ensures	  a	  wider	  plurality	  of	  productive	  traditions.	  An	  IP	  regime	  must	  support	  a	  sense	   of	   public	   morality	   because	   it	   is	   dependent	   upon	   civil	   support.	   This	  inevitably	  prompts	  questions	  of	  what	  are	   “good”	  exclusive	   rights	  and	  what	  are	  “bad”	  exclusive	  rights,	  and	  how	  shall	  such	  IP	  rights	  be	  developed.	  We	  argue	  that	  the	   democratization	   of	   the	   current	   IP	   regimes	   is	   an	   important	   first	   step	   to	  respond	  to	  these	  issues.	  	  	  Keywords:	   intellectual	   property	   rights,	   global	   justice,	   open	   innovation,	  stakeholder	  conference	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Introduction	  	  Public	  goods,	  as	  well	  as	  commercial	  commodities,	  are	  affected	  by	  exclusive	  rights	  secured	  by	  intellectual	  property	  (IP)	  rights.	  These	  rights	  serve	  as	  an	  incentive	  to	  invest	  human	  and	  material	  capital	  in	  research	  and	  development	  that	  is	  destined	  for	   a	   host	   of	   resources	   and	   goods.	   Particularly	   in	   the	   life	   sciences,	   IP	   rights	  regulate	   objects	   such	   as	   food	   and	   medicines	   that	   are	   key	   to	   securing	   human	  rights,	  such	  as	  access	  to	  adequate	  food	  and	  the	  right	  to	  health.139	  Consequently,	  IP	  serves	  private	  and	  public	   interests.	  Private	   interests	  consist	  of	  being	  able	   to	  enjoy	  the	  fruits	  of	  one’s	  labor,	  and	  public	  interests	  entail	  the	  provision	  of	  current	  and	  future	  public	  goods.	  Extensive	  research	  and	  development	  (R&D)	  enterprises	  are	   made	   rentable	   as	   rights	   holders	   can	   market	   their	   products	   exclusively,	  securing	  the	  existence	  of	  new	  commodities	  and	  due	  to	  the	  temporal	  limits	  of	  IP,	  also	   the	   provision	   of	   future	   goods,	   as	   resources	   become	   part	   of	   the	   public	  domain.	  	  As	  costs	  of	  developing	  a	  merchantable	  product	  in	  the	  life	  sciences	  have	  risen,140	  a	  more	   stringent	  market	   orientation	   has	   become	  more	  mandatory.	   Often,	   goods	  that	  were	  formerly	  free,	  must	  now	  be	  paid	  for	  by	  end-­‐users	  due	  to	  high	  product-­‐development	   expenses.	   With	   worldwide	   income	   inequalities	   it	   is	   becoming	  evident	  that	  if	  economically	  under	  –	  or	  undeveloped	  groups	  and	  nations	  are	  not	  allowed	   to	   make	   use	   of	   the	   technological	   innovations	   of	   developed	   countries,	  they	   may	   end	   up	   even	   more	   impoverished	   and	   increasingly	   vulnerable	   both	  economically	  and	  geo-­‐politically.	  Furthermore,	  objects	  predominantly	  needed	  in	  resource-­‐scarce	   markets	   often	   are	   not	   developed,	   given	   that	   R&D	   expenses	  incurred	  (by	  either	  developed	  or	  underdeveloped	  nations)	  cannot	  be	  adequately	  recovered	  (this	  phenomenon	  is	  epitomized	  with	  the	  so-­‐called	  “10/90	  gap”)141.	  	  In	   order	   to	   discuss	   the	   implications	   of	   this	   status	   quo	   and	   the	   feasibility	   of	  alternatives,	   researchers	   and	   policymakers	   were	   convened	   at	   a	   conference	   in	  Brussels	  at	  the	  end	  of	  September,	  2011.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (1948,	  hereinafter	  UDHR),	  art.	  25.1.	  140	  for	  a	  recent	  study	  in	  the	  area	  of	  pharmaceutical	  see	  Munos	  (2009)	  141	  see	  Drugs	  for	  Neglected	  Diseases	  Working	  Group	  (2001)	  and	  CIPIH	  (2006)	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The	  grounding	  idea	  of	  the	  conference	  	  How	  can	  appropriate	   IP	  regimes	  alleviate	  the	  huge	  welfare	  burden	   incurred	  by	  developing	   countries	   that	   engage	   progressive	   biotechnology?	   In	   other	   words,	  how	   can	   IP	   rights	   contribute	   to	   social	   justice?	   These	   questions	   prompted	   two	  Dutch	  research	  institutions	  –	  the	  Centre	  for	  Society	  and	  the	  Life	  Sciences	  and	  the	  Applied	   Philosophy	   Group 142 	  at	   Wageningen	   University	   –	   to	   engage	  philosophers,	   sociologists,	   experts	   in	   IP	   law,	   patent	   examiners,	   scholars	   and	  practitioners	   from	   biotechnology,	   alternative	   business	   modeling,	   development	  aid,	  innovation	  studies,	  political	  science,	  as	  well	  as	  state	  representatives	  and	  EU	  officials,	  to	  discuss	  the	  ethical	  and	  social	  issues	  generated	  by	  current	  IP	  protocols	  and	  paradigms.	  	  
Scope	  of	  the	  problem	  	  Research	   and	   development	   in	   the	   life	   sciences	   lead	   to	   huge	   business	  opportunities	   for	   knowledge	   economies,	   and	   also	   to	   possibilities	   for	   securing	  fundamental	   human	   rights,	   at	   national	   and	   international	   levels.	   The	   ever-­‐increasing	  globalization	  of	   trade,	  epitomized	  by	   the	  worldwide	   implementation	  of	   the	   Agreement	   on	   Trade-­‐Related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	  (TRIPS)143,	   negotiated	   1994,	   has	   been	   important	   to	   such	   global	   biotechnology	  commerce	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  IP.	  Without	  doubt,	  scientific	  innovation	  has	  greatly	  improved	  the	  overall	  quality	  of	  life	  in	  the	  developed	  world,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  longer	  life	  expectancy,	  both	  due	  to	  a	  significant	  extent	  to	  achievements	  in	  biomedicine	  and	  in	  agrobiotechnology	  and	  nutrition.	  Indeed,	  science	  and	  technology	  could	  play	  a	  vital	   role	   in	   alleviating	   the	   predicament	   of	   developing	   and	   underdeveloped	  nations	   of	   the	   world,	   in	   particular	   by	   reducing	   the	   18	  million	   poverty	   related	  deaths.	   An	   extensive	   critique	   on	   negative	   influence	   of	   trade	   regimes	   on	  world	  poverty	  is	  offered	  by	  Pogge.144	  But,	  given	  that	  much	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  is	  provided	  as	  proprietary	  commercial	  enterprise	  –	  and	   its	  allocation	  and	  sharing	  regulated	   by	   IP	   governance	   –	   we	  must	   ask	   if	   and	   how	   such	   IP	   statutes	   could	  and/or	  should	  be	  construed	  so	  as	  to	  better	  meet	  the	  social	  obligations	  of	  science.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  The	  position	  the	  group	  takes	  to	  this	  general	  problem	  is	  exemplified	  in	  Korthals	  (2010),	  Belt	  and	  Korthals	  (forthcoming)	  and	  Timmermann	  and	  Belt	  (2013)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  5]	  143	  Agreement	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  (hereinafter	  TRIPS).	  (Annex	  1C	  of	  the	  Marrakesh	  Agreement	  Establishing	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  signed	  in	  Marrakesh,	  Morocco	  on	  15	  April	  1994).	  	  144	  Cf.	  Pogge	  (2008b)	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Opportunities	  and	  reforms	  	  No	   single	   solution	   will	   address	   the	   justice	   issues	   raised	   by	   the	   existence	   of	  intellectual	  property	   regimes	  –	   this	  was	   recognized	  and	  widely	   appreciated	  by	  the	  participants	  of	  the	  conference.	  A	  more	  scrutinous	  view	  of	  current	  IP	  schemes	  led	   to	   posing	   of	   three	   alternatives	   to	   existing	   IP	   regimes;	   these	   are	   1)	   “open	  innovation”,	   2)	   the	   “access	   to	   knowledge	   movement”	   and	   3)	   the	   concept	   of	   a	  “Health	   Impact	   Fund”.	   The	   subjects	   were	   discussed	   in	   keynote	   lectures	   and	  dedicated	   workshops,	   and	   of	   particular	   note	   was	   an	   approach	   proposed	   for	  Brazil,	  a	  new	  emerging	  economy.	  	  
The	  current	  IPR	  regime	  	  Nikolaus	   Thumm,	   Chief	   Economist	   of	   the	   European	   Patent	   Office,	   provided	   an	  overview	  of	  the	  justification	  of	  current	  IP	  regimes:	  The	  function	  of	  a	  patent	  is	  to	  address	  a	  particular	  market	  failure.	  Research	  and	  development	  costs,	  especially	  in	  biotechnology,	  are	  extremely	  high	  yet	  it	  is	  relatively	  affordable	  to	  reproduce	  a	  product	  once	  it	  has	  been	  developed.	  This	  reflects	  a	  lack	  of	  incentive	  to	  invest	  in	  research	   and	   development	   if/when	   there	   is	   little	   possibility	   to	   recoup	   the	  expenses	   involved.	   This	   is	  where	   the	   patents	   come	   into	   play.	   An	   inventor	   has,	  under	   a	   given	   set	   of	   constraints,	   the	   option	   to	   apply	   for	   temporary	   exclusive	  rights	   if	  he	   is	  willing	   to	  disclose	  relevant	   information	  to	  assemble	   the	  object	  of	  innovation.	  In	  this	  way,	  civil	  society	  limits	  what	  is	  presently	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  the	  potential	  existence	  of	  future	  public	  goods.	  The	  nature	  of	  a	  patent	   is	   therefore	   instrumental:	   it	   is	   a	   tool	   to	   ensure	   that	   innovators	   who	  produce	  objects	  with	  reasonable	  research	  and	  development	  costs,	  and	  that	  find	  a	  sufficient	  market,	  will	  recover	  expenses	  and	  gain	  sufficient	  resources	  to	  render	  such	   investment	   worthwhile	   and	   thereby	   continue	   to	   make	   those	   goods.	  However,	   there	   are	   limits	   to	  which	   inventions	   can	   qualify	   for	   exclusive	   rights.	  New	  market	   opportunities,	   or	   the	   enlargement	   of	   the	   knowledge	   pool,	   are	   not	  goals	   to	  be	  pursued	  at	  all	   costs;	   the	  perception	   that	  a	  patent	  might	  conflict	   the	  
ordre	  public	  has	  roots	  anchored	  in	  patent	  law.145	  	  	  The	  notion	  that	  patenting	  is	  good,	  more	  patenting	  is	  even	  better	  lacks	  empirical	  evidence.	  As	  too	  little	  protection	  of	  new	  inventions	  can	  limit	  the	  future	  existence	  of	   some	   goods,	   too	   much	   protection	   can	   also	   deter	   some	   innovators	   from	  developing	  products	  in	  adjacent	  areas.	  As	  well,	  patent	  offices	  offer	  civil	  society	  the	  possibility	  to	  file	  for	  appeals.	  This	  is	  an	   opportunity	   to	   instill	   checks	   and	   balances	   to	   confront	   possible	   negative	  effects	  upon	  public	  welfare	  that	  were	  not	  evident	  at	  the	  time	  of	  patent	  issue.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  An	  early	  exposition	  of	  Thumm’s	  early	  perspective	  on	  the	  ethical	  implications	  of	  patenting	  is	  offered	  in	  Ibarreta	  and	  Thumm	  (2002)	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quality	  of	  patents	   in	   this	   sense	   therefore	  depends	  on	   the	  active	  engagement	  of	  civil	  society.	  	  
Open	  innovation	  
	  Richard	   Jefferson,	   Executive	   Director	   of	   Cambia,	   an	   autonomous	   not-­‐for-­‐profit	  organization	   connected	   with	   Queensland	   University	   of	   Technology,	   Brisbane	  Australia,	  provided	  an	  overview	  of	  his	  efforts	  in	  making	  biotechnology	  research	  and	  development	  more	  accessible.	  Concepts	  such	  as	  “open	  access”,	  “open	  source”	  and	   “open	   innovation”	   address	   not	   only	   different	   levels	   of	   accessibility,	   but	  represent	   a	   sense	   of	   attitude	   and	   commitment	   to	   the	   public. 146 	  “Open	  innovation”	  does	  not	  mean	  free-­‐of-­‐cost,	  but	  free	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  transparent	  and	   unrestricted.	   The	   complexity	   of	   IP	   regimes	   often	   poses	   a	   threat	   to	   the	  openness	   of	   science	   by	   adding	   uncertainty,	   and	   increasing	   risks	   of	   wrong	   or	  frankly	   socially	   disruptive	   investments.	   Jefferson’s	   soon	   to	   be	   released	   “The	  Lens”,	  is	  a	  public	  search	  tool	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  patent	  literature	  as	  well	  as	  incorporates	   more	   public	   databases	   and	   open	   access	   journal	   articles	   to	   both	  inform	  how	  R&D	  are	  done,	  who	  is	  doing	  R&D,	  and	  where	  R&D	  are	  being	  done.147	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  openness	  leads	  to	  fairer	  distribution	  is	  something	  that	  remains	  unresolved	  until	  further	  research.	  	  The	   workgroup	   discussions	   started	   with	   a	   short	   critical	   statement	   by	   Pieter	  Lemmens	   emphasizing	   the	   role	   of	   commons	   for	   the	   future	   production	   of	  knowledge	  and	  their	  potential	  to	  rebalance	  uneven	  power	  relations.148	  	  
	  
Access	  to	  knowledge	  	  According	   to	  Carlos	  M.	  Correa	  of	   the	  University	  of	  Buenos	  Aires,	   there	  are	   two	  streams	   of	   the	   “access	   to	   knowledge”	   movement,	   one	   that	   aims	   to	   build	   an	  information	   society	   where	   knowledge	   is	   openly	   available	   without	   restriction,	  and	  a	  second	  that	  seeks	  a	  general	  expansion	  of	  the	  public	  domain.	  Correa	  posed	  the	  question	  of	  if	  and	  how	  can	  these	  ideas	  could	  be	  reconciled	  with	  initiatives	  for	  protecting	   traditional	   knowledge	   through	   exclusive	   rights?149	  It	   became	   clear	  that	  an	  attempt	  to	  protect	  traditional	  knowledge	  by	  exclusive	  rights	  was	  at	  odds	  with	   those	   philosophical	   approaches	   that	   are	   based	   on	   sharing,	   rather	  appropriating,	  knowledge.	  Still,	  a	  consistent	  issue	  in	  whether	  those	  conventions	  are	  of	  actual	  interest	  to	  the	  individual	  indigenous	  communities,	  particularly	  the	  predominance	   of	   Western	   conceptions	   of	   intangible	   property	   with	   customary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  See	  Jefferson	  (2006)	  147	  Patent	  Lens,	  see	  http://www.patentlens.net	  148	  P.	  Lemmens	  offers	  a	  wider	  introduction	  to	  his	  viewpoint	  in	  idem	  (2010).	  149	  Many	  points	  of	  his	  talk	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Correa	  (2010)	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laws,	   and	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   various	   international	   statues	  might	   consider	   the	  nature	  of	  traditional	  knowledge.150	  	  	  Henk	  van	  den	  Belt	  re-­‐introduced	  the	  topic	   in	   the	  especially	  assigned	  workshop	  with	  a	  short	  statement	  that	  started	  with	  an	  historical	  overview	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  ended	  emphasizing	  the	  dual	  role	  of	  “access”:	  consumption	  and	  participation.	  
	  
The	  idea	  of	  an	  impact	  fund	  	  Linking	   profits	   to	   exerting	   positive	   impact	   on	   urgent	   problems	   is	   of	   particular	  interest	   for	   the	   development	   of	   targeted	   products	   not	   covered	   sufficiently	   by	  market	  incentives	  (such	  as	  medicines	  for	  neglected	  diseases	  or	  improvements	  in	  agrosciences	   especially	   targeted	   for	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   poor).	   An	   elaborate	  proposal	  for	  this	  is	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund.151	  Doris	  Schroeder,	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Central	  Lancashire	   (UK)	  and	  University	  of	  Melbourne	   (Australia),	  noted	   that	  the	   idea	   behind	   the	   fund	   is	   to	   offer	   a	   reward	   to	   companies	   that	   aim	   at	  maximizing	   quality-­‐adjusted	   life	   years	   (QALY)	   of	   people	   suffering	   a	   particular	  disease	  or	  disorder.	  While	  keeping	  IP	  rights,	  the	  company	  must	  be	  committed	  to	  sell	  medicines	  at	  cost-­‐price	   in	  order	   to	  be	  rewarded	   financially	  proportional	   to	  the	  product	  impact	  in	  increasing	  QALY.	  Cristian	  Timmermann	  raised	  the	  problems	  involved	  in	  any	  proposal	  that	  leaves	  the	  current	  global	  distribution	  of	  IP	  rights	  intact.152	  	  Of	  noted	  interest	  was	  how	  far	  the	  impact	  fund	  construct	  might	  be	  implemented	  in	  other	  areas,	  such	  as	  agriculture	  and	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  and	  adaptation.	  The	  main	  criticisms	  of	  the	  impact	  fund	  idea	  question	  the	  prerequisite	  of	  patents	  for	  fund	  rewards	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  current	  power	  relations.153	  	  	  Emerging	  countries:	  Brazil	  as	  a	  case	  study.	  A	  delegate	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  Mission	  to	  the	   European	   Union,	   Eduardo	   Ferreira	   provided	   a	   detailed	   overview	   on	   the	  country’s	   new	   law	   on	   the	   protection	   of	   cultivars.	   Although	   the	   law	   was	  introduced	  in	  order	  to:	  	  (1)	   facilitate	   the	   exchange	   of	   genetic	   material	   and	   the	   genetic	  enrichment	  of	  Brazilian	  agriculture	  	  (2)	   allow	  imports	  of	  commercial	  seeds	  and	  	  (3)	   assure	  that	  Brazil	  can	  export	  this	  kind	  of	  material	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  This	  distinction	  is	  exemplified	  in	  Robinson	  (2008)	  151	  see	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  152	  A	  revised	  version	  of	  his	  statement	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Timmermann	  (2012a)	  153	  Meanwhile	  Thomas	  Pogge	  has	  informed	  us	  that	  the	  revised	  version	  of	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  proposal	  has	  loosened	  up	  this	  criterion.	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It	  became	  evident	  that	  the	  country	  was	  also	  aiming	  at	  a	  stronger	  enforcement	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  granted	  to	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  seed	  producers	  and	  providing	  a	  safe	   harbor	   for	   foreign	   investment	   while	   improving	   the	   grounds	   for	   future	  scientific	  collaboration.154	  	  
Problems	  	  Different	   approaches	  underline	   the	  difficulties	   of	   generating	   revised	  or	  new	   IP	  regimes	   that	   more	   saliently	   reduce	   extreme	   poverty,	   powerlessness	   and	  vulnerability	  of	  individuals,	  communities	  and	  nations.	  
	  
Human	  rights	  and	  IP	  rights	  	  The	   right	   to	   adequate	   food	   and	   the	   right	   to	   health	   as	   per	   the	   Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (UDHR,	  art.	  25.1)	  are	  not	   the	  only	  two	  rights	   that	  are	   potentially	   negatively	   affected	   by	   liberties	   granted	   by	   the	   use	   of	   exclusive	  rights	   secured	   by	   IP	   regimes	   (UDHR,	   art.	   25.1).	   There	   is	   a	   strong	   plea	   for	   a	  democratization	  of	  science,	  a	  demand	  for	  openness	  and	  inclusion,	  both	  in	  active	  participation	   and	   decision-­‐making,	   that	   in	   the	   human	   rights	   discourse	   are	  encompassed	   in	   the	   right	   to	   share	   in	   the	   advancement	   of	   science	   (UDHR,	   art.	  27.1).	   There	   is	   a	   widespread	   indignation	   about	   the	   ways	   IP	   rights	   restrict	  freedom	  to	  operate,	  and	  constrict	  high-­‐level	  science	  to	  be	  a	  luxury	  reserved	  for	  developed	  nations.	  	  IP	   regimes	   could	   play	   a	  much	  more	   favorable	   role	   in	   improving	   global	   human	  welfare	   and	   in	   securing	   human	   rights	   (TRIPS,	   art.	   6).	   At	   present,	   there	   is	  insufficient	  incentive	  to	  both	  provide	  innovations	  that	  would	  alleviate	  problems	  that	   predominantly	   affect	   the	   poor,	   and	   to	   make	   those	   innovations	   widely	  accessible.	  	  European	   states	   have	   a	   long-­‐standing	   tradition	   in	   securing	   their	   citizens	   the	  minimum	   requirements	   for	   adequate	   living	   standards.	   The	   successful	  eradication	  of	  extreme	  poverty	  in	  Western	  Europe	  has	  led	  to	  viewing	  poverty	  as	  a	  definitive	  harm	  to	  human	  welfare	  that	  is	  unacceptable,	  and	  also	  preventable.	  	  	  
Human	  rights	  commitments	  	  Antony	   Taubman,	   Director	   of	   the	   Intellectual	   Property	   Division,	   World	   Trade	  Organization	  (WTO),	  addressed	  the	  role	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  when	  acknowledging	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  Presentation	  slides.	  Ethical	  and	  Social	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  –	  Agrifood	  and	  Health.	  Conference.	  Brussels,	  September	  2011	  [on	  file	  with	  authors].	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intellectual	  property,	  namely	  that	  society	  grants	  a	  temporary	  exclusive	  right	  for	  bringing	   into	   existence	   a	   future	   public	   good.	   Taubman	   noted	   that	   by	   revising	  theory	   and	   international	   conventions	   there	   is	   no	   human	   right	   to	   intellectual	  property,	  rather	  only	  the	  right	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  material	  interests	  of	  scientific	  production	  (UDHR,	  art.	  27.2).	  	  Some	   essential	   liberties	   are	   also	   affected	   by	   current	   IP	   regimes.	  We	  must	   ask	  ourselves	  if	  and	  to	  what	  level	  “individualist	  atomistic	  innovation”	  will	  be	  favored	  at	   the	   cost	   of	   “cumulative,	   collective	   innovation	   of	   indigenous	   communities”?	  Might	  this	  constitute	  a	  violation	  of	  rights,	  and	  if	  so,	  to	  which	  rights?	  Or,	  does	  this	  simply	  amount	  to	  a	  lamentable	  loss	  of	  diversity	  in	  scientific	  practices	  that	  could	  be	  deemed	  acceptable	  on	  utilitarian	  terms?	  This	  inevitably	  prompts	  the	  question	  of	   what	   human	   goods	   may	   be	   sacrificed	   for	   efficiency	   in	   technological	  advancement?	  	  
IP	  rights	  and	  the	  needs	  of	  small	  and	  medium	  enterprises	  and	  industry	  	  The	   current	   IP	   system	   has	   unintended	   consequences	   that	   render	   increasingly	  larger-­‐scale	  players	  domination	   in	   the	  markets.	  This	  has	  a	   foreseeable	  adverse	  effect	  on	  the	  rate	  and	  quality	  of	  inventions,	  and	  the	  survival	  of	  small	  and	  medium	  size	   enterprises.	   In	   particular,	   newcomers	   from	   the	   developing	   world	   face	  numerous	  difficulties.	  	  The	  Paris	   convention	  of	  1883	   largely	   set	   the	   “rules	  of	   the	  game”	   for	  patenting.	  The	  late	  19th	  century	  was	  an	  era	  where	  differences	  between	  bigger	  and	  smaller	  companies	   were	   less	   pronounced,	   and	   the	   implications	   of	   biotechnology	  were	  yet	   unforeseeable.	  We	  must	   ask	   how	   those	   rules	  might	   be	   outdated,	   and	  what	  negative	  costs	   for	  public	  welfare	  and	  business	  opportunities	  are	  bound	  to	  such	  anachronistic	  legislation.	  We	  may	  also	  question	  if	  something	  similar	  accounts	  for	  
Union	   internationale	   pour	   la	   Protection	   des	   Obtentions	   Végétales155,	   given	   that	  differences	   in	   the	  membership	  of	  more	  and	   less	  developed	  countries	  are	   today	  more	  varied	   than	   in	   the	   year	   that	   treaty	  was	  drafted.	  This	   is	   the	   conclusion	  of	  Orlando	   de	   Ponti,	   former	   President	   of	   the	   International	   Seed	   Federation.	   The	  industrial	   sector	  has	   the	  capacity	   to	  provide	  much	  of	   the	   innovation	  needed	   to	  provide	   sufficient	   food	   for	   a	   growing	   world	   population,	   but	   to	   do	   so	   it	   needs	  better	  access	  to	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  biotechnology.	  Specific	  exemptions	  in	  patent	  laws	  must	  be	   clearly	  defined	   in	  order	   to	  not	   jeopardize	   future	   inventions.	  This	  clarity	   could	   also	   equalize	   the	   highly	   uneven	   competition	   between	   bigger	   and	  smaller	   companies,	   and	   result	   in	   enhanced	   innovative	   collaboration	   and	  cooperation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  UPOV,	  the	  first	  international	  agreement	  on	  plant	  variety	  protection,	  1961	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Biodiversity	  and	  traditional	  knowledge	  	  Yet	  unresolved	  are	  issues	  such	  as	  how	  should	  indigenous	  knowledge	  be	  treated,	  in	   what	   way	   should	   biodiversity	   be	   maintained,	   and	   how	   should	   biosafety	  dossiers	   be	   regulated?	   It	   is	   important	   to	   assess	   to	   what	   extent	   those	   issues	  should	  be	  addressed	  by	   IP	   regimes,	   or	   to	  what	   extent	   IP	   regimes	  have	   created	  situations	  that	  evoke	  those	  issues.	  	  Biodiversity	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  something	  vital,	  but	  there	  are	  insufficient	  empirical	  studies	   to	   provide	   clear	   evidence	   in	   support	   of	   such	   a	   stance.	   Success	   of	  promoting	   the	   conservation	   (or	   even	   enhancement)	   of	   biodiversity	   depends	  upon	   the	   outcomes	   of	   such	   studies.	   Similarly,	   claims	   of	   the	   importance	   of	  traditional	   knowledge	   as	   a	   cultural	   heritage	   of	  mankind	  might	   not	   be	   enough.	  Rather,	   what	   is	   required	   is	   a	   demonstration	   of	   those	   ways	   that	   indigenous	  scientific	  practices	  and	  knowledge	  have	  been	  or	  real	  and	  meaningful	  value	  and	  innovation.	  But,	  can	  such	  indigenous	  practices	  simply	  be	  up-­‐taken	  into	  a	  global	  R&D	   effort?	   It	   will	   be	   evermore	   crucial	   to	   work	   on	   gaining	   indigenous	  communities	  as	  partners	  for	  long-­‐term	  cooperation	  and	  not	  merely	  as	  entities	  to	  exploit	  or	  develop	  long	  term	  dependencies	  after	  one-­‐time	  transactions.	  Current	  practices	  do	  little	  to	  address	  past	  errors	  and	  to	  actively	  gain	  those	  communities	  as	  cooperation	  partners	  –	  a	  point	  well-­‐noted	  by	  Bram	  De	  Jonge.156	  	  
Governance	  	  Evidence	   is	  urgently	  needed	  to	  define	  whether	  current	  IP	  systems	  are	  efficient,	  promote	   innovation	   and	   do	   not	   unnecessarily	   limit	   access	   or	   set	   unacceptable	  constraints	   for	   fostering	   innovations	   destined	   for	   poorer	   markets.	   Ingrid	  Schneider157	  has	   focused	   on	   the	   need	   for	   evidence	   on	   the	   possible	   negative	  effects	   of	   current	   IP	   regimes,	   such	   as	   the	   extreme	   expense	   in	   its	   demand	   of	  researchers’	  time	  and	  resources,	  and	  the	  wide	  contingent	  of	  IP	  experts	  that	  must	  be	  financed	  by	  reallocating	  funds	  originally	  destined	  for	  research,	  development,	  and	   product	   application.	   Also,	   the	   “one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all”	   approach	   propagated	  with	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement,	  is	  less	  suitable	  for	  innovations	  in	  the	  life	  sciences	  than	  for	  research	  and	  development	  in	  the	  electronic,	  chemical	  or	  mechanical	  industry.158	  We	   cannot	   just	   balance	   business	   opportunities	   lost	   in	   one	   area	   in	   favor	   of	  another;	   to	   be	   sure,	   a	   detailed	   assessment	   of	   the	   unused	   potential	   to	   secure	  human	  rights	  is	  required.	  Anything	  that	  counts	  as	  a	  setback	  from	  the	  realization	  of	  human	  rights	  must	  be	  approved	  by	  those	  who	  are	  subjects	  of	  those	  rights,	  i.e.,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  For	  his	  position	  on	  Benefit-­‐Sharing	  see	  De	  Jonge	  (2011)	  157	  cf.	  Schneider	  (2009)	  158	  Although	  those	  areas	  are	  also	  not	  immune	  to	  criticism,	  see	  Bessen	  and	  Meurer	  (2008),	  chap.	  3.	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the	   human	   beings	   involved	   as	   shareholders	   in	   such	   decisions	   about	   and	  applications	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  research	  and	  development.159	  	  Worries	  about	  the	  actual	  negative	  impact	  of	  data	  exclusivity	  in	  biosafety	  dossiers	  are	   also	   a	   factor	   in	   the	   discussion.	   Here	   not	   only	   issues	   like	   ever-­‐greening	   of	  exclusive	   rights	   come	   in,	   but	   also	   the	   repetition	   of	   clinical	   trials	   using	   human	  subjects	   in	   which	   medicines	   are	   tested,	   not	   to	   show	   their	   safety,	   as	   has	   been	  already	   done,	   but	   to	   have	   additional	   data	   that	   are	   not	   protected	   in	   order	   to	  secure	  sales	  permissions	  as	  a	  generic	  manufacturer,	  and	  repetition	  of	  tests	  using	  animal	  subjects	  which	  are	  becoming	  harder	  to	  justify.	  	  A	   clearer	   division	   of	   labor	   and	   confinement	   of	   tasks	   between	   the	   different	  stakeholders	  is	  necessary.	  Competition	  law,	  careful	  examination	  of	  patents,	  filing	  appeals	  to	  seemingly	  unjust	  patents,	  making	  use	  of	  ‘flexibilities’	  as	  formulated	  in	  the	   TRIPS	   agreement,	   are	   all	   tools	   to	   counteract	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   IP	  regimes,	   which	   must	   be	   used	   by	   governmental	   and	   civil	   society	   experts	   to	  counteract	   the	   misuse	   of	   power	   relations	   and	   balances.	   For	   example,	   in	   the	  European	  Union	  (EU),	  a	  better	  cooperation	  between	  EU	  and	  the	  European	  Patent	  Organisation	   (EPOrg)	   is	   desirable	   to	   compensate	   for	   fragmentation	   due	   to	  national	   patent	   offices,	   and	   can	   be	   achieved	   by	   a	   relatively	   high	   degree	   of	  harmonization	  by	  patent	  granting	  via	  EPOrg.	  
	  
Participation:	  Top-­‐down	  vs.	  horizontal	  	  Many	   important	   stakeholders	   feel	   that	   their	   interests	   and	   voice	   are	   not	   taken	  into	   sufficient	   consideration	   in	   the	   negotiation	   and	   drafting	   of	   IP	   laws.	   Justice	  demands	   a	   fairer	   distribution	   of	   objects	   of	   innovation,	   and	   an	   availability	   of	  biotechnological	  solutions	  for	  the	  problems	  that	  impact	  the	  poorest	  people	  of	  the	  world’s	   countries.	  Obviously,	   however,	   being	   able	   to	   participate	   at	   all	   levels	   of	  the	  innovation	  process,	  and	  having	  a	  say	  in	  research	  agendas	  remains	  something	  completely	  out	  of	  reach	  for	  most	  of	  the	  world’s	  population.	  	  Various	   civil	   society	   efforts	   have	   been	  made	   to	   foster	   a	  wider	   participation	   in	  innovation	   efforts.	   As	   G.	   Pakki	   Reddy,	   Executive	   Director	   Agri	   Biotech	  Foundation,	  Hyderabad	  (India),	  has	  noted,	  a	   solid	  example	   is	   the	   Indian	  Honey	  Bee	   Network	   and	   its	   collaborating	   institutions.	   Those	   networks	   afford	   a	  more	  just	  distribution	  of	  resources,	  and	  also	  stimulate	  innovation	  through	  recognition	  of	   the	   work	   of	   small-­‐scale	   innovators,	   granting	   them	   an	   opportunity	   to	   have	  wider	  publicity	  of	   their	   inventions.	  However,	   it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  far	   the	  Indian	  example	  of	   innovation	  and	  networking	  know-­‐how	  can	  be	   transferred	   to	  other	  nations	  and	  societies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  cf.	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (1990)	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Future	  policy	  items	  	  It	   has	   become	   clear	   that	   patents	   exert	   broader	   effect,	   beyond	   simply	   the	  producers	   of	   patented	   technologies	   and	   the	   buyers	   of	   end-­‐products.	   The	  existence	  of	  an	  object	  that	  is	  made	  artificially	  scarce	  by	  exclusive	  rights,	  which	  at	  the	   same	   time	   could	   alleviate	   problems	   of	   human	   welfare,	   is	   controversial.	  Similarly,	  having	  scientific	   infrastructure	  in	  place	  to	  provide	  technical	  solutions	  to	   many	   of	   the	   problems	   that	   afflict	   developing	   and	   underdeveloped	   nations,	  while	  not	  making	  full	  use	  of	  it	  speaks	  strongly	  to	  the	  need	  for	  a	  wider	  and	  more	  inclusive	  discourse	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  instantiated	  by	  current	  IP	  regimes.	  	  In	  the	  main,	  we	  hold	  that	  the	  main	  questions	  for	  this	  discussion	  are:	  	   a. What	   could	   be	   a	   socially	   desirable	   balance	   between	   the	   types	   of	   IP	  exclusivities	   innovative	   enterprises	   require,	   and	   the	   inclusive	   public	  goods	   protection	   such	   innovations	   are	   said	   to	   serve?	   How	   is	   this	  proper	  balance	  to	  be	  achieved?	  	  b. What	  old	  and	  new	  ideas	  (such	  as	  Open	  Innovation	  and	  the	  Access	   to	  Knowledge	   movement)	   about	   exclusivities	   and	   their	   optimal	  integration	  with	  the	  public	  good	  and	  fair	  invention	  are	  interesting	  and	  worthwhile	   for	   debate,	   experimentation,	   and	   ultimate	   development	  and	  use?	  What	  studies	  should	  be	  pursued?	  	   c. In	   what	   way(s)	   can	   a	   property	   rights	   system	   become	   inclusive,	   not	  only	   attending	   to	  patent	  holders,	   but	   also	   to	   those	   stakeholders	   that	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  patent	  system?	  	   d. How	   can	   inventions	   be	   stimulated	   that	   are	   specifically	   designed	   to	  alleviate	   urgent	   problems	   and	   to	   reach	   global	   targets,	   such	   as	   the	  millennium	  development	   goals	   and	   caps	   in	   gas	   emissions	   that	   affect	  climate	  change?	  	   e. Why	  are	   some	   flexibilities	   of	   the	  TRIPS	   agreement	   regarding	  human	  welfare	  (TRIPS,	  art.	  6)	  not	  used	  in	  national	  IP	  regimes,	  and	  why	  does	  the	   full	  potential	  of	  TRIPS	  seem	  to	  be	  underused?	  What	  steps	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  ensure	  better	  use	  of	  those	  flexibilities?	  	  f. How	  can	  ethical	  principles	  and	  values	  of	  a	  nation	  or	  a	  group	  of	  nations	  be	   protected	   and	   what	   does	   this	   mean	   with	   respect	   to	   a	   broad	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interpretation	   of	   the	   ordre	   public	   and	   public	   policy	   exemptions	   to	  patentability	  (TRIPS,	  art.	  27.2	  and	  art.	  27.3)?	  	  This	  discourse	  should	  be	  inclusive:	  involving	  all	  parties,	  not	  only	  patent	  holders,	  industrial	  countries	  and	  their	  governmental	  officials.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  focus	   on	   general	   challenges,	   such	   as	   the	  place	   of	   IP	   rights	   in	   a	   pluralist	  world,	  rather	   than	   on	   specific	   situations	   and	   environments.	   We	   should	   analyze	   the	  greater	  picture	  and	  make	  an	  overall	  judgment.	  	  
Future	  research	  issues	  	  Five	   major	   research	   issues	   can	   make	   the	   recommended	   public	   discourse	   and	  ultimately	  science	  and	  technology	  IP	  rights	  more	  relevant	  to	  current	  and	  future	  conditions	  in	  a	  global	  economy:	  
	  
First,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  lack	  of	  transparency,	  and	  to	  make	  the	  patent	  system	  more	   accessible	   to	   non-­‐patent	   holders,	   mechanisms	   should	   be	   developed	   to	  make	   public,	   comprehensible	   and	   not	  misleading	   all	   information	   about	   patent	  files.	   This	   information	   should	   be	   made	   publicly	   available	   without	   restricted	  access.	  
	  
Second,	   research	   is	   necessary	   to	   answer	   the	   question	   how,	   given	   the	  democratization	   of	   information,	   the	   current	   IP	   system	   can	   be	   made	   more	  democratic,	  (e.g.,	  by	  including	  the	  voices	  of	  non-­‐patent	  holders).	  	  
	  
Third,	  research	  is	  required	  into	  alternatives,	  complements	  and	  other,	  new	  ideas	  to	   achieve	   a	   balanced	   relation	   between	   exclusive	   entitlements	   and	   inclusive	  ends-­‐in-­‐view	   that	   comprise	   public	   goods	   (such	   as	   open	   innovation,	   Access	   to	  Knowledge	  (A2K),	  common	  pools,	  alternatives	  and	  complements	  to	  the	  current	  IP	  regimes).	  Equity	  and	  inclusivity	  should	  be	  leading	  principles,	  both	  in	  intention	  and	  outcome	  (impact).	  
	  
Fourth,	   further	   inquiry	   is	   required	   to	   examine	   other,	   freedom	   restricting	  regulations	   or	   practices,	   such	   as	   steward	   regulations	   concerning	   biosafety	  dossiers	   of	   patented	   inventions,	   which	   allow	   owners	   to	   keep	   those	   dossiers	  restricted	  from	  public	  access	  without	  time	  limits.	  
	  
Fifth,	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  assess	  the	  social	  and	  technological	  impacts	  of	  current	  IP	   systems	   and	   of	   alternatives,	   taking	   into	   account	   inter	   alia	   questions	   of	  stakeholder	   involvement	   and	   how	   it	   might	   prevent	   power	   relationships	  determine	  unfair	  use	  of	  property	  systems.	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Concluding	  ethical	  reflection	  	  Intellectual	   property	   rights	   are	   a	  means	   to	   an	   end	  –	   and	   the	   current	   regime	   is	  only	  one	  of	  many	  conceivable	  systems	  of	   incentives.	  The	  current	  regime	  can	  be	  praised	  for	  bringing	  out	  many	  inventions	  that	  have	  benefited	  a	  wide	  public,	  but	  the	   IP	   system	   also	   faces	   a	   serious	   charge	   of	   sustaining	   a	   specific	   culture	   of	  developing	  products	  and	  doing	  scientific	  work	  that	  may	  be	  directly	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  needs	  and	  vulnerabilities	  of	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  people.	  If	  this	  charge	  is	  indeed	   related	   to	   the	   current	   IP	   regime,	   we	   have	   to	   ask	   ourselves	   what	  responsibilities	  and	  duties	  arise	   to	  mitigate	  and	  remedy	   this	  effect.	  Part	  of	   this	  charge	  claims	  that	  the	  current	  IP	  regime	  is	  privatizing	  the	  very	  building	  blocks	  of	  further	   research	   and	   development	   –	   components	   that	   were	   once	   part	   of	   the	  commons.	  The	  public	  domain,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  private	  domain,	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  a	  locus	   of	  much	  more	   diverse	   forms	   of	   creativity	   that	   also	   ensure	   a	   plurality	   of	  ideas,	  traditions,	  and	  translations.	  	  Antony	   Taubman	   stated	   during	   the	   conference	   that	   “IP	   law	   or	   treaty	   may	   be	  greater	   than	   the	   sum	   of	   its	   parts”.	   We	   can	   see	   this	   in	   ordre	   public	   clauses	   in	  patent	  law	  that	  are	  conceptualized	  to	  avoid	  the	  creation	  of	  incentives	  that	  create	  objects	  that	  are	  socially	  undesirable,	  and/or	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  offensive	  by	  the	  general	   public.	   During	   this	   last	   decade,	   the	   world	   is	   coping	   with	   disastrous	  effects	   of	   financial	   hubris	   on	   public	   welfare,	   and	   economic	   rationality	   is	  evermore	  widely	  seen	  as	  secondary	  to	  social	  and	  political	  welfare.	  Moreover,	  the	  old	  concept	  of	  ordre	  public	  may	  need	  to	  be	  revised	  and	  expanded,	  parallel	  to	  the	  way	  public	  morality	  has	  expanded	  from	  a	  set	  of	  values	  and	  duties	  that	  only	  were	  valid	   for	   a	   smaller	   community,	   to	   the	   now	   more	   predominant	   cosmopolitan	  sense	  of	   justice.	  The	   IP	   regime	  must	  do	   justice	   to	   this	   sense	  of	  public	  morality	  because	   is	   dependent	   upon	   civil	   support.	   Here	   we	   inevitably	   confront	   the	  question	   of	   who	   shall	   be	   the	   moral	   gatekeeper	   in	   deciding	   what	   are	   “good”	  exclusive	   rights	   and	   what	   are	   “bad”	   exclusive	   rights.	   It	   may	   be	   that	   the	  democratization	   of	   the	   current	   IP	   regimes	   is	   a	   first	   step	   to	   respond	   to	   this	  problem.	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  corporate	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the	  access	  to	  knowledge	  movement	  
	  
(with	  Henk	  van	  den	  Belt)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  been	  published	  as:	  	  Timmermann,	  Cristian,	  and	  Henk	  van	  den	  Belt.	  2013.	  Intellectual	  property	  and	  global	  health:	  from	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  to	  the	  access	  to	  knowledge	  movement.	  Liverpool	  Law	  Review	  34	  (1):47-­‐73.	  	  (The	  final	  publication	  is	  available	  at	  link.springer.com)	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Abstract	  	  	  Any	   system	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   (IPRs)	   has	   three	  main	  kinds	  of	  distributive	  effects.	  It	  will	  determine	  or	  influence:	  (a)	  the	  types	  of	  objects	   that	   will	   be	   developed	   and	   for	   which	   IPRs	   will	   be	   sought;	   (b)	   the	  differential	   access	   various	   people	   will	   have	   to	   these	   objects;	   and	   (c)	   the	  distribution	  of	  the	  IPRs	  themselves	  among	  various	  actors.	  	  What	   this	  means	   to	   the	   area	  of	  pharmaceutical	   research	   is	   that	  many	  urgently	  needed	  medicines	  will	   not	  be	  developed	  at	   all,	   that	   the	   existing	  medicines	  will	  not	  be	  suitable	  for	  countries	  with	  a	  precarious	  health	  infrastructure	  or	  not	  target	  the	   disease	   variety	   that	   is	   prevalent	   in	   poorer	   regions.	   Such	   effects	   are	  commonly	  captured	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  the	  "10/90	  gap"	  in	  biomedical	  research.	  High	  prices	  will	  also	  restrict	  access	  to	  medicines	  as	  well	  endanger	  compliance	  to	  treatment	  schemes.	  IPRs	  are	  mainly	  held	  by	  multinational	  corporations	  situated	  in	   the	   developed	   world,	   which	   not	   only	   raises	   egalitarian	   concerns,	   but	   also	  severely	   limits	   the	   possibilities	   of	   companies	   in	   poorer	   countries	   to	   realize	  improvements	  on	  existing	  inventions,	  as	  they	  cannot	  financially	  afford	  to	  secure	  freedom	   to	   operate,	   which	   systematically	   shrinks	   the	   number	   of	   potential	  innovators.	  Those	   inequities	   lead	   to	  an	  enormous	  burden	   for	   the	  global	  poor	  and	   since	  no	  institution	  is	  willing	  to	  assume	  the	  responsibility	  to	  fulfil	  the	  right	  to	  health	  and	  the	   corresponding	   right	   of	   access	   to	   essential	   medicines,	   we	   have	   to	   analyse	  alternatives	  or	  additions	   to	   the	  actual	   intellectual	  property	  regimes	   in	  order	   to	  create	  new	  incentives	  to	  fill	  this	  gap.	  	  	  Keywords:	   global	   justice;	   intellectual	   property	   rights;	   access	   to	   medicines;	  innovation	  policy;	  neglected	  diseases	  	  
  








Introduction	  	  For	   slightly	   more	   than	   a	   decade,	   the	   recognition	   has	   become	   increasingly	  common	  that	  there	  may	  exist	  a	  deep	  conflict	  between	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  (the	   collective	   name	   for	   a	   set	   of	   rights	   encompassing	   patents,	   copyrights,	  trademarks,	  plant	  breeders	  rights	  and	  the	  like)	  and	  basic	  human	  rights.	  In	  their	  campaigns	   for	   access	   to	   essential	   medicines,	   for	   example,	   civil-­‐society	  organizations	   like	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières	   (MSF)	  and	  Oxfam	   invariably	   insist	  that	  patents	  should	  never	  be	  put	  before	  the	  human	  right	  to	  health.	  Likewise,	   in	  2005	   Brazil	   and	   Argentina	   and	   other	   developing	   countries	   supported	   their	  proposal	   to	   broaden	   the	   narrow	   mandate	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   (UN)	   agency	  WIPO	   (World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organization)	   by	   arguing	   that	   “under	   no	  circumstances	   can	   human	   rights	   –	   which	   are	   inalienable	   and	   universal	   –	   be	  subordinated	   to	   intellectual	   property	   protection”160.	   The	   Adelphi	   Charter	   on	  Creativity,	  Innovation	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  that	  was	  issued	  in	  October	  2005	  also	  declared	   that	   “[IP]	   laws	  must	   serve,	   and	  never	   overturn,	   the	  basic	   human	  rights	   to	   health,	   education,	   employment	   and	   cultural	   life”161.	   And	   as	   a	   final	  example:	   The	   UN	   special	   rapporteur	   on	   the	   right	   to	   food,	   Olivier	   De	   Schutter,	  used	  the	  human	  right	  to	  adequate	  food	  as	  a	  normative	  yardstick	  for	  assessing	  the	  effects	  of	  patents	  and	  other	  IP	  rights	  in	  the	  field	  of	  agriculture	  and	  nutrition162.	  	  The	  human	  rights	  that	  are	  often	  invoked	  against	  certain	  IP	  rights	  are	  enshrined	  in	   such	   classical	   documents	   as	   the	   UN	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	  (UDHR)	   of	   1948	   and	   the	   UN	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (ICESCR)	  of	  1966.	  The	  human	  right	  to	  health	  is	  encompassed	  in	  a	  rather	   broad	   article	   of	   the	  Universal	   Declaration:	   “Everyone	   has	   the	   right	   to	   a	  standard	  of	   living	   adequate	   for	   the	  health	   and	  well-­‐being	  of	  himself	   and	  of	  his	  family,	   including	   food,	   clothing,	   housing	   and	  medical	   care	   and	  necessary	   social	  services,	   and	   the	   right	   to	   security	   in	   the	   event	   of	   unemployment,	   sickness,	  disability,	   widowhood,	   old	   age	   or	   other	   lack	   of	   livelihood	   in	   circumstances	  beyond	   his	   control”163 .	   	   The	   International	   Covenant	   gives	   a	   more	   specific	  formulation:	   “The	  States	  Parties	   to	   the	  present	  Covenant	   recognize	   the	  right	  of	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  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Organization	  (2005)	  17.	  161	  RSA	  (2006)	  	  162	  De	  Schutter	  (2009)	  163	  Universal	  Declaration	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  25.1	  (1948).	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everyone	   to	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   the	   highest	   attainable	   standard	   of	   physical	   and	  mental	  health”164.	  Rights	  to	  participate	  in	  cultural	  life	  and	  to	  share	  in	  the	  benefits	  of	   the	  advance	  of	  science	  are	  also	  formulated	   in	  both	  human	  rights	  documents.	  Thus	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   states	   in	   article	   27.1:	   “Everyone	   has	   the	   right	  freely	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  cultural	  life	  of	  the	  community,	  to	  enjoy	  the	  arts	  and	  to	  share	   in	   scientific	   advancement	   and	   its	  benefits”165.	  However,	   the	   tenor	  of	   this	  paragraph	  seems	  to	  be	  counterbalanced	  by	  the	  very	  next	  paragraph:	  “Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  moral	  and	  material	  interests	  resulting	  from	  any	   scientific,	   literary	  or	   artistic	  production	  of	  which	  he	   is	   the	   author”166.	  This	  might	   be	   seen	   as	   providing	   a	   justification	   for	   IP	   rights	   as	   themselves	   based	   in	  fundamental	   human	   rights,	   thus	   creating	   a	   (potential)	   tension	  with	   the	  human	  rights	   of	   participation	   and	   sharing	   that	   are	   stated	   in	   the	   first	   paragraph.	   The	  same	   tension	   recurs	   in	   the	   International	   Covenant:	   “The	   States	   Parties	   to	   the	  present	   Covenant	   recognize	   the	   right	   of	   everyone:	   (a)	   To	   take	   part	   in	   cultural	  life;	   (b)	  To	   enjoy	   the	  benefits	   of	   scientific	  progress	   and	   its	   applications;	   (c)	  To	  benefit	   from	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  moral	   and	  material	   interests	   resulting	   from	  any	  scientific,	  literary	  or	  artistic	  production	  of	  which	  he	  is	  the	  author”167.	  To	  escape	  from	  the	  legal	  deadlock	  in	  which	  one	  set	  of	  human	  rights	  might	  seem	  to	  negate	  another	   set	  of	  human	  rights,	   the	  precise	   status	  of	   IP	   rights	  definitely	  needs	   to	   be	   clarified.	   Some	   would	   argue	   that	   such	   rights	   must	   indeed	   be	  recognized	   as	   fully-­‐fledged	   human	   rights,	   even	   to	   the	   point	   of	   overriding	   any	  possible	  claim	  of	  patients	   to	  have	  access	   to	  essential	  medicines168.	  However,	   in	  2005	   the	   Committee	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	   issued	   an	  interpretative	   comment	   which	   cautioned	   against	   equating	   the	   human	   right	  recognized	  in	  ICESCR	  15.1.c	  	  (and	  in	  UDHR	  27.2)	  with	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  as	   defined	   in	   national	   laws	   and	   international	   agreements.	   According	   to	   the	  Committee,	   human	   rights	   are	   “fundamental,	   inalienable	   and	   universal	  entitlements	  belonging	  to	  individuals	  and,	  under	  some	  circumstances,	  groups	  of	  individuals	  and	  communities”,	  whereas	   IP	  rights	  are	   “first	  and	   foremost	  means	  by	  which	  States	  seek	  to	  provide	  incentives	  for	  inventiveness	  and	  creativity”	  and	  IP	   regimes	   “primarily	   protect	   business	   and	   corporate	   interests	   and	  investments”169.	  In	  short,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  grant	  legally	  recognized	  IP	  rights	  the	  full	  dignity	  of	  basic	  human	  rights170.	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  Declaration	  on	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  see	  Millum	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The	   awareness	   that	   IP	   rights	   might	   sometimes	   clash	   with	   basic	   human	   rights	  such	   as	   the	   right	   to	   health	   and	   the	   derivative	   right	   of	   access	   to	   essential	  medicines	   is	   of	   fairly	   recent	   origin.	   It	   is	   apparent	   that	   the	   issue	   of	   a	   potential	  conflict	   was	   not	   foremost	   on	   the	   minds	   of	   those	   who	   were	   involved	   in	   the	  formulation	   of	   the	   international	   human	   rights	   charters.	   This	   general	   lack	   of	  awareness	   can	  be	  attributed	   in	  part	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   “Westphalian	  assumption”	  that	  it	   is	  the	  national	  government	  of	  each	  and	  every	  country	  which	  is	  primarily	  responsible	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   human	   rights	   of	   its	   citizens.	   Although	  increasingly	   contested	   in	   recent	   years,	   this	   assumption	  has	  been	   the	  dominant	  and	  often	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  axiom	  in	  international	  affairs	  throughout	  the	  entire	  United	   Nations	   period.	   Moreover,	   before	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   Agreement	   on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  (TRIPS)	  in	  1994	  as	  part	  of	  the	  overall	  WTO	  package,	   the	  design	  of	  national	   intellectual	  property	   laws	  was	  largely	  left	  to	  the	  needs,	  desires	  and	  insights	  of	  the	  government	  of	  each	  country.	  Thus,	   for	   example,	   national	   governments	   could,	   if	   they	   wished,	   exclude	  pharmaceutical	   products	   from	   patent	   protection.	   All	   of	   this	   changed	   with	   the	  arrival	   of	   the	   TRIPS	   agreement,	   which	   imposes	   relatively	   high	   minimum	  standards	   of	   protection	   for	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   on	   all	   WTO	   member	  states.	  The	  TRIPS	  agreement	  mandates	  for	  example	  that,	  with	  few	  exceptions,	  “...	  patents	  shall	  be	  available	  for	  any	  inventions,	  whether	  products	  or	  processes,	   in	  all	   fields	   of	   technology”171.	   Countries	   like	   India	   and	   Brazil	   that	   had	   previously	  excluded	   patents	   for	   pharmaceutical	   products	   (allowing	   patents	   on	  pharmaceutical	   processes	   only),	   were	   obliged	   to	   introduce	   new	   legislation	   by	  2005	   to	   allow	   the	   patenting	   of	   pharmaceuticals	   (Brazil	   complied	   with	   this	  requirement	  already	  in	  1996,	  India	  in	  2005).	  More	  generally,	  TRIPS	  created	  for	  the	  first	  time	  a	  de	  facto	  global	  IP	  regime.	  Only	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  such	  an	  international	  system	  of	  protection	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  could	  concerns	  about	   human	   rights	   and	   global	   justice	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   patents	   and	   other	   forms	   of	  intellectual	  property	  be	  sufficiently	  elaborated.	  A	  new	  institutional	  arrangement	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  was	  needed	  for	  such	  concerns	  to	  attain	  more	  articulation	  and	  a	  sharper	  focus.	  However,	  it	  would	  take	  some	  time	  before	  these	  concerns	  assumed	  more	  definite	  shape.	  As	   a	   preliminary	   to	   the	   subsequent	   discussion,	  we	  will	   set	   out	   the	   very	   useful	  threefold	   perspective	   that	   has	   been	   introduced	   by	   the	   American	   philosopher	  Matthew	  Wayne	  DeCamp	  	  for	  the	  ethical	  scrutiny	  of	  	  IP	  systems.	  Any	  system	  for	  the	  protection	  of	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   or	   IP	   regime,	  DeCamp	  points	   out,	  has	  three	  main	  kinds	  of	  distributive	  effects.	  It	  will	  determine	  or	  influence:	  (a)	  the	  
types	  of	  objects	  that	  will	  be	  developed	  and	  for	  which	  IPRs	  will	  be	  sought;	  (b)	  the	  differential	  access	  various	  people	  will	  have	  to	  these	  objects;	  (c)	  the	  distribution	  of	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the	   IPRs	   themselves	   among	   various	   actors172 .	   Because	   of	   these	   distributive	  effects,	  any	  IP	  regime	  can	  be	  judged	  from	  the	  angle	  of	  (distributive)	  justice.	  The	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  simply	  the	  purpose	  of	  an	  IP	  system	  to	  maximize	  innovation	  does	  not	   provide	   an	   exemption	   from	   ethical	   evaluation,	   as	   no	   regime	   is	  distributionally	  neutral.	  As	  we	  have	  at	  present	  a	  global	  IP	  regime,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  incipient	   forms	  of	  a	  global	  regime,	   the	  relevant	  standards	  of	   judgment	  must	  be	  derived	  from	  a	  credible	  conception	  of	  global	  justice.	  There	  are	  diverging	  views	  on	  global	  justice,	  but	  a	  common	  ground	  between	  the	  most	  important	  views	  is	  a	  shared	  recognition	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  basic	  human	  
rights173.	   This	  means	   that	  we	   can	   pragmatically	   use	   internationally	   recognized	  and	  codified	  human	  rights	  (as	  defined	  in	  UDHR	  and	  ICESCR)	  as	  a	  proxy	  criterion	  for	  assessing	  IP	  systems	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  compatibility	  with	  global	  justice.	  When	  discussing	   pharmaceutical	   patents,	   for	   instance,	   we	   would	   obviously	   want	   to	  refer	  to	  the	  human	  right	  to	  health	  as	  codified	  in	  UDHR	  25.1	  and	  ICESCR	  12.1,	  and	  the	  derived	  human	  right	  of	  access	  to	  essential	  medicines.	  A	  relevant	  distributive	  effect	  of	  the	  current	  international	  IP	  system	  relates	  to	  the	  prices	  of	  the	  lifesaving	  drugs	   it	   generates,	   and	   hence	   their	   affordability	   for	   various	   categories	   of	  patients.	  This	  effect	  concerns	  DeCamp’s	  second	  dimension	  (b).	  But	  we	  could	  also	  wonder	  what	  type	  of	  innovations	  will	  be	  promoted	  by	  the	  present	  system:	  will	  it	  primarily	  stimulate	  the	  development	  of	  lifestyle	  drugs	  like	  Viagra	  and	  remedies	  against	   baldness	   or	   rather	   encourage	   the	   development	   of	   medicines	   for	  conditions	   that	   afflict	   the	   lives	   of	   the	   global	   poor?	   This	   question	   refers	   to	  DeCamp’s	   first	   dimension	   (a).	   This	   distributive	   effect	   is	   also	   a	   hot	   issue	   in	   the	  international	   debate	   on	   pharmaceutical	   patents	   and	   access	   to	   essential	  medicines.	  What	  is	  often	  overlooked	  in	  the	  debate,	  however,	  is	  the	  relevance	  of	  DeCamp’s	  third	  dimension,	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  IPRs	  themselves.	  When	  the	  IP	  system	   functions	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   almost	   all	   exclusive	   rights	   end	   up	   in	   the	  hands	   of	   a	   few	   big	   multinational	   corporations	   headquartered	   in	   western	  countries,	  such	  an	  outcome	  might	  also	  be	  problematic	  from	  a	  global	  justice	  angle,	  even	  if	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  IP	  system	  on	  the	  two	  other	  dimensions	  were	  fully	  satisfactory.	  Here,	  other	  basic	  human	  rights	  beyond	  the	  right	  to	  health	  may	  be	  at	  stake,	   such	   as	   the	   right	   to	   take	   part	   in	   cultural	   life	   and	   to	   share	   in	   the	  advancement	  of	  science.	  Concerns	  about	  capacity	  building	  can	  also	  be	  subsumed	  under	  this	  rubric.	  	  
The	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  and	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  crisis	  	  The	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  was	   the	   culmination	   of	   years	   of	   intensive	   lobbying	  by	   a	  (predominantly	  US)	  coalition	  of	  	  business	  firms	  in	  such	  IP-­‐intensive	  industries	  as	  pharmaceuticals,	   software,	   agricultural	   chemicals	   and	   biotechnology,	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  DeCamp	  (2007)	  50f.	  and	  315-­‐317.	  173	  DeCamp,	  ibid.,	  253.	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music	  and	  movie	  sector174.	  In	  the	  early	  1980s	  Pfizer’s	  CEO	  Edmund	  Pratt	  was	  a	  key	  figure	  in	  building	  this	  coalition.	  The	  very	  notion	  of	  ‘intellectual	  property’	  was	  instrumental	  in	  bringing	  the	  interests	  of	  patent	  holders	  (e.g.	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry)	   and	   copyright	   holders	   (e.g.	   the	   music	   and	   movie	   industry)	   together	  under	  one	  umbrella175.	  The	  IP	  coalition	  thundered	  against	  what	  it	  considered	  the	  “theft”	  of	  US-­‐owned	  intellectual	  “property”	  abroad.	  The	  unauthorized	  copying	  of	  Hollywood	   movies	   and	   the	   production	   of	   generic	   equivalents	   of	   patented	  medicines,	   even	   if	   perfectly	   legal	   according	   to	   foreign	   laws,	   were	   labeled	   as	  “piracy”	  and	  “stealing	  from	  the	  mind”.	  	  The	  IP	  coalition	  used	  its	  privileged	  access	  to	   policymakers	   to	   institute	   policies	   destined	   to	   end	   such	   practices.	   By	  threatening	   trade	  retaliations	   (denying	  access	   to	   the	  American	  market),	   the	  US	  government	   brought	   enormous	   pressure	   to	   bear	   on	   recalcitrant	   foreign	  countries	   that	   showed	   insufficient	   respect	   for	   IPRs,	   in	   the	   end	   more	   or	   less	  forcing	  them	  to	  accept	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement.	  For	  the	  IP	  coalition	  the	  insertion	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  intellectual	  property	  into	  the	  WTO	  framework	  was	  of	   strategic	   importance,	   as	   it	  would	  allow	  sanctioning	  non-­‐compliant	   countries	  with	   punitive	   damages.	   Thus	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   has	   real	   teeth.	   No	  wonder	  then	  that	  a	   leading	  figure	  in	  the	  pro-­‐IP	  business	  coalition,	   Jacques	  Gorlin,	  could	  declare:	  “we	  got	  95%	  of	  what	  we	  wanted”176.	  The	  remaining	  5%	  that	  they	  did	  not	  get	   relate	   to	   the	   transition	   period	   that	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   granted	   to	  developing	   countries	   for	   introducing	   product	   patents	   for	   pharmaceuticals	   and	  the	   perhaps	   somewhat	   ambiguously	   defined	   options	   for	   compulsory	   licensing	  that	  the	  agreement	  still	  retained	  (in	  articles	  30	  and	  31),	  a	  crucial	  element	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “TRIPS	  flexibilities”	  (ibid.).	  Ethical	  judgments	  about	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  vary.	  Bruce	  Lehman,	  president	  of	  the	   International	   Intellectual	   Property	   Institute	   and	   commissioner	   of	   the	   US	  Patent	  and	  Trademark	  Office	  during	  the	  Clinton	  Administration,	  holds	  that	  “the	  TRIPS	   Agreement	   was	   intended	   to	   create	   a	   more	   equitable	   system	   of	  international	  trade”177.	  The	  philosopher	  Thomas	  Pogge,	  by	  contrast,	  arrives	  at	  a	  strongly	   negative	   judgment:	   “The	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   and	   its	   imposition	   are	  plainly	   unjust	   and	   will,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   magnitude	   of	   harm	   caused,	   number	  among	   the	   largest	   human	   rights	   violations	   in	   history”178.	   No	   less	   critical	   is	  economist	   Joseph	   Stiglitz:	   “When	   the	   trade	   ministers	   signed	   the	   TRIPS	  agreement	   in	  Marrakesh	   in	   the	  spring	  of	  1994,	   they	  were	   in	   	  effect	   signing	   the	  death	  warrants	  on	  thousands	  of	  people	   in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  developing	  countries”179.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  See	  Drahos	  and	  Braithwaite	  (2003),	  and	  Sell	  and	  Prakash	  (2004).	  175	  Kapczynski	  (2008).	  176	  Sell	  and	  Prakash	  (2004)	  160.	  	  177	  Lehman	  (2003)	  6.	  	  	  178	  Pogge	  (2008a)	  76.	  	  179	  Stiglitz	  (2008)	  1701.	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It	  was	  the	  worldwide	  HIV/AIDS	  crisis	  that	  would	  put	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  to	  a	  severe	  test	  in	  the	  years	  around	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  millennium.	  There	  is	  no	  cure	  for	  HIV/AIDS,	   but	   in	   1996	   medical	   researchers	   discovered	   that	   the	   progressive	  advance	   of	   the	   disease	   could	   be	   effectively	   controlled	   by	   a	   combination	  treatment	   of	   three	  different	   antiretroviral	   (ARV)	  drugs.	   The	   annual	   cost	   of	   the	  use	   of	   the	   three	   patented	   medicines	   together	   would	   be	   between	   10,000	   and	  15,000	  US	  dollars	  per	  patient.	  Such	  costs	  could	  perhaps	  be	  affordable	  in	  wealthy	  countries	  with	  robust	  health	  insurance	  systems,	  but	  would	  surely	  be	  out	  of	  reach	  for	   developing	   countries.	   In	   1997	   South	   Africa	   passed	   a	   new	   Medicines	   Act,	  which	   would	   allow	   the	   Minister	   of	   Health	   to	   initiate	   compulsory	   licensing	   or	  parallel	   importation	   of	   HIV/AIDS	   drugs.	   Thereupon	   40	   international	  pharmaceutical	   companies	   (and	   the	   Pharmaceutical	  Manufacturers	  Association	  of	   South	  Africa)	   filed	  a	   lawsuit	   against	   the	  South	  African	  government,	   claiming	  that	  the	  new	  law	  breached	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  and	  even	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  Republic	   of	   South	   Africa.	   The	   US	   government	   exerted	   additional	   pressure	   by	  placing	   the	   country	   on	   the	   so-­‐called	   “Section	   301	   Watch	   List”	   (enumerating	  countries	   that	   “misbehave”	   in	   the	   IP	   area	   as	   potential	   targets	   for	   retaliatory	  measures).	   The	   European	   Union	   also	   increased	   the	   diplomatic	   pressure.	   The	  initiative	   of	   Big	   Pharma	   led	   to	   a	   strong	   backlash,	   however,	   after	   HIV/AIDS	  activists	  mobilized	  international	  public	  opinion	  against	  the	  lawsuit,	  which	  turned	  into	  a	  PR	  nightmare	  for	  the	  pharmaceutical	  companies.	  It	  also	  caused	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  authorities	  to	  withdraw	  their	  support180.	  	  A	  decisive	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  evolving	  drama	  occurred	  in	  January	  2001,	  when	  the	  Indian	  generics	  manufacturer	  Cipla	  offered	  to	  sell	  the	  triple-­‐therapy	  cocktail	  to	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières	   for	  350	  US	  dollars	  per	  patient	  per	  year181:	  “Cipla’s	  dramatic	   price	   reduction,	   which	   received	   widespread	   media	   attention,	  hammered	   the	   message	   home	   that	   the	   multinational	   drug	   companies	   were	  abusing	  their	  monopolistic	  position	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  catastrophic	  human	  disaster.	  It	   also	   focused	  attention	  on	   the	  effects	  of	   generic	   competition	   in	  bringing	  drug	  prices	   down”182.	   In	   April	   2001,	   the	   pharmaceutical	   companies	   dropped	   their	  lawsuit	   against	   the	   South	  African	   government.	   The	   same	  month	  UN	   Secretary-­‐General	   Kofi	   Annan	   announced	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Global	   Fund	   to	   Fight	   AIDS,	  Tuberculosis	   and	   Malaria.	   The	   price	   drop	   also	   led	   the	   international	   policy-­‐makers	  to	  change	  course:	  earlier	  they	  had	  approved	  the	  use	  of	  donor	  funds	  only	  for	  prevention,	  but	  not	  for	  treatment183.	  Finally,	   in	  November	  2001	  the	  WTO	  Ministerial	  Conference	  assembled	  in	  Doha,	  Qatar	  issued	  the	  famous	  Declaration	  on	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  and	  Public	  Health	  (or	  Doha	  Declaration),	  stating	  that	  “the	  Agreement	  can	  and	  should	  be	  interpreted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  180	  ‘t	  Hoen	  (2009)	  21.	  181	  see	  Sell	  and	  Prakash	  (2004)	  162,	  and	  Love	  (2009)	  17.	  182	  ‘t	  Hoen	  (2009)	  25.	  183	  Love	  (2009)	  16f.	  	  
	   83	  
and	   implemented	   in	   a	   manner	   supportive	   of	   WTO	   Members’	   right	   to	   protect	  public	   health	   and,	   in	   particular,	   to	   promote	   access	   to	   medicines	   for	   all”	   (our	  italics).	   This	   was	   at	   least	   an	   ideological	   victory	   for	   the	   access-­‐to-­‐medicines	  campaign	  waged	  by	  MSF,	  Oxfam	  and	  several	  other	  organizations.	  Unfortunately,	  it	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  in	  actual	  practice	  developing	  countries	  would	  henceforth	  be	  free	   to	   use	   the	   “TRIPS	   flexibilities”	   such	   as	   compulsory	   licensing	   to	   the	   full	  without	  having	  to	  fear	  any	  retaliations	  from	  more	  powerful	  countries.	  	  
Access	  to	  medicines:	  a	  contested	  terrain	  	  The	  worldwide	  HIV/AIDS	  crisis	  has	  brought	  the	  problem	  of	  access	  to	  life-­‐saving	  medicines	   into	   sharp	   relief,	   much	   to	   the	   dismay	   of	   the	   (non-­‐generic)	  pharmaceutical	  industry.	  Drug	  companies	  resent	  the	  one-­‐sided	  focus	  on	  patents	  and	   high	   drug	   prices	   as	   a	   major	   obstacle	   to	   access.	   A	   more	   impartial	  investigation	   of	   the	   situation	   in	   developing	   countries,	   they	   insist,	   would	   show	  that	  access	  to	  medicines	  is	  actually	  impeded	  by	  a	  great	  variety	  of	  factors,	  such	  as	  lack	  of	  an	  adequate	  infrastructure,	   lack	  of	  well-­‐equipped	  hospitals,	   lack	  of	  well-­‐trained	   doctors,	   nurses	   and	   pharmacists,	   lack	   of	   clean	   water	   and	   adequate	  storage	  capacity,	   lack	  of	  good	  governance,	  and	  so	  on	  and	  so	  forth	  –	  in	  short,	  an	  endless	  array	  of	   factors	  that	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  in	  the	  one	  underlying	  factor	  of	  extreme	  poverty.	  Thus	  the	  international	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  inappropriate	  and	  unfair	  to	  concentrate	  on	  intellectual	  property	  protection	  as	  if	  this	  were	  the	  single	  or	  decisive	  factor	  impeding	  access	  to	  essential	  medicines.	  A	  report	   issued	  by	   the	   International	   Intellectual	  Property	   Institute	   (IIPI)	   in	  2000	  even	   stated	   categorically	   that	   “the	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   and	   the	   TRIPS	  Agreement	  are	  not,	   in	   themselves,	   impediments	   to	   the	  availability	  of	  HIV/AIDS	  therapies	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa”184 ;	   the	   focus	   on	   patents	   tended	   to	   divert	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  “real	  factors”	  constraining	  the	  availability	  of	  and	  access	  to	   drugs	   in	   this	   region.	   The	   position	   that	   patents	   do	   not	   constitute	   a	   major	  obstacle	   for	   access	   to	   essential	   HIV/AIDS	   drugs	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   was	  further	   elaborated	   in	   an	   academic	   article	   by	   Amir	   Attaran	   and	   Lee	   Gillespie-­‐White185;	  Amir	  Attaran186	  put	  the	  argument	  in	  the	  general	   form	  that	  patents	  do	  not	   impede	   access	   to	   essential	   medicines	   for	   all	   sorts	   of	   diseases	   in	   the	  developing	  world	  as	  a	  whole.	  However,	   the	  methodological	  assumptions	  of	   this	  work	   have	   been	   severely	   criticized	   by	   NGOs	   involved	   in	   access-­‐to-­‐medicines	  campaigns187.	  	  	  	  	  In	   debates	   on	   access	   to	   medicines,	   representatives	   of	   the	   non-­‐generic	  pharmaceutical	   industry	  constantly	  reiterate	   their	  mantra	   that	   the	  big	  problem	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  International	  Intellectual	  Property	  Institute	  (2000)	  54.	  185	  Attaran	  and	  Gillespie-­‐White	  (2001)	  186	  Attaran	  (2004)	  187	  Consumer	  Project	  on	  Technology	  et	  al.	  (2001)	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is	  not	  patents	  but	  poverty188.	  Yet	  there	  is	  something	  disingenuous	  about	  this	  way	  of	   framing	  the	  problem.	  By	  blaming	   lack	  of	  access	  on	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  poverty	  and	   arguing	   that	   an	   effective	   solution	   should	   address	   the	   “real	   factors”	  underlying	  the	  problem,	  the	  proponents	  of	  Big	  Pharma	  turn	  the	  critical	  spotlight	  away	  from	  their	  intellectual	  property	  rights.	  It	  is	  an	  easy	  way	  to	  get	  off	  the	  hook,	  as	   no	   one	   would	   contest	   the	   desirability	   of	   more	   aid	   and	   assistance	   to	   tackle	  global	   poverty	   –	   least	   of	   all	   the	   NGOs	   campaigning	   for	   greater	   access	   to	  medicines.	  There	  are	   indeed	  more	  barriers	   impeding	  access,	  but	   that	  would	  be	  no	  excuse	  not	  to	  clear	  the	  one	  particular	  barrier	  making	  patented	  medicines	  so	  expensive	   as	   to	   be	   unaffordable	   for	   poor	   patients	   and	   poor	   countries189.	   As	   a	  number	  of	  NGOs	  declared	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Big	  Pharma	  position:	  “We	  agree	  that	  donor	  aid	   is	   extremely	   important,	   and	   continue	  our	  work	   to	   advocate	   for	   such	  aid.	  But	   it	   is	  entirely	   irrational,	  and	   in	  our	  opinion,	  deeply	  cynical,	   to	  pit	  donor	  aid	  against	  efforts	  to	  overcome	  patent	  barriers.	  Everything	  possible	  needs	  to	  be	  done.	  Every	  barrier	  for	  cheaper	  medicine	  needs	  to	  be	  removed”190.	  By	  robustly	  protecting	  their	  global	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  and	  insisting	  that	  access	   to	  essential	  medicines	  should	  be	  ensured	  by	   increased	  donor	  aid	   rather	  than	   by	   lowering	   their	   prices	   and/or	   licensing	   generic	   manufacturers,	  pharmaceutical	   companies	   effectively	   shift	   the	   burden	   of	   solving	   the	   access	  problem	   onto	   governments	   and	   international	   donor	   funds.	   This	   approach	   is	  vehemently	  defended	  by	  the	  president	  of	  the	  International	  Intellectual	  Property	  Institute,	   Bruce	   Lehman.	   Thus	   after	   first	   extolling	   the	   stimulating	   effect	   of	   the	  patent	  system	  on	  the	  development	  of	  new	  medicines,	  Lehman	  refuses	  to	  blame	  the	  same	  system	  for	  the	  high	  drug	  prices:	  “None	  of	  the	  new	  drugs	  in	  the	  pipeline,	  much	   less	   the	   74	   medicines	   that	   already	   have	   caused	   deaths	   from	   AIDS	   to	  plummet	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   would	   have	   come	   into	   existence	   without	   the	  patent	   incentive	   and	   the	   prospect	   of	   a	   return	   on	   investment	   provided	   by	   that	  incentive.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  dismiss	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  patients	  in	  the	  world	  cannot	  pay	  for	  these	  drugs	  and	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  them.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  result	  
of	  the	  patent	  system.	  It	  is	  the	  result	  of	  lack	  of	  a	  source	  of	  funding	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  drugs	  for	  those	  currently	  too	  poor	  to	  buy	  them	  themselves”191.	  In	  other	  words,	  high	  prices	  for	  patented	  drugs	  are	  apparently	  an	  inevitable	  fact	  of	  nature.	  Lack	  of	  access	   of	   the	   world’s	   poor	   to	   such	   medicines	   can	   only	   be	   remedied	   if	  governments	  or	  donor	   funds	  are	  willing	   to	  pay	   the	   full	  price	   for	   them.	  Lehman	  would	  not	  be	  appreciative	  at	   all	   if	  donor	   funds	   like	   the	  Global	  Fund	  used	   their	  limited	  budgets	  to	  purchase	  much	  cheaper	  generics,	  even	  if	  they	  would	  thereby	  reach	  many	  more	  patients192.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  Leisinger	  (2009)	  7f.	  	  189	  Sell	  (2007)	  45-­‐47.	  190	  Consumer	  Project	  on	  Technology	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  191	  Lehman	  (2003)	  8,	  (our	  italics).	  192	  Lehman,	  idem.,	  10.	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The	   sad	   fact,	   however,	   is	   that	   governments	   or	   international	   charities	   may	  sometimes	  consider	  the	  prices	  of	  patented	  medicines	  prohibitively	  high	  to	  act	  as	  a	  source	  of	   funding	  for	  the	  poor.	   James	  Love	  tells	  us	  about	  a	  meeting	  he	  had	  in	  2003	  with	   the	  Director	   of	   the	  Office	   of	  Management	   and	  Budget	   (OMB)	   under	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  Mitch	  Daniels,	  who	  declared	   that	  when	  prices	  were	  more	  than	  $1,000	  per	  year,	  the	  OMB	  could	  not	  justify	  spending	  money	  on	  AIDS	  treatment,	  but	  that	  when	  the	  price	  fell	  below	  $1	  per	  day,	  he	  felt	   they	  could	  not	  justify	  not	  spending	  money	  on	  AIDS	  medicines193.	  The	   drop	   in	   prices	   for	   antiretroviral	   drugs,	   mainly	   thanks	   to	   increased	  competition	  from	  generic	  manufacturers,	  induced	  US	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  in	   early	  2003	   to	   launch	  a	  major	   initiative,	   the	  Presidential	  Emergency	  Plan	   for	  AIDS	  Relief	  (PEPFAR).	  In	  his	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  Address	  of	  January	  28,	  2003,	  he	  declared:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  “There	  are	  whole	  countries	   in	  Africa	  where	  more	   than	  one-­‐third	  of	   the	  adult	  population	   carries	   the	   infection.	   More	   than	   four	   million	   require	   immediate	  drug	   treatment.	   Yet	   across	   that	   continent,	   only	   50,000	   AIDS	   victims	   –	   only	  50,000	   –	   are	   receiving	   the	  medicine	   they	   need	   .	   .	   .	   	   A	   doctor	   in	   rural	   South	  Africa	   describes	   his	   frustration.	   He	   says,	   ‘We	   have	   no	   medicines	   …	   many	  hospitals	  tell	  [people],	   ‘You’ve	  got	  AIDS.	  We	  can’t	  help	  you.	  Go	  home	  and	  die.’	  In	  an	  age	  of	  miraculous	  medicines,	  no	  person	  should	  have	  to	  hear	  those	  words.	  AIDS	   can	  be	  prevented.	  Anti-­‐retroviral	  drugs	   can	  extend	   life	   for	  many	  years.	  And	  the	  cost	  of	  those	  drugs	  has	  dropped	  from	  $12,000	  a	  year	  to	  under	  $300	  a	  year,	  which	  places	  a	  tremendous	  possibility	  within	  our	  grasp	  ………	  [T]onight	  I	  propose	   the	   Emergency	   Plan	   for	   AIDS	   Relief	   –	   a	   work	   of	   mercy	   beyond	   all	  current	  international	  efforts	  to	  help	  the	  people	  of	  Africa.	  .	  .	  .	  	  I	  ask	  the	  Congress	  to	  commit	  $15	  billion	  over	  the	  next	  five	  years,	   including	  nearly	  $10	  billion	  in	  new	  money,	  to	  turn	  the	  tide	  against	  AIDS	  in	  the	  most	  afflicted	  nations	  of	  Africa	  and	  the	  Caribbean.”194	  	  For	  all	  its	  generosity	  the	  PEPFAR	  initiative	  would	  have	  been	  unthinkable	  were	  it	  not	  for	  the	  inroads	  made	  by	  generic	  manufacturers	  on	  the	  patent	  monopolies	  of	  the	  world’s	  leading	  drug	  companies.	  In	  his	  address	  to	  the	  nation	  Bush	  implicitly	  affirmed	   the	   universal	   right	   to	   health	   and	   the	   derivative	   right	   of	   access	   to	  essential	  medicines	  (note	  the	  line:	  “In	  an	  age	  of	  miraculous	  medicines,	  no	  person	  should	   have	   to	   hear	   those	  words”).	   So,	   for	   once,	   the	   US	   president	   did	   not	   put	  patents	  before	  patients.	  His	  stance	  represented	  a	  remarkable	  departure	  from	  the	  “patents-­‐are-­‐sacrosanct”	   position	   usually	   adopted	   by	   the	   pharmaceutical	  industry	  and	  also,	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  by	  the	  US	  government.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  193	  Love	  (2009)	  18	  n.	  36.	  194	  Bush	  (2003)	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The	  general	  thrust	  of	  US	  trade	  policy	  during	  the	  last	  fifteen	  years	  or	  so	  has	  been	  to	  aggressively	  defend	  the	  global	  IP	  interests	  of	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry.	  The	  American	   government	   has	   concluded	   several	   bilateral	   and	   regional	   trade	  agreements	   containing	   so-­‐called	   “TRIPS-­‐plus”	   provisions	   aimed	   at	   eliminating	  the	  “flexibilities”	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  and	  it	  has	  also	  exerted	  heavy	  economic	  and	   political	   pressure	   on	   Third	   World	   countries	   intent	   on	   using	   these	   same	  “flexibilities”	  (e.g.	  compulsory	  licensing)	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  protecting	  public	  health	  or	  promoting	  access	  to	  medicines	  for	  all195.	  A	  case	  in	  point	  is	  the	  US	  response	  to	  the	   decisions	   taken	   by	   the	   Thai	   government	   in	   2006	   and	   2007	   to	   issue	  compulsory	   licenses	   for	   the	   production	   of	   the	   first-­‐line	   AIDS	   drug	   efavirenz	  (Stocrin),	   the	   second-­‐line	   AIDS	   drug	   lopinavir/ritonavir	   (Kaletra)	   and	   the	  antiplatelet	   drug	   clopidogrel	   (Plavix),	   patented	   respectively	   by	  Merck	   Sharp	  &	  Dohme	   (the	   UK	   subsidiary	   of	   the	   US	   firm	  Merck),	   the	   US	   firm	   Abbott	   and	   the	  European	   company	   Sanofi-­‐Aventis.	   Although	   these	   decisions	  were	   fully	   in	   line	  with	   the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	   (as	   reaffirmed	  by	   the	  Doha	  Declaration),	   they	  were	  branded	  by	   the	   international	   pharmaceutical	   industry	   as	   illegal	   appropriations	  of	   private-­‐sector	   property196.	   US	   and	   European	   ambassadors	   signaled	   their	  strong	   disapproval	   of	   the	   compulsory	   licenses	   to	   the	  Thai	   government.	   Abbott	  retaliated	  by	  announcing	  to	  withdraw	  all	  applications	  to	  register	  its	  new	  drugs	  in	  Thailand.	   The	  US	  Trade	  Representative	   placed	  Thailand	   under	   the	   Special	   301	  “Priority	   Watch	   List	   Surveillance”	   and	   threatened	   to	   terminate	   Thailand’s	  privileges	  to	  export	  to	  the	  US	  market.	  According	  to	  some	  legal	  experts,	  however,	  it	   is	   not	   the	   Thai	   government’s	   resort	   to	   compulsory	   licensing,	   but	   the	  contemplated	   US	   reprisal	   against	   Thailand	   that	   is	   in	   contravention	   of	  international	  law197.	  In	  its	  conflict	  with	  the	  US	  government	  and	  pharmaceutical	  companies,	  Thailand	  received	   support	   from	   an	   unsuspected	   quarter,	   namely	   from	   Bill	   Clinton.	  Accompanying	   the	  Thai	  minister	  of	  health	  during	  her	  visit	   to	  New	  York	   in	  May	  2007,	  the	  former	  US	  president	  defended	  Thailand’s	  decision	  to	  issue	  compulsory	  licenses:	  “No	  company	  will	   live	  or	  die	  because	  of	  high	  price	  premiums	  for	  AIDS	  drugs	   in	  middle-­‐income	  countries,	  but	  patients	  may”198.	  For	  Clinton,	   affordable	  drug	   prices	   were	   a	   life-­‐and-­‐death	   issue.	   Since	   2002	   the	   William	   J.	   Clinton	  Foundation	  had	  been	  active	  in	  making	  first-­‐line	  AIDS	  medicines	  available	  to	  the	  needy	   in	   Africa	   and	   elsewhere	   by	   striking	   advantageous	   deals	   with	   generic	  manufacturers.	   The	   relative	   success	   of	   this	   program	   created	   a	   new	   financial	  burden	  because	  part	  of	  the	  patients	  who	  have	  been	  kept	  alive	  develop	  resistance	  to	  the	  first-­‐line	  drugs	  and	  need	  to	  be	  treated	  by	  the	  newer	  and	  much	  more	  costly	  second-­‐line	   AIDS	   drugs.	   Typically,	   patented	   brand-­‐name	   versions	   of	   the	   latter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  Sell	  (2007)	  196	  Limpananont	  and	  Kijtiwatchakul	  (2010)	  442.	  197	  Reichman	  (2009a)	  256.	  198	  Bill	  Clinton	  quoted	  by	  Dugger	  (2007).	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are	  more	  than	  10	  times	  as	  expensive	  as	  the	  first-­‐line	  generic	  drugs,	  thus	  causing	  an	  enormous	  strain	  on	  the	  health-­‐care	  budget.	  The	  Clinton	  Foundation	  therefore	  struck	   new	   deals	   with	   the	   Indian	   manufacturers	   Cipla	   and	   Matrix	   to	   provide	  generic	   versions	   of	   second-­‐line	   AIDS	   drugs	   at	   greatly	   reduced	   prices,	   with	  average	   savings	   of	   50	   percent	   in	   middle-­‐income	   countries	   like	   Thailand.	  Needless	   to	   say	   that	   Clinton’s	   initiative	   was	   not	   welcomed	   by	   the	   big	  multinational	   drug	   companies	   and	   the	   US	   government,	   but	   their	   demurral	   did	  not	   deter	   him.	   He	   criticized	   Abbott’s	   “hard-­‐line	   position”	   over	   what	   he	  considered	  to	  be	  “a	  life	  and	  death	  matter”.199	  	  	  	  	  
The	  human	  rights	  obligations	  of	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  	  While	   states	   have	   the	   primary	   responsibility	   for	   realizing	   the	   human	   right	   to	  health	   and	   increasing	   access	   to	   medicines,	   other	   national	   and	   international	  actors,	   including	   private	   business	   firms,	   also	   share	   in	   this	   responsibility.	  Although	   pharmaceutical	   companies	   normally	   have	   extensive	   Corporate	   Social	  Responsibility	   (CSR)	   policies	   in	   place	   and	   often	   subscribe	   to	   the	   loftiest	  humanitarian	   aims	   in	   their	   mission	   statements	   (typically	   placing	   the	   relief	   of	  human	  suffering	  before	  profits),	  they	  generally	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  strictly	  held	  to	  account	  with	  regard	  to	  more	  specific	  commitments	  and	  obligations.	  When	  the	  previous	  UN	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  right	  to	  health,	  Dr.	  Paul	  Hunt,	  undertook	   to	   create	   more	   clarity	   on	   the	   human	   rights	   obligations	   of	   drug	  companies	  in	  relation	  to	  access	  to	  medicines,	  he	  found	  few	  firms	  that	  were	  ready	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  consultation	  process	  and	  his	  draft	  and	  final	  guidelines	  met	  with	  negative	  comments	  from	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry200.	  The	  drug	  firms	  felt	  that	   the	   human	   rights	   obligations	   that	   had	   conventionally	   been	   placed	   on	   the	  nation	  state	  (and	  the	   international	  community)	  were	   illegitimately	  shifted	  onto	  their	  shoulders,	  and	  they	  rejected	  this	  move:	  “Most	  companies	  will	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  their	  role	  to	  step	  in	  when	  those	  first	  in	  line	  of	  responsibility	  fail	  to	  perform	  their	  duty”201.	  Let	  us	  have	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  Hunt’s	  guidelines	  to	  see	  whether	  or	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  response	  is	  warranted.	  Hunt’s	  definitive	  list	  contains	  no	  less	  than	  47	  guidelines,	  grouped	  into	  14	  themes.	  Some	   of	   the	   guidelines	   refer	   to	   such	   general	   requirements	   as	   the	   need	   for	  transparency,	  monitoring	   and	   accountability.	   It	   is	   further	   held	   imperative	   that	  companies	  disclose	  all	  their	  advocacy	  and	  lobbying	  activities	  and	  their	  attempts	  to	  influence	  public	  policy	  (guidelines	  17	  and	  18).	  Companies	  are	  also	  called	  upon	  to	  respect	  the	  letter	  and	  spirit	  of	  the	  Doha	  Declaration	  (guideline	  27)	  and	  not	  to	  impede	   those	   states	   that	   wish	   to	   use	   the	   flexibilities	   of	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	  (guideline	  28).	  There	  are	  also	  interesting	  requirements	  on	  licensing	  and	  pricing.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  Bill	  Clinton	  quoted	  by	  Usborne	  (2007).	  200	  See	  Hunt	  (2008)	  and	  Hunt	  and	  Khosla	  (2010).	  201	  Leisinger	  (2009)	  10f.	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Thus	  drug	  companies	  “should	  issue	  non-­‐exclusive	  voluntary	  licenses	  with	  a	  view	  to	   increasing	   access,	   in	   low-­‐income	   and	   middle-­‐income	   countries,	   to	   all	  medicines”	  (guideline	  30).	  With	  a	  view	  to	  ensuring	  that	  a	  company’s	  medicines	  are	  affordable	  to	  as	  many	  people	  as	  possible,	  the	  former	  UN	  Special	  Rapporteur	  suggests	   that	   it	   should	  adopt	  differential	  pricing	  between	  countries	  and	  within	  countries	   (guideline	   33),	   charging	   lower	   prices	   in	   poorer	   countries	   and	   for	  poorer	  patients	  and	  communities.	  Drug	  companies	  should	  also	  do	  more	  research	  and	   development	   on	   neglected	   diseases	   and	  make	   public	   commitments	   in	   this	  respect	   (guideline	   23).	   Hunt	   recognizes	   that	   drug	   companies	   also	   have	   a	  responsibility	   to	   enhance	   shareholder	   value	   (preamble)	   and	   thus	   are	   no	  charities,	   but	   he	   insists	   that	   they	   should	   do	   everything	   they	   reasonably	   can	   to	  help	   realize	   the	   human	   right	   to	   health:	   “The	   seminal	   right-­‐to-­‐health	  responsibility	  is	  to	  take	  all	  reasonable	  steps	  to	  make	  the	  medicine	  as	  accessible	  as	   possible,	   as	   soon	   as	   possible,	   to	   all	   those	   in	   need,	   within	   a	   viable	   business	  model”202.	   Moreover,	   companies	   have	   to	   make	   themselves	   accountable	   in	   this	  regard	   by	   having	   their	   efforts	   to	   enhance	   access	   to	   medicines	   monitored	   and	  reviewed	  by	  independent	  agencies.	  While	  working	  on	  the	  guidelines,	  Hunt	  also	  undertook	  a	  mission	  in	  2008	  to	  the	  headquarters	   of	   the	   UK-­‐based	   drug	   firm	   GlaxoSmithKline	   (GSK)	   to	   interview	  several	   senior	   managers	   on	   the	   company’s	   policy	   with	   regard	   to	   access	   to	  medicines.	   GSK	   is	  widely	   recognized	   as	   a	   strong	   exponent	   of	   Corporate	   Social	  Responsibility	   policies	   within	   the	   pharmaceutical	   industry.	   In	   2008	   it	   ranked	  first	  on	  Access	  to	  Medicine	  Index	  and	  in	  2010	  it	  came	  out	  on	  top	  again.	  As	  GSK’s	  policy	   might	   be	   considered	   as	   constituting	   ‘best	   practice’	   in	   this	   area,	   Hunt’s	  findings	   are	   particularly	   interesting203.	   While	   he	   thinks	   some	   aspects	   of	   GSK	  policy	  are	  indeed	  admirable	  and	  commendable,	  he	  still	  concludes	  that	  across	  the	  board	  the	  company	  fails	  to	  live	  up	  to	  its	  human	  rights	  obligations.	  GSK	  does	  quite	  a	   lot	   of	   research	   on	   so-­‐called	   “neglected	   diseases”	   with	   special	   relevance	   to	  developing	   countries.	   The	   company	   also	   has	   made	   a	   commitment	   to	   offer	   its	  antiretrovirals	  and	  anti-­‐malarial	  treatments	  to	  least-­‐developed	  countries	  and	  all	  of	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   at	   not-­‐for-­‐profit	   prices	   (which	   cover	   costs	   including	  insurance	   and	   freight).	   These	   price	   reductions	   are	   in	   line	   with	   GSK’s	   right-­‐to-­‐health	   responsibilities,	   but	   Hunt	   observes	   that	   they	   have	   been	   forced	   by	  competition	   from	   generic	   producers:	   “Crucially,	   generic	   competition	   played	   a	  vital	   role	   in	   driving	   down	   these	   prices.	   In	  most	   cases,	   generic	   companies	   have	  pushed	   their	   prices	   below	   the	   NFP	   [not-­‐for-­‐profit]	   prices	   of	   innovator	  companies”204.	   The	   former	   UN	   Special	   Rapporteur	   also	   notes	   that	   the	   price	   of	  GSK’s	   HPV	   (human	   papilloma	   virus)	   vaccine	   against	   cervical	   cancer,	   Cervarix,	  remains	   so	   high	   (US	   $	   300)	   as	   to	   be	   beyond	   the	   reach	   of	   most	   people	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	  Hunt	  and	  Khosla	  (2010)	  2.	  203	  Hunt	  (2009)	  204	  Hunt	  (2009)	  18.	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developing	  countries.205	  Although	  GSK	  grants	  licenses	  for	  some	  of	  its	  products	  in	  some	   markets,	   Hunt	   holds	   that	   the	   company	   is	   too	   reluctant	   to	   use	   this	  instrument	   and	   that	   it	   should	   enter	   into	   voluntary	   licensing	   (both	   commercial	  and	   non-­‐commercial)	   on	   a	  much	  wider	   scale	   across	   a	   range	   of	  medicines	   and	  markets.	   GSK	   has	   also	   experimented	   with	   a	   new	   marketing	   approach	   of	  differential	   pricing	   between	   countries	   and	   within	   countries.	   This	   approach	  would	  hold	  much	  interest	  and	  promise,	  Hunt	  remarks	  in	  his	  report,	  if	  it	  could	  be	  extended	   considerably	   beyond	   its	   present	   far	   too	   modest	   scale.	   Hunt	   is	   also	  critical	   of	   GSK’s	   lobbying	   activities	   to	   discourage	   the	   full	   use	   of	   the	   TRIPS	  flexibilities	  by	  countries	  like	  India,	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  Philippines	  and	  its	  support	  for	   the	   inclusion	  of	   “TRIPS-­‐plus”	  provisions	   in	  bilateral	  and	  regional	   free	   trade	  agreements.	  Finally,	  the	  company	  has	  not	  lived	  up	  to	  standards	  of	  accountability	  by	  failing	  to	  provide	  for	  external	  review	  of	  its	  Corporate	  Accountability	  Report	  for	  2008.	  Hunt’s	   recommendations	   (not	   to	   say	   prescriptions)	   to	   GSK	   and	   the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  in	  general	  are	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  drug	  firms	  have	   definite	   human	   rights	   obligations	   in	   relation	   to	   access	   to	  medicines.	   It	   is	  precisely	  this	  assumption	  that	  is	  bluntly	  rejected	  by	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry.	  In	  this	  regard	  GSK’s	  response	  to	  Hunt’s	  report	  on	  the	  company’s	  policies	  is	  highly	  significant:	  “The	  ‘right	  to	  health’	  is	  an	  important	  issue,	  though	  not	  well	  defined,	  especially	   as	   it	   relates	   to	   non-­‐state	   actors.	   Therefore	   we	   do	   not	   accept	   the	  suggestion	  –	  implicit	  in	  the	  development	  of	  this	  Report	  –	  that	  GSK’s	  programme	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  Hunt	  states	  in	  his	  report:	  “As	  a	  patent	  holder	  of	  a	  life-­‐saving	  medicine,	  GSK	  has	  a	  right-­‐to-­‐health	  responsibility	  to	  do	  all	  it	  reasonably	  can	  to	  put	  in	  place,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  urgency,	  mechanisms	  that	  enhance	  access	  to	  Cervarix	  in	  middle-­‐income	  and	  low-­‐income	  countries	  […]”,	  Hunt	  (2009)	  18.	  However,	  beyond	  being	  financially	  unaffordable,	  Cervarix	  is	  also	  not	  the	  most	  appropriate	  HPV	  vaccine	  for	  use	  in	  developing	  countries.	  The	  same	  holds	  for	  the	  other	  HPV	  vaccine	  that	  is	  currently	  on	  the	  market,	  Merck’s	  Gardasil.	  Both	  vaccines	  have	  actually	  been	  designed	  and	  developed	  with	  a	  view	  to	  be	  used	  in	  developed	  countries.	  They	  are	  expensive	  to	  produce;	  require	  refrigeration	  and	  a	  cold	  chain	  for	  storage;	  they	  require	  delivery	  by	  intramuscular	  injection	  in	  three	  doses	  over	  a	  six-­‐month	  period;	  they	  work	  against	  HPV16	  and	  HPV18,	  but	  not	  against	  virus	  variants	  such	  as	  HPV35	  that	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa;	  they	  may	  be	  less	  effective	  in	  women	  with	  other	  infections	  (like	  HIV);	  their	  ideal	  target	  group	  is	  females	  in	  early	  adolescence,	  but	  this	  may	  make	  them	  culturally	  inappropriate	  in	  some	  developing	  countries.	  For	  all	  these	  reasons,	  Cervarix	  and	  Gardasil	  are	  not	  optimally	  designed	  for	  use	  in	  developing	  countries,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  more	  appropriate	  alternative	  options	  would	  have	  been	  possible,	  see	  Intemann	  and	  de	  Melo-­‐Martín	  (2010).	  Thus,	  these	  two	  HPV	  vaccines	  not	  only	  illustrate	  the	  problem	  of	  access	  to	  existing	  medicines	  or	  vaccines	  due	  to	  their	  high	  prices,	  but	  also	  show	  the	  biased	  orientation	  of	  the	  global	  R&D	  effort	  towards	  the	  demands	  of	  affluent	  markets.	  It	  is	  not	  just	  that	  HPV	  vaccines	  are	  “largely	  unaffordable	  where	  [they	  are]	  most	  needed”,	  Hunt	  (2009)	  18;	  as	  Hunt	  notes,	  but	  appropriate	  forms	  of	  HPV	  vaccines	  are	  not	  even	  available	  where	  they	  would	  be	  most	  needed.	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and	  ongoing	   commitment	   is	   in	   any	  way	   required	  by	   international	   legal	   norms,	  whether	   in	   the	   human	   rights	   or	   other	   areas.”206.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   company	  prefers	   to	   see	   its	  Corporate	   Social	  Responsibility	  policies	   as	   “good	  works”	   that	  are	   supererogatory	   and	   not	   required	   by	   international	   legal	   norms.	   The	  implication	  is	  that	  a	  pharmaceutical	  company	  cannot	  be	  held	  to	  account	  for	  not	  living	   up	   to	   any	   alleged	   human	   rights	   obligations	   in	   relation	   to	   access	   to	  medicines.	  	  GSK’s	   position	   is	   in	   fact	   representative	   for	   the	   entire	   pharmaceutical	   industry.	  The	  editors	  of	  PLoS	  Medicine	  argue	   that	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  “blunt	   their	  own	  responsibilities	  by	  instead	  emphasizing	  their	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  initiatives”	  and	  that	  by	  persistently	  claiming	  that	  “the	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  delivering	   the	   right	   to	   health	   lies	   with	   the	   State”	   the	   industry	   allows	   “to	  exculpate	  itself	  from	  its	  own	  human	  rights	  responsibilities”207.	  	  Business	  ethicist	  Richard	   De	   George	   also	   points	   out	   that	   the	   Corporate	   Social	   Responsibility	  initiatives	   in	  which	  pharmaceutical	   companies	   engage	   seem	   to	   imply	   that	   they	  are	  not	  to	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  failing	  to	  live	  up	  to	  any	  commitments:	  “In	  their	  various	  programs,	  many	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  give	  a	  variety	  of	  drugs	  away	  free	   to	   the	   needy,	   be	   they	  AIDS	   victims	   in	  Africa	   or	   poor	   people	   in	   the	  United	  States.	  These	  are	  most	  often	  presented	  as	  meeting	  part	  of	   the	  company’s	  social	  responsibility.	   So	   framed,	   it	   sounds	   as	   if	   these	   are	   voluntary,	   non-­‐obligatory	  programs	   that	   the	   companies	   adopt	   as	   good	   citizens	   or	   through	   their	  philanthropic	   foundations.	   They	  might	   be	   considered	   supererogatory,	   or	   good	  works	  that	  are	  not	  required,	  and	  ones	  for	  which	  they	  deserve	  praise;	  but	  failure	  to	   engage	   in	   them	  would	   deserve	   no	   blame.	   This	   approach	   puts	   the	   actions	   of	  pharmaceutical	   companies	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   charity,	   and	   portrays	   them	   as	  generous	  and	  caring”208.	  	  The	  language	  of	  social	  responsibility,	  he	  also	  observes,	  “carries	  with	  it	  no	  non-­‐self	  imposed	  obligations	  and	  so	  no	  broader	  accountability	  beyond	  what	  the	  company	  defines	  its	  responsibility	  to	  be”209.	  Pharmaceutical	   companies	   often	   cite	   the	   reduced	   prices	   for	   antiretrovirals	   or	  other	   essential	   medicines	   that	   they	   charge	   in	   developing	   countries,	   or	   their	  willingness	  to	  engage	  in	  differential	  pricing	  schemes	  on	  a	  case-­‐by	  case	  basis210,	  as	   proof	   of	   their	   good	   intentions	   to	   help	   enhance	   access	   to	   medicines.	   It	   is	  doubtful,	   however,	   whether	   such	   price	   reductions	   are	   always	   of	   an	   entirely	  voluntary	  nature.	  In	  many	  cases,	  as	  Paul	  Hunt	  also	  pointed	  out	  in	  his	  report	  on	  GSK,	   prices	   have	   been	   driven	   down	   by	   increased	   competition	   from	   generic	  producers	   and	   pharmaceutical	   companies	   were	   simply	   forced	   to	   follow	   suit	  (although	  Hunt	  noted	  that	  GSK’s	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  prices	  were	  still	  above	  the	  prices	  of	   generic	   versions).	   It	   might	   be	   naïve	   to	   expect	   that	   drug	   companies	   would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  206	  GlaxoSmithKline	  (2009)	  207	  PLoS	  Medicine	  Editors	  (2010)	  208	  De	  George	  (2005)	  557f.	  209	  De	  George,	  idem.,	  557.	  210	  Leisinger	  (2009)	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introduce	  drastic	   price	   reductions	   entirely	   on	   their	   own	   accord,	  without	   being	  pressed	   to	  do	   so	  by	   strong	  external	   forces.	   In	   their	   study	  of	  Brazil’s	   successful	  policy	  of	  securing	  access	  to	  low-­‐cost	  AIDS	  medication,	  William	  Flanagan	  and	  Gail	  Whiteman	   also	   show	   that	   pharmaceutical	   companies	   were	   only	   willing	   to	  concede	  drastic	  price	   reductions	   in	   the	   face	  of	   strong	  pressure	   from	  NGOs	  and	  especially	   from	   the	   Brazilian	   government,	   which	   credibly	   used	   the	   threat	   of	  compulsory	   licensing.	  They	  conclude:	  “Action	  undertaken	  in	  terms	  of	  voluntary	  CSR	  alone	  may	  be	  insufficient”211.	  In	   view	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   pharmaceutical	   companies	   generally	   reject	   the	   notion	  that	   they	  have	  definite	  obligations	   flowing	   from	   the	  human	  right	   to	  health	  and	  that	   their	  CSR	   initiatives	  are	  often	   just	  a	   reaction	   to	  NGO	  campaigns	  and	  other	  external	   pressures,	   it	  would	   seem	   that	   a	   direct	  moral	   appeal	   to	   their	   sense	   of	  social	  responsibility	  is	  not	  the	  best	  approach	  to	  realize	  global	  justice	  with	  regard	  to	   access	   to	   and	   availability	   of	   medicines.	   One	   may	   also	   insist	   that	   “all	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  take	  reasonable	  measures	  to	  redress	   the	   historic	   neglect	   of	   poverty-­‐related	   diseases”212,	   and	   it	   would	   of	  course	  be	  nice	  if	  companies	  would	  do	  more	  research	  on	  “neglected	  diseases”,	  but	  this	   moral	   appeal	   remains	   rather	   futile	   as	   long	   as	   the	   profit	   opportunities	   of	  wealthy	  markets	  exercise	  a	  powerful	  pull	   in	   the	  contrary	  direction.	   It	  might	  be	  too	  much	  to	  expect	  that	  companies,	  which	  also	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  enhance	  shareholder	  value,	  would	  resist	  this	  pull.213	  In	  short,	  a	  more	  structural	  approach	  may	  be	  called	  for.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Thomas	  Pogge	  and	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  
	  The	   German	   philosopher	   Thomas	   Pogge	   has	   thought	   long	   and	   hard	   about	   the	  working	  of	  the	  international	  patent	  system	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  global	  justice.	  He	   is	   also	   concerned	   about	   the	   human	   right	   to	   health,	   but	   he	   thinks	   it	   is	  inappropriate	  and	  unhelpful	  to	  assign	  the	  responsibility	  for	  realizing	  this	  right	  to	  national	  states	  or	   to	   individual	  business	  enterprises.	   Instead,	  he	  holds	   that	   this	  right	   is	   to	  be	  secured	  by	  a	   just	  global	   institutional	  order.	  Pogge	  also	  holds	   that	  the	  right	  of	  access	   to	  essential	  medicines,	  as	  a	  derivative	  of	   the	  right	   to	  health,	  not	  only	  demands	  that	  existing	  essential	  medicines	  are	  accessible	  to	  all,	  but	  also	  that	  a	  fair	  allocation	  of	  research	  efforts	  ensures	  that	  work	  is	  being	  done	  on	  the	  right	   kind	   of	   diseases	   (e.g.	   also	   for	   life-­‐threatening	   diseases	   that	   are	   currently	  being	   “neglected”	   due	   to	   lack	   of	   profitable	   markets).	   Thus	   Pogge	   pays	   special	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  211	  Flanagan	  and	  Whiteman	  (2007)	  65.	  212	  Hunt	  (2009)	  23.	  213	  Here	  is	  a	  concise	  expression	  of	  this	  viewpoint:	  “Pharmaceutical	  companies	  prosper	  by	  catering	  to	  the	  affluent;	  and	  they	  would	  be	  violating	  their	  responsibilities	  to	  their	  shareholders	  if	  they	  purposefully	  served	  poor	  patients	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  their	  bottom	  line.”	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2010)	  12.	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attention	   to	   the	   first	   two	   distributive	   effects	   of	   IP	   systems	   distinguished	   by	  DeCamp:	  (a)	  the	  types	  of	  objects	  that	  will	  be	  developed	  and	  for	  which	  IPRs	  will	  be	  sought;	   and	   (b)	   the	   differential	   access	   various	   people	   will	   have	   to	   these	  objects 214 .	   What	   is	   more,	   Pogge	   holds	   that	   any	   attempt	   to	   re-­‐design	   the	  international	  patent	  system	  according	  to	  principles	  of	  global	   justice	  has	  to	  deal	  with	   these	   two	   dimensions	   together	   and	   to	   solve	   the	   twin	   problems	   of	  availability	  and	  access	  simultaneously.	  Any	  solution	  alleviating	  the	  one	  problem	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  aggravating	  the	  other	  must	  be	  avoided.	  Pogge	  starts	  with	  a	  fairly	  conventional	  economic	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  of	  patents.	  Patents	  are	  intended	  to	  address	  a	  well-­‐known	  “market	  failure”,	  namely	  the	  lack	  or	  insufficiency	  of	  innovative	  activities	  on	  the	  part	  of	  firms	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  legal	  protection	  for	  the	  results	  of	  their	  efforts.	  If	  any	  inventions	  could	  be	  easily	  copied	  by	  “free	  riders”,	  firms	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  recoup	  the	  expenses	  incurred	  in	  their	  innovative	   efforts	   and	   would	   therefore	   have	   no	   incentive	   to	   engage	   in	   such	  pursuits	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	  patent	  system	  helps	  to	  overcome	  this	  problem	  by	  providing	   the	   inventor	   a	   temporary	  monopoly	   on	   the	   use	   of	   the	   invention	   for	  which	  he	  is	  granted	  a	  patent,	  currently	  for	  a	  period	  of	  20	  years	  from	  the	  date	  of	  filing	   the	   patent	   application.	   This	   amounts	   in	   effect	   to	   solving	   one	   “market	  failure”	  (the	  undersupply	  of	  innovations)	  by	  creating	  another	  “market	  failure”215.	  As	  any	  economics	  textbook	  explains,	  a	  monopoly	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  static	  inefficiency	  or	  welfare	  loss	  that	  is	  known	  as	  a	  “deadweight	  loss”.	  A	  patent	  on	  a	  drug	  allows	  the	  patent	  holder	  to	  charge	  what	  the	  market	  will	  bear,	  that	  is,	  to	  set	  the	  price	  at	  the	  level	  where	  his	  profits	  will	  be	  maximized.	  Because	  the	  monopoly	  price	  is	  so	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  marginal	  cost	  price,	  this	  will	  prevent	  transactions	  with	  all	  those	   potential	   users	  who	   are	   able	   and	  willing	   to	   pay	  more	   than	   the	  marginal	  cost	  but	  not	  the	  full	  monopoly	  price	  of	  the	  patented	  medicine.	  Some	  quantitative	  calculations	  indicate	  that	  the	  deadweight	  loss	  in	  the	  US	  pharma	  market	  may	  be	  no	   less	   than	   60	   percent	   of	   sales	   revenues	   and	   that	   the	   relative	   share	   in	  developing	  country	  markets	  may	  be	  even	  higher216	  –	  thus	  it	  is	  clear	  that,	  simply	  in	   economic	   terms,	   enormous	   amounts	   are	   involved.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   patents	   for	  essential,	   life-­‐saving	   medicines,	   this	   “market	   failure”	   leads	   to	   morally	  unacceptable	  situations,	  as	  deadweight	   losses	  in	  economic	  terms	  translate	  here	  to	  dead	  bodies	  in	  human	  terms.	  In	   theory,	   the	   deadweight	   loss	   of	   a	   monopoly	   could	   be	   mitigated	   or	   even	  overcome	   if	   the	   monopolist	   were	   able	   to	   charge	   different	   prices	   for	   different	  customers,	  according	  to	  their	  respective	  ability	  and	  willingness	  to	  pay,	  instead	  of	  charging	   a	   single	   price	   for	   all	   customers.	   This	   solution	   requires	   that	   the	  monopolist	  can	  differentiate	  his	  customers	  into	  different	  “classes”	  and	  also	  that	  any	  re-­‐sale	  of	  the	  product	  between	  these	  different	  “classes”	  can	  be	  prevented	  –	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  See	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  (2007)	  50f.	  215	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  (2005)	  186.	  216	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conditions	   that	   in	  practice	  may	  be	  extremely	  hard	   to	   fulfill217.	  Nonetheless,	  we	  have	   seen	   that	   the	   former	   UN	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   the	   right	   to	   health,	   Paul	  Hunt,	   strongly	   urged	   pharmaceutical	   companies	   to	   use	   differential	   pricing	  schemes,	  both	  between	  and	  within	  countries,	  on	  a	  wide	  scale	   in	  order	   to	   fulfill	  their	  human	  rights	  responsibilities.	  Some	  drug	  firms	  have	  indeed	  made	  modest	  attempts	   in	   this	   direction	   (examples	   are	  GSK	  and	  Novartis),	   but	  most	   are	   very	  reluctant	   to	   engage	   in	   deliberate	  price	  differentiation	   at	   all	   for	   fear	   of	   spoiling	  their	   markets	   in	   affluent	   countries.	   It	   is	   not	   just	   that	   they	   are	   afraid	   that	  medicines	   will	   be	   diverted	   from	   low-­‐price	  markets	   in	   poor	   countries	   to	   high-­‐price	   markets	   in	   rich	   countries.	   It	   is	   also	   because	   of	   the	   practice	   of	   reference	  
pricing:	   “some	   high-­‐income	   and	   middle-­‐income	   countries	   try	   to	   use,	   as	  benchmarks	   for	   the	  prices	  at	  which	   they	  buy,	   the	  preferential	  prices	  offered	   to	  low-­‐income	  countries”218.	  For	  all	  these	  reasons	  Pogge	  concludes	  that	  differential	  pricing	   is	   not	   a	  workable	   solution	   to	   the	  deadweight-­‐loss	  problem,	   or	   in	   other	  words,	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  access	  to	  essential	  medicines219.	  He	  also	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  unreasonable	   to	   expect	   drug	   companies	   “to	   systematically	   lower	   prices	   in	  developing	  countries	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  altruism”220.	  In	  his	  eyes	  it	  is	  even	  unfair	  to	  impose	   such	   a	   requirement	   on	   the	   pharmaceutical	   industry	   “when	   other	  industries	  (which	  do	  nothing	  for	  poor	  people)	  have	  no	  such	  expectations	  placed	  on	  them”	  (ibid.).	  	  	  It	   thus	   becomes	   apparent	   that	   Pogge	   does	   not	  wish	   to	   go	   along	  with	   all	   those	  NGOs	   that	   relentlessly	   continue	   to	   press	   pharmaceutical	   companies	   to	   lower	  their	  prices	  in	  developing	  countries	  ever	  further	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  this	  is	  the	  right	  way	   to	   proceed	   in	   the	   search	   for	   solutions	   to	   global	   health	   problems.	   He	   also	  highlights	   the	   limitations	   of	   compulsory	   licenses,	   noting	   not	   only	   the	   fierce	  opposition	  of	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  political	  retaliation	  but	  also	  pointing	  out	   that	   their	  widespread	  use	  might	  undermine	   the	   incentivizing	  effect	  of	  patents:	   “But	   [..]	   compulsory	   licensing,	   especially	   if	   it	  were	   to	  become	  more	   common,	   brings	   back	   the	   first	   market	   failure	   of	   undersupply:	  Pharmaceutical	   companies	   will	   tend	   to	   spend	   less	   on	   the	   quest	   for	   essential	  drugs	   when	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   success	   is	   compounded	   by	   the	   additional	  unpredictability	   of	  whether	   and	   to	  what	   extent	   they	  will	   be	   allowed	   to	   recoup	  their	  investments	  through	  undisturbed	  use	  of	  their	  monopoly	  pricing	  powers”221.	  It	  is	  almost	  as	  if	  we	  hear	  the	  well-­‐known	  mantras	  of	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry.	  Drug	   firms	   also	   tend	   to	   emphasize	   that	   it	   is	   incorrect	   to	   look	   at	   the	   prices	   of	  patented	   medicines	   only	   from	   a	   static	   point	   of	   view.	   After	   all,	   patents	   are	  temporary	  monopolies	  that	  are	  precisely	  intended	  as	  incentives	  to	  stimulate	  the	  search	   for	   new	   medicines.	   No	   patents,	   no	   innovation.	   Higher	   prices	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  217	  Lipsey	  and	  Steiner	  (1972)	  258-­‐263.	  	  218	  See	  Hunt	  (2009)	  16	  and	  also	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  85.	  	  219	  See	  Pogge	  (2005)	  187	  and	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  98f.	  	  220	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  95.	  221	  Pogge	  (2005)188	  and	  see	  also	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  99f.	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present	   (until	   the	   competition	   of	   generics	   after	   the	   expiration	   of	   the	   patent	  brings	  them	  down),	  the	  industry	  argues,	  are	  simply	  the	  “price”	  we	  all	  have	  to	  pay	  to	  enjoy	  the	  fruits	  of	  progress.	  A	  substantial	  erosion	  of	  price	  margins	  might	  well	  endanger	  pharmaceutical	  innovation.	  	  	  	  	  Pogge	   agrees	   that	   one	   should	   not	   consider	   the	   problem	   exclusively	   from	   the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  static	  efficiency	  but	  also	   take	   into	  account	   the	  dynamic	  role	  of	  the	   patent	   system	   to	   foster	   innovation.	   In	   so	   far	   he	   subscribes	   to	   the	   industry	  position.	  However,	  one	  cannot	  simply	   trade	  off	  static	  efficiency	  (wide	  access	   to	  existing	  medicines)	   against	   dynamic	   efficiency	   (innovation).	   Pogge	   insists	   that	  access	   to	   essential	  medicines	   is	   a	   human	   right	   that	   is	   to	   be	   secured	   by	   a	   just	  international	   system.	   This	   human	   right	   cannot	   be	   sacrificed	   on	   the	   altar	   of	  pharmaceutical	   innovation.	   Even	   more,	   when	   looked	   at	   from	   a	   dynamic	  perspective,	  the	  international	  patent	  system	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  global	   justice	   either:	   it	   generates	   innovations,	   indeed,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   generate	  the	   right	   kind	   of	   innovations.	   As	   financial	   incentives,	   patents	   operate	   by	  orienting	   research	   towards	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   wealthy	   and	   the	   affluent,	   that	   is,	  those	  who	  exercise	   effective	  demand	  backed	  up	  by	  purchasing	  power,	   and	  not	  towards	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  poor	  and	  needy	  who	  are	  unable	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  result	  is	  an	  enormously	  skewed	  distribution	  of	  the	  global	  pharmaceutical	  research	  effort.	  The	  well-­‐known	   “10/90	   gap”	   illustrates	   this	   effect:	   “Only	   10	   percent	   of	   global	  health	  research	  is	  devoted	  to	  conditions	  that	  account	  for	  90	  percent	  of	  the	  global	  disease	  burden”222.	  There	  are	  therefore	  many	  “neglected”	  diseases,	  especially	  in	  the	   Tropics,	   which	   fail	   to	   receive	   adequate	   attention	   from	   the	   international	  research	  community.223	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  222	  Drugs	  for	  Neglected	  Diseases	  Working	  Group	  (2001)	  10.	  223	  Actually,	  we	  use	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “10/90	  gap”	  as	  a	  shorthand	  to	  denote	  the	  skewed	  allocation	  of	  worldwide	  medical	  and	  pharmaceutical	  research	  effort	  over	  diseases	  and	  conditions	  differentially	  affecting	  various	  parts	  and	  populations	  of	  the	  globe.	  This	  stylized	  formula	  may	  be	  appropriate	  as	  a	  first-­‐order	  indication	  of	  global	  imbalances,	  but	  needs	  to	  be	  refined	  in	  a	  more	  thorough	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  problem.	  The	  WHO’s	  Commission	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  Innovation	  and	  Public	  Health	  (CIPIH)	  offers	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  approach.	  It	  distinguishes	  between	  Type	  I	  diseases	  (incident	  in	  both	  rich	  and	  poor	  countries,	  with	  large	  numbers	  of	  vulnerable	  population	  in	  each),	  Type	  II	  diseases	  (incident	  in	  both	  rich	  and	  poor	  countries,	  but	  with	  a	  substantial	  proportion	  of	  the	  cases	  in	  poor	  countries),	  and	  Type	  III	  diseases	  (overwhelmingly	  or	  exclusively	  incident	  in	  the	  developing	  countries).	  Diseases	  that	  disproportionately	  affect	  developing	  countries	  would	  thus	  by	  definition	  be	  Type	  II	  and	  Type	  III	  diseases.	  However,	  this	  approach	  may	  be	  too	  simplistic,	  as	  some	  Type	  I	  diseases	  (like	  cardiovascular	  diseases)	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  rise	  in	  importance	  in	  developing	  countries	  while	  showing	  decreasing	  mortality	  rates	  in	  developed	  countries.	  As	  the	  CIPIH	  report	  rightly	  remarks:	  “The	  criterion	  should	  be	  diseases	  or	  conditions	  of	  significant	  public	  health	  importance	  in	  developing	  countries	  for	  which	  an	  adequate	  treatment	  does	  not	  exist	  for	  use	  in	  resource-­‐poor	  settings	  –	  either	  because	  no	  treatment	  exists	  whatsoever,	  or	  because,	  where	  treatments	  exist,	  they	  are	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Pogge	   concludes	   that	   any	   proposal	   for	   a	   re-­‐design	   of	   the	   international	   patent	  system	  in	  the	  field	  of	  medicines	  has	  to	  solve	  the	  access	  problem	  (cf.	  deadweight	  loss)	   and	   the	   availability	   problem	   (cf.	   the	   10/90	   gap)	   simultaneously.	   He	   has	  proposed	  his	  own	  institutional	  solution	  for	  dealing	  with	  these	  two	  problems,	  the	  so-­‐called	  Health	  Impact	  Fund,	  which	  has	  been	  further	  elaborated	  with	  the	  help	  of	  economist	   Aidan	   Hollis224.	   Irrespective	   of	   how	   one	   judges	   the	   merits	   of	   his	  reform	   proposal,	   Pogge	   certainly	   deserves	   credit	   for	   bringing	   home	   so	   clearly	  that	   these	  twin	  problems	  define	  a	  major	  part	  of	   the	  task-­‐set	   for	  any	  attempt	  at	  institutional	  re-­‐design.	  	  In	  Pogge’s	  view,	  an	   international	  public	   fund	  based	  on	  obligatory	  contributions	  (mostly)	   from	   developed	   countries,	   the	   Health	   Impact	   Fund,	   should	   be	  established	  to	  create	  the	  possibility	  of	  rewarding	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  for	  developing	   essential	  medicines,	   the	   size	   of	   their	   reward	   being	   proportional	   to	  the	   impact	   of	   their	   invention	   on	   the	   global	   disease	   burden.	   In	   essence,	   the	  scheme	  means	  that	  companies	  are	  offered	  a	  choice.	  Once	  they	  have	  taken	  out	  a	  patent	  for	  a	  new	  drug,	  they	  can	  either	  attempt	  to	  earn	  money	  on	  it	  in	  the	  usual	  way	   by	   exploiting	   the	   monopoly	   and	   setting	   prices	   that	   affluent	   markets	   can	  bear,	   or	   they	   can	   choose	   the	   option	   of	   registering	   with	   the	   Fund	   and	   being	  rewarded	  according	  to	  a	  formula	  that	  is	  geared	  to	  the	  health	  impact	  of	  the	  new	  drug	  (measured	  in	  terms	  of	  QALYs,	  i.e.	  the	  number	  of	  quality-­‐adjusted	  life	  years	  saved	  worldwide).	  In	  the	  latter	  case	  the	  drug	  will	  have	  to	  be	  made	  available	  at	  an	  administered	   price	   that	   is	   set	   by	   the	   Health	   Impact	   Fund	   to	   reflect	   average	  manufacturing	  and	  distribution	   cost.	   In	   return	   the	   registrant	  will	   receive,	   after	  market	   approval	   of	   the	   new	  medicine,	   annual	   reimbursements	   from	   the	   Fund	  that	  are	  proportional	   to	   the	  global	  health	   impact	  of	   the	  drug	   for	  a	  period	  of	  10	  years.	  (The	  absolute	  size	  of	  the	  reimbursements	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  size	  of	  the	   Fund	   and	   the	   measured	   health	   impacts	   of	   the	   other	   registered	   products.)	  After	  this	  period	  the	  medicine	  will	  be	  freely	  available	  for	  generic	  producers.	  The	  second	  option	  would	   entail	   a	   different	  metric	  of	   success	   for	   the	   drug	   company.	  Success	  will	  not	  be	  measured	  then	  in	  terms	  of	  net	  sales	  to	  those	  who	  can	  afford	  to	  pay	  the	  high	  prices	  of	  a	  monopolized	  invention,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  global	  disease	  burden,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  purchasing	  power	  of	  those	  who	  suffer	  from	  it.	  In	  this	  way	  it	  is	  hoped	  that	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  will	  redress	  the	  existing	  imbalance	  of	  availability	  (epitomized	  by	  the	  “10/90	  gap”)	  by	  providing	  incentives	  that	  are	  not	  geared	  to	  purchasing	  power	  but	  to	  medical	  need.	  Setting	  an	   administered	   price	   at	   roughly	   the	   level	   of	   average	   manufacturing	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  inappropriate	  for	  use	  in	  countries	  with	  poor	  delivery	  systems,	  or	  unaffordable”	  CIPIH	  (2006)	  26.	  	  	  224	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  
	   96	  
distribution	  cost	  will	  ensure	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  access	  is	  also	  addressed,	  at	  least	  for	  drugs	  registered	  with	  the	  Fund.225	  According	  to	  Pogge,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  moral	  obligation	  for	  the	  governments	  and	  citizens	  of	  affluent	  countries	  to	  support	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  (HIF).	  He	  holds	  that	   the	   citizens	   of	   affluent	   countries	   are	   indirectly	   responsible	   for	   the	  international	   institutional	   order	   which	   their	   governments	   have	   the	   power	   to	  impose	  on	  the	  entire	  world.	  In	  his	  eyes,	  the	  status	  quo	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  system	  of	  IP	  protection,	  which	  “foreseeably	  and	  avoidably	  deprive[s]	  human	  beings	  of	  secure	  access	  to	  the	  object	  of	  their	  human	  right”226,	  is	  thoroughly	  unjust.	  Given	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  large	  part	  of	  these	  human	  rights	  violations	  can	  in	  principle	  be	  avoided	  by	  installing	   the	   HIF,	   the	   ethical	   conclusion	   is	   that	   they	   should	   be	   avoided:	  “Maintaining	   SQ	   [=	   the	   status	   quo]	   without	   the	   HIF	   constitutes	   a	   massive	  violation	   of	   the	   human	   rights	   of	   the	   global	   poor.	   So	   long	   as	   there	  will	   be	   poor	  people	   in	   this	  world	   –	  whether	   in	   poor	   or	   rich	   countries	   –	  who	   are	   unable	   to	  obtain	   expensive	   medicines	   still	   under	   patent,	   SQ	   will	   gravely	   harm,	   and	   kill,	  many	  of	  them”227.	  The	  SQ	  +	  HIF	  option	  drastically	  changes	  the	  moral	   landscape	  and	   is	   even	   ethically	   preferable,	   in	   Pogge’s	   judgment,	   to	   a	   return	   to	   the	   pre-­‐TRIPS	  era.228	  	  
Criticism	  
	  Several	   commentators	   have	   questioned	   the	   political	   and	   practical	   feasibility	   of	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund.	  One	  critical	  issue	  is	  funding.	  The	  whole	  initiative	  needs	  initially	   some	  6	  billion	  dollars	   from	  governments	  or	  other	   contributors	   to	   take	  off.	   Will	   such	   funds	   really	   be	   forthcoming	   and	   can	   pharmaceutical	   companies	  base	  their	  long-­‐term	  R&D	  decisions	  with	  any	  confidence	  on	  government	  pledges	  to	  provide	   funds	  over	  a	   longer	  period	  of	   time?	   “Providing	  public	   funds	   to	  drug	  companies	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  politically	  popular:	  competing	  demands	  will	  always	  seem	   more	   urgent	   and	   desirable”229.	   It	   has	   also	   been	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	  measurement	   procedure	   for	   assessing	   the	   impact	   of	   a	   new	   medicine	   on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  For	  a	  detailed	  exposition	  of	  the	  whole	  scheme,	  see	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  and	  Singer	  and	  Schroeder	  (2010).	  226	  Pogge	  (2005)	  199.	  227	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  60.	  228	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge,	  idem.,	  54.	  229	  Buchanan	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  326.	  This	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  governments’	  commitments	  is	  shared	  by	  Philip	  Hedger,	  executive	  managing	  director	  of	  international	  affairs	  at	  Pfizer:	  “The	  sustainability	  of	  a	  government-­‐funded	  reward	  system	  has	  various	  areas	  of	  uncertainty.	  Governments	  change,	  as	  do	  their	  objectives	  and	  their	  funding	  mandates.	  Totally	  unpredicted	  issues	  can	  arise,	  as	  the	  world	  is	  currently	  witnessing.	  These	  and	  more	  reasons	  provide	  plenty	  of	  opportunity	  for	  governments	  to	  review	  their	  commitments,	  whatever	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  original	  agreement.”	  quoted	  in	  Schulz	  (2008).	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global	   disease	   burden	   is	   rather	   complex,	   which	   would	   make	   the	   assessment	  vulnerable	  to	  corruption230.	  In	  many	   respects	   the	   Health	   Impact	   Fund	   is	   similar	   to	   the	  prize	   fund	   that	   has	  been	   elaborated	   by	   James	   Love	   and	   others	   as	   an	   alternative	   system	   for	  rewarding	   pharmaceutical	   innovation.231	  Love’s	   ideas	   have	   also	   inspired	   the	  legislative	   proposals	   introduced	   by	   US	   Representative	   Bernard	   Sanders	   from	  Vermont	   in	   2005	   and	   2007	   to	   create	   a	   Medical	   Innovation	   Prize	   Fund	   in	   the	  United	  States.	  The	  HIF	  as	  well	  as	   James	  Love’s	  prize	   fund	  aim	  to	  break	  the	   link	  between	   incentives	   for	  R&D	  and	  product	  prices,	   or	   in	  other	  words	   to	   separate	  the	   market	   for	   innovation	   from	   the	   product	   market.	   However,	   there	   are	   also	  important	  differences.	  Whereas	  the	  HIF	  allows	  registrants	  to	  retain	  their	  IP	  and	  only	  requires	  them	  to	  accept	  the	  price	  to	  be	  set	  at	  average	  cost	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  being	  eligible	   to	  reimbursements	   from	  the	  HIF,	  Love’s	  scheme	  would	  make	   the	  patented	   invention	   on	   registration	   available	   to	   generic	   competitors	   through	  open	   licensing232.	   The	   consequence	   is	   that	   this	   scheme	   actively	   harnesses	   the	  forces	   of	   economic	   competition	   to	   bring	   the	   prices	   of	   new	   medicines	   down.	  Furthermore,	   while	   the	   HIF	   is	   a	   voluntary	   complement	   to	   the	   existing	  pharmaceutical	  innovation	  system,	  Love’s	  prize	  fund	  ultimately	  aims	  to	  become	  a	  complete	  replacement.	  An	  obvious	  drawback	  of	  a	  voluntary	  system	  like	  the	  HIF	  is	   that	   it	  would	   not	   address	   the	   access	   problem	   if	   the	   patent	   owner	   chose	   the	  traditional	   patent	   monopoly	   rather	   than	   the	   HIF	   option233.	   Finally,	   Love	   and	  Pogge	   also	   strongly	   disagree	   about	   the	   role	   of	   compulsory	   licensing.	   For	   Love,	  this	  option	  continues	  to	  be	  vital	  to	  secure	  access	  to	  medicines	  in	  poor	  countries	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  potential	  of	  generic	  competition.	  Pogge,	  by	  contrast,	   is	  rather	  critical	   of	   this	   option	   and	   emphasizes	   that	   “compulsory	   licenses	   weaken	   the	  innovation	  incentives	  that	  were	  supposed	  to	  result	  from	  the	  extension	  of	  strong	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  into	  the	  less	  developed	  countries”234.	  In	  Love’s	  view,	  this	  alleged	  ‘trade-­‐off’	  between	  innovation	  and	  access	  is	  extremely	  overstated	  as	  the	  potential	  demand	  from	  poor	  countries	  does	  not	  provide	  much	  of	  an	  incentive	  at	  all,	  with	  or	  without	  patent	  protection.	  Love	  refers	  to	  the	  report	  of	  the	  WHO’s	  Commission	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  Innovation	  and	  Public	  Health,	  which	  concluded	   that	   strong	   global	   IP	   protection	   (without	   compulsory	   licensing)	   is	  unlikely	   to	   boost	   pharmaceutical	   research	   on	   diseases	   disproportionately	  affecting	   developing	   countries	   (i.e.	   Type	   II	   and	   Type	   III	   diseases),	   given	  insufficient	  market	  incentives.235	  Love	  fears	  that	  Pogge’s	  statements	  may	  readily	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  Sonderholm	  (2010)	  231	  See	  Love	  and	  Hubbard	  (2007)	  and	  see	  Gombe	  and	  Love	  (2010).	  232	  Compare	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  105f.	  233	  Love	  and	  Hubbard	  (2007)	  1535.	  234	  See	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  54	  and	  also	  99f.	  235	  CIPIH	  (2006)	  85	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play	   into	   the	   hands	   of	   patent-­‐owning	   companies	   opposing	   compulsory	  licensing.236	  	  	  	  	  It	   is	   a	   notable	   feature	   of	   Pogge’s	   reform	   proposal	   that	   the	   whole	   scheme	   still	  relies	  very	  strongly	  on	  the	  “incentivizing”	  effect	  of	  patents.237	  The	  main	  problem	  with	  the	  present	  patent	  system,	  in	  Pogge’s	  view,	  is	  that	  the	  incentives	  are	  geared	  to	   (potential)	   market	   demand	   in	   wealthy	   countries	   that	   is	   backed	   up	   by	  purchasing	   power.	   The	   “trick”	   of	   the	   HIF	   scheme	   is	   to	   leverage	   the	   unmet	  medical	   needs	   of	   the	   South	   by	   backing	   them	  up	  with	   additional	   funds,	   so	   that	  they	   too	   carry	   some	   weight	   in	   the	   market	   pull	   directing	   pharmaceutical	  innovation.	  It	  is	  all	  a	  matter	  of	  setting	  the	  incentives	  “straight”	  –	  but	  by	  the	  same	  token	  the	  scheme	  still	  counts	  on	  the	  role	  of	  patents	  as	  incentives.	  In	  this	  regard	  Pogge’s	   ideas	   are	   clearly	   out	   of	   sync	   with	   the	   emerging	   “A2K”	   (Access	   to	  Knowledge)	   movement,	   which	   radically	   questions	   the	   need	   for	   exclusive	  intellectual	   property	   rights	   as	   a	   condition	   for	   stimulating	   creativity	   and	  innovation. 238 	  The	   success	   of	   free	   and	   open-­‐source	   software	   provides	   the	  paradigmatic	   example	   for	   the	  A2K	  movement:	   “The	  production	  process	  of	   free	  and	   open-­‐source	   software	   is	   central	   to	   the	   imaginary	   of	   the	   A2K	  mobilization	  because	   it	  offers	  a	  model	  of	   collaborative,	  distributed	   innovation	   that	  does	  not	  rely	   on	   the	   incentivizing	   effect	   of	   IP	   rights”239.	   Another	   plank	   of	   the	   “A2K”	  platform	   is	   that	   “under	  no	  circumstances	  can	  human	  rights	  be	  subordinated	   to	  intellectual	   property	   protection”240.	   The	  A2K	  movement	   is	   however	   concerned	  with	   a	   wider	   range	   of	   human	   rights	   than	   the	   right	   to	   health	   and	   the	   right	   of	  access	  to	  essential	  medicines	  that	  constitute	  the	  major	  focus	  of	  Pogge’s	  concerns.	  The	   pharmaceutical	   industry	   is	   usually	   seen	   as	   a	   sector	   where	   patents	   are	  indispensible	   for	   innovation,	   due	   to	   high	   investment	   costs	   of	   R&D	   and	   the	  relative	   ease	   to	   reverse	   engineer	   any	   resulting	   product.	   Lately,	   however,	   the	  presumed	   “incentivizing”	   effect	   of	   patents	   even	   for	   the	   pharma	   sector	   is	  increasingly	  called	  into	  question.	  For	  one	  thing,	  the	  track	  record	  of	  the	  industry	  over	  the	  recent	  period	  is	  not	  particularly	  impressive	  (even	  apart	  from	  the	  global	  imbalance	   epitomized	   in	   the	   10/90	   gap).	   Official	   figures	   show	   that	   in	   the	   last	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  236	  Love	  (2008)	  	  237	  As	  Singer	  and	  Schroeder	  explain:	  “The	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  leaves	  intact	  strong	  incentives	  for	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  around	  the	  globe,	  thereby	  preserving	  the	  TRIPS	  advantages,	  whilst	  mitigating	  its	  main	  challenge,	  namely	  to	  block	  access	  to	  life-­‐saving	  medicines	  to	  the	  poor.	  By	  registering	  a	  patented	  medicine	  with	  the	  Fund,	  a	  firm	  would	  agree	  to	  sell	  it	  globally	  at	  cost.	  In	  exchange,	  the	  firm	  would	  receive,	  for	  a	  fixed	  time,	  payments	  based	  on	  the	  product’s	  assessed	  global	  health	  impact.	  The	  arrangement	  would	  be	  optional	  and	  it	  would	  not	  diminish	  patent	  rights,	  it	  therefore	  aligns	  the	  interests	  of	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  poor	  patients.	  Such	  a	  win-­‐win	  situation	  has	  to	  be	  welcomed!”	  Singer	  and	  Schroeder	  (2010)	  17.	  238	  See	  Kapczynski	  (2008)	  and	  Kapczynski	  and	  Krikorian	  (2010).	  	  239	  Kapczynski	  (2008)	  869f.	  240	  Kapczynski	  (2008)	  866.	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three	  decades	  “the	  productivity	  of	  the	  pharma	  R&D	  enterprise	  –	  the	  number	  of	  new	   molecules	   brought	   to	   market	   per	   dollar	   spent	   on	   R&D	   –	   has	   declined	  markedly”241.	   This	   productivity	   slowdown	   occurred	   in	   a	   period	   when	   new	  technologies	   like	   genomics,	   combinatorial	   chemistry	   and	   knock-­‐out	  mice	  were	  supposed	  to	  make	  the	  drug	  discovery	  process	  more	  rapid	  and	  more	  efficient.	  The	  conditioned	  reflex	  of	  the	  pharma	  industry	  to	  a	  drying	  pipeline	  of	  new	  inventions	  is	   to	   clamor	   for	  more	  patent	  protection,	  but	   the	   fact	  of	   the	  matter	   is	   that	   their	  wishes	  on	   this	   score	  have	  been	  answered	   rather	  well	   during	   the	  past	  decades.	  Ironically,	  some	  hard-­‐boiled	  economic	  analyses	  locate	  the	  root	  of	  the	  problem	  in	  the	   patent	   system	   itself	   and	   the	   very	   high	   profit	   margins	   that	   it	   generates.	  Grootendorst	  sums	  up	  the	  social	  costs	  that	  are	  caused	  by	  the	  current	  system	  of	  pharmaceutical	   innovation	  centered	  on	  patents:	   (1)	   the	   costs	   to	   the	  healthcare	  system	   of	   medication	   non-­‐compliance	   due	   to	   higher	   drug	   prices;	   (2)	   the	  resources	  consumed	  in	  the	  battle	  over	  the	  innovator’s	  profits;	  (3)	  the	  resources	  spent	  by	  the	  innovator	  to	  expand	  unit	  sales	  and	  extend	  patents;	  (4)	  the	  increased	  costs	  of	  pharma	  R&D	  when	   this	  R&D	  builds	  on	  patented	  upstream	  discoveries;	  (5)	   the	  distortions	   in	   research	  direction	   caused	  by	  non-­‐patentability	   of	   certain	  compounds;	  and	  (6)	  the	  administrative	  costs	  of	  the	  patent	  system.242	  To	  this	  list	  can	  be	  added	  the	  unknown	  but	  most	  likely	  very	  considerable	  extent	  of	  bias	  and	  distortions	   in	   the	   medical	   literature	   due	   to	   widespread	   practices	   like	   “ghost	  management”	   and	   “publication	   planning”	   that	   result	   from	   the	   dominance	   of	  marketing	  imperatives	  over	  the	  research	  process.243	  Thus	  there	  is	  every	  reason	  to	  question	  Pogge’s	  assumption	  that	  patents	  are	   indispensible	  as	   incentives	   for	  innovation.	  	  	  
A	  broader	  panorama	  
	  Looking	   at	   Pogge’s	   ideas	   and	   proposals	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   the	   emerging	   A2K	  movement	   reveals	   some	   conspicuous	   blind	   spots.	   While	   concentrating	   his	  attention	  on	  the	  human	  right	  to	  health	  (or	  rather,	  more	  narrowly,	  on	  the	  derived	  human	  right	  of	  access	   to	  essential	  medicines)	  and	  on	   the	  design	  of	  a	  workable	  patent-­‐based	  system	  that	   is	  able	  to	  address	  the	  twin	  problems	  of	  access	  to	  and	  availability	  of	  medicines,	  Pogge	  tends	  to	  ignore	  or	  dismiss	  other	  areas	  of	  science,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  241	  Grootendorst	  (2009)	  2.	  242	  Grootendorst,	  idem.,	  p.	  32.	  In	  Grootendorst’s	  paper,	  each	  of	  these	  rubrics	  of	  social	  costs	  is	  further	  specified	  and	  discussed	  in	  detail.	  A	  very	  interesting	  category	  is	  the	  second	  rubric.	  When	  a	  patent	  allows	  very	  high	  profit	  margins	  on	  a	  certain	  drug,	  this	  will	  attract	  others	  seeking	  their	  share	  of	  the	  spoils.	  A	  lot	  of	  effort	  is	  simply	  wasted	  on	  keeping	  these	  rent-­‐seekers	  at	  bay:	  “The	  innovator	  will	  need	  to	  spend	  resources	  fending	  off	  counterfeiters,	  resellers,	  competing	  drug	  companies	  (both	  generic	  and	  branded	  me-­‐toos),	  and	  negotiating	  with	  and	  lobbying	  price	  regulators	  and	  drug	  insurers	  …”	  (idem,	  p.	  32).	  	  	  243	  Sismondo	  and	  Doucet	  (2010)	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technology	  and	  culture	  and	  other	   forms	  of	   intellectual	  property	   that	  may	   raise	  issues	   of	   global	   justice.	   There	   is	   of	   course	   no	   denying	   that	   access	   to	   essential	  medicines	  is	  extremely	  important,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  rather	  weird	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  the	  only	  issue	  in	  which	  basic	  human	  rights	  are	  at	  stake.	  Proponents	  of	  the	  A2K	  movement	  typically	  bring	  into	  play	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  human	  rights,	  as	  transpires	  from	   the	   following	   statement	   from	   the	   Adelphi	   Charter	   already	   quoted	   above:	  “[IP]	   laws	   must	   serve,	   and	   never	   overturn,	   the	   basic	   human	   rights	   to	   health,	  education,	  employment	  and	  cultural	  life”244.	  The	  rights	  to	  participate	  in	  cultural	  life	   and	  scientific	   advancement	  are	  also	  enshrined	   in	   the	  Universal	  Declaration	  (UDHR	  27.1)	  and	  other	  official	  human	  rights	  charters.	  Pogge’s	  narrow	  focus	  on	  the	  right	  to	  health	  may	  also	  explain	  why	  he	  pays	  no	  attention	  to	  what	  DeCamp	  refers	   to	   as	   the	   third	  distributive	   effect	   of	   an	   IP	   system,	   beyond	   the	   effects	   on	  access	   and	   availability,	   namely	   the	   distribution	   of	   the	   IPRs	   themselves245.	   For	  Pogge	   it	   seems	   to	   present	   no	   particular	   problem	   of	   global	   justice	   when	   most	  pharmaceutical	  patents	  are	  possessed	  by	  a	  handful	  of	  western	  drug	  companies.	  Access	   to	   knowledge,	   however,	   is	   crucially	   about	   participation	   in	   the	   global	  networked	   knowledge-­‐and-­‐information	   economy.	   The	   key	   issue	   is	   “whether	  information	  production	  will	  be	  primarily	  centralized	  and	  proprietary	  or	  whether	  large	  parts	  of	  it	  should	  be	  decentralized	  and	  participatory”246.	  While	  Pogge	  may	  sound	  fairly	  radical	  when	  he	  criticizes	  the	  restrictive	  effects	  of	  patents	   on	   access	   to	   medicines,	   his	   judgments	   are	   rather	   timid	   when	   he	  occasionally	  turns	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  IP	  and	  to	  other	  areas	  of	  science,	  technology	  and	  culture.	  He	  even	  deems	  the	  exclusion	  brought	  about	  by	  “other	  categories	  of	  intellectual	   property	   (for	   example,	   software,	   films,	   and	   music)”	   perfectly	  “acceptable”.247	  Proponents	   of	   free	   and	   open-­‐source	   software	   and	   of	   the	   A2K	  movement	  hold	  a	  different	  view.	  Brazil’s	  former	  Minister	  of	  Culture,	  Gilberto	  Gil,	  saw	   free	   software	   as	   central	   to	   Brazil’s	   collective	   sovereignty	   (“a	   cultural	  question	  par	   excellence”)	   and	   as	   an	   essential	   contribution	   to	   the	  promotion	  of	  skills	   and	   knowledge	   that	  will	   enable	   historically	   disenfranchised	  Brazilians	   to	  participate	   in	   various	   forms	   of	   cultural	   production	   such	   as	   music,	   design,	  publishing,	   software	  development	   and	  photography.248	  One	   could	   think	  here	  of	  the	   fourth	   category,	   called	   ‘Senses,	   Imagination,	   and	   Thought’,	   in	   Martha	  Nussbaum’s	   list	   of	   central	   human	   capabilities,	   representing	   a	   key	   element	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  244	  RSA	  (2006)	  245	  DeCamp	  (2007)	  318.	  246	  Balkin	  (2006)	  	  247	  Pogge	  (2005)	  187.	  The	  conflict	  between	  participation	  in	  scientific	  advancement	  in	  general	  and	  the	  principle	  behind	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  is	  further	  explored	  in	  Timmermann	  and	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2012b)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  6]	  and	  Timmermann	  (2012a).	  248	  see	  Schoonmaker	  (2007)	  1015f.	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human	   flourishing. 249 	  In	   this	   connection	   worldwide	   access	   to	   educational	  materials	   and	   scientific	   publications,	   often	   effectively	   blocked	   by	   copyright	  protections,	  also	  comes	  to	  mind	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  global	  justice.250	  Access	   to	   knowledge	   can	   refer	   to	   four	   different	   things:	   (1)	   human	   knowledge	  (education,	  know-­‐how,	  embodied	  skills);	   (2)	   information	   (news,	  data,	   reports);	  (3)	  knowledge-­‐embedded	  goods	   (KEGs)	   like	  drugs	  and	   computer	   software;	   (4)	  tools	   for	   the	   production	   of	   KEGs	   (e.g.	   research	   tools,	   materials	   and	   chemical	  compounds,	   computer	   programs). 251 	  Sectors	   like	   the	   multinational	  biotechnology	   and	   pharmaceutical	   industry	   try	   to	   control	   the	   production	   of	  knowledge-­‐embedded	   goods	   by	   using	   IPRs	   and	   monopolizing	   the	   tools	   of	  production.	  Sometimes,	  however,	  attempts	  are	  made	   to	  wrest	   control	   from	  the	  hands	   of	   the	   few	   oligopolistic	   companies	   dominating	   the	   industry.	   Special	  importance	   in	   this	   regard	   accrues	   to	   the	   initiative	   taken	   by	   the	   molecular	  biologist	  Richard	  Jefferson	  to	  set	  up	  BiOS	  (Biological	  Innovation	  for	  Open	  Society	  or	   Biological	   Open	   Source)	   at	   CAMBIA	   in	   Australia.	   His	   aim	   is	   to	  make	   and	   to	  keep	   the	   basic	   techniques	   of	   agricultural	   biotechnology,	   the	   “tools”	   and	   the	  “technology	   platforms”,	   accessible	   to	   everybody.	   Freeing	   the	   tools	   from	   the	  stranglehold	   of	   patents	   would	   make	   the	   development	   of	   numerous	   potential	  applications	  benefiting	   the	  poor	  and	  needy	  of	   the	  world	  economically	  viable.	   It	  would	   also	   facilitate	   the	   active	   participation	   of	   developing	   countries	   in	   the	  process	   of	   biotechnological	   innovation.	   Interestingly,	   in	   an	   interview	   Jefferson	  declared	   that	   “the	   most	   fundamental	   human	   right	   is	   the	   freedom,	   or	   the	  capability,	  to	  make	  and	  use	  tools	  to	  solve	  problems”252.	  It	   might	   seem	   just	   wishful	   thinking	   to	   expect	   that	   in	   the	   foreseeable	   future	  developing	   countries	   could	   build	   the	   capacity	   to	   undertake	   fully-­‐fledged	   drug	  research	   and	   to	   become	   actively	   involved	   in	   such	   a	   complicated,	   knowledge-­‐intensive	   and	   capital-­‐intensive	   industry	   as	   pharmaceutics.	   However,	   there	   are	  some	  considerations	  that	  mitigate	  this	  skepticism.	  For	  one	  thing,	  the	  established	  shape	   of	   the	   pharmaceutical	   industry	   and	   the	   corresponding	   pattern	   of	  innovation	   are	   by	   no	   means	   set	   in	   stone	   –	   if	   only	   because	   of	   the	   widely	  recognized	  productivity	   crisis	  of	   the	  current	  R&D	  model.	   It	   is	  also	  notable	   that	  middle-­‐income	   countries	   like	   Brazil,	   India	   and	   China	   (the	   so-­‐called	   BIC	  countries)	   have	   built	   up	   quite	   formidable	   industries	   for	   producing	   generic	  medicines	   (although	   their	   continued	   survival	   will	   crucially	   depend	   on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  249	  “Being	  able	  to	  use	  the	  senses,	  to	  imagine,	  think,	  reason	  –	  and	  to	  do	  these	  things	  in	  a	  ‘truly	  human’	  way,	  a	  way	  informed	  and	  cultivated	  by	  an	  adequate	  education,	  including,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  limited	  to,	  literacy	  and	  basic	  mathematical	  and	  scientific	  training.	  Being	  able	  to	  use	  imagination	  and	  thought	  in	  connection	  with	  experiencing	  and	  producing	  works	  and	  events	  of	  one’s	  own	  choice,	  religious,	  literary,	  musical,	  and	  so	  forth	  …”	  (Nussbaum	  2006)	  76.	  250	  Willinsky	  (2006)	  251	  Balkin	  (2006)	  252	  Richard	  Jefferson	  quoted	  by	  Poynder	  (2006).	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maintaining	  the	  “flexibilities”	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement).	  It	  would	  be	  inappropriate	  to	  consider	  generics	  production	  simply	  as	  a	   “copycat”	   industry	   (the	   image	   that	  the	  non-­‐generic	  pharmaceutical	   industry	  wants	  to	  convey).	  As	  Amy	  Kapczynski	  notes,	   “it	  was	   Indian	   [generic]	   firms	   that	   first	   incorporated	  all	  of	   the	  necessary	  anti-­‐HIV	  drugs	   into	  one	  pill,	   thereby	  making	   it	   easier	   for	  patients	   to	   adhere	   to	  treatment	   and	   prevent	   viral	   resistance”253.	   The	   need	   to	   drive	   production	   costs	  down	  also	  requires	  skills	  to	  effect	  incremental	  process	  innovation.	  The	   international	   pharmaceutical	   industry	   is	   definitely	   in	   flux.	   Companies	   are	  casting	   around	   to	   find	  new	  models	   for	   drug	   research	   and	  development.	  Under	  the	   leadership	   of	   its	   new	   CEO,	   Andrew	  Witty,	   GlaxoSmithKline	   is	   embracing	   a	  model	   of	   “open	   innovation”	   –	   which	   involves	   making	   a	   library	   of	   13.500	  compounds	   freely	   available	   for	   testing	   against	   malaria,	   granting	   access	   to	  patents	  and	  know-­‐how	  of	   the	  company,	  and	  creating	  broad-­‐based	  partnerships	  around	   a	   so-­‐called	   “Open	   Lab”	  where	   researchers	   are	   allowed	   to	   access	   GSK’s	  expertise	   and	   infrastructure	   –	   all	   in	   the	   name	   of	   breaking	   down	   barriers	   to	  innovation	  and	  access	  to	  medicines	  and	  vaccines254.	  Jeffrey	  Sturchio,	  former	  vice-­‐president	   of	   Merck	   and	   currently	   president	   of	   the	   Global	   Health	   Council,	   also	  sketches	   a	   broad	   panorama	   of	   the	   changing	   landscape	   of	   innovation	   in	   the	  international	  pharmaceutical	   industry	  which	   in	  his	  view	  heralds	  a	  “new	  era	   for	  intellectual	  property”255.	  Sturchio	  notes	  that	  more	  and	  more	  companies,	  just	  like	  GSK,	   are	   adopting	   an	   “open	   innovation	   model	   built	   around	   licensing	   and	  alliances”,	   and	   he	   also	   refers	   to	   the	   rise	   of	   partnerships	   between	   non-­‐generic	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  and	  generic	  firms,	  an	  increased	  interest	  in	  innovation	  and	  IP	  among	  the	  latter,	  and	  finally	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  PDPs	  or	  product	  development	  partnerships	   (e.g.	   the	   Medicines	   for	   Malaria	   Venture,	   the	   Drugs	   for	   Neglected	  Diseases	   Initiative,	   the	   International	   AIDS	   Vaccine	   Initiative,	   and	   the	   Malaria	  Vaccine	  Initiative).	  The	  upshot	  of	  all	  these	  trends:	  “IP	  is	  still	  important,	  but	  it	  is	  being	  used	  now	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  foster	  more	  open	  innovation,	  rather	  than	  an	  end	  in	  itself”256.	   The	   reason	   Sturchio	   gives	   for	   the	   increasing	   popularity	   of	   the	   open	  innovation	   model	   among	   pharmaceutical	   firms	   is	   also	   revealing;	   it	   is	   “the	  realization	  that	   they	  cannot	  hope	  to	  generate	  or	  control	  within	  their	   four	  walls	  more	  than	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  global	  biomedical	  research	  in	  areas	  of	  interest”257.	  It	  thus	  seems	  that	  the	  days	  of	  pharmaceutical	  laboratories	  as	  closed	  bulwarks	  of	  research	  and	  innovation	  are	  numbered.	  During	   the	   last	   decade	   Product	   Development	   Partnerships	   (PDPs)	   and	   other	  forms	  of	  Public-­‐Private	  Partnerships	  (PPPs)	  have	  been	  proliferating	   in	  the	  area	  of	   neglected	   diseases.	   Although	   this	   new	   wave	   of	   activity	   is	   of	   course	   highly	  welcome,	   its	   institutional	   setup	   is	  not	  without	   criticism.	  Hollis	   and	  Pogge	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  253	  Kapczynski	  (2008)	  872.	  254	  Witty	  (2010)	  255	  Sturchio	  (2010)	  256	  Sturchio,	  idem.,	  5.	  257	  Sturchio,	  idem.,	  4	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pointed	   at	   some	   of	   the	   problems	   inherent	   in	   PDPs	   such	   as	   the	   difficulty	   to	  monitor	   contractual	   compliance	   among	   partners	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   sufficient	  incentives	  to	  push	  products	  through	  regulatory	  approval	  and	  promote	  their	  use	  by	  healthcare	  personnel258.	  Their	  claim	  is	  that	  these	  problems	  could	  be	  alleviated	  if	  a	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  were	  in	  place.	  Shortcomings	  related	  to	  local	  participation	  have	  escaped	  their	  critical	  notice,	  however.	  Complaints	  have	  been	  raised	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  indigenous	  (in	  most	  cases	  here:	  African)	  representation	  on	  the	  boards	  of	   these	  partnership	  organizations,	  which	   is	   said	   to	   result	   in	   a	  perpetuation	  of	  “neo-­‐colonial”	  dependency	  relationships,	  with	  monies	  being	  channeled	   through	  first-­‐world	  head	  offices	  and	  decisions	   taken	   in	   the	  USA	  or	  Europe259.	  A	   related	  complaint	   is	   that	   the	   ethical	   acceptability	   of	   drug	   trials	   and	   other	   projects	  carried	   out	   in	   developing	   countries	   is	   often	   judged	   by	   the	   criteria	   set	   up	   by	  ethical	   committees	   in	   the	   USA	   or	   Europe	   rather	   than	   by	   local	   standards.260	  Another	   complaint	   is	   that	   a	   large	   part	   of	   funding	   for	   PDPs	   originates	   from	   a	  single	  source,	  the	  (admittedly	  very	  generous)	  Bill	  and	  Melinda	  Gates	  Foundation,	  which	  thereby	  gains	  enormous	  power	  to	  set	  priorities.261	  Rumors	  are	  circulating	  that	   decision-­‐making	   on	   the	   malaria	   research	   agenda	   has	   been	   effectively	  “captured”	  by	   the	  Gates	   Foundation	   and	   that	   the	  WHO	   feels	   threatened	  by	   the	  latter’s	   growing	   influence. 262 	  	   However	   that	   may	   be,	   it	   would	   seem	   that	  developing	   countries	   in	   Africa	   and	   elsewhere	   desperately	   need	   to	   build	  indigenous	  clinical,	  research	  and	  regulatory	  capacity	  in	  order	  to	  better	  set	  their	  own	   priorities,	   advance	   their	   own	   ethical	   standards	   and	   secure	   their	   own	  interests.263	  Otherwise	  they	  will	  continue	  to	  find	  themselves	  at	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	   decisions	   taken	   by	   companies	   and	   agencies	   headquartered	   in	   first-­‐world	  countries.	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  258	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2010)	  259	  Tucker	  and	  Makgoba	  (2008)	  260	  Lexchin	  (2010).	  For	  a	  detailed	  case	  study,	  see	  Crane	  (2010).	  261	  Lexchin,	  idem.	  262	  See	  McNeil	  (2008).	  263	  Cf.	  McNeil	  (2008).	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  One	   of	   the	  most	   attractive,	   but	   nevertheless	   highly	   controversial	   proposals	   to	  alleviate	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  today’s	  patent	  regime	  is	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  (HIF).	   Although	   the	  HIF	   has	   been	   drafted	   to	   facilitate	   access	   to	  medicines	   and	  boost	   pharmaceutical	   research,	   we	   have	   theorized	   on	   the	   potential	   negative	  effects	   a	   similar	   proposal	   could	   have	   that	   is	   designed	   to	   promote	   the	   use	   and	  development	  of	  climate-­‐friendly	  technologies.	  Drawing	  parallels	  from	  the	  access	  to	  medicines	  debate,	  we	   suspect	   that	   an	   analogous	   “Climate	   Impact	   Fund”	  will	  increase	   the	   already	   very	   high	   scientific	   and	   technological	   dominance	   of	   the	  developed	  world	  over	  the	  developing	  world	  and	  advocate	  alleviating	  this	  gap.	  	  	  	  Keywords:	   technology	   transfer,	   distributive	   justice,	   health	   impact	   fund,	  development	  aid,	  climate	  change,	  priority,	  scientific	  participation	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Introduction	  	  	  Climate	  change	  is	  a	  mayor	  global	  hazard	  that	  differentially	  affects	  the	  regions	  of	  the	  world.	  While	  some	  areas	  will	  experience	  positive	  effects,	   such	  as	   increased	  yields	   in	   agriculture,	   the	   highly	   populated	   tropical	   regions	  will	   suffer	   negative	  consequences,	   such	   as	   a	   decrease	   in	   harvest	   yields	   and	   a	  wider	   prevalence	   of	  tropical	   diseases.	   Generally,	   a	   broad	   consensus	   holds	   that	   the	   current	   rate	   of	  greenhouse	   gases	   emissions	   cannot	   be	   sustained.	   Even	   if	   there	   is	   some	  scepticism	  whether	  catastrophic	  tipping	  points	  exist,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  potential	  hazards	  to	  life	  far	  outstrips	  the	  costs	  our	  and	  next	  generations	  would	  have	  to	  pay	  in	   order	   to	   mitigate	   greenhouse	   gases	   emissions.	   Therefore,	   we	   have	   strong	  moral	  reasons	  to	  give	  the	  benefit	  of	  doubt	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  tipping	  points	  and	  advocate	  concrete	  proposals	   that	  could	   foster	  mitigation	  efforts.264	  In	  what	  follows,	   we	   would	   like	   to	   examine	   in	   how	   far	   the	   concept	   behind	   the	   “Health	  Impact	   Fund”265	  as	   formulated	   by	   Aidan	   Hollis	   and	   Thomas	   Pogge	   could	   be	  applied	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  climate-­‐friendly	  technologies.	  While	  earlier	  work266	  discussed	  some	  of	   the	  practical	  problems	  such	  a	   type	  of	   fund	  might	  encounter,	  we	   wish	   to	   concentrate	   here	   on	   global	   justice	   considerations	   that	   have	   to	   be	  taken	  into	  account.	  After	  a	  short	  discussion	  of	  (1)	  the	  moral	  justification	  of	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  proposal,	  we	  will	  expose	  (2)	  that	  the	  fund	  might	  aggravate	  the	  inequality	  in	  the	  distribution	   of	   research	   locations,	   (3)	   the	   reasons	   why	   such	   inequalities	   are	  condemnable,	   (4)	   that	   the	  attempt	  to	  correct	   this	   injustice	   is	  more	  problematic	  than	   is	   apparent	   at	   first	   sight,	   (5)	   the	   special	   role	   grassroots	   innovators	   could	  play	   and	   (6)	   briefly	   elucidate	   the	   conflict	   that	  might	   arise	   in	   concentrating	   on	  mitigation	  efforts	  alone	  while	  leaving	  adaptation	  needs	  aside.	  	  
Incentivizing	  innovations	  	  In	  accordance	  with	  Rawls’	   theory	  of	   justice,	  we	  could	  argue	  that	  an	   intellectual	  property	   (IP)	   regime	   can	   be	   legitimately	   established	   if	   under	   that	   regime	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  264	  Cf.	  Singer	  (2004)	  265	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  266	  Timmermann	  and	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2012a)	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least	  advantaged	  would	  be	  better	  off	  than	  without	  such	  an	  incentive	  mechanism.	  However,	   this	   type	   of	   reasoning	   does	   not	   resolve	   the	   question	   in	   how	   far	   the	  industrialized	   world	   is	   obliged	   to	   institute	   an	   incentive	   regime	   that	   not	   just	  barely	  matches	  this	  minimum	  constraint,	  but	  up	  to	  what	  degree	  it	  should	  aim	  at	  increasing	   the	   position	   of	   the	   worst-­‐off	   to	   the	   maximum	   sustainable	   level.	  Addressing	  this	  one	  question	  has	  become	  a	  highly	  polarized	  never-­‐ending	  debate	  with	  a	  strong	  clash	  of	  diverse	  schools	  of	  thoughts.	  The	  situation	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	   find	  wide	  consensus	   for	  a	  clear	  answer	  has	  been	  aggravated	  by	  the	   fact	   that	  we	   cannot	   provide	   empirical	   evidence	   of	   how	   the	   well-­‐being	   of	   the	   worst-­‐off	  would	  change	   (or	   if	   it	  would	  change	  at	  all)	   if	  we	  had	  not	   the	  current	   incentive	  system	  for	  innovations	  in	  place.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  today’s	  intellectual	  property	  regime	  of	  patents	  more	  acceptable	  to	   the	  worst-­‐off	  and	   to	  civil	   society	   in	  general,	  Thomas	  Pogge	  and	  Aidan	  Hollis	  have	   elaborated	   a	   detailed	   proposal	   to	   redress	   its	   negative	   consequences.	   The	  global	  extension	  of	  Western	  European,	  North	  American	  and	  Japanese	  standards	  of	   minimum	   recognition	   of	   intellectual	   property	   has	   increased	   the	   access	   and	  availability	  problems.	  Access	  to	  objects	  of	  innovation	  has	  become	  more	  limited,	  since	  the	  obligation	  of	  governments	  to	  recognize	  product	  patents	  (i.e.	  patents	  on	  the	  object	   itself,	  not	  merely	   the	  process	  by	  which	   it	  was	  produced)	  has	   limited	  the	  possibilities	  of	  generic	  manufacturers	  to	  develop	  cheaper	  alternatives	  to	  the	  original	   product	   for	   people	   with	   less	   financial	   resources.	   The	   availability	  problem	   is	   indirectly	   increased	   by	   this	   global	   extension	   of	   standards,	   as	  companies	   all	   around	   the	   world	   can	   recoup	   their	   research	   and	   development	  costs	   by	   selling	   the	   products	   resulting	   from	   their	   investigations	   on	   the	   world	  markets.	  When	  a	  particular	  market	   can	  pay	  much	  more	   for	   its	  desired	  objects,	  this	  creates	  an	  incentive	  to	  satisfy	  this	  particular	  demand,	  leaving	  other	  markets	  with	  less	  purchasing	  power	  unsatisfied.267	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  when	  a	  market	  is	  very	  poor	  and	  has	  different	  needs,	  it	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  pay	  high	  enough	  mark-­‐up	  prices	   to	   cover	   the	   costs	   incurred	   to	  develop	   the	   customized	  objects.	  When	  no	  third	   party	   jumps	   in,	   the	   research	   and	   development	   of	   the	   technological	  solutions	  needed	  may	  not	  occur	  and	  the	  products	  will	  never	  be	  available.	  	  After	   the	   Trade-­‐Related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   (TRIPS)	  agreement	   started	   to	   come	   into	   effect	   in	   1994	   universalizing	   the	   mentioned	  standards,	   generic	   companies	   that	   tried	   to	   fill	   in	   a	   market	   gap	   by	   developing	  innovations	   specified	   for	   resource-­‐poor	   markets	   (such	   as	   single-­‐dosage	  medicines)	   had	   to	   change	   business	   practices	   as	   selling	   retro-­‐engineered	   drugs	  became	   illegal.	   Now	   more	   than	   ever,	   companies	   all	   over	   the	   world	   focus	   on	  providing	  products	  primarily	  designed	  to	  meet	  the	  richer	  markets’	  appetites.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  267	  Here	  the	  high	  income	  inequalities	  come	  for	  the	  poor	  as	  a	  double	  penalty,	  they	  not	  only	  suffer	  from	  their	  limited	  purchasing	  power,	  but	  also	  from	  the	  rich	  being	  so	  much	  richer	  and	  thus	  attracting	  nearly	  all	  research	  efforts	  to	  satisfy	  their	  wants,	  cf.	  Pogge	  (2008b).	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As	   other	   incentives	   systems	   to	   promote	   research	   and	  development	   that	   better	  suit	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   global	   poor	   –	   we	  may	   think	   of	   prize-­‐systems268	  –	   are	  conceivable	   but	   have	   not	   been	   implemented,	   we	   can	   identify	   the	   current	   way	  innovations	  are	  incentivized	  as	  an	  institutional	  injustice.	  Arguments	  stating	  that	  countries	  voluntarily	  decided	  to	  sign	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  lose	  ground	  when	  we	  look	  at	  historical	  circumstances.269	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  is	  more	  a	  story	  of	  a	   reckless	   imposition	  of	  a	   treaty	   than	  a	   textbook	  example	  of	  good	   global	   democratic	   decision-­‐making	   practice.	   Making	   available	   the	  necessary	   resources	   for	   establishing	   the	  Health	   Impact	   Fund	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  compensation	   for	   having	   violated	   the	   negative	   duty	   of	   not	   imposing	   an	  oppressive	  regime	  on	  others.	  The	  global	  trade	  regime,	  with	  its	  tariffs	  regulation	  and	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  standards,	  acts	  as	  an	  oppressive	  regime	  as	  far	  as	  competition	  possibilities	   for	  newcomers	   in	   the	  world	  economy	  go	  and	   the	   real	  prospects	  of	  using	  technology	  to	  address	  welfare	  issues	  are	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  
Distribution	  of	  research	  facilities	  	  The	  Health	   Impact	  Fund	  addresses	   the	   two	  problems	  of	  access	  and	  availability	  previously	   introduced.	  The	  cost	  of	  medicinal	   treatment	   is	  often	  dictated	  by	   the	  sale	   price	   of	   medicines,	   thus	   reducing	   the	   price	   tag	   of	   medicines	   can	   make	  treatment	  more	  widely	  accessible.	  Pharmaceutical	  companies,	  holding	  exclusive	  rights,	   set	  prices	  and	  research	  agendas	  according	   to	  market	   incentives	   that	  are	  commonly	  driven	  by	  consumers’	  ability	  to	  pay.	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  impact	  fund	  is	  to	  offer	   an	   extra	   incentive	   based	   on	   the	   impact	   the	  medicinal	   innovation	   has	   on	  alleviating	   the	   disease	   burden	   measured	   in	   its	   capacity	   to	   increase	   quality-­‐adjusted	  life	  years	  (QALY).	  A	  company	  that	  has	  a	  patent	  on	  a	  new	  medicine	  will	  have	  the	  option	  to	  either	  exploit	  its	  exclusive	  rights	  in	  the	  traditional	  way,	  i.e.	  by	  maximizing	  profits	  through	  sales	  or	  could	  commit	  to	  the	  proposed	  impact	  fund,	  selling	   its	   drugs	   at	   production	   cost	   and	   receiving	   a	   reward	   that	   would	   be	  dependent	   on	   the	   drugs’	   ability	   to	   add	   QALY	   anywhere	   in	   the	   world.	   If	   a	  company	  has	  a	  new	  drug	  that	  will	  primarily	  alleviate	  the	  disease	  burden	  of	  those	  who	  have	  less	  purchasing	  power	  it	  will	  rationally	  opt	  for	  the	  impact	  fund	  reward.	  The	  main	  concern	  of	   the	  Health	   Impact	  Fund	   is	   to	  make	  medicines	  available	   to	  the	   poor.	   We	   can	   fear	   however	   that	   by	   focusing	   on	   this	   noble	   goal,	   the	  implementation	   of	   the	   HIF	   may	   actually	   undermine	   other	   human	   rights,	  particularly	   the	   right	   to	   share	   in	   the	   advancement	   of	   science,	   as	   specified	   in	  article	   27.1	   of	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   (1948,	   henceforth	  UDHR).	  The	  HIF	  uses	  the	  international	  patent	  regime	  for	  its	  goal	  of	  meliorating	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  268	  Prize-­‐systems	  reward	  innovators	  that	  first	  reach	  pre-­‐specified	  targets	  from	  public	  funds.	  For	  a	  characterization	  in	  the	  pharmaceutical	  area	  see	  Love	  and	  Hubbard	  (2007).	  269	  Cf.	  Drahos	  and	  Braithwaite	  (2003),	  Pogge	  (2008b)	  and	  Singer	  (2004)	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global	   health.	   Hence,	   it	   does	   not	   seek	   to	   abolish	   the	   use	   of	   patents	   for	  pharmaceutical	   innovations,	   as	   the	   proponents	   of	   the	   fund	   believe	   that	   the	  existent	   regime	   with	   a	   substantial	   addition	   (i.e.	   the	   HIF)	   leaves	   the	   worst-­‐off	  better	  off	  than	  in	  a	  world	  prior	  to	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement.270	  	  A	  widely	  shared	  critique	  to	  the	  HIF	  is	  that	  the	  fund	  does	  not	  actively	  tackle	  the	  distribution	  of	  IP	  rights	  themselves.271	  IP	  rights	  do	  not	  only	  give	  the	  possibility	  to	  exclude	  others	  from	  copying	  the	  product,	  but	  may	  also	  hinder	  research	  with	  the	  product.	  This	  facilitates	  monopolizing	  follow-­‐up	  research	  preventing	  particularly	  poorer	  competitors	  from	  entering	  the	  market.	  The	  HIF	  would	  therefore	  leave	  the	  situation	   where	   research	   and	   development	   is	   almost	   exclusively	   done	   in	   the	  Global	  North	  unchanged,	  as	  it	  does	  not	  introduce	  additional	  incentives	  to	  remedy	  this	  inequality.272	  Our	  concern	  is	  how	  far	  the	  HIF	  may	  use	  the	  patent	  system	  for	   its	  own	  purpose	  (i.e.	  improving	  global	  health)	  before	  becoming	  complicit	  of	  supporting	  the	  other	  inequalities	  brought	  up	  by	  the	  existing	  intellectual	  property	  regime.	  	  The	   HIF	   seeks	   to	   make	   at	   least	   $6	   billion	   additionally	   available	   to	   incentivize	  pharmaceutical	   innovation	   a	   year.	   The	   companies	   interested	   in	   claiming	   those	  monies	   have	   to	   develop	   a	   new	  medicine.	   Given	   the	   way	   the	   fund	   is	   designed,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  stronger	  incentive	  to	  develop	  medicines	  for	  diseases	  that	  burden	  a	  high	  number	  of	  people.	  This	  mechanism	  will	  favour	  research	  on	  diseases	  that	  are	   now	   affecting	   a	   huge	   number	   of	   individuals	   but	   for	   which	   no	   cure	   (or	  insufficient	   remedy)	   is	   available	   –	   particularly	   widespread	   neglected	   diseases.	  Research	   institutes	   that	   are	   located	   in	   the	   areas	   where	   such	   diseases	   are	  prevalent	  (nowadays	  mostly	  the	  tropical	  region	  of	  the	  world)	  may	  have	  an	  initial	  advantage	  by	  having	  better	  samples	  of	  the	  pathogen,	  knowledge	  on	  how	  the	  local	  population	   has	   dealt	   with	   the	   disease,	   ties	   to	   the	   affected	   population	   and	  scientific	  expertise	  on	  the	  subject.273	  However,	  we	  should	  not	  underestimate	  the	  huge	   power	   the	   expensive	   scientific	   infrastructure	   located	   in	   the	   developed	  world	  has	  in	  attracting	  the	  best	  researchers	  in	  the	  field,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  capacity	  to	  accelerate	   research.	   Even	   among	   research	   institutes	   in	   the	   developed	   world	  there	  is	  a	  firm	  competition	  in	  who	  manages	  to	  attract	  the	  best	  researchers	  with	  the	  most	  appealing	  start-­‐up	  packages	  and	  cutting-­‐edge	  facilities.274	  We	  can	  fear	  a	  further	  brain	  drain	  of	  the	  top	  scientists	   in	  the	  field	  of	  neglected	  diseases	  to	  the	  developed	  world.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  270	  Pogge	  (2009)	  271	  This	  criticism	  can	  be	  found	  in	  DeCamp	  (2007),	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Timmermann	  and	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2013)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  5],	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  point	  raised	  by	  Knowledge	  Ecology	  International	  (keionline.org).	  	  272	  Further,	  the	  HIF	  only	  requires	  from	  industry	  to	  give	  up	  their	  price-­‐setting	  privilege	  and	  not	  to	  surrender	  patents.	  This	  is	  a	  concession	  made	  to	  industry	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  needed	  to	  create	  the	  fund.	  273	  Timmermann	  (2012a)	  274	  cf.	  Stephan	  (2012)	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An	  additional	  problem	  is	   that	   the	  HIF	   in	   its	  present	   form	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  financial	  assistance	  to	  help	  resource-­‐poor	  institutes	  to	  carry	  out	  clinical	  trials	  on	  their	   newly	   developed	   substances,	   therefore	   they	   will	   have	   to	   rely	   on	  partnerships	  with	  companies	  that	  do	  have	  the	  financial	  means	  to	  further	  develop	  the	  drug.275	  Here	  the	  terms	  of	  scientific	  participation	  within	  the	  partnership	  will	  end	   up	   being	   shaped	   by	   ideals	   of	   corporate	   social	   responsibility	   held	   by	   the	  stronger	   partner.	   At	   the	   end,	   the	   subjects	   of	   the	   right	   to	   share	   in	   the	  advancement	  of	  science	  will	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  to	  see	  if	   they	   will	   have	   a	   chance	   to	   participate	   in	   scientific	   endeavours	   on	   an	   equal	  standing	   relative	   to	   comparable	   merit.	   Reshaping	   an	   institutional	   order	   that	  clearly	  strengthens	  access	   to	  medicines,	  but	   leaves	   the	   fulfilment	  of	   the	  human	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  advancement	  of	  science	  to	  the	  goodwill	  of	  companies	  whose	   behaviour	   is	   primarily	   moulded	   by	   market	   incentives,	   unavoidably	  entrenches	  a	  normative	  standpoint	  that	  advocates	  prioritarianism.276	  	  	  	  	  Another	   issue	   is	   the	   status	   of	   clinical	   trials	   as	   a	   private	   good.	   The	   testing	   for	  biosafety	   and	   efficacy	   represent	   the	   biggest	   expense	   in	   drug	   development,	  consisting	   in	   a	   huge	   hurdle	   that	   impedes	   most	   companies	   to	   bring	   new	  medicines	  on	  the	  market	  on	  their	  own.	  Treating	  clinical	   trials	  as	  a	  public	  good,	  would	   allow	   also	   small	   and	   medium-­‐sized	   companies	   to	   develop	   new	  medicines.277	  If	   the	  needed	   safety	   and	   efficacy	   testing	   is	   publicly	   funded,	  many	  conflicts	   of	   interest	   could	   also	   be	   avoided.	   When	   stakes	   are	   so	   high	   for	  demonstrating	   success,	   scientific	   accuracy	   is	   at	   risk.	  Outcomes	  are	  prone	   to	  be	  biased,	   standards	  might	   be	  weakened	  by	   a	   favourable	   selection	   of	   patients	   for	  testing	   the	   compound	   and	   publication	   of	   unfavourable	   results	   might	   be	  suppressed	  or	  delayed.278	  Generic	  companies	  cannot	  rely	  on	  the	  data	  submitted	  by	   pharmaceutical	   companies	   to	   regulatory	   agencies	   before	   a	   specified	   time	  (that	  varies	  according	  to	  drug	  type	  and	  jurisdiction)	  for	  the	  market	  approval	  of	  their	   drugs.	   In	   practice	   this	   can	   act	   as	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   exclusivity	   time,	   as	  most	   generic	   companies	   do	   not	   have	   the	  means	   to	   repeat	   the	   clinical	   trials	   in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  new	  set	  of	  data	  to	  prove	  the	  already	  known	  performance	  of	  the	   compound	   in	   question.	   However,	   in	   theory,	   regulatory	   data	   shall	   only	   be	  protected	  from	  “unfair	  commercial	  use”	  (TRIPS,	  art.	  39)	  –	  originally	  this	  phrase	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  275	  The	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  foreign	  partners	  could	  be	  aggravated	  if	  high	  fees	  to	  be	  able	  to	  register	  a	  drug	  with	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  apply.	  276	  Here	  we	  understand	  prioritarianism	  as	  the	  position	  that	  seeks	  to	  raise	  the	  well-­‐being	  level	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off,	  regardless	  if	  that	  comes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  lower	  aggregated	  welfare	  level	  of	  the	  entire	  world	  population.	  	  277	  cf.	  Reichman	  (2009b)	  278	  cf.	  Reiss	  (2010).	  It	  is	  to	  note	  that	  the	  HIF	  provides	  an	  additional	  incentive	  for	  scientific	  accuracy	  as	  it	  pays	  out	  for	  measured	  health	  impact	  (in	  QALY)	  and	  not	  for	  claimed	  health	  impact.	  However	  making	  the	  public	  aware	  of	  long-­‐term	  side-­‐effects	  is	  still	  not	  directly	  encouraged.	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was	   defined	   in	   terms	   of	   misrepresentation	   (i.e.	   confusing	   and	   misleading	  consumers),	  but	  US	  and	  EU	  authorities	  illegitimately	  invoke	  this	  article	  to	  justify	  a	   new	   type	   of	   proprietary	   rights	   over	   the	   data	   on	   efficacy	   and	   safety	   that	  companies	   have	   to	   submit	   to	   regulatory	   agencies.279	  Generic	   companies	   are	  therefore	   compelled	   to	   present	   a	   separate	   set	   of	   data	   in	   order	   to	   gain	  market	  approval.	   In	  order	  to	  avoid	  “unfair	  commercial	  use”	  of	  data,	  repetitions	  of	  tests	  involving	   the	   exposure	   of	   human	   and	   animal	   subjects	   to	   drugs	   with	   no	  therapeutic	   or	   scientific	   intentions	   are	   deemed	   acceptable.	   Some	   duplicative	  work	  could	  be	  avoided	  with	  a	  careful	  draft	  of	  the	  HIF	  proposal,	  as	  companies	  can	  be	  asked	  to	  give	  up	  data	  exclusivity	  rights	  after	  the	  ten-­‐year	  reward	  period.	  	  	  	  We	   have	   not	   been	   able	   to	   identify	   a	   clearer	   statement	   of	   what	   constitutes	   an	  “institutional	   order	   that	   is	   feasible”280	  and	   one	   that	   is	   not.	   Drawing	   the	   line	  between	   “real-­‐world”	   possibilities	   and	   theoretical	   feasibility,	   does	   not	   only	  satisfy	   philosophical	   cravings,	   but	   builds	   a	   solid	   foundation	   for	   follow-­‐up	  political	  legitimation.	  As	  the	  natural	  rights	  basis	  of	  intellectual	  property	  is	  hardly	  tenable	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   incentivizing	   innovations	   are	   conceivable,	   a	   world	  without	  pharmaceutical	  patents	  is	  theoretically	  feasible.	  Some	  pessimism	  might	  be	   implied	  when	   stating	   that	   such	   a	  world	   is	   in	   principle	   politically	   infeasible.	  However	  one	  has	  to	  be	  quite	  blind	  to	  current-­‐day	  political	  power	  plays	  to	  believe	  that	   a	   radical	   reform	   in	   how	   innovations	   are	   incentivized	   will	   occur	   within	   a	  relatively	   short	   time	   frame.	   Here	   is	  where	   the	   HIF	   gains	  much	   support,	   it	   has	  much	   higher	   chances	   to	   be	   implemented	   in	   a	   shorter	   period	   of	   time,	   as	   it	  constitutes	  only	  an	  addition	  to	  the	  current	  intellectual	  property	  regime	  and	  does	  not	   seek	   to	  build	   a	  new	   incentive	   system	   from	   scratch.	  The	   implementation	  of	  the	  HIF	  does	  also	  not	  hinder	  people	  to	  continue	  advocating	  reforms	  that	  seek	  a	  fuller	   realization	   of	   human	   rights.	   If	   the	   HIF	   gains	   legitimacy	   as	   a	   temporary	  solution	   before	   a	  more	   fundamental	   reform	   can	   be	   carried	   out,	   it	   has	   to	   show	  that	  it	  will	  have	  a	  substantial	  effect	  on	  human	  lives	  before	  becoming	  out-­‐dated	  –	  something	  that	   intuitively	  will	  be	  self-­‐evident,	  but	  still	  may	  need	  a	  quantifiable	  estimate	  in	  order	  to	  contrast	  a	  scenario	  of	  inaction.	  For	  the	  arguments	  previously	  spelled	   out,	   we	   do	   not	   believe	   that	   the	   HIF	   is	   the	   best	   reform	   that	   can	   be	  conceptualized,	   however	   political	   realities	   make	   it	   a	   very	   good	   and	   feasible	  option	  that	  can	  be	  realised	  within	  a	  foreseeable	  period	  of	  time.	  	  	  Advocates	  of	  the	  HIF	  who	  accept	  compromise	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  political	  feasibility	  ought	  to	  admit	  openly	  that	  we	  should	  give	  priority	  to	  having	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  healthy	   people	   over	   having	   a	   lower	   number	   of	   healthy	   people	  with	   eventually	  more	   people	   participating	   in	   scientific	   endeavours.	   This	   approach	   aims	   at	  minimizing	   suffering	   related	   to	   disease	  while	   categorizing	   unhappiness	   due	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  279	  cf.	  Correa	  (2004)	  and	  Wadlow	  (2008)	  	  280	  Pogge	  (2002)	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lack	   of	   scientific	   engagement	   possibilities	   to	   a	   lower	   order	   of	   urgency.	   This	  compromise	  has	  to	  also	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  duplicative	  work	  necessitated	  by	  the	  current	  proprietary	  regime	  of	  clinical	  data	  is	  morally	  acceptable	  in	  order	  to	  reach	   the	   higher	   goal	   of	   improving	   global	   health.	   The	   fact	   that	   people	   who	  severely	   suffer	   from	   a	   disease	   cannot	   participate	   in	   science	   may	   help	   gather	  popular	   support	   for	   preferring	   one	   human	   right	   over	   the	   other,	   but	   if	   an	  institution	  formally	  acknowledges	  that	  it	  wishes	  to	  pursue	  one	  right	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  another,	   it	  will	  go	  against	   the	  progressive	  realization	  of	  human	  rights	  and	   thus	  violate	   international	   law281.	   The	   extra	   research	   money	   the	   HIF	   attempts	   to	  attract	  will	  most	  likely	  not	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  people	  who	  enjoy	  the	  right	  to	  share	  in	  the	  advancement	  of	  science	  in	  resource-­‐poor	  countries,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	   that	   it	   will	   not	   enlarge	   the	   distributional	   gap	   of	   research	   facilities	  between	   the	   developed	   and	   the	   developing	   world.282 	  History	   of	   innovation	  shows	  us	  plenty	  of	  cases	  where	  prolific	  patenting	  at	  early	  stages	  of	  research	  has	  been	  detrimental	  for	  further	  product	  development	  –	  many	  such	  “patent	  thickets”	  have	   been	   avoided	   by	   prudent	   researchers,	   fewer	   are	   the	   cases	   where	  governments	   have	   succeeded	   in	   taking	   action.283	  Making	   research	   in	   neglected	  diseases	  profitable	  will	   first	  of	  all	  create	  a	  race	  to	  the	  patent	  offices,	  restricting	  freedom	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  few	  areas	  where	  poorer	  research	  institutes	  could	  work	  with	  little	  fear	  of	  infringing	  patents.	  	  There	  has	  to	  be	  a	  general	  awareness	  that	  spending	  less	  than	  0,01%	  of	  the	  global	  income284	  for	  an	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  cannot	  address	  all	  major	  inequalities	  raised	  by	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  TRIPS	  agreement,	  but	  merely	  constitutes	  a	  much	  better	  situation	  for	  the	  global	  poor	  than	  not	  spending	  that	  money	  at	  all.	  	  Thomas	   Pogge	   justifies	   his	   prioritarian	   position	   with	   an	   investigation	   on	   how	  nongovernmental	   aid	   organisations	   should	   allocate	   their	   limited	   resources.285	  However	  this	   justification	  presumes	  that	  actors	  cannot	  change	  the	   fact	   that	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  281	  A	  comment	  on	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (1966,	  henceforth	  ICESCR)	  article	  2.1	  notes	  that	  “any	  deliberately	  retrogressive	  measures	  in	  that	  regard	  [i.e.	  under	  the	  obligation	  of	  progressive	  realization]	  would	  require	  the	  most	  careful	  consideration	  and	  would	  need	  to	  be	  fully	  justified	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  rights	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  Covenant	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  full	  use	  of	  the	  maximum	  available	  resources”	  (Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  1990,	  §	  9).	  It	  is	  to	  note	  that	  a	  right	  to	  share	  in	  scientific	  advancement	  as	  spelled	  out	  in	  the	  UDHR,	  cannot	  be	  as	  clearly	  interpreted	  in	  the	  corresponding	  article	  15	  of	  the	  ICESCR.	  282	  An	  outline	  of	  how	  research	  and	  development	  facilities	  of	  multinational	  corporations	  are	  distributed	  is	  offered	  in	  von	  Zedtwitz	  and	  Grassmann	  (2002).	  An	  insight	  on	  how	  this	  distribution	  affects	  the	  propagation	  of	  climate-­‐friendly	  technologies	  is	  offered	  by	  Sarnoff	  (2011).	  283	  Henry	  and	  Stiglitz	  (2010)	  284	  calculated	  from	  Pogge	  (2009)	  285	  Pogge	  (2011)	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available	  resources	  are	  limited	  and	  thus	  are	  obliged	  to	  make	  sacrifices	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  maximum	  amount	  of	  suffering.	  Governments	  of	   larger	  economies	  or	  supranational	  bodies	  cannot	  use	  this	  same	  argument	  to	   justify	  a	  prioritarian	  position	   that	   neglects	   significant	   efforts	   for	   scientific	   capacity-­‐building	   in	  developing	  countries	  in	  favour	  of	  improving	  global	  health	  as	  they	  are	  responsible	  for	   fixing	   the	   available	   resources	   for	   tackling	   injustices.	   Nongovernmental	  organisations	  (NGOs)	  have	  to	  justify	  “solely”	  what	  they	  have	  accomplished	  with	  the	   entrusted	   resources.	   Governments	   have	   to	   justify	   not	   only	   how	   they	   have	  allocated	  the	  resources	  collected,	  but	  also	  the	  amount	  they	  have	  found	  prudent	  to	   collect	   and	   the	   incentive	   systems	   framed.	   The	   slightest	   appeal	   to	  maximize	  welfare	   improvement	   per	   euro	   spent	   globally 286 	  will	   fail	   to	   justify	   any	  accountability	   based	   on	   proportionality.	   On	   that	   account,	   a	   net	   official	  development	   assistance	   that	   amounts	   to	   a	   0,32%	   share	   of	   the	   gross	   national	  income	  of	  the	  23	  Development	  Assistance	  Committee	  countries287	  would	  hardly	  give	  a	  solid	  ground	  to	  morally	  justify	  this	  type	  of	  prioritarianism.	  A	  country	  like	  the	   Netherlands	   could	   finance	   the	   HIF	   with	   current	   official	   development	  assistance	  rate	  on	   its	  own,	  while	  Germany	  could	  pay	  twice	   the	  amount	   the	  HIF	  needs	   to	  start	  with	   its	  missing	  portion	   to	  meet	   the	  UN	  targeted	  0,7%	  share	   for	  development	  assistance.288	  	  
What	  technological	  solutions	  should	  be	  developed?	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  why	  poorer	  people	  should	  not	  be	  excluded	  from	  being	  able	   to	  develop	  technological	  solutions.289	  	  Here	  we	  will	  discuss	  only	  one	  aspect:	  the	  lack	  of	  possibilities	  in	  influencing	  research	  agendas.	  Technologies	  are	  taking	  an	  ever	  more	  important	  role	  in	  our	  daily	  lives	  and	  participating	  in	  civil	  life	  without	   them	  is	  getting	  closer	  and	  closer	  to	  being	   impossible.	  On	  a	  global	   level	  there	   is	   hardly	   a	   democratic	   decision-­‐making	   process	   to	   identify	   which	  technologies	  should	  be	  developed	  and	  what	  form	  they	  should	  take.	  Today	  most	  of	   the	   research	   is	   done	   in	   the	   developed	  world.	   For	   this	   part	   of	   the	  world	  we	  cannot	  say	  that	  the	  development	  of	  new	  technologies	  underlies	  strict	  democratic	  resolution,	   but	   there	   is	   nevertheless	   a	   strong	   civil	   society	   influence	   by	   the	  offering	   of	   governmental	   financial	   aid	   to	   specific	   business	   branches	   or	   the	  development	   of	   products	   by	   direct	   request.	   Technologies	   that	   cause	   public	  controversies	  can	  be	  banned	  altogether,	  but	  this	  liberty	  can	  only	  be	  made	  use	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  286	  cf.	  Singer	  (2009)	  287	  OECD	  (2011)	  288	  data	  taken	  from	  OECD	  (2011)	  289	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  intellectual	  property	  affects	  the	  diversity	  in	  research	  practices	  (Timmermann	  2012b)	  and	  work	  in	  progress	  concentrates	  in	  how	  far	  the	  current	  IP	  regime	  limits	  (or	  fails	  to	  secure)	  human	  flourishing	  and	  development	  (Timmermann	  2013)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  3].	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when	   a	   country	   can	   rely	   on	   alternative	   products	   or	   can	   expect	   to	   be	   able	   to	  develop	  such	  alternatives	  within	  a	  time	  frame	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  public	  urgency	   the	   availability	   of	   such	   alternatives	   demands.	   Here	   is	   where	   this	  particular	  liberty	  is	  especially	  at	  stake	  for	  countries	  in	  the	  Global	  South,	  as	  they	  almost	   exclusively	   have	   to	  make	   use	   of	   technologies	   already	   developed	   by	   the	  Global	  North	  without	  being	  able	  to	  question	  the	  local	  acceptability	  thereof.	  	  Mitigating	   climate	   change	   with	   the	   aid	   of	   technology	   could	   be	   a	   much	   more	  inclusive	  effort	   than	   the	  battle	  against	  neglected	  diseases.	  When	   taking	  climate	  change	   mitigation	   as	   a	   global	   effort,	   researchers	   from	   poorer	   institutes	   could	  develop	   high	   impact	   solutions	   that	   do	   not	   necessarily	   rely	   on	   investigations	  made	  under	  an	  expensive	  infrastructure.	  The	  technologies	  developed	  would	  still	  count	   as	   an	   invention,	   being	   a	   public	   good	   –	   thus	   non-­‐excludable	   and	   non-­‐rivalrous	   in	   consumption	   –	   but	  will	   not	   necessarily	   have	   to	   continue	  with	   the	  trend	  of	  “complexity	  being	  better”.	  Technologies	  that	  might	  be	  easily	  copied	  and	  thus	   nowadays	   do	   not	   have	   enough	   market	   incentives	   to	   be	   developed	   since	  exclusivity	   cannot	   be	  made	   full	   use	   of	   in	   practice,	   could	   be	   stimulated	   by	   the	  climate	  impact	  fund’s	  reward	  system.	  	  Here	  we	  can	  differentiate	  between	  a	  core	   invention,	  which	  will	  be	  applying	   for	  the	   fund’s	   rewards,	  and	  subsequent	   local	  adaptation	  of	   the	  core	   invention.	  The	  company	  that	  brought	  up	  the	  core	   invention	  will	  benefit	   from	  the	  extra	   impact	  gained	   by	   the	  wide	   distribution	   of	   the	   invention	   and	   its	   local	   variation.	  When	  local	   variations	   have	   mutated	   to	   a	   new	   invention	   altogether,	   specific	   policies	  should	  be	   formulated	   to	  be	  able	   to	  draw	  the	   line	  between	  the	  new	  and	  the	  old	  product	  as	  well	  as	  to	  establish	  the	  fair	  shares	  each	  inventor	  should	  get.290	  	  A	  second	  argument	  concerns	  the	  possibility	  of	  raising	  the	  bar	  independently	  as	  a	  group.	   If	   a	   society	   is	   dependent	   upon	   the	   technological	   innovations	   made	   by	  others,	   it	   will	   have	   to	   subject	   itself	   to	   a	   level	   of	   risk	   toleration	   that	   it	   cannot	  influence.	  Risk	  affinity	  varies	  among	  societies.	  Nowadays	  most	  countries	  do	  not	  have	   the	   infrastructure	   to	   develop	   alternatives	   or	   solutions.	   In	   the	   case	   that	  predefined	   standards	   of	   quality,	   levels	   of	   toxicity	   or	   climate	   change	  mitigation	  targets	  are	  deemed	  unacceptable	   locally,	  poorer	  countries	  have	  no	  possibilities	  to	  take	  action	  and	  will	  have	  to	  content	  themselves	  with	  alien	  criterions.	  	  Finally,	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  is	  a	  global	  goal	  in	  which	  everybody	  should	  be	  able	   to	   participate	   as	   it	   counts	   as	   a	   worldwide	   hazard.	   Here	   access	   to	   the	  technologies	   becomes	   important	   on	   moral	   grounds.	   For	   example	   when	  insufficient	  public	  transport	  infrastructure	  is	  available,	  some	  people	  will	  have	  no	  option	  then	  to	  go	  to	  work	  with	  an	  energy-­‐inefficient	  car.	  In	  other	  cases	  technical	  solutions	  to	  allow	  poorer	  people	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  290	  The	  HIF	  mechanism	  makes	  the	  development	  of	  “me-­‐too”	  drugs	  (i.e.	  drugs	  that	  have	  no	  substantial	  benefits	  over	  existing	  medicines	  to	  treat	  a	  particular	  disease)	  not	  lucrative.	  While	  this	  makes	  sense	  for	  diseases,	  the	  existence	  of	  me-­‐too	  products	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change	  has	  to	  be	  judged	  using	  different	  parameters	  and	  taking	  a	  wider	  scope	  of	  social	  implications	  into	  consideration.	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not	   even	   available.	   People	   should	   have	   the	   freedom	   to	   contribute	   to	   a	   good	  cause,	   i.e.	   mitigating	   greenhouse	   gases	   emissions,	   and	   not	   to	   be	   in	   a	   situation	  where	  they	  can	  only	  cause	  further	  damage	  to	  the	  earth’s	  atmosphere.	  	  
Correcting	  the	  injustice	  	  Subsequent	  publications	  to	  the	  2008	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  proposal	  have	  dropped	  the	  strict	  patent	  requirement.	  This	  was	  done	  mainly	  for	  two	  reasons,	  some	  high	  impact	   medicinal	   improvements	   are	   not	   patentable291 	  and	   the	   potential	   of	  traditional	  medicine292	  can	  play	  an	  enormous	  role	  for	  global	  health	  and	  therefore	  has	   also	   to	   be	   harnessed.	   The	   current	   version	   of	   the	   proposal293	  suggests	   that	  researchers	   who	   gain	   the	   approval	   of	   a	   major	   regulatory	   agency,	   e.g.	   the	   U.S.	  Food	   and	   Drug	   Administration	   (FDA),	   should	   be	   eligible	   to	   receive	   the	   fund’s	  rewards.	  Herewith	  we	  have	   a	   slightly	  wider	   opening	  of	   the	   ‘filter’	   that	   decides	  which	  innovations	  can	  apply	  for	  HIF	  rewards	  and	  which	  not,	  as	  more	  innovations	  will	  qualify.	  The	  contour	  of	  this	  ‘filter’	  does	  not	  only	  define	  the	  hurdle	  that	  actors	  will	  have	  to	  pass	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  the	  reward,	  but	  if	  shaped	  differently	  will	  also	  change	  the	  spectrum	  of	  actors	  attracted	  to	  the	  fund’s	  rewards.	  Making	  the	  circle	  of	  potential	  applicants	  less	  exclusive	  will	  stimulate	  a	  higher	  competition	  among	  applicants	   to	   the	   fund.	   As	   the	   reward	   rate	   is	   self-­‐adjusted	   by	   competition,294	  participating	  companies	  will	  have	  an	  economic	  interest	  not	  to	  have	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  changed	  after	  the	  fund	  comes	  into	  existence.	  When	  we	  make	  it	  possible	  to	   reach	   the	   target	   (maximizing	   QALY)	   by	   more	   means	   we	   will	   increase	   the	  number	  of	  potential	  competitors	  and	  thus	  drive	  down	  the	  size	  of	  the	  reward.295	  Making	  the	  HIF	  rewards	  accessible	   for	  new	  competitors	  will	  primarily	  hurt	   the	  established	   large	   corporations	   mostly	   headquartered	   in	   the	   potential	   donor	  countries,	  something	  that	  small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  companies	  around	  the	  world	  will	  welcome,	  but	  which	  may	  provoke	  resistance	  from	  major	  business	  lobbies.	  	  There	   is	   also	   another	   political	   catch,	   however,	   in	   dropping	   the	   strict	   patent	  requirement	   for	  HIF	   eligibility	   and	   settling	   for	   approval	   by	   a	  major	   regulatory	  agency	  alone.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  a	  company	  could	  be	  asked	  to	  give	  up	  some	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  291	  see	  Syed	  (2009)	  292	  see	  Mendel	  and	  Hollis	  (2010)	  293	  see	  changes	  in	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2009)	  294	  see	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  295	  The	  exceptional	  success	  of	  one	  candidate	  drug	  can	  also	  affect	  considerably	  the	  expected	  pay-­‐out	  for	  other	  participating	  companies.	  The	  HIF	  considers	  having	  a	  pay-­‐out	  ceiling	  for	  a	  single	  drug	  (Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  2008).	  A	  minimum	  pay-­‐out	  rate	  per	  QALY	  added	  could	  reduce	  uncertainties	  if	  clearly	  fixed.	  Designing	  the	  HIF	  with	  a	  self-­‐adjusting	  pay-­‐out	  rate	  comes	  with	  the	  price	  that	  every	  change	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  inventions	  that	  are	  allowed	  to	  apply	  for	  the	  fund’s	  reward	  will	  encounter	  strong	  resistance	  with	  people	  having	  already	  products	  destined	  for	  the	  HIF	  in	  their	  research	  pipeline.	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exclusive	  rights	  that	  derive	  from	  its	  proprietary	  control	  of	  the	  regulatory	  data	  in	  exchange	  for	  becoming	  eligible	  for	  the	  HIF	  rewards.	  The	  catch	  is	  that	  this	  might	  indirectly	   reinforce	   the	   international	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   “data	  exclusivity”	   allegedly	   based	   on	   article	   39	   of	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement,	   a	   principle	  that	  is	  currently	  being	  promoted	  by	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU	  but	  that	  is	  fiercely	  resisted	  by	  India	  and	  other	  developing	  countries.	  The	  HIF	  could	  thus	  be	  seen	  as	  implicitly	  taking	  sides	  (and	  even	  the	  ‘wrong’	  side)	  on	  this	  contentious	  issue.	  	  Since	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  climate-­‐friendly	  technologies	  many	  non-­‐patentable	  but	   high-­‐impact	   innovations	   may	   emerge,	   the	   relaxation	   of	   the	   patent	  requirement	  deserves	  further	  elaboration.	  	  It	   is	   in	   the	   public	   interest	   that	   a	  medicine	   has	   been	   approved	   by	   a	   regulatory	  agency	   for	  efficacy	  and	  safety.	  We	  can	  say	   that	   loosing	  up	   this	   requirement	   for	  any	   purpose	   whatsoever	   not	   only	   contradicts	   public	   interest,	   but	   may	   also	  jeopardize	   the	  health	   of	   people	  who	   are	   relying	  on	   the	   claimed	  benefits	   of	   the	  medicine	   in	   question.	   A	   Health	   Impact	   Fund	   that	  will	   not	   demand	   such	   safety	  tests	  will	  not	  do	  justice	  to	  its	  name.	  However	  this	  limits	  “impacting”	  global	  health	  to	  medicinal	   innovation	   and	   the	  making	   available	   of	   new	   drugs,	   leaving	   other	  ways	  to	  improve	  health	  unrewarded	  by	  the	  fund.	  There	  is	  a	  very	  good	  reason	  to	  concentrate	  on	   the	  development	  of	  medicines:	   the	  knowledge	   involved	   in	   their	  making	  is	  a	  public	  good.	  As	  a	  public	  good	  it	  is	  non-­‐rivalrous	  in	  consumption	  –	  a	  welfare	   improvement	   that	   will	   survive	   wars	   and	   civil	   unrest.	   Medicinal	  treatments	  and	  cures	  can	  play	  a	  key	  role	  when	  natural	  or	  human	  disasters	  occur,	  as	   diseases	   that	   spread	   out	   by	   the	   collapse	   of	   infrastructure,	   overcrowded	  confinement	  of	  people	  and	  rape,	  can	  be	  controlled.	  As	  no	  society	  can	  completely	  insulate	  itself	  from	  such	  vulnerabilities,	  preventive	  measures	  for	  disease	  control	  can	  never	  do	  the	  full	  job.	  	  As	   far	   as	   a	   Climate	   Impact	   Fund	   is	   concerned,	   regulatory	   approval	   plays	   a	   far	  lesser	   role.296	  It	   is	   easier	   to	   estimate	   the	   difference	   in	   emission	   output	   a	   new	  technology	  may	  have	  over	  an	  older	  one,	  than	  it	  is	  to	  measure	  the	  efficacy	  a	  drug	  has	  on	  combating	  a	  disease.	  The	  distribution	  of	  the	  innovation	  landscape	  has	  the	  potential	  of	  being	  much	  more	  dispersed	  than	  in	  the	  area	  of	  medicinal	  innovation,	  as	  a	  lesser	  minimum	  infrastructure	  is	  required.	  However	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  difference	   between	   climate-­‐friendly	   technologies	   and	   medicines:	   the	   harm	  caused	  by	  manufacturing	  the	  products	  of	  innovation	  may	  supersede	  the	  claimed	  benefits.	  Estimating	  the	  total	  emissions	  caused	  by	  making	  the	  product	  available	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  296	  Regulatory	  approval	  might	  also	  be	  relevant	  for	  new	  agrochemicals	  and	  new	  agricultural	  crops	  which	  could	  potentially	  play	  a	  role	  in	  climate	  mitigation.	  Data	  exclusivity	  is	  not	  only	  claimed	  for	  medicines	  but	  also	  for	  agrochemicals,	  as	  the	  latter	  are	  also	  mentioned	  in	  article	  39	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement.	  Agri-­‐biotech	  companies	  would	  also	  like	  to	  see	  regulatory	  data	  on	  the	  biosafety	  of	  GM	  crops	  being	  treated	  as	  proprietary.	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on	  a	  massive	  scale	  is	  a	  quite	  challenging	  undertaking.	  The	  debate	  around	  biofuels	  has	  become	  a	  classic	  example.	  Therefore,	  some	  kind	  of	  hurdle	  to	  be	  able	  to	  apply	  for	   a	   Climate	   Impact	   Fund’s	   reward	   seems	   also	   necessary.	   Some	   kind	   of	  certification	  body	  similar	  to	  the	  Technischer	  Überwachungs-­‐Verein	  (TÜV)	  will	  be	  needed	   to	   set	   the	   standard	   of	   what	   kind	   of	   innovations	   could	   apply	   for	   the	  rewards.	   The	   selection	   of	   technologies	   will	   probably	   have	   to	   be	   limited	   to	  technologies	   whose	   total	   environmental	   production	   costs	   can	   be	   reasonably	  measured.	   The	   reward	   has	   to	   be	   fixed	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   total	   impact	   the	  technology	   has	   (reduction	   of	   emissions	  minus	   additional	   emissions	   caused	   by	  production	   and	   operation).	   To	   make	   the	   climate	   impact	   measurement	   cost-­‐effective,	  we	  may	  not	  only	  have	  to	  restrict	  the	  types	  of	  technologies	  that	  can	  opt	  for	  the	  fund’s	  rewards,	  but	  also	  demand	  a	  fairly	  specific	  standard	  in	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  objects	  of	  innovation.	  	  	  Shifting	   the	   threshold	   line	   from	   having	   a	   patent	   with	   FDA	   approval	   to	   having	  FDA	   approval	   alone	   for	   eligibility	   for	   the	   Health	   Impact	   Fund	   may	   change	  fundamentally	   how	   the	   fund	   is	   perceived.	   The	   basic	  mechanism	   of	   the	   impact	  fund	  relies	  on	  an	  exchange.	  Innovators	  have	  to	  give	  up	  some	  type	  of	  exclusivity,	  mainly	  price-­‐setting	  privileges	  facilitated	  by	  patents	  or	  by	  being	  the	  sole	  “owner”	  of	  clinical	  trials	  data,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  eligible	  to	  apply	  for	  the	  fund’s	  rewards.	  Now,	  for	   the	   sake	   of	   the	   argument,	   let	   us	   imagine	   that	   a	   philanthropic	   organization	  systematically	   undertakes	   clinical	   trials	   to	   show	   the	   efficacy	   of	   traditional	  medicine.	  This	  organization	  applies	   for	   the	   fund’s	   rewards	   for	  no	  other	   reason	  than	   to	   give	   the	   indigenous	   communities	   that	   brought	   up	   the	   traditional	  medicine	  the	  entire	  impact	  fund’s	  reward	  monies.	  The	  decision	  is	  based	  solely	  on	  notions	   of	   desert	   –	   the	   indigenous	   community	   created	   a	   public	   good,	   a	   gift	   to	  society,	  something	  that	  has	  to	  be	  reciprocated.	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   medicines,	   this	   case	   might	   be	   nothing	   more	   than	   a	   thought	  experiment,	   due	   to	   the	   high	   costs	   of	   running	   clinical	   trials.	  While	   considering	  climate-­‐friendly	   technologies,	   this	   possibility	   ceases	   to	   be	   utopian,	   as	  certification	   costs	   may	   only	   be	   minor.	   There	   might	   be	   some	   cases	   where	   the	  impact	  fund	  may	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  reciprocate	  such	  kinds	  of	  gifts	  to	  society.	  Now	  having	  the	  possibility	  to	  do	  so	  and	  choosing	  not	  to,	  demands	  a	  justification.	  If	   the	   invention	   happened	   to	   enter	   directly	   into	   the	   public	   domain,	   should	   the	  impact	  fund	  reward	  the	  inventor	  solely	  on	  notions	  of	  desert?	  Does	  society	  want	  to	  use	   the	  scarce	  resources	   for	  addressing	  global	  hazards	   to	  reward	  something	  that	   is	   already	   in	   the	   public	   domain?	   A	   Maussean	   conception	   of	   gifts	   clearly	  demands	  some	  kind	  of	  reciprocity.	  Forgoing	  the	  possibility	  to	  reciprocating	  such	  gifts	   will	   send	   a	   very	   particular	   message	   on	   how	   society	   perceives	   them.	  Prioritizing	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   tools	   to	   combat	   current	   global	   hazards	   could	  count	  as	  a	  strong	  argument,	  but	  as	  we	  are	  conceptualizing	  a	  global	  solution	  we	  should	  not	  underestimate	  the	  social	  importance	  the	  reciprocation	  of	  gifts	  has	  for	  some	  societies	  in	  our	  world.	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Harnessing	  the	  potential	  of	  grassroots	  innovators	  	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  possibility	  to	  adapt	  an	  invention	  to	  local	  needs	  and	  even	   to	   be	   able	   to	   build	   an	   equivalent	   using	   local	   resources	   is	   vital	   for	  distributing	   it	   to	   areas	  where	   the	  market	   does	   not	   have	   its	   expected	   effect.297	  When	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  is	  the	  central	  goal,	  there	  are	  limitations	  (at	  least	  economic	  limitations)	  to	  what	  we	  can	  reach	  with	  the	  help	  of	  standardized	  highly	  technological	   inventions.	  The	  huge	   inequalities	   in	   the	  world	   limit	   access	   to	   the	  objects	  of	   innovation	  and	   the	  diversity	   in	  educational	  backgrounds	  may	  hinder	  the	  effective	  use	  of	  standardized	  inventions	  in	  all	  corners	  of	  the	  world.	  	  We	  may	  think	  of	  the	  newest	  generation	  of	  light	  bulbs	  showing	  great	  efficiency	  in	  energy	   saving.	   Those	   bulbs	   are	   expensive	   to	   acquire	   and	   require	   special	  environmentally	  safe	  disposal.	  In	  how	  far	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  light	  bulbs	  can	  take	  into	  account	  the	  purchasing	  power	  of	  the	  poorest	  half	  of	  the	  planet,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  recycling	  limitations,	  remains	  open,	  but	  there	  is	  some	  justified	  scepticism	  on	   how	   far	   development	   further	   down	   this	   road	   will	   be	   as	   cost-­‐effective	   as	   a	  strategy	  that	  aims	  at	  a	  diversification	  of	  innovation	  projects.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	   inventions	   that	   can	   be	   amended	   according	   to	   local	   needs	   or	   can	   be	   locally	  reproduced.	  	  By	  contrast,	   the	  knowledge	   involved	   in	  a	  method	   to	  convert	  agricultural	  waste	  into	   a	   soil	   enhancer,	   biochar,	   does	   not	   only	   add	   to	   climate	   change	   mitigation	  efforts	  but	  can	  also	  play	  an	  important	  role	  for	   food	  security.298	  If	   the	  method	  is	  taught	   to	   farmers	   in	   remote	   areas,	   many	   could	   develop	   variations	   thereof	   to	  adapt	   to	   the	   local	   environment	   and	   through	   a	   process	   of	   trial	   and	   error	   keep	  improving	   local	  variations.	  People	  developing	  particularly	   successful	  variations	  could	  be	  incentivized	  to	  teach	  other	  communities	  about	  their	  skills.	  	  
	  
Conflicts	  of	  leaving	  adaptation	  needs	  aside	  	  In	  an	  earlier	  sketch299	  of	  the	  practical	  problems	  of	  a	  Climate	  Impact	  Fund	  (CIF),	  we	   came	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   such	   a	   fund	   would	   only	   be	   feasible	   and	   cost-­‐effective	  if	  it	  concentrates	  on	  incentivizing	  technologies	  that	  can	  be	  assessed	  by	  a	  broad	  across-­‐the-­‐board	  metric	  (in	  close	  analogy	  to	  how	  the	  original	  HIF	  uses	  the	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  see	  Gupta	  (2010)	  298	  An	  extensive	  presentation	  of	  the	  popular	  reception	  of	  biochar	  is	  offered	  in	  www.biochar-­‐international.org.	  A	  brief	  historical	  introduction	  as	  well	  as	  a	  sketch	  of	  problems	  that	  have	  to	  be	  overcome	  for	  a	  wider	  use	  in	  East	  Africa	  is	  presented	  by	  N.	  Hagemann	  (2012).	  299	  Timmermann	  and	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2012a)	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QALY	  metric300).	  Therefore	  a	  CIF	  should	  concentrate,	  at	   least	   in	  its	   initial	  stage,	  on	   climate	   change	   mitigation	   only.	   At	   least	   for	   some	   technologies	   we	   can	  measure	  its	  relative	  improvement	  in	  reduction	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  emissions	  to	  existing	  technologies,	  as	  mention	  earlier.	  Constructing	  a	  broad	  metric	  for	  climate	  change	   adaptation	  will	   be	   close	   to	   impossible	   due	   to	   the	   heterogeneity	   of	   the	  various	  coping	  strategies.	  	  This	  whole	  path	  will	  lead	  inevitably	  to	  a	  series	  of	  disputes.	  Firstly,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  self-­‐evident	   that	   choosing	   a	   metric	   for	   its	   simplicity	   will	   provide	   a	   sufficient	  justification	   for	   its	   implementation.	   Focusing	   on	   lowering	   the	   carbon	   footprint	  might	   undermine	   other	   very	   important	   goals	   such	   as	  maintaining	   biodiversity,	  recovering	   green	   areas,	   changing	   to	   more	   sustainable	   food	   consumption,	   etc.	  Secondly,	   a	  major	   initiative	   that	   concentrates	   solely	   on	  mitigation	   efforts,	  may	  lead	  to	  neglecting	  the	  importance	  of	  adaptation	  needs.	  Here	  we	  should	  not	  forget	  that	  benefits	  gained	  by	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  are	  a	  public	  good	  –	  nobody	  can	  be	   excluded	   from	   it.	   The	   urgency	   of	   climate	   change	   adaptation	   varies	  significantly,	  especially	  when	  assessing	  food	  security.301	  Local	  adaptation	  efforts	  may	   not	   automatically	   lead	   to	   solutions	   that	   could	   be	   exported	   to	   other	   areas	  that	  are	  also	  struggling	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  new	  environmental	  conditions.	  	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  	  Prioritising	  a	  global	   relief	  of	   suffering	  caused	  by	  diseases	  or	  mitigating	  climate	  change	   are	   very	   noble	   goals.	   However	   the	   need	   of	   reshaping	   our	   incentive	  system	   for	   technological	   innovation	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   we	   can	   achieve	   those	  goals	   in	   a	   reasonable	   time	   frame	   should	   not	   prevent	   us	   from	   questioning	   the	  acceptability	  of	  the	  methods	  used	  in	  the	  process.	  We,	  as	  people	  participating	  in	  society,	  are	  still	  responsible	  for	  the	  institutional	  order	  that	  has	  been	  set	  up	  and	  that	  we	  maintain	  with	  our	  daily	  habits.	  As	  a	  collective	  we	  are	  deciding	  what	   is	  feasible	  and	  thus	  we	  cannot	  escape	  accountability.	  We	  fear	  that	  by	  advocating	  an	  incentive	  mechanism	  based	  on	  the	  concept	  behind	  the	  Health	   Impact	   Fund	  we	  might	   implicitly	   confirm	   the	  moral	   acceptability	   of	  our	   global	   intellectual	   property	   regimes	   by	   failing	   to	   formally	   reject	   it.	   Even	   if	  this	   addition	   to	   the	   patent	   system	   is	   the	   best	   thing	   we	   could	   establish	   under	  given	   political	   realities	   and	   therefore	   solely	   support	   this	   type	   of	   innovation	  system	  to	  achieve	  our	  goals,	  we	  are	  still	  adding	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  a	  system	  that	  could	  be	  rejected	  on	  moral	  grounds	  altogether.	  Supporting	  the	  patent	  system	  in	  this	  way	  might	  make	  it	  harder	  for	  future	  policy	  makers	  to	  combat	   it.	  Generally,	  settling	  for	  the	  low	  minimum	  global	  justice	  commitment	  the	  HIF	  suggests,	  might	  not	  be	  without	  negative	  consequences	  for	  future	  policymaking.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  300	  see	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  301	  cf.	  Cline	  (2007)	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  Enabling	   people	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   advancement	   of	   science	   cannot	   be	  addressed	   solely	   by	   corporate	   social	   responsibility.	   We	   therefore	   suggest	   an	  “innovation	   inclusion	  clause”	   to	  be	  set	   in	  any	  proposed	   impact	   fund.	  There	  are	  multiple	  ways	   to	   incentivize	   inclusion,	   some	  more	   restricting,	   like	   limiting	   the	  availability	  of	  rewards	  to	  companies	  that	  have	  less	  than	  a	  defined	  percentage	  of	  scientific	   activities	   in	   the	   developing	  world	   (something	   that	  might	   bring	   other	  problems	  into	  existence	  that	  have	  to	  be	  addressed	  accordingly).	  Another	  way	  is	  to	   reserve	   a	   fixed	   portion	   of	   the	   available	   funds	   to	   help	   poorer	   companies	   to	  overcome	   the	   clinical	   trials	   hurdle	   (or	   the	   required	   approval	   of	   comparable	  regulatory	   agencies).	   Such	   a	   clause	   can	   still	   be	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   negative	  duties:	   if	   the	   HIF	   adds	   to	   the	   research	   gap,	   it	   has	   to	   address	   this	   negative	  externality.	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Abstract	  	  	  Indigenous	  communities	  are	  not	  only	  holding	  knowledge	  of	  their	  ancestors,	  but	  also	  actively	  engaging	  in	  inventive	  endeavours.	  As	  those	  communities	  dissolve	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  knowledge	  gets	  lost,	  which	  does	  not	  only	  amount	  to	  a	  waste	  of	  global	  intellectual	  capital	  but	  can	  be	  counted	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  moral	  interests	  of	   innovators.	   By	   adding	   a	   supplementary	   element	   to	   what	   is	   traditionally	  protected	  under	  the	  doctrine	  of	  moral	  rights	  of	  innovators,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  a	  fair	  chance	  of	  having	  an	  impact	  should	  also	  constitute	  part	  of	  this	  doctrine.	  Through	  an	   emphasis	   in	   securing	   material	   interests,	   moral	   rights	   are	   often	   neglected,	  something	   that	   comes	   at	   a	   huge	   cost	   for	   the	   recognition	   of	   indigenous	  communities’	   inventiveness.	   I	   will	   claim	   that	   observing	  moral	   interests	   has	   in	  some	  cases	  priority	  over	  material	   interests	  and	   illustrate	  how	  open	   innovation	  models	  are	  an	  attractive	  alternative	  to	  secure	  innovators’	  moral	  considerations.	  	  	  Keywords:	  traditional	  knowledge,	  recognition	  as	  peers,	  fair	  competition	  of	  ideas,	  intellectual	  property,	  global	  justice.	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Introduction	  	  Every	  year	  thousands	  of	  indigenous	  communities	  around	  the	  world	  are	  dissolved	  as	  their	  members	  get	  thrown	  out	  of	  their	  traditional	  lands	  or	  seek	  for	  new	  living	  opportunities	  in	  urban	  areas.	  This	  in	  itself	  raises	  a	  variety	  of	  justice	  concerns,	  of	  which	  I	  will	  elaborate	  only	  one:	  the	  fate	  of	  traditional	  knowledge.	  Traditional	   knowledge	   has	   both	   a	   static	   dimension,	   as	   knowledge	   passed	   on	  through	  many	   generations,	   as	  well	   as	   a	   dynamic	   dimension,	   as	   the	   knowledge	  produced	  through	  autochthonous	  practices	  of	  observation,	  selection,	  adaptation,	  learning	   and	   a	   loose	   exchange	   of	   ideas.302	  Much	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	  empirical	   knowledge	   built	   up	   over	   generations	   and	   grounded	   on	   practical	  evidence	   and	   can	   therefore	   be	   integrated	   in	   modern	   science.303	  Here	   I	   will	  understand	   traditional	   knowledge	   as	   a	   very	   wide	   concept,	   encompassing	  innovations	   and	   scientific	   observations	   made	   by	   tribal	   communities,	   small-­‐farmers	  and	  grass-­‐root	  innovators	  –	  basically	  all	  groups	  that	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  major	  modern	  scientific	  infrastructure.	  Traditional	   knowledge	   is	   often	   not	   written	   down,	   making	   it	   vulnerable	   to	   be	  forgotten	   or	   misappropriated	   by	   outsiders,	   the	   latter	   being	   a	   phenomenon	  widely	   known	   as	   biopiracy304.	   In	   some	   cases	   traditional	   knowledge	   can	   be	  patented,	   although	   for	   that	   a	   relatively	   minor	   step	   is	   necessary:	   it	   has	   to	   be	  written	  down	  in	  a	  patent	  application	  using	  modern	  scientific	  language	  and	  when	  encompassing	  a	  genetic	  resource,	  this	  one	  has	  to	  be	  isolated	  from	  how	  it	  is	  found	  in	   nature.	   Both	   steps	   are	   mostly	   unattainable	   for	   indigenous	   communities	   on	  their	  own,	  creating	  a	  huge	   temptation	   to	  cut	  out	   innovators	  situated	   in	   remote	  and	  economically	  poor	  regions	  from	  their	  fair	  share.	  In	  order	  to	  counteract	  this	  inclination,	   a	   variety	   of	   access	   and	   benefit	   sharing	   mechanisms	   have	   been	  elaborated,	  although	  with	  limited	  success.305	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  302	  For	  this	  distinction	  exemplified	  in	  a	  northern	  Thailand	  case	  study,	  see	  Robinson	  (2008).	  303	  cf.	  ICSU	  Study	  Group	  on	  Science	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  (2002)	  304	  The	  political	  relevance	  of	  this	  term	  and	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  its	  use	  is	  analysed	  by	  Dutfield	  (2006).	  305	  See	  Prathapan	  and	  Rajan	  (2011).	  An	  overview	  of	  the	  different	  philosophical	  traditions	  that	  support	  benefit-­‐sharing	  schemes	  with	  an	  especial	  emphasis	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  desert,	  is	  given	  by	  De	  Jonge	  (2011).	  Van	  Overwalle	  (2005)	  and	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In	   this	   paper	   I	   will	   defend	   a	   different	   strategy:	   open	   innovation.	   Under	   this	  model,	   knowledge	   has	   to	   be	   categorized	   and	   digitalized,	   therefore	  misappropriation306	  is	   reduced	  and	   loss	   is	  prevented,	  making	   innovations	   from	  an	  early	  stage	  of	  development	  accessible	  to	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  peers.	  As	  innovations	  are	   more	   visible,	   interested	   parties	   can	   comment	   and	   built	   upon	   the	   single	  contributions,	   as	   well	   as	   making	   innovators	   aware	   of	   flaws,	   repetitions	   or	  possible	   wastages	   of	   creative	   efforts	   by	   sharing	   past	   experiences	   with	  unsuccessful	  research	  trajectories.	  The	  model	  has	  the	  disadvantage	  that	  it	  might	  not	   enable	   innovators	   to	   secure	   their	  material	   interests.	  While	  defending	  open	  innovation,	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   (1)	   every	   innovator	   has	   a	   moral	   right	   to	   a	   fair	  assessment	   of	   her	   invention,	   (2)	   that	   this	   right	   is	   fundamental	   and	   in	   specific	  cases	  precedes	  economic	   interests,	   (3)	   that	  securing	   this	   right	  helps	   to	  achieve	  the	   deserved	   recognition	   of	   indigenous	   communities	   inventiveness,	   (4)	   open	  innovation	  models	  could	  help	  in	  securing	  this	  right	  and	  (5)	  those	  kinds	  of	  models	  will	   enhance	   recognition	   and	   therefore	   make	   practising	   science	   following	  autochthonous	  practices	  more	  attractive.	  	  
Moral	  interests	  of	  innovators	  	  Traditionally	   understood,	  moral	   interests	   of	   authors	   lead	   to	   the	   recognition	   of	  two	  sets	  of	  rights:	  the	  right	  to	  attribution	  of	  authorship	  and	  the	  right	  to	  control	  the	  integrity	  of	  one’s	  work.	  The	  right	  to	  attribution	  is	  the	  right	  to	  be	  identified	  as	  an	  author,	  to	  use	  a	  pseudonym	  or	  to	  stay	  in	  anonymity.	  Generally	  inventors	  keep	  the	  right	  to	  have	  their	  name	  written	  down	  in	  the	  patent	  document,	  even	  after	  the	  patent	  is	  sold	  or	  has	  expired.	  The	  right	  to	  integrity	  holds	  mainly	  in	  cases	  where	  the	   reputation	  of	   the	  author	   is	   at	   stake	  when	   the	  work	   is	  modified.	   In	  how	   far	  those	  rights	  are	  alienable	  and	  to	  what	   level	   they	  are	  protected,	  depends	  on	  the	  jurisdiction.307	  Some	  countries	  are	  quite	  paternalistic	   in	  their	   limitations	  to	  this	  freedom.308	  	  	  Those	   two	   rights	   are	   the	   only	   ones	   identified	   in	   an	   official	   comment309	  to	   the	  human	   right	   in	   question,	   article	   27.2	   of	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	  Rights	   (1948,	  henceforth	  UDHR),	   “[e]veryone	  has	   the	  right	   to	   the	  protection	  of	  the	  moral	  and	  material	  interests	  resulting	  from	  any	  scientific,	  literary	  or	  artistic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Correa	  (2010)	  offer	  a	  detailed	  account	  on	  the	  legal	  constructs	  for	  protecting	  and	  preserving	  traditional	  knowledge.	  	  306	  A	  requirement	  for	  patentability	  is	  that	  an	  invention	  is	  novel,	  i.e.	  that	  it	  was	  not	  made	  public	  before.	  The	  easiest	  way	  to	  prevent	  misappropriation	  is	  “defensive	  publishing”,	  although	  the	  efficacy	  of	  this	  practice	  is	  under	  criticism,	  see	  Munzer	  and	  Raustiala	  (2009).	  	  307	  cf.	  Conde	  Gutiérrez	  (2011)	  308	  For	  a	  criticism	  concentrating	  on	  artistic	  work,	  see	  Beitz	  (2005).	  309	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (2006)	  
	   127	  
production	  of	  which	  he	  is	  the	  author”.	   I	  will	   follow	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Declaration	  and	  not	  distinguish	  between	  authors	  of	  a	  scientific	  production	  and	  inventors.	  	  Departing	   from	   this	   legal	   tradition,	   I	  will	  make	   the	   strong	   claim	   that	   reducing	  moral	  interests	  of	  authors	  to	  those	  two	  concerns	  is	  rather	  narrow	  and	  deserves	  re-­‐evaluation:	   a	   third	   element	   is	   missing,	   which	   is	   a	   right	   to	   a	   fair	   chance	   of	  having	  a	  societal	  impact	  with	  one’s	  scientific	  contribution.	  Developing	   tools	   is	   a	   fundamental	   human	   capability.	  We	   can	   even	   say	   that	   the	  specialization	  we	  have	  achieved	   in	   this	   field	   is	   the	   central	   characteristic	  of	  our	  species.	  While	  developing	  tools	  one	  is	  not	  only	  able	  to	  fully	  use	  one’s	  senses	  and	  imagination,	   but	   one	   can	   also	   contribute	   to	   society’s	   well-­‐being.310	  Scientific	  enterprises	   can	   lead	   to	   the	   development	   of	   new	   tools	   which	   can	   save	   in	   the	  future	  work	  time	  and	  alleviate	  suffering,	  particularly	  that	  related	  to	  diseases	  or	  malnutrition.	   When	   the	   possibility	   to	   develop	   such	   tools	   is	   disproportionally	  open	  to	  only	  one	  part	  of	   the	  world’s	  population,	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  an	   injustice	  –	  especially	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  –	  in	  cases	  where	  potential	  impact	  was	  not	  used	  to	  justify	  differential	  treatment.311	  This	  injustice	  is	  twofold:	  unjust	   to	   people	   whose	   welfare	   would	   have	   increased	   if	   the	   full	   innovative	  potential	   would	   have	   been	   permitted	   to	   unravel	   and	   unjust	   to	   people	   who	  consider	   participating	   in	   meaningful	   innovative	   enterprises	   as	   part	   of	   human	  flourishing.312	  Societal	   absorption	   of	   innovations	   is	   a	   prerequisite	   to	   sustain	  future	  innovative	  endeavours.	  In	  order	  to	  show	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  last	  point,	  I	  will	  built	  up	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  “fair	  competition	  of	  ideas”	  developed	  by	  Rafael	  Ziegler.313	  Under	  this	  perspective	  an	  idea	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  an	  abstract	  entity	  with	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  rights,	  very	  in	  line	   with	   rights	   traditionally	   conceded	   to	   humans,	   particularly	   the	   right	   to	  freedom	  of	  movement,	  to	  equality	  of	  opportunity,	  and	  to	  not	  being	  discriminated	  against	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  origin.	  Treating	  ideas314	  in	  such	  way	  will	  highlight	  several	  global	  justice	  concerns	  raised	  by	  current	  practices.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  310	  Being	  able	  to	  use	  one’s	  “senses,	  imagination	  and	  thought”	  has	  been	  explicitly	  identified	  by	  Martha	  Nussbaum	  as	  one	  of	  the	  central	  human	  capabilities,	  while	  being	  able	  to	  contribute	  to	  society’s	  well-­‐being	  requires	  some	  interpretation,	  I	  consider	  it	  as	  an	  element	  of	  being	  able	  to	  actively	  “show	  concern	  for	  other	  human	  beings”	  and	  nature	  (Nussbaum	  1997).	  Generally	  having	  the	  capability	  to	  “care	  for”,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  looking	  after	  someone	  or	  something.	  311	  Richard	  Jefferson	  takes	  a	  completely	  different	  starting	  point.	  Centralizing	  his	  argument	  on	  scientific	  progress,	  he	  has	  reiteratively	  casted	  out	  the	  indispensability	  of	  being	  able	  use,	  develop	  and	  improve	  tools,	  see	  Jefferson	  (2006).	  	  	  312	  See	  generally	  Timmermann	  (2013)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  3]	  313	  see	  Ziegler	  (2011)	  314	  In	  this	  article	  I	  will	  encompass	  under	  the	  concept	  “idea”	  also	  inventions	  and	  ignore	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  argument	  the	  differentiation	  made	  in	  the	  intellectual	  property	  discourse.	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Freedom	   of	   movement.	   If	   we	   concede	   ideas	   a	   right	   analogous	   to	   the	   right	   to	  freedom	  of	  movement,	  any	  limitation	  to	  the	  propagation	  of	  ideas	  will	  have	  to	  be	  justified.	   Taking	   such	   a	   perspective	   comes	   immediately	   against	   intuitions	   on	  freedom	   of	   speech.	   Ideas	   are	   part	   of	   one’s	   personality	   and	   thus	   we	   have	   no	  obligation	   to	   cast	   them	  out.	  Having	   this	  highly	  demanding	  duty	  would	  act	   as	   a	  huge	   disincentive	   to	   involve	   in	   critical	   thinking	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Granting	  discretionary	  power	  to	  select	  the	  ideas	  one	  wishes	  to	  propagate	  will	  also	  reduce	  the	   amount	   of	   information	   one’s	   peers	   have	   to	   evaluate.	   Thus,	  we	  have	   strong	  utilitarian	   arguments	   for	   rejecting	   too	   demanding	   duties	   to	   propagate	   ideas	  without	  constraints.	  However,	  those	  arguments	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  to	  inherited	  knowledge.	  An	  idea	  that	  has	  been	  passed	  on	  in	  a	  closed	  community	  falls	   normatively	   under	   a	   different	   category,	   since	   people	   are	   in	   such	   cases	  recipients	   of	   an	   idea	   already	   casted	   out.	  When	   judging	   if	   the	   idea	   is	   worth	   to	  continue	   to	   be	   communicated,	   the	   following	   generations	   have	   to	   make	   their	  decision	   based	   on	   different	   background	   knowledge	   than	   the	   person	   that	  originally	  communicated	  the	  idea	  to	  them.	  	  Conceding	   an	   idea	   a	   certain	   freedom	   of	   movement,	   will	   impose	   on	   us	   a	  conservation	  duty	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  have	  some	  certainty	  that	  the	  idea	  will	  be	  lost	  if	  we	  fail	  to	  share	  it.	  Not	  recording	  an	  idea	  in	  a	  stable	  medium	  for	  it	  to	  be	  accessible	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  being	  unwilling	  to	  share	  the	  idea	  to	  someone	  who	  is	  willing	  to	   undertake	   that	   task,	   will	   be	   tantamount	   to	   hinder	   an	   idea’s	   freedom	   of	  movement.	  	  	  
Equality	   of	   opportunity	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.	   We	   generally	   grant	   people	   an	  equal	  right	  to	  participation,	  however	  when	  participation	  possibilities	  are	  limited,	  selecting	  on	  merit	  is	  in	  most	  cases	  widely	  accepted.	  When	  the	  concept	  of	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  is	  transferred	  to	  ideas	  we	  can	  understand	  this	  right	  as	  enabling	  an	  idea	   to	   take	  part	   in	   the	   systems	  of	   thought	   it	   has	   earned	   its	  position	  by	  merit.	  Meaning	   that	   the	   rank	   an	   idea	   has	   achieved	   in	   society,	   should	   be	   primarily	  traceable	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  improve	  people’s	  well-­‐being.	  Social	  utility	  should	  be	  the	  main	  factor	  to	  measure	  merit.	  An	  emphasis	  on	  the	  dexterity	  and	  ingeniousness	  of	  the	  idea	  itself	  may	  play	  a	  principal	  role	  in	  peer	  assessment,	  but	  should	  take	  only	  a	   secondary	   role	   when	   judging	   societal	   value.	   This	   type	   of	   reasoning	   will	   not	  allow	  discriminating	   ideas	  by	  origin	   and	   limiting	   their	  propagation	   in	   any	  way	  other	  than	  lack	  of	  merit.	  An	  idea	  originating	  in	  a	  small	   farm	  in	  Thailand	  should	  have	   the	  same	  right	   to	  compete	   for	   fame	  than	  an	   idea	   that	  came	  up	   in	  a	  Dutch	  university.	   This	   means	   that	   neither	   can	   it	   be	   forgotten	   nor	   forbidden	   its	   use	  through	   exclusive	   rights	   before	   having	   a	   chance	   to	   be	   widely	   evaluated.	  Furthermore,	   a	   society	   that	   favours	   one	   type	   of	   ideas	   over	   other	   types,	   has	   to	  also	  take	  into	  account	  the	  disincentive	  it	  creates	  for	  people	  to	  make	  use	  of	  their	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freedom	  of	  speech315	  as	  biasedly	  selecting	  ideas	  may	  demotivate	  larger	  groups	  in	  making	  use	  thereof.	  When	  competing	  for	  a	  societally	  relevant	  position	  time	  and	  environment	  play	  an	  important	  role.	  An	  exceptional	  achievement	  is	  qualified	  as	  such	  depending	  upon	  the	  circumstances	  it	  was	  brought	  up	  in.	  An	  idea	  can	  miss	  its	  potential	  of	  having	  an	   impact	  when	   it	   was	   brought	   up	   too	   early,	   history	   of	   science	   is	   full	   of	   such	  stories,	  or	  when	  it	  was	  brought	  up	  too	  late.	  Much	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  may	  have	  the	  latter	  fate.	  Holding	  knowledge	  secret	  for	  a	  longer	  time	  comes	  at	  the	  risk	  of	   reducing	   its	   potential	   to	   influence.	   Similarly	   ideas	  have	   to	  be	   evaluated	   in	   a	  variety	   of	   environments.	   A	   centralized	   institution	   should	   not	   be	   the	   sole	  evaluator	  of	  ideas,	  as	  recipients	  in	  different	  kind	  of	  environmental	  susceptibility	  may	   find	   distinct	   uses.	  Making	   ideas	  widely	   available	   enhances	   the	   chances	   of	  being	   taken	  notice	   of	   by	  parties	  who	   could	  use	   those	   ideas	   to	   solve	   their	   local	  problems.	  	  	  Ensuring	  that	  people	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  a	  reasonably	  fair	  assessment	  of	  the	  potential	  of	  their	  ideas	  is	  tantamount	  to	  securing	  the	  capability	  to	  show	  concern	  about	   one’s	   environment	   by	   developing	   inventive	   solutions.	   However,	   besides	  securing	   individual	   interests,	   there	  are	  also	  collective	   interests	   that	  play	  a	  role.	  Ideas	  do	  not	  only	  serve	  individual	  interests,	  but	  also	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  a	  society’s	  well-­‐being.	  If	  a	  fair	  competition	  of	  ideas	  leads	  either	  to	  a	  faster	  rate	  of	  innovation	  or	  aligns	  innovation	  outputs	  to	  people’s	  needs	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  support	  it.316	  	  	  
Retaining	  and	  “destroying”	  ideas	  	  	  When	   securing	   a	   freedom	   requires	   large-­‐scale	   cooperation	   or	   a	   change	   in	  customs,	   delays	   are	   unavoidable.	   Postponing	   the	   public	   availability	   of	   an	   idea	  also	  affects	  its	  success	  in	  having	  societal	  impact.	  Since	  such	  delays	  are	  common	  practice,	   a	   clearer	   elaboration	   of	   the	   consequences	   is	   necessary.	   Retaining	   an	  idea	  for	  a	  prolonged	  time	  may	  have	  the	  consequence	  of	  its	  “destruction”,	  which	  means	   that	   the	   constitution	   of	   an	   idea	   is	   deteriorated	   (one	   remembers	   only	   a	  fraction	   of	   it)	   or	   that	   it	   has	   become	   obsolete	   due	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   receptive	  environment.	  Deeply	  anchored	   in	   the	  Lockean	  natural	   law	  tradition	  of	  material	  property	  is	  the	  “non-­‐wastage”	  proviso,	  but	  not	  all	  destruction	  can	  be	  assessed	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  315	  The	  importance	  of	  having	  a	  wider	  concept	  of	  this	  freedom	  is	  advocated	  by	  Seana	  Shiffrin:	  “a	  comprehensive	  commitment	  to	  mental	  autonomy	  and	  freedom	  of	  thought	  and	  speech,	  in	  both	  personal	  relations	  and	  the	  public	  sphere,	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  developing	  the	  full	  moral	  agency	  between	  equals,	  upon	  which	  a	  flourishing	  democratic	  and	  just	  society	  depends”	  (2011).	  316	  An	  extensive	  defence	  for	  favouring	  an	  increased	  level	  of	  innovation	  is	  offered	  by	  Pogge	  (2008b).	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wastage	   and	   therefore	   condemnable.	   Destruction	   leaves	   room	   for	   new	  creativity, 317 	  as	   both	   physical	   space	   and	   the	   amount	   of	   ideas	   we	   can	   be	  simultaneously	   aware	   of	   is	   limited.	   However	   I	   am	   not	   keen	   towards	   a	   direct	  translation	  of	  this	   last	  notion	  to	  the	  realm	  of	   ideas	  we	  can	  possess	  as	  a	  society.	  An	   argument	   that	   is	   refuted	   is	   “destroyed”,	   but	   it	   is	   destroyed	   while	   having	  created	   a	   new	   fact	   (i.e.	   the	   argument	   has	   a	   flaw).	   This	   destruction	   does	   not	  amount	  to	  wastage,	  as	  the	  refuted	  idea	  was	  a	  necessary	  building	  block	  for	  a	  new	  fact.	   Speaking	  of	  a	   transformation	   is	  more	  accurate.	  Further,	   refuted	   ideas	   that	  were	   influential	  are	  often	  still	  available	   in	  scientific	  archives.	  This	   is	   the	   fate	  of	  many	   ideas,	   however	   ideas	   that	   are	   destroyed	   by	   being	   partially	   forgotten	   or	  having	  become	  obsolete,	  will	  never	  be	  subject	  to	  critical	  evaluation.	  	  Granting	   ideas	   rights	   make	   it	   necessary	   to	   answer	   the	   question	   of	   when	   the	  suppression	   of	   such	   rights	   is	   justifiable.	   Here	   three	   problems	   are	   immediately	  identifiable:	   (i)	   sharing	   an	   idea	   is	   an	   act,	   whose	   proper	   fulfilment	   may	   take	  enough	  effort	   to	   shift	   it	   towards	   the	   category	  of	   supererogatory	  acts,	   (ii)	   some	  ideas	   are	   by	   nature	   damaging	   or	   beneficent	   –	   motives	   of	   sharing	   (or	  withholding)	   are	   not	   neutral	   for	   ethical	   evaluation,	   and	   (iii)	   if	   broadening	   the	  pool	  of	  knowledge	  is	  a	  societal	  goal,	  and	  the	  possibility	  to	  suppress	  ideas	  can	  act	  as	  an	  incentive	  to	  develop	  even	  more	  ideas,	  society	  might	  have	  good	  reasons	  to	  concede	  that	  possibility	  to	  people.	  	  Sharing	  an	  idea	  that	  is	  already	  fixed	  in	  a	  stable	  medium	  with	  a	  second	  person	  can	  be	  an	  act	  that	  requires	  hardly	  any	  additional	  effort.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  much	  of	   what	   is	   known	   as	   tacit	   knowledge	   or	   generally	   for	   knowledge	   that	   has	   not	  been	   recorded.	   If	   people	   are	  obliged	   to	   share	  knowledge	   that	  was	   acquired	  by	  accident,	  we	  restrict	  their	  freedom	  to	  do	  other	  things	  during	  the	  time	  required	  to	  share	   the	   knowledge	   in	   question,	   something	   that	   is	   in	   need	   of	   justification.	   In	  cases	  where	  people	   agreed	  on	   taking	  over	   inherited	  knowledge,	   i.e.	   a	   situation	  where	  the	  knowledge	  was	  passed	  on	  under	  the	  condition	  of	  continuing	  to	  deliver	  it	   to	   the	  next	   generation,	   a	   duty	   to	   share	  might	  be	   easier	   to	   justify	   on	  basis	   of	  principles	  of	  reciprocity	  towards	  potentially	  interested	  future	  generations.	  	  The	  simplest	  way	  to	  defend	  a	  duty	  to	  share	  knowledge	  acquired	  by	  chance,	  is	  to	  say	   that	   if	   we	   expect	   that	   our	   ideas	   should	   be	   awarded	   a	   fair	   opportunity	   to	  compete	  for	  impact,	  we	  should	  also	  do	  our	  part	  in	  giving	  other	  people’s	  ideas	  the	  same	   opportunity.	   We	   can	   nevertheless	   expect	   that	   some	   people	   will	   be	  disproportionally	   burdened	   with	   the	   amount	   of	   knowledge	   they	   will	   have	   to	  save.	  Generally	  people	  who	  migrate,	  travel	  or	  have	  a	  diverse	  ethnic	  background,	  will	  most	  likely	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  much	  more	  undocumented	  knowledge.	  A	  fair	   distribution	   of	   burdens	   would	   oblige	   society	   to	   provide	   the	   technological	  infrastructure	  along	  with	   the	  necessary	   training	  of	  auxiliary	  personal	   to	  bridge	  the	   digital	   divide	   and	   enable	   people	   to	   share	   and	   access	   knowledge	   at	   a	  minimum	  cost	  for	  themselves.	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  cf.	  Strahilevitz	  (2005)	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There	  are	  cases	  where	  we	  might	  limit	  the	  propagation	  of	  an	  idea	  for	  good,	  since	  not	  all	   ideas	  serve	  public	  welfare	  –	  some	   ideas	  are	  even	  quite	  damaging.	   Is	   the	  concept	  of	  fair	  competition	  of	  ideas	  compatible	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  “constructive”	  and	   “destructive”	   ideas?	   The	   public	   good	   nature	   of	   knowledge	   leads	   to	   an	  immediate	   problem	   when	   ideas	   are	   to	   be	   judged	   through	   public	   deliberation.	  The	  evaluation	  of	  which	  ideas	  should	  be	  cast	  out	  becomes	  inevitably	  limited	  to	  a	  small	  group.318	  	  	  In	   our	   society	   ideas	   are	   commonly	   retained	   or	   shared	   based	   on	   utilitarian	  calculations.	  Our	  patent	  regime	  works	  in	  a	  way	  that	  it	  gives	  holders	  of	  exclusive	  rights	   the	  option	   to	  restrict	   the	  potential	   impact	  an	   idea	  may	  have.	  Patents	  are	  justified	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   giving	   inventors	   temporary	   exclusive	   rights	   enables	  them	  to	  recoup	   their	  research	  and	  development	  costs	  and	   therefore	  makes	   the	  creation	  of	  even	  more	  new	  ideas	  feasible.	  Translating	  this	  to	  the	  former	  concept	  of	   fair	   competition	   of	   ideas	   means	   that	   society	   allows	   restriction	   in	   the	  competition	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  having	  more	  participants	  (i.e.	   ideas)	  involved	  in	  the	  “tournament”.	   Here	   we	   have	   a	   standard	   utilitarian	   concession:	   limiting	   some	  rights	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  securing	  more	  freedoms	  in	  a	  near	  future.	  	  This	  type	  of	  incentive	  system	  brings	  two	  problems.	  First,	  some	  people	  might	  be	  able	  to	  buy	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  over	  an	  invention	  and	  restrict	  its	  propagation,	  in	  order	   to	   not	   negatively	   suffer	   from	   the	   invention’s	   potential.	   A	   bigger	   oil	  company	   has	   an	   incentive	   for	   buying	   the	   patent	   of	   a	  much	  more	   fuel-­‐efficient	  engine	  in	  order	  to	  suppress	  its	  availability,	  since	  if	  widely	  present,	   it	  will	   lower	  the	  demand	  for	  fuel.	  Second,	  when	  a	  person	  has	  the	  possibility	  to	  sell	  an	  idea	  (e.g.	  especially	  if	   it	  encompasses	  an	  invention)	  and	  a	  seemingly	  low	  offer	  is	  the	  only	  reward	  she	  gets,	  the	  person	  might	  prefer	  to	  not	  share	  the	  idea	  at	  all	  to	  retain	  a	  certain	  pride.319	  The	  first	  case	  is	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  abuse	  of	  rights320,	  or	  more	  precisely	  a	  use	  of	  rights	  that	  is	  (up	  to	  a	  certain	  degree)	  legally	  tolerated	  but	  which	  goes	  against	  the	  original	   intention	   the	   law	   drafters	   had	   in	   mind.	   The	   patent	   system	   clearly	  foresees	   that	   patents	   should	   be	   granted	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   both	   producers	   and	  potential	   users	   of	   technologies.321	  In	   cases	   where	   the	   patent	   holder	   is	   not	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  318	  Clearing	  this	  question	  will	  be	  out	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  article,	  as	  this	  issue	  plays	  only	  a	  minor	  role	  for	  traditional	  knowledge.	  319	  As	  soon	  as	  a	  person	  sells	  an	  idea,	  a	  certain	  measurable	  monetary	  value	  will	  be	  attached	  to	  the	  sold	  idea.	  This	  monetary	  value	  can	  be	  used	  for	  comparative	  purposes	  by	  the	  transaction	  parties	  as	  well	  as	  third	  parties	  familiar	  with	  this	  trade.	  Selling	  cheap	  might	  be	  unavoidably	  relate	  the	  offered	  object	  to	  other	  objects	  of	  similar	  monetary	  value	  but	  lower	  endowment.	  320	  The	  concept	  of	  abuse	  of	  rights	  on	  resources	  in	  the	  philosophical	  tradition	  is	  exemplarily	  discussed	  by	  van	  Donselaar	  (2009).	  321	  An	  example	  is	  offered	  by	  the	  Agreement	  on	  Trade-­‐related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  (1994)	  article	  7:	  “The	  protection	  and	  enforcement	  of	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actual	  inventor	  and	  does	  not	  have	  an	  uncompromised	  approval	  of	  such	  blocking	  use	  by	  the	  latter,	  we	  could	  even	  say	  that	  we	  have	  a	  violation	  of	  moral	  interest	  as	  advocated	  here.	  	  While	   we	   cannot	   (and	   arguably	   should	   not)	   prevent	   people	   from	   prioritizing	  economic	   interests	   over	   moral	   rights	   they	   do	   not	   want	   to	   make	   use	   of,	   this	  freedom	  is	  not	  transposable	  to	  inherited	  knowledge	  where	  no	  clear	  record	  of	  the	  original	  will	  of	  the	  inventor	  is	  available.	  Here	  we	  have	  to	  give	  the	  benefit	  of	  doubt	  towards	  a	  willingness	  to	  share	  –	  similarly	  then	  the	  approach	  a	  few	  jurisdictions	  have	   chosen	   for	   organ	   donation:	   presume	   consent.	   When	   the	   person	   did	   not	  clearly	  expressed	  opposition	  during	  her	  lifetime,	  willingness	  to	  share	  is	  assumed,	  even	  when	  there	  is	  no	  consent	  from	  the	  family.	  	  	  
Indigenous	  innovators’	  inventiveness	  	  Nowadays	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   often	   treated	   as	   something	   that	   is	   free	   to	  appropriate	  or	  not	  necessary	  to	  conserve.	  Regularly	  the	  one	  extreme	  is	  justified	  by	  calling	  into	  attention	  the	  other	  pole.	  Some	  scientists	  in	  the	  Global	  North	  might	  excuse	  their	  actions	  by	  claiming	  that	  if	  they	  do	  not	  appropriate	  the	  knowledge,	  it	  will	  get	  lost,	  while	  some	  people	  who	  inherited	  indigenous	  knowledge	  from	  their	  ancestors	  prefer	  not	  to	  share	  their	  knowledge	  when	  not	  fairly	  remunerated.	  Both	  perspectives	   are	   defensible	   up	   to	   a	   certain	   extent.	   Indigenous	   knowledge	   gets	  lost	  when	  not	  properly	  recorded	  and	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  profits	  is	  seldom	  guaranteed	  to	  the	  providers	  of	  indigenous	  knowledge.	  However	   both	   positions	   are	   controversial.	   The	   way	   scientist	   from	   the	   Global	  North	   document	   indigenous	   knowledge	   is	   often	   selective.	   What	   knowledge	   is	  chosen	   for	   being	   documented	   is	   not	   a	  matter	   of	   sheer	   fortune.	  Documentation	  efforts	  are	  aligned	  with	  key	  interests,	  such	  as	  food	  security	  or	  the	  development	  of	  new	  medicines,	  while	   following	  primarily	  market	   incentives.	  This	  preference	  leaves	  much	  knowledge	  out,	  as	  the	  overall	  global	  societal	  relevance	  of	  the	  idea	  is	  not	   the	   selection	   criterion.	   Common	   is	   the	   documentation	   of	   solely	   knowledge	  that	  meets	  the	  collectors’	  targets:	  knowledge	  that	   leads	  to	  products	  that	  can	  be	  sold	   in	   affluent	   markets.	   There	   is	   no	   incentive	   other	   than	   corporate	   social	  responsibility	  to	  document	  knowledge	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  only	  help	  people	  in	  financially	  poor	  countries.	  Regarding	  the	  fair	  sharing	  of	  benefits,	  it	  is	  very	  hard	  to	  guess	  what	  counts	  as	  an	  appropriate	   remuneration	   for	   a	   specific	   idea.	   One	   might	   have	   a	   bias	   to	  overestimate	  or	  undervalue	  the	  importance	  of	  one’s	  own	  contribution.	  The	  lack	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  should	  contribute	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  technological	  innovation	  and	  to	  the	  transfer	  and	  dissemination	  of	  technology,	  to	  the	  mutual	  advantage	  of	  producers	  and	  users	  of	  technological	  knowledge	  and	  in	  a	  manner	  conducive	  to	  social	  and	  economic	  welfare,	  and	  to	  a	  balance	  of	  rights	  and	  obligations.”	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of	  transparency	  of	  pharmaceutical	  research	  and	  development	  costs	  only	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  notion	  of	  a	  fair	  reward	  size.	  	  Extending	  the	  notion	  of	  moral	  rights	  to	  include	  an	  interest	  in	  a	  fair	  competition	  of	  ideas	  will	  create	  a	  different	  emphasis	  in	  knowledge	  collection	  and	  evaluation.	  Ideas	   should	   have	   a	   fair	   opportunity	   to	   have	   an	   impact	   in	   improving	   society’s	  well-­‐being;	   it	   does	   not	   necessarily	  mean	   that	  making	   ideas	  widely	   available	   is	  tantamount	  to	  develop	  them	  in	  a	  marketable	  product.	  A	  considerable	  part	  of	  the	  world	  population	  cannot	  benefit	   from	  market	  mechanism	  in	  order	   to	  enjoy	   the	  benefits	  of	  innovative	  ideas.	  For	  many	  people	  an	  idea	  can	  only	  proof	  itself	  to	  be	  useful	   if	   it	   leads	   to	   a	   tool	   that	   can	   be	   made	   out	   of	   local	   resources.322	  Here	   is	  where	   the	   great	   and	   underused	   potential	   of	   indigenous	   innovation	   lays.	  Companies	  that	  rely	  on	  patents	  to	  recoup	  their	  research	  and	  development	  costs	  tend	  to	  produce	  products	  that	  are	  homogeneous	  and	  can	  be	  mass-­‐manufactured.	  Exclusive	   rights	   give	   them	   also	   the	   opportunity	   to	   recover	   the	   expenses	   of	   an	  aggressive	   advertisement	   campaign.	   	   Developing	   products	   that	   can	   be	   easily	  reproduced	  with	  local	  resources	  with	  no	  major	  infrastructure	  is	  counterintuitive	  to	   this	   latter	   strategy.	   On	   the	   other	   side	   the	   situation	   of	   scarcity	   in	   which	  indigenous	   innovators	   usually	   have	   to	   develop	   their	   innovative	   solutions	  demands	   this	   very	   flexibility.	   Nowadays,	   most	   indigenous	   communities	   have	  little	  chance	  to	  learn	  what	  other	  communities	  in	  similar	  conditions	  are	  inventing.	  As	  science	  and	  inventive	  endeavours	  are	  social	  enterprises,	  a	  clear	  overview	  of	  what	  peers	  are	  doing	  is	  essential	  for	  constructive	  development.	  	  	  
Potential	  of	  open	  innovation	  in	  stimulating	  traditional	  knowledge	  	  The	  establishment	  of	  intellectual	  property	  regimes	  has	  made	  defensive	  measures	  against	   misappropriation	   necessary.	   The	   question	   whether	   it	   is	   fair	   that	  indigenous	  communities	  and	  their	  governments	  have	  to	  fully	  pay	  for	  a	  defensive	  infrastructure	   is	   something	   I	   cannot	   discuss	   here.323	  However,	   the	   most	   likely	  outcome	   is	   that	   at	   least	   initially	   people	   who	   benefit	   the	   most	   from	   the	  intellectual	  property	   regimes	  will	   not	   financially	   support	   those	   infrastructures.	  Therefore	   it	   is	   important	   that	   indigenous	   communities	   can	   also	   harvest	   some	  benefits	  from	  this	  defensive	  mechanism.	  	  Defensive	   mechanisms	   that	   meet	   this	   criterion	   are	   open	   innovation	   models.	  Under	   those	  models,	   the	   research	   and	   development	   process	   is	  made	   public	   in	  order	   to	   show	   one’s	   creative	   efforts	   and	   make	   visible	   possible	   flaws	   or	  vulnerabilities	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  the	  services	  or	  advices	  of	  peers.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  indigenous	   innovators	   open	   innovation	   has	   to	   be	   necessarily	   embedded	   in	   a	  larger	  networked	  community	  that	  lives	  under	  specified	  rules	  in	  order	  to	  gather	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  322	  cf.	  Gupta	  (2010)	  323	  I	  have	  discussed	  this	  problem	  of	  cooperative	  justice	  to	  a	  longer	  extent	  in	  Timmermann	  (2013)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  3].	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sufficient	  attention.	  The	  use	  of	   licenses	  can	  (up	  to	  a	  certain	  degree)	  regulate	   in	  how	   far	   other	   researchers	   and	   product	   developers	   can	   use	   the	   knowledge	  exposed.	   There	   is	   a	   variety	   of	   ways	   to	   shape	   the	   rules	   of	   open	   innovation	  communities	  and	   the	   scholarship	  exploring	   such	  possibilities	   is	   in	  an	  early	  but	  rapidly	   expanding	   stage.324	  In	   addition	   to	   that,	   innovations	   can	   be	   even	   more	  rapidly	   shared	  with	   the	  use	  of	  digital	   social	  networks.325	  I	  will	   leave	  details	   on	  the	   exact	   format	   such	   communities	   should	   have	   aside	   and	   focus	   on	   a	   set	   of	  essential	  characteristics.	  Ideally	  an	  open	  innovation	  platform	  that	  is	  set	  to	  promote	  indigenous	  innovation	  should	   (i)	   allow	   flexibility	   in	   spelling	   out	   authorship,	   (ii)	   be	   available	   in	   a	  diversity	   of	   local	   languages,	   (iii)	   be	   searchable	   by	   multiple	   criteria,	   (iv)	   allow	  users	  to	  easily	  add	  improvements,	  variations	  and	  feedback	  to	  inventions,	  and	  (v)	  offer	  the	  possibility	  to	  license	  out	  innovations	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  the	  number	  of	  participants.	  Firstly,	  we	  have	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  diverse	  communities	  might	  have	  different	  values	   on	   to	   what	   extent	   they	   want	   to	   recognize	   individual	   contributions	   or	  claim	  authorship.	  Especially	  when	  the	  invention	  is	  built	  up	  on	  knowledge	  passed	  on	   by	   ancestors,	   the	   willingness	   to	   be	   named	   as	   authors	   of	   an	   invention	  may	  vary.	  Some	  might	  prefer	  to	  name	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole	  as	  the	  inventor	  while	  others	  would	  prefer	  to	  acknowledge	  strictly	  the	  individual	  inventor.326	  Allowing	  flexibility	   on	   this	   issue	  may	   avoid	   conflicts	  with	   customary	   law.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  static	   traditional	   knowledge,	   some	   inventions	   or	   discoveries	   might	   have	   been	  made	   independently	   in	   different	   parts	   of	   the	   world.	   Proving	   priority	   will	   be	  costly	  and	  of	  little	  utility	  for	  open	  innovation.	  Secondly,	  if	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  promote	  indigenous	  innovation,	  the	  database	  has	  to	  be	  able	  to	  receive	  feedback	  and	  be	  readable	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  languages	  spoken	  in	  rural	  areas	  to	  overcome	  linguistic	  barriers.327	  Although	  here	  one	  should	  keep	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  database	  in	  mind:	  to	  promote	  indigenous	  knowledge.	  People	  that	  are	  able	  to	   express	   themselves	   in	   a	  more	   common	   language	   should	   give	  priority	   to	   the	  use	  of	  this	  language	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  wider	  audience.	  Maximizing	  the	  potential	  audience	  should	  be	  a	  central	  target.	  Doing	  justice	  to	  the	  use	  a	  particular	  language	  should	  only	  be	  a	  secondary	  concern.	  An	  additional	  effort	  will	  have	  to	  be	  done	  to	  translate	   local	   botanic	   and	   zoological	   names	   into	   a	   common	   scientific	  terminology.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  324	  see	  Herzog	  (2011)	  and	  Eppinger	  (2012)	  325	  see	  Atenas	  Rivera	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  326	  Some	  recent	  evidence	  suggest	  that	  we	  are	  over-­‐estimating	  the	  extension	  of	  communal	  property	  systems	  in	  indigenous	  communities.	  In	  many	  cases	  major	  self-­‐interest	  does	  not	  surpass	  the	  person	  itself	  or	  at	  the	  most	  close	  relatives,	  cf.	  Hernando	  de	  Soto	  (2011).	  The	  way	  databases	  holding	  traditional	  knowledge	  can	  be	  shaped	  does	  not	  oblige	  us	  to	  reach	  a	  compromise,	  as	  homogeneity	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  not	  mandatory.	  	  327	  cf.	  Gupta	  (2006)	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Thirdly,	   if	  more	  criteria	  to	  search	  for	   inventions	  can	  be	  used,	   the	  dominance	  of	  “big	  names”	  can	  be	  reduced.	  The	  trend	  of	  relying	  on	  “big	  names”	  or	  generally	  on	  scientific	   citation	   indexes,	   established	   authors,	   institutions,	   geographic	  dominations	  or	  schools,	  comes	  at	  a	  very	  big	  cost	  for	  newcomers.328	  Action	  should	  be	   taken	   in	   order	   to	   minimize	   the	   chances	   that	   some	   groups	   end	   up	   over-­‐privileged.	  One	  can	  design	  search	  engines	  in	  a	  way	  that	  top	  results	  are	  interlaced	  with	   randomly	   chosen	   entries.	   Here	   the	   increasing	   sophistication	   of	   online	  search	  engines	  should	  be	  harvested	  for	  addressing	  this	  disadvantage.	  Fourthly,	  the	  possibility	  to	  add	  feedback	  to	  the	  database	  should	  also	  be	  available	  in	   rural	   areas.	   The	   key	   features	   that	   enable	   peer	   production,	   modularity,	  granularity	  and	  low-­‐cost	  integration	  should	  be	  incorporated	  in	  the	  design	  of	  such	  databases.329	  Modularity	  means	  that	  the	  individual	  projects	  should	  be	  able	  to	  be	  broken	  down	   for	  permitting	   independent	   and	  unsynchronised	   contributions.	   If	  the	  size	  of	  those	  modules	  varies,	  it	  will	  be	  easier	  to	  attract	  reviewers	  with	  tasks	  that	   require	   different	   amounts	   of	   time	   and	   effort.	   Reducing	   the	   costs	   for	  innovators	  and	  database	  keepers	  to	  integrate	  and	  maintain	  new	  input	  is	  vital	  for	  good	   functioning.	   Here	   it	   has	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration,	   that	   the	   major	  beneficiaries	   and	   contributors	   to	   the	   database	   will	   be	   indigenous	   innovators	  themselves.	   They	   are	   not	   only	   inventors,	   but	   principally	   also	   users	   of	   the	  technologies,	   thus	   profiting	   directly	   from	  any	   suggested	   improvement	   on	   their	  invention.	  The	  main	  motivation	  in	  contributing	  to	  the	  databases	  can	  arise	  from	  a	  sense	   of	   reciprocity	   after	   enjoying	   the	   benefits	   of	   other	   innovators’	  contribution.330	  Even	   if	   people	   take	  much	  more	   than	   they	   add	   to	   the	   database,	  large-­‐scale	   network	   dynamics	   and	   the	   similarity	   of	   everyday	   problems	   people	  face,	   will	   still	   ensure	   a	   continuous	   expansion	   of	   contributions.	   Volunteers	   can	  take	   the	   tasks	   of	   reviewing	   the	   information	   inserted	   in	   the	   database,	   erasing	  obvious	  malicious	  contributions	  and	  trying	  to	  build	  links	  to	  industry	  and	  modern	  science.	   The	   possibility	   to	   link	   such	   an	   effort	   systematically	   with	   academic	  investigations	  might	  be	  worthwhile	  to	  explore.	  	  Fifthly,	  excluding	  the	  possibility	  to	  have	  a	  financial	  gain	  for	  participating	  in	  open	  innovation	   may	   deter	   some	   innovators	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   database.	  Possibilities	   to	   license	   out	   spin-­‐off	   products	   or	   the	   invention	   itself	   should	   be	  available,	   provided	   the	   original	   inventor(s)	   receive	   a	   fair	   share	   on	   resulting	  benefits.	  Similarly,	  the	  option	  to	  suppress	  for-­‐profit	  use	  should	  also	  be	  offered	  to	  contributors,	  again,	  to	  ensure	  compatibility	  with	  customary	  laws	  or	  to	  do	  justice	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  328	  In	  how	  far	  scientist	  should	  rely	  (or	  may	  rely)	  on	  past	  efforts	  and	  “big	  names”	  is	  a	  question	  that	  has	  been	  eagerly	  discussed	  for	  the	  last	  two	  centuries,	  perhaps	  most	  prominently	  by	  Robert	  Merton,	  for	  a	  brief	  historical	  overview	  see	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2010).	  329	  cf.	  Benkler	  (2002)	  330	  Benkler	  and	  Nissenbaum	  (2006)	  have	  identified	  a	  series	  of	  other	  social	  and	  individual	  virtues	  that	  explain	  why	  people	  contribute	  freely	  to	  such	  types	  of	  enterprises.	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to	   specific	   moral	   values.	   When	   companies	   find	   innovations	   worthwhile	   to	  exploit,	   a	   rational	   interest	   to	   share	   some	   of	   the	   benefits	   with	   the	   original	  inventor	  will	  arise.	  As	  open	  innovation	  makes	  the	  original	  invention	  traceable	  a	  company	  that	  fears	  damage	  of	  brand	  image	  may	  feel	  compelled	  to	  share	  benefits	  to	  maintain	  a	  good	  reputation.	  The	  wider	  transparency	  will	  place	  countries	  that	  by	  international	  agreements	  have	  committed	  themselves	  to	  promote	  access	  and	  benefit	  sharing	  in	  more	  pressure	  to	  take	  necessary	  action.	  	  To	  ensure	  that	  such	  type	  of	  platform	  succeeds	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  one	  has	  to	  ensure	  that	   informed	   consent	   is	   available	   when	   third	   parties	   add	   the	   description	   of	  inventions	  to	  the	  database.	  	  	  The	  Honey	  Bee	  Network	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  database	  that	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  saving	  indigenous	  innovation	  from	  illicit	  third	  party	  appropriation	  while	  linking	  indigenous	   innovators	   to	   potential	   users	   of	   inventions	   and	   investors.	   In	   this	  Indian	   case,	   a	   central	   gathering	   of	   over	   one	   million	   ideas,	   inventions	   and	  practices	  is	  offered.	  The	  network	  does	  not	  only	  aim	  at	  documenting	  inventions,	  but	   also	   at	   disseminating	   them.	   One	   of	   the	   substantial	   efforts	   of	   the	   network	  consists	   in	   making	   the	   documented	   inventions	   available	   in	   the	   major	   local	  languages	  to	  ensure	  that	  people	  in	  the	  countryside	  can	  gather	  good	  knowledge	  of	  innovations	  made	  by	  people	  in	  similar	  conditions	  or	  environments.331	  The	  Honey	  Bee	  Network	  has	  already	  some	  experience	  with	  computerized	  networked	  kiosks	  (Gyan	   Manthan	   Kendra)	   to	   promote	   public	   awareness	   of	   traditional	  knowledge.332	  	  
Sacred	  knowledge	  	  An	  issue	  that	  will	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  handle	  is	  how	  ideas	  are	  treated	  in	  modern	  science.	  Conflicts	  with	  customary	  law	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  may	  seem	  unavoidable.	  Scientific	  ideas	  are	  subject	  to	  critical	  evaluation	  and	  are	  ideally	  denied	  any	  special	  status.	  Moreover	  overcoming	  any	  feelings	  of	  sympathy	  or	  sentimental	  attachment	  to	  an	  idea	  has	  been	  considered	  essential	  for	  scientific	  progress.	  Discarding	  one’s	   life-­‐time	  work	  when	  proven	   false	   is	  a	  sacrifice	  often	  made,	  we	  can	  even	  say	  it	  is	  even	  demanded	  by	  a	  scientific	  ethos.	  However,	  part	  of	   traditional	  knowledge	   is	   subject	   to	   customary	   laws,	  often	   considered	   sacred	  and	   its	   sharing	   subject	   to	   specific	   conditions.333	  The	   objectification	   of	   such	  knowledge	  may	  find	  strong	  resistance	  among	  indigenous	  communities.	  Some	  of	  the	   key	   characteristics	   Martha	   Nussbaum	   identifies	   for	   objectification	   can	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  331	  More	  information	  can	  be	  found	  under	  www.honeybee.org.	  332	  see	  Gupta	  (2006)	  333	  cf.	  Taubman	  (2005)	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translated	  to	  ideas:	  instrumentality,	  fungibility	  and	  violability.334	  In	  science	  ideas	  are	  treated	  as	  hypotheses	  that	  need	  to	  be	  tested	  and	  proven,	  in	  part	  or	  as	  whole,	  with	   little	  mercy	  on	   the	  author’s	  original	  will.	  When	   incorporating	  an	   idea	   to	  a	  global	   system	   of	   innovation,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   give	   an	   idea	   a	   differential	   status.	  Research	  and	  development	   is	  dependent	  on	  being	  able	   to	  dismantle,	   exchange,	  use,	  criticize,	  refute	  and	  merge	  ideas	  partially	  or	  completely.	  	  Over-­‐estimating	  the	  character	  of	  “sacred	  knowledge”	  can	  go	  directly	  at	  the	  cost	  of	   stimulating	   indigenous	   innovation	   and	   the	   documentation	   of	   practices	  performed	   by	   vanishing	   cultures.	   An	   emphasis	   on	   fair	   competition	   of	   ideas	  would	  insist	  on	  regarding	  sacredness	  of	  knowledge	  more	  as	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  rule	   than	   the	   standard.	   Acknowledging	   the	   vital	   role	   knowledge	   can	   play	   to	  secure	   human	   rights	   demands	   to	   reconsider	   current	   practices	   of	   retaining	  knowledge	   and	   not	   to	   construct	   additional	   criteria	   under	   which	   the	   free	  movement	  of	  ideas	  can	  be	  suppressed.	  True,	  much	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  is	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  because	   the	  design	  of	   intellectual	  property	   laws	  was	  mainly	  shaped	  to	  meet	  industry’s	  needs,335	  however	  this	  argument	  does	  not	  qualify	  as	  a	  justification	   to	  permit	   further	   restrictions	   to	   the	  potentially	  positive	   impact	   an	  idea	  may	  have.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  temporary	  exclusivity	  on	  an	  invention	  granted	  by	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  is	  justified	  with	  the	  argument	  of	  enlarging	  the	   future	  pool	  of	  knowledge	   in	   the	  public	  domain.	   Securing	  human	   rights	   is	   a	  global	  task	  that	  requires	  the	  creative	  capacity	  of	  individuals	  and	  communities	  all	  over	   the	   world.	   Allowing	   a	   community	   to	   permanently	   retract	   some	   of	   their	  capacities	   from	   this	   commitment	   will	   go	   against	   principles	   of	   reciprocity	   in	  fulfilling	  human	  rights	  and	  opens	  room	  for	  further	  retractions.	  	  	  	  
Enhancing	  recognition	  	  It	   is	   difficult	   to	   trace	   how	   much	   our	   industrial	   and	   academic	   research	   and	  development	  relies	  on	  indigenous	  innovation.	  A	  clearer	  transparency	  is	  urgently	  needed	  as	  we	  need	  to	  know	  in	  how	  far	  we	  are	  relying	  on	  those	  parallel	  forms	  of	  scientific	  practice.	  Even	  if	  our	  modern	  science	  could	  completely	  forgo	  indigenous	  innovation	   efforts,	   we	   should	   keep	   in	   mind	   that	   presently	   the	   overwhelming	  majority	   of	   the	   world	   can	   only	   participate	   in	   inventive	   enterprises	   when	   no	  major	   infrastructure	   is	   required.	   Maintaining	   and	   encouraging	   indigenous	  innovation	   is	   fundamental	   for	   an	   inclusive	   system	   of	   innovation	   and	   to	   allow	  people	   to	   help	   solve	   society’s	   problems	   through	   technological	   and	  mechanical	  solutions.	  	  Open	   innovation	   allows	   whoever	   identifies	   herself	   as	   a	   peer	   to	   speed	   up	  innovation	   processes. 336 	  An	   open	   innovation	   initiative	   that	   recognizes	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  334	  see	  Nussbaum	  (1995)	  335	  cf.	  Dutfield	  (2006)	  336	  cf.	  Koepsell	  (2010)	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indigenous	   innovators	   are	   in	   a	   favoured	   position	   to	   provide	   creative	   aid	   to	  people	  in	  similar	  environmental	  conditions	  and	  resource-­‐scarcity	  situations	  can	  alleviate	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   poverty	   significantly.	   Currently	   industry	   and	  academia,	   both	   heavily	   influenced	   by	  market	   incentives,	   shape	   the	   authorizing	  environment	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  “useful”	  innovation	  and	  what	  does	  not.	  As	  soon	  as	  indigenous	   innovation	   is	   openly	   accessible	   the	   evaluation	   of	  what	   innovations	  are	   suitable	   to	   serve	   urgent	   societal	   problems	   will	   be	   done	   by	   a	   much	   wider	  spectrum	   of	   people.	   If	   ideas	   have	   to	   be	   first	   marketed	   in	   order	   to	   be	   widely	  known,	  we	  should	  not	  wonder	  that	  unmarketable	  but	  high	   impact	   ideas	  do	  not	  reach	   rural	   areas	   and	   thus	   are	   never	   recognized	   for	   their	   potential.	   Fostering	  indigenous	   innovation	   will	   make	   it	   possible	   for	   economically	   poorer	  communities	   to	   offer	   technological	   advice	   to	   people	   in	   developed	   economies.	  Indigenous	   communities	   will	   then	   not	   be	   seen	   as	   mere	   technological	   aid	  receivers	  but	   recognized	  as	  active	  peers	   in	   the	  effort	  of	  maximizing	  worldwide	  welfare	  through	  innovative	  enterprises.337	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  The	   position	   I	   have	   exposed	   here	   departs	   from	   the	   trend	   of	   seeing	   traditional	  knowledge	  principally	  as	  a	  resource	  owned	  by	  governments.	  Such	  a	  perspective	  implies	   that	   treating	   knowledge	   as	   a	   commodity	   is	   widely	   accepted	   and	  supported	  by	  indigenous	  innovators	  themselves.	  I	  do	  not	  support	  a	  position	  that	  assumes	  that	  everyone	  has	  material	  interests	  regarding	  their	  intellectual	  labour	  and	  sees	   free-­‐riding	  as	  condemnable,	  particularly	   in	  cases	  when	  the	  attempt	  to	  secure	  material	  interests	  through	  the	  use	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  may	  interfere	  with	  moral	  interests	  of	  inventors	  as	  advocated	  here.	  	  	  Although	   applying	   the	   concept	   of	   rights	   we	   grant	   to	   humans	   to	   ideas	   is	  philosophically	  hard	  to	  digest	  and	  can	  only	  be	  used	  selectively	  for	  argumentation	  purposes,	   some	   interest	   insights	   nevertheless	   arise.	   When	   ensuring	   a	   fair	  competition	   of	   ideas,	   we	   not	   only	   enable	   people	   to	   be	   able	   to	   share	   in	   the	  advancement	  of	  science	  by	  increasing	  the	  possibilities	  of	  having	  a	  societal	  impact	  through	  indigenous	  innovation,	  but	  also	  broaden	  the	  opportunities	  to	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	   of	   the	   advancement	   of	   science	   by	   fostering	   the	   plurality	   of	   scientific	  practices.338	  	  Choosing	   open	   innovation	   as	   a	   method	   to	   ensure	   widespread	   recognition	   of	  indigenous	   inventiveness	  has	  some	  problems	   in	   its	  own.	  The	  phenomenon	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  337	  The	  concept	  of	  “recognition	  as	  peers”	  is	  taken	  from	  Fraser	  (1998);	  for	  the	  problem	  of	  recognition	  in	  development	  aid	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  epistemic	  justice,	  see	  Dübgen	  (2012).	  338	  The	  human	  right	  basis	  is	  UDHR	  article	  27.1:	  “Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  freely	  participate	  in	  the	  cultural	  life	  of	  the	  community,	  to	  enjoy	  the	  arts	  and	  to	  share	  in	  scientific	  advancement	  and	  its	  benefits.”	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has	  been	  widely	  known	  as	   the	   “rush	   for	  green	  gold”	  has	  had	  as	  a	   consequence	  that	   much	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   getting	   lost.	   This	   problem	   has	   two	   major	  sources:	  at	   the	  one	  side	   the	  opportunity	   to	  earn	  enormous	   financial	  benefits	   is	  mostly	   completely	   overestimated	   thus	   acting	   as	   an	   incentive	   to	   keep	   that	  knowledge	  secret	  in	  hopes	  for	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  better	  “deal”,	  often	  with	  knowledge	  ending	   up	   forgotten,	   and	   secondly,	   the	   acquisition	   and	   further	   patenting	   of	  traditional	   knowledge	   by	   developed	   world	   companies	   has	   been	   regarded	   by	  indigenous	  communities	  as	   theft	   (partially	  also	  caused	  by	   the	   inaccessibly	  high	  prices	   derived	   products	   have),	   which	   made	   those	   communities	   particularly	  hesitant	   to	   continue	   sharing	   their	   knowledge.	   Lack	   of	   trust	   is	   endemic	   and	  oriented	   to	   the	   industrial	   world	   in	   general.	   From	   this	   starting	   position,	   the	  project	   of	   open	   innovation	   has	   not	   only	   to	   encounter	   the	   hard	   challenge	   of	  setting	  up	  the	  necessary	  infrastructure	  and	  facilitating	  access	  to	  rural	  and	  poorer	  populations,	  but	  has	  the	  difficult	  burden	  of	  gaining	  the	  trust	  of	  its	  potential	  users.	  Although	  much	  more	  difficult	  in	  the	  life	  sciences,	  gaining	  trust	  in	  making	  people	  believe	  in	  the	  worthiness	  of	  participating	  in	  open	  innovation	  projects	  is	  possible,	  as	   the	  example	  of	  Wikipedia	   shows	  us.	   Large-­‐scale	  participation	   is	   realistic,	   by	  democratizing	  the	  making	  of	  new	  rules,	  by	  transparency	  and	  by	  letting	  users	  be	  able	   to	   adapt	   interfaces.	   This	   last	   part	   is	   very	   important,	   since	   malleability	  fosters	  the	  notion	  of	  control	  and	  one	  shows	  greater	  trust	  towards	  what	  one	  has	  the	  power	  to	  change.	  Open	  innovation	  platforms	  can	  be	  shaped	  in	  such	  way	  as	  to	  ensure	  higher	  compatibility	  with	  customary	  laws.	  Here	  interfaces	  can	  be	  adapted	  in	   order	   to	   fit	   in	   a	  wide	   conception	   of	  what	  may	   constitute	   authorship	   and	   to	  offer	   the	   possibility	   to	   ban	   certain	   sales	   practices.	   However,	   one	   should	   not	  create	  a	  special	  room	  to	  legitimize	  practices	  that	  are	  not	  compatible	  with	  human	  rights,	   such	   as	   limiting	   the	   availability	   of	   knowledge	   to	   gender,	   specific	   age	   or	  ethnic	   groups,	   religion	   or	   other	   forms	   of	   illicit	   discrimination. 339 	  Some	  differential	   treatment	   however	   can	   be	   justified,	   like	   interlacing	   innovation	  reports	   on	   indigenous	   innovations	   in	  broad	   search	   engines	   results,	   in	   order	   to	  address	  past	  injustices.	  	  Efforts	   to	  bridge	   the	  digital	  divide	  between	   indigenous	   communities	   and	  other	  users	   of	   open	   innovation	   platforms	   have	   to	   be	   made	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   fair	  equality	   of	   opportunity.	   A	   third	   party	   effort	   that	   standardizes	   the	   terminology	  used	   by	   indigenous	   contributors	   and	   a	   platform	   design	   that	   permits	   small	  incremental	   contributions	   in	   multiple	   major	   languages	   should	   round	   up	   this	  major	  innovation	  integration	  aspiration.	  	  	  Whatever	  approach	  one	  takes,	  illicit	  appropriation	  of	  knowledge	  can	  be	  a	  wrong	  to	   the	   original	   inventor,	   but	   the	   far	   greater	   injury	   is	   to	   be	   undeservedly	  forgotten.	  However,	  the	  notion	  of	  “fair	  competition	  of	  ideas”	  should	  not	  serve	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  339	  Here	  my	  argument	  is	  leant	  upon	  Garzón	  Valdés	  (2004).	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pretext	   to	   reduce	   (or	   limit	   future)	   self-­‐determination	   rights	   of	   indigenous	  communities	  if	  not	  accompanied	  by	  comparable	  efforts	  made	  in	  the	  Global	  North.	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Abstract	  	  A	  wide	  range	  of	  proposals	  to	  alleviate	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  intellectual	  property	  regimes	  is	  currently	  under	  discussion.	  This	  article	  offers	  a	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  six	   of	   these	   proposals:	   the	   Health	   Impact	   Fund,	   the	   Access	   to	   Knowledge	  movement,	   prize	   systems,	   open	   innovation	   models,	   compulsory	   licenses	   and	  South-­‐South	   collaborations.	   An	   assessment	   on	   how	   these	   proposals	   target	   the	  human	  rights	  affected	  by	   intellectual	  property	  will	  be	  provided.	  The	  conflicting	  human	  rights	   that	  will	  be	   individually	  discussed	  are	   the	   rights:	   to	  benefit	   from	  one’s	   own	   scientific	   work,	   to	   benefit	   from	   the	   advancement	   of	   science,	   to	  participate	  in	  scientific	  enterprises	  and	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  	  	  	  	   	  
	   143	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	  number	  of	  proposals	  and	  movements	  aiming	  at	  alleviating	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	   intellectual	   property	   regimes	   have	   gained	   popularity	   during	   the	   last	   decade	  and	  a	  half.	  The	  interdisciplinary	  character	  of	  the	  discussion	  has	  made	  compliance	  with	   human	   rights	   a	   standard	   assessment	   tool.	   The	   revisions	   to	   the	   existing	  regimes	   are,	   deliberately	   or	  not,	   far	   from	  addressing	   all	   issues	   that	  need	   to	  be	  dealt	  with,	   and	  mostly	  do	  not	  aim	  at	  offering	  an	   ideal	   solution.	  For	   the	   sake	  of	  political	  feasibility	  a	  number	  of	  concessions	  have	  been	  made	  in	  the	  proposals	  to	  gain	   governmental	   support,	   some	   of	   which	   have	   been	   severely	   criticized.	   The	  aim	  of	   this	   article	   is	   to	   provide	   an	   assessment	   on	   how	   the	   current	   intellectual	  property	   regimes	   along	   with	   six	   major	   proposals	   and	  movements	   that	   aim	   to	  improve	   such	   regimes	   relate	   to	   human	   rights	   commitments.	   The	   discussed	  proposals	   are	   the	  Health	   Impact	   Fund,	   prize	   systems,	   open	   innovation	  models,	  South-­‐South	  partnerships,	  the	  Access	  to	  Knowledge	  movement,	  and	  the	  strategic	  use	  of	  compulsory	  licensing.	  	  A	  brief	   introduction	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  human	  rights	  obligations	  will	  be	  provided,	  followed	   by	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   human	   rights	   affected	   by	   intellectual	   property	  rights.	   Thereafter	   the	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses	   of	   each	   proposal	   will	   be	  discussed.	  Finally,	  an	  evaluation	  will	  be	  offered	  on	  how	  the	  proposals	   relate	   to	  three	   different	   priority	   criteria:	   potential	   to	   secure	   basic	   needs,	   overall	  compatibility	   with	   human	   rights	   law	   and	   orientation	   towards	   the	   interests	   of	  future	   people.	   Throughout	   this	   analysis	   I	   will	   provide	   a	   comprehensive	   list	   of	  conflicting	   items	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   building	   a	   map	   where	   the	   different	  stakeholders’	  position	  can	  be	  identified.	  
	  
Introduction	  	  Intellectual	  property	  rights	  have	  a	   far-­‐reaching	   impact	   that	  not	  only	  affects	   the	  lives	  of	  producers	  and	  buyers	  of	  developed	  inventions,	  but	  also	  society	  at	  large.	  Keeping	  a	  vital	  medicine	  as	  an	  artificially	  scarce	  resource	  using	  exclusive	  rights	  causes	   public	   outrage,	   especially	  when	   the	   strict	  market	   orientation	   of	   private	  companies	  results	  in	  the	  avoidable	  loss	  of	  lives.340	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  340	  Timmermann	  and	  Belt	  (2013)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  5]	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There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  urgent	  global	  problems	  that	  need	  to	  be	  handled.	  Climate	  change	  is	  threatening	  future	  food	  provision.341	  Disease	  and	  malnutrition	  have	  an	  annual	  death	  toll	  of	  over	  18	  million	  people.342	  Increased	  social	  consciousness	  has	  crystallized	   in	   a	   number	   of	   organizations,	   institutions	   and	   individuals	   offering	  solutions.	  Science	  and	  technological	  innovation	  are	  among	  the	  institutions	  from	  which	  support	   is	  expected	  and	  solicited.	   In	  order	   for	  science	  and	   technology	  to	  deliver	  solutions	  that	  actively	  tackle	  those	  global	  problems	  the	  incentive	  system	  that	   drives	   research	   and	   development	  will	   have	   to	   be	   aligned	   to	  meet	   societal	  needs. 343 	  Shaping	   research	   agendas	   according	   to	   market	   demands	   as	  increasingly	   is	   done	   results	   in	   the	   poor	   often	   not	   getting	   the	   innovations	   they	  need	   (i.e.	   the	   availability	   problem).	   Profit-­‐maximizing	   sales	   practices	  systematically	  leave	  people	  empty-­‐handed	  (i.e.	  the	  accessibility	  problem).	  	  It	   is	   often	   forgotten	   that	   the	  wide	  use	   of	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   dictates	   a	  specific	   type	   of	   scientific	   conduct	   that	   might	   be	   at	   odds	   with	   local	   customs,	  endangering	  diversity	  in	  science.	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  a	  general	  trend	  to	  favour	  break-­‐through	   science	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   grassroots	   innovation.	   Lastly,	   those	   rights	  are	   very	   restrictive,	   limiting	   participation	   possibilities	   and	   decision-­‐making	  opportunities.	  	  	  Research	  and	  development	  in	  the	  life	  sciences	  has	  great	  potential	  to	  alleviate	  the	  disease	  burden	  and	  malnutrition	  problems	  of	  the	  global	  poor,	  but	  this	  potential	  is	  currently	  underused.	  This	  is	  something	  that	  we	  as	  a	  society	  have	  come	  to	  grips	  with	   due	   to	   the	   enormous	   existing	  welfare	   problems	   around	   the	  world.	  At	   the	  turn	   of	   the	   new	   century	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   promises	   to	   the	   global	   poor	   and	  ourselves	  were	  made	   to	  reduce	   those	  welfare	  deficits.344	  Progress	  however	  has	  been	  miserable	  and	  the	  first	  target	  deadlines	  are	  approaching,	  meaning	  that	  we	  have	  to	  prepare	  to	  justify	  our	  failings.345	  Despite	  the	  urgency	  of	  these	  issues,	  we	  still	  have	   the	  duty	   to	  ask	  ourselves	  what	  sacrifices	  are	   too	  high	  when	  trying	   to	  promote	   efficiency	   in	   research	   and	   development	   aiming	   at	   alleviating	   those	  pressing	   problems.	   Any	   reform	   attempt	   might	   be	   in	   jeopardy	   when	   the	  progressive	   realization346	  of	   other	  human	   rights	   is	   endangered.	  Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  main	  lessons	  learned	  in	  the	  last	  century	  is	  that	  even	  for	  the	  noblest	  goals	  we	  should	   critically	   judge	   the	   means	   used	   for	   their	   promotion.	   Therefore,	   while	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  341	  Cline	  (2007)	  342	  Pogge	  (2008b)	  343	  cf.	  Drugs	  for	  Neglected	  Diseases	  Working	  Group	  (2001);	  Korthals	  and	  Timmermann	  (2012)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  4]	  344	  Most	  prominently	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals,	  in	  relation	  to	  food	  security	  cf.	  Genugten	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  	  345	  Substantive	  criticism	  on	  the	  measurement	  of	  progress	  toward	  meeting	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	  is	  offered	  by	  Pogge	  (2010b)	  pp.	  57-­‐74	  346	  cf.	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (1948),	  preamble;	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (1966),	  art.	  2.1	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pursuing	   access	   to	   medicines	   it	   is	   still	   essential	   to	   be	   able	   to	   give	   a	   clear	  justification	  if	  in	  the	  process	  some	  rights	  are	  being	  neglected	  or	  even	  violated.	  A	  one-­‐sided	  focus	  on	  basic	  necessities	  may	  undermine	  the	  triumph	  of	  having	  being	  able	   to	   agree	   as	   a	   global	   society	   on	   a	   comprehensive	   list	   of	   universally	  recognized	  human	  rights.347	  	  
The	  current	  intellectual	  property	  regimes	  and	  their	  alternatives	  	  Intellectual	  property	  is	  a	  social	  construct	  that	  aims	  at	  stimulating	  innovation	  by	  ensuring	   temporary	   exclusive	   rights	   for	   those	   who	   can	   successfully	   claim	  authorship.	   Innovators	   gain	   by	   having	   the	   opportunity	   to	   recoup	   reasonable	  research	   and	   development	   costs.	   Society	   benefits	   from	   these	   intellectual	  endeavours	  by	  having	  a	  wider	  set	  of	  products	  in	  the	  market	  and	  once	  temporary	  exclusive	   rights	   elapse,	   also	   by	   having	   more	   knowledge	   entering	   the	   public	  domain	  for	  free	  further	  exploitation.	  	  	  	  Especially	  after	  the	  Agreement	  on	  Trade-­‐related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  (1994,	  hereinafter	  TRIPS)	  started	  to	  become	  effective	  minimal	  protection	  levels	   became	   internationally	   standardized	   and	   binding.	   Thereafter	   many	   of	  those	  minimal	   protection	   guarantees	   have	   been	   raised	   through	   bilateral	   trade	  agreements,348	  which	  are	  automatically	  generalized	  through	  the	  “most	  favoured	  nation”	   rule349,	   as	   any	   concession	   related	   to	   intellectual	   property	  made	   to	   one	  country	  has	  to	  be	  also	  granted	  to	  all	  other	  signatory	  member	  states.	  	  Criticism	   of	   the	   new	   trade	   regime	   has	   been	   severe	   and	   various	   stakeholder	  groups	  are	  searching	  for	  alternatives.350	  The	  parties	  aiming	  for	  a	  change	  are	  far	  from	  being	   a	   homogeneous	  mass	   that	   shares	   the	   same	   interests	   and	   concerns.	  Disagreement	  already	  manifests	  itself	  in	  the	  choice	  of	  basic	  strategy.	  One	  group	  of	   advocates	   identifies	   a	   significant	   gap	   between	   what	   the	   TRIPS	   agreement	  actually	   requires	   countries	   to	   implement	   and	   the	   level	   of	   protection	   national	  legislation	   grants.	   Taking	   copyright	   as	   an	   example,	   while	   TRIPS	   requires	   a	  minimum	  protection	  of	  “no	  less	  than	  50	  years	  from	  the	  end	  of	  the	  calendar	  year	  of	   authorized	   publication”351,	   common	   are	   protection	   terms	   of	   up	   to	   70	   years	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  347	  Strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  having	  human	  rights	  justified	  on	  basis	  of	  agreements	  among	  members	  with	  different	  interests	  are	  discussed	  in	  Beitz	  (2009)	  pp.	  73-­‐95	  348	  See	  Drahos	  and	  Braithwaite	  (2003),	  esp.	  pp.	  85-­‐107	  349	  TRIPS,	  art.	  4:	  “With	  regard	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  intellectual	  property,	  any	  advantage,	  favour,	  privilege	  or	  immunity	  granted	  by	  a	  Member	  to	  the	  nationals	  of	  any	  other	  country	  shall	  be	  accorded	  immediately	  and	  unconditionally	  to	  the	  nationals	  of	  all	  other	  Members	  …”.	  350	  Cf.	  Korthals	  and	  Timmermann	  (2012)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  4]	  351	  TRIPS,	  art.	  12	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after	   the	   author’s	   death.	   Adjusting	   national	   laws	   so	   that	   they	   just	  meet	   TRIPS	  minimal	   requirements	   would	   reduce	   significantly	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	  intellectual	  property.	  A	  second	  group	  aims	  at	  abrogating	  TRIPS	  altogether,	  or	  in	  a	  softer	  variant,	  to	  abolish	  patents	  in	  the	  field	  of	  medicine	  or	  those	  affecting	  food	  security.	  The	  third	  group	  takes	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  for	  granted,	  and	  this	  either	  by	  agreeing	  that	  with	  an	  addition	  that	  compensates	  some	  negative	  effects	  it	  will	  be	  much	  better	   than	  other	  alternative	  regimes,	  or	  simply,	  because	   they	  believe	  that	  such	  a	  kind	  of	  addition	  is	  the	  only	  improvement	  attainable.	  This	  last	  group	  aims	   at	   building	   proposals	   that	   stand	   in	   a	   positive	   relation	   to	   the	   TRIPS	  agreement	  by	  complementing	  it	  with	  necessary	  additions.	  	  	  Much	  of	   the	  criticism	  toward	   the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  and	   intellectual	  property	   in	  general	   uses	   the	   human	   rights	   language.	   There	   is	   strong	   divergence	   on	   how	  human	   rights	   law	   is	   interpreted	   and	  on	  how	   invasive	  human	   rights	   are	  on	   the	  free	   exercise	   of	   intellectual	   property	   rights.	   We	   will	   dedicate	   the	   next	   two	  sections	  to	  discuss	  this	  interaction.	  	  
On	  the	  nature	  of	  human	  rights	  obligations	  	  The	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  defines	  three	  levels	  of	  obligations:	  to	  respect,	  protect	  and	  fulfil.	  The	  obligation	  to	  respect	   is	  seen	  as	  prohibiting	   states	   interfering	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   with	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   a	  particular	   human	   right,	   while	   the	   obligation	   to	   protect	   requires	   state	   action	  when	  third	  parties	  are	  interfering	  human	  rights	  guarantees.	  Under	  the	  obligation	  to	  fulfil	  states	  are	  required	  to	  pursue	  actions	  that	  facilitate,	  provide	  and	  promote	  human	  rights.352	  	  Those	   principles	   should	   guide	   states	   to	   implement	   the	   different	   articles	   of	   the	  two	  Covenants	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration.	  Here	  we	  should	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  genealogy	  of	   intellectual	  property	  rights.	  Under	  human	  rights	   law	  the	  current	   intellectual	  property	  regimes	  should	  be	  seen	   just	  as	  means	  states	  have	  made	  to	  implement	  article	  15.1	  of	  the	  ICESCR.353	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  352	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (2000)	  353	  An	  official	  UN	  comment	  distinguishes:	  “Human	  rights	  are	  fundamental	  as	  they	  are	  inherent	  to	  the	  human	  person	  as	  such,	  whereas	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  are	  first	  and	  foremost	  means	  by	  which	  States	  seek	  to	  provide	  incentives	  for	  inventiveness	  and	  creativity,	  encourage	  the	  dissemination	  of	  creative	  and	  innovative	  productions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  development	  of	  cultural	  identities,	  and	  preserve	  the	  integrity	  of	  scientific,	  literary	  and	  artistic	  productions	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole.”	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (2006)	  §1	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As	  far	  as	  human	  rights	  obligations	  are	  concerned,	  the	  debates	  on	  how	  far	  states	  have	  obligations	  outside	  their	  borders	  will	  be	  left	  aside.	  Further,	  it	  will	  be	  taken	  for	   granted	   that	  we	   can	   agree	   on	   a	   very	  minimal	  welfare	   threshold	   line	  below	  nobody	   should	   stand	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   human	   rights.	   The	   extent	   of	   the	   debate	  around	   sufficientarianism	  makes	   it	   clear	   that	   an	   answer	   on	  where	   this	   line	   is	  drawn	  cannot	  be	  provided	  within	  this	  context.	  We	  should	  however	  note	  that	  no	  society	   can	   secure	   the	   objects	   of	   human	   rights	   absolutely,	   an	   attempt	   to	  do	   so	  would	  take	  up	  practically	  all	  of	  society’s	  resources	  and	  still	  fail	  to	  fully	  guarantee	  all	  rights.	  Society	  can	  merely	  hope	  to	  sufficiently	  secure	  human	  rights.354	  	  
	  The	   emphasis	   will	   be	   put	   on	   a	   different	   discussion.	   For	   this	   article	   it	   is	   more	  interesting	   to	   identify	   the	   crucial	   differences	   between	   standard	   human	   rights	  violations	   and	   softer	   interferences	   in	   someone’s	   enjoyment	   of	   a	   human	   right.	  Under	  the	  idea	  of	  soft	  interferences,	  borderline	  cases	  will	  be	  focussed	  on,	  such	  as	  routinely	   discouraging	   people	   to	  make	   use	   of	   freedoms	   guaranteed	   by	   human	  rights	   or	   giving	   another	   party	   an	   additional	   advantage	   that	   will	   completely	  demotivate	   people	   to	   make	   use	   of	   some	   of	   their	   freedoms.	   Such	   a	   type	   of	  intervention	   will	   however	   have	   to	   occur	   systematically	   to	   qualify	   as	   a	   human	  rights	   violation.355	  Single	   cases,	   interferences	   from	   one	   person	   to	   another,	   do	  generally	  not	  fit	  this	  category.	  	  Discouraging	   scientists	   to	   research	   in	   areas	  where	   infringing	  patents	   is	   almost	  inevitable	  in	  order	  to	  not	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  costly	  lawsuits	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  limiting	   scientific	   freedom.	   Taking	   a	   very	   broad	   understanding	   of	   the	   right	   to	  take	   part	   in	   cultural	   life	   (encompassing	   scientific	   life)	   would	   be	   at	   odds	   with	  acknowledging	   that	   some	   areas	   of	   science	   are	   already	   seized.	   Participation	  possibilities	  would	   be	   restrained	   for	   people	  who	   are	   not	   able	   to	   persuade	   the	  holder	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  grant	  a	  license.	  	  More	  challenging	  to	  frame	  as	  human	  rights	  violations	  are	  systematic	  attempts	  to	  demotivate	   the	   economically	   poor	   to	   participate	   in	   science	   or	   being	   actively	  involved	  in	  decision-­‐making	  that	  determines	  the	  role	  technology	  should	  have	  in	  their	  lives.	  The	  challenge	  does	  not	  merely	  consist	  in	  overinflating	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  human	  rights	  violation,	  but	   in	   the	  subjective	  nature	  of	  what	  may	  qualify	  as	  a	  demotivation.	  That	  what	  counts	  as	  demotivation	  for	  some,	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  the	  same	  effects	  on	  others.	  	  There	  are	  some	  natural	  undeserved	  advantages	  that	  are	  clearly	  out	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  is	  covered	  by	  human	  rights	   law.	  However,	  action	  has	  to	  be	  taken	  when	  the	  opportunity	  to	  make	  use	  of	  those	  advantages	  are	  not	  distributed	  randomly,	  but	  are	  concentrated	  in	  certain	  population	  segments.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  354	  Cf.	  Pogge	  (2000)	  355	  Phrased	  in	  Pogge’s	  words,	  human	  rights	  violations	  have	  to	  be	  “in	  some	  sense	  official”	  to	  count	  as	  such,	  see	  Pogge	  (2000)	  p.	  47	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Disadvantages	  are	  also	  a	  result	  of	  poverty,	  e.g.	  reduced	  intellectual	  capacities	  due	  to	  malnutrition	   during	   childhood.	   Since	   addressing	   those	   disadvantages	   entail	  the	  allocation	  of	  limited	  resources	  I	  will	  not	  discuss	  them	  further	  here.	  Important	  for	   the	   main	   argument	   is	   that	   some	   disadvantages	   can	   be	   traced	   to	   certain	  technological	   solutions	   being	   artificially	   scarce.	   As	   this	   is	   a	   direct	   effect	   of	  intellectual	  property	  policies	  design	  we	  will	  dedicate	  more	  attention	  to	  it	  in	  the	  next	  sections	  of	  this	  article.	  Here	  access	  to	  scientific	  literature	  is	  probably	  one	  of	  the	   most	   prominent	   cases,	   hindering	   the	   possibility	   to	   follow	   up-­‐to-­‐date	  discussions	  in	  cultural	  life	  (especially	  science)	  and	  politics.356	  	  	  
Catalogue	  of	  rights	  affected	  by	  the	  existing	  intellectual	  property	  regimes	  	  Intellectual	  property	  affects	  human	  rights	  in	  multiple	  ways.	  To	  a	  similar	  extent,	  commonly	   held	   conceptions	   of	   justice	   clash	   with	   a	   reckless	   use	   of	   exclusive	  rights.	   Criticism	   of	   the	   post-­‐TRIPS	   intellectual	   property	   regimes	   comes	   from	   a	  wide	   array	   of	   stakeholders	   and	   affected	   parties	   with	   diverse	   disciplinary	   and	  cultural	   backgrounds	   representing	   a	   broad	   spectrum	   of	   interests.	   Not	  surprisingly,	   the	   language	   used	   in	   the	   discussion	   and	   interpretation	   of	  intellectual	   property	   regimes	   and	   alternatives	   has	   a	   corresponding	  heterogeneity.	  Further,	  in	  discussions	  around	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  identify	  who	  is	  judging	  the	  juridical	  virtues	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  itself	  and	  who	   is	   unable	   (or	   unwilling)	   to	   critically	   assess	   the	  wording	   of	   the	   agreement	  without	   taking	   the	   realities	   of	   the	   world	   for	   which	   it	   was	   meant	   into	  consideration.	  Extreme	  inequalities	  in	  terms	  of	  power,	  wealth	  and	  legal	  expertise	  have	  an	  enormous	  effect	  on	  how	  an	  agreement	  will	  ultimately	  be	  implemented.	  That	  many	  liberties	  foreseen	  in	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  were	  signed	  away	  through	  bilateral	  trade	  agreements	  is	  a	  clear	  sign	  of	  these	  power	  plays.	  	  	  	  Additionally,	  intellectual	  property	  regimes	  are	  only	  one	  of	  the	  many	  factors	  that	  affect	   the	   establishment	   of	   an	   international	   cooperative	   environment	   that	  promotes	   fruitful	  scientific	  enterprises.	  Labour	   law,	  migration	  control,	   freedom	  of	  speech,	  as	  well	  as	  gender,	  social	  or	  racial	  discrimination	  are	  all	  elements	  that	  affect	   a	  well-­‐working	   scientific	   environment.	   International	   law	   generally	   takes	  this	  broader	  perspective	  when	  protecting	  science	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  promote	  social	  and	  economic	  development.357	  	  Consequently,	  a	  very	  broad	  interpretation	  of	  rights	  will	  be	  taken	  in	  the	  following	  to	  help	  us	  understand	  real	  and	  apparent	  conflicts	  between	  the	  existing	  regimes,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  356	  Online	  newspapers	  have	  greatly	  facilitated	  access	  to	  current	  day	  political	  discussions	  all	  around	  the	  world.	  Open	  access	  publishing	  of	  scientific	  literature	  is	  still	  relatively	  rare,	  likewise	  in	  the	  arts,	  particularly	  music.	  357	  see	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (1966),	  art.	  11.2	  (a)	  and	  art.	  15;	  Charter	  of	  Economic	  Rights	  and	  Duties	  of	  States	  (1974),	  art.	  13	  and	  generally	  Donders	  (2011)	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the	  proposed	  alternatives,	  commonly	  held	  notions	  of	  justice	  and	  interpretations	  of	   human	   rights	   law.	   As	   mentioned,	   intellectual	   property	   regimes	   and	   the	  proposals	   for	   reform	   are	   not	   only	   criticized	   by	   a	   variety	   of	   private	   and	   public	  actors,	   but	   also	   by	   advocates	   of	   different	   –	   one	   could	   say	   often	   competing358	  –	  proposals,	   which	   makes	   it	   particularly	   important	   to	   have	   as	   broad	   an	  interpretation	   as	   possible	   to	   understand	  where	   real	   differences	   lay	   and	  which	  conflicts	  are	  merely	  due	  to	  misunderstandings.	  	  	  
(i)	   Benefiting	  from	  one’s	  own	  intellectual	  work	  	  Innovators	   moral	   and	   material	   interests	   have	   to	   be	   safeguarded	   according	   to	  UDHR	   article	   27.2.	   Those	   private	   interests	   however	   have	   to	   be	   balanced	  with	  public	  interests	  and	  needs.359	  Intellectual	  property	  as	  currently	  conceived	  is	  not	  protected	  as	  a	  human	  right.360	  Human	  rights	  law	  demands	  from	  states	  merely	  to	  have	   a	   regulatory	   framework	   that	   will	   facilitate	   innovators	   the	   protection	   of	  their	  moral	  and	  material	   interests.361	  Here	  we	  have	  to	  realize	   the	   limitations	  of	  existing	   intellectual	   property	   law:	   patent	   rights	   allow	   only	   some	   innovators	   to	  protect	   the	   material	   interests	   of	   some	   of	   their	   inventions. 362 	  Geographical	  indications,	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  protect	  knowledge	  that	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  patent	  protection	  have,	  as	  the	  name	  states,	  territorial	  limitations	  and	  are	  limited	  to	   collective	   innovation.363	  As	   far	   as	  moral	   interests	   are	   concerned,	   intellectual	  property	   law	   only	   recognizes	   two	   moral	   interests	   as	   such:	   attribution	   of	  authorship	  and	  being	  able	  to	  control	  the	  integrity	  of	  one’s	  work.	  Other	  interests	  that	  are	  moral	  in	  nature,	  such	  as	  concerns	  about	  the	  licensing	  behaviour	  of	  one’s	  employer	  over	  one’s	  inventions	  are	  not	  legally	  protected.	  For	  better	  or	  worse,	  much	  creative	  intellectual	  activity	  still	  remains	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  can	  be	  protected	  by	  patent	  rights.	  Some	  scientific	  productions	  do	  not	  meet	   the	  non-­‐obviousness	  requirement	  of	  patentability	  as	   they	  consist	   in	  a	  series	   of	   small-­‐scale	   increments.	   Innovations	   that	   are	   not	   uniform	   and	   stable	  cannot	  apply	  for	  patents	  or	  plant	  varieties	  protection.364	  Rediscovery,	  even	  when	  assisted	  by	  scientific	  methods,	  is	  in	  principle	  not	  patentable.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  358	  There	  is	  harsh	  mutual	  criticism	  among	  the	  advocates	  of	  different	  proposal:	  for	  Knowledge	  Ecology	  International’s	  review	  of	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund,	  see	  http://keionline.org/HIF	  359	  TRIPS	  article	  7	  360	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (2006),	  especially	  §§	  1-­‐3,	  35	  	  361	  see	  UDHR	  (1948),	  art.	  27.2	  and	  ICESCR	  (1966),	  art.	  15.1(c)	  362	  cf.	  Cullet	  (2007)	  p.	  412	  363	  cf.	  Sunder	  (2007)	  	  364	  In	  agriculture,	  farmers’	  plant	  varieties,	  especially	  those	  coming	  from	  indigenous	  communities	  are	  unstable	  and	  in	  permanent	  evolution,	  which	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  Natural	  law	  recognizes	  a	  right	  to	  benefit	  from	  intellectual	  labour.	  However	  some	  intellectual	   labourers	   are	   able	   to	   gain	   from	   intellectual	   endeavours	  more	   than	  others,	   and	   this	   not	   due	   to	   the	   social	   utility	   of	   their	   effort	   nor	   by	   having	  undertaken	  more	  painstaking	  work,	  but	  merely	  by	  their	  type	  of	  work	  matching	  better	  the	  requirements	  set	  by	  the	  established	  innovation	  incentive	  system.	  Here	  we	   can	   talk	   about	   an	   undeserved	   advantage,	   which	   –	   given	   that	   the	   patent	  regime	  is	  a	  societal	  tool	  to	  stimulate	  innovation	  –	  puts	  an	  obligation	  on	  society	  to	  explain	  this	  differential	  treatment.	  	  A	  defence	   to	   justify	   this	  differential	   treatment	   is	  however	  missing.	  At	  most,	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  human	  rights	  articles	  that	  aim	  at	  securing	  basic	  needs,	  such	  as	   food	   and	   health	   care,	   as	   dictating	   a	   certain	   preference	   for	   one	   type	   of	  innovation	   over	   other,	   less	   urgent	   ones.	   The	   relation	   between	   scientific	  knowledge	  and	  social	  utility	  is	  indeed	  addressed	  in	  human	  rights	  law.	  In	  relation	  to	   food	   production,	   ICESCR	   article	   11.2(a)	   foresees	   that	   “States	   Parties	   …	  individually	   and	   through	   international	   co-­‐operation	  …	   [shall	   take	  measures	   to]	  improve	  methods	  of	  production,	  conservation	  and	  distribution	  of	  food	  by	  making	  full	  use	  of	  technical	  and	  scientific	  knowledge,	  by	  disseminating	  knowledge	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  nutrition	  and	  by	  developing	  or	  reforming	  agrarian	  systems	  in	  such	  a	   way	   as	   to	   achieve	   the	   most	   efficient	   development	   and	   utilization	   of	   natural	  resources”.	   Official	   UN	   comments	   on	   the	   right	   to	   food	   and	   the	   right	   to	   health	  make	   similar	   provisions.365	  We	   are	   however,	   as	  mentioned	   earlier,	   far	   from	   of	  having	   innovation	   aligned	  with	   societal	   needs,	   especially	  when	   taking	   a	  wider	  cosmopolitan	  conception	  of	  justice.	  	  Similarly,	   any	   theory	   that	   links	   ownership	   to	   notions	   of	   desert	   would	   have	   to	  explain	   why	   luck	   can	   play	   such	   an	   enormous	   role	   in	   determining	   the	   yield	   of	  harvestable	  benefits	  from	  an	  invention	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  intellectual	  property.	  The	  inventor	  who	  brings	  out	  the	  same	  invention	  independently	  a	  day	  later	  is	  not	  entitled	   to	   any	  benefits.366	  In	   general	  we	   can	   say	   that	   intellectual	  property	   law	  does	  not	  recognize	  effort	  in	  any	  special	  way.	  	  	  The	  ICESCR	  recognizes	  in	  article	  11.1	  a	  right	  to	  the	  continuous	  improvement	  of	  people’s	  living	  conditions.	  There	  is	  however	  no	  mention	  that	  this	  right	  ceases	  to	  be	  valid	  once	  one	  surpasses	  a	  certain	  threshold	  level.	  This	  right	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  liberty	  that	  should	  be	  respected	  in	  itself,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  others	  are	  in	   a	   worse	   situation.	   The	   propensity	   to	   improve	   one’s	   position,	   e.g.	   through	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  disqualifies	  them	  from	  most	  types	  of	  intellectual	  property	  protection,	  see	  De	  Schutter	  (2011)	  p.	  317	  365	  see	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (1999)	  §	  26	  (on	  appropriate	  technology),	  §	  36	  (international	  cooperation)	  and	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (2000),	  §45	  (on	  technical	  cooperation)	  366	  for	  a	  critic	  see	  Nozick	  (1974)	  p.	  182	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science	   and	   technology	   development,	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   something	   intrinsic	   to	  human	  nature.	  	  Yet,	  whatever	  claims	  one	  might	  have	  in	  being	  able	  to	  improve	  one’s	  situation,	  a	  distinction	   between	   full	   and	   just	   remuneration	   still	   has	   to	   be	   drawn. 367	  Taxpayers	   contribute	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   necessary	   research	  infrastructure.	   Various	   investments	   in	   public	   education	   and	   research	   facilities	  increase	  the	  chances	  people	  have	  in	  taking	  part	  in	  scientific	  enterprises.	  Further,	  inventions	  rely	  on	  previous	  knowledge,	  the	  production	  and	  conservation	  thereof	  having	  taken	  place	  all	  around	  the	  world.	  The	  fact	  that	  all	  have	  participated	  in	  the	  production	   and	   conservation	   of	   knowledge,	   to	   a	   greater	   or	   lesser	   extent,	  precludes	   that	   one	   country	   could	   justly	   claim	   being	   the	   full	   owner	   of	   a	   given	  piece	  of	  knowledge.	  Thus,	  under	  principles	  of	  fairness	  inventors,	  by	  having	  used	  previous	   knowledge,	   owe	   a	   certain	   social	   return	   to	   people	   all	   around	   the	  world.368	  	  Finally,	   allowing	   others	   to	   benefit	   from	   one’s	   work	   should	   not	   be	   seen	   as	  something	  deplorable.	  As	   James	  Wilson	   rightly	   notes	   in	   relation	   to	   innovators:	  “The	   fact	   that	   others	   can	   […]	   benefit	   from	   their	   work	   need	   not	   provide	   a	  disincentive	  for	  them,	  and	  if	  they	  are	  even	  moderately	  altruistic	  may	  provide	  an	  incentive.”369	  The	   non-­‐rivalrous	   nature	   of	   knowledge	   allows	   its	   simultaneous	  enjoyment	  by	  a	  number	  of	  people.	  	  	  
(ii)	  Benefiting	  from	  scientific	  advancement	  	  The	   advancement	   of	   science	   brings	   about	   a	   series	   of	   innovations	   from	   which	  humankind	   may	   benefit.	   Science	   however	   follows	   research	   agendas	   and	  incentives	  that	  have	  been	  more	  or	  less	  deliberately	  set.	  The	  objects	  made	  newly	  available	   are	   partially	   determined	   by	   the	   direction	   science	   takes.	   We	   can	  however	  change	  this	  direction;	  some	  would	  even	  argue	  that	  we	  are	  obliged	  to	  do	  so	   in	   order	   to	   benefit	   people	   who	   are	   in	   direr	   needs.370	  Therefore,	   benefiting	  from	   scientific	   advancement	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   not	   only	  meaning	   access	   to	  the	  objects	  that	  science	  brings	  out,	  but	  also	  a	  fairer	  allocation	  of	  research	  efforts.	  Moral	  (or	  in	  some	  cases	  legal)	  obligations	  to	  make	  objects	  of	  innovation	  available	  are	   determined	   by	   three	   main	   factors:	   uniqueness	   of	   the	   object,	   dependency	  upon	  it	  and	  on	  how	  urgently	  access	  is	  needed.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  367	  cf.	  Yu	  (2007)	  p.	  1129	  368	  Herbert	  Simon	  estimates	  that	  social	  capital	  produces	  at	  least	  90%	  of	  the	  income	  in	  richer	  societies	  like	  the	  United	  States	  or	  northwestern	  Europe.	  On	  moral	  ground	  a	  social	  return	  may	  match	  this	  rate,	  see	  Simon	  (2001).	  	  369	  Wilson	  (2010)	  p.	  455	  370	  Generally,	  utilitarians	  would	  mostly	  take	  such	  a	  standpoint,	  e.g.	  for	  this	  type	  of	  argumentation	  see	  Singer	  (1993)	  pp.	  218-­‐246	  
	   152	  
Uniqueness	  of	  objects.	  An	  object	  may	  be	  considered	  unique	  if	  there	  are	  natural	  or	  semantic	   constraints	   that	   impede	   the	   provision	   of	   an	   alternative.	   From	   a	   less	  strict	  perspective,	  an	  object	  may	  also	  be	  considered	  unique	  if	  reasonable	  efforts	  will	   not	   produce	   an	   alternative	   within	   the	   time	   the	   object	   of	   innovation	   is	  protected	  by	  exclusive	  rights.	  Lastly,	  a	  broader	  concept	  of	  “unique”	  will	  consider	  an	  object	  of	  innovation	  as	  unique	  if	  at	  present	  no	  alternative	  products	  exist.	  	  In	  the	  first	  case	  availability	  of	  the	  object	  of	  innovation	  will	  depend	  mostly	  on	  the	  licensing	  behaviour	  of	  the	  holder	  of	  exclusive	  rights.	  Here	  responsible	  behaviour	  can	   be	   demanded,	   as	   the	   patentee	   is	   in	   control	   of	   the	   single	   existing	   solution.	  This	   responsibility	   diminishes	   the	   more	   alternatives	   are	   available	   or	   would	  become	   available	   if	   action	   was	   taken.	   The	   more	   alternatives	   are	   feasible,	   the	  more	   the	   responsibility	   is	   shared	   with	   civil	   society,	   which	   could	   also	   have	  engaged	  in	  similar	  endeavours	  to	  come	  up	  with	  solutions.	  	  	  
Dependency.	  An	  additional	  criterion	  is	  to	  analyse	  how	  dependent	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  a	   human	   right	   is	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   the	   object	   of	   innovation.	   Are	   there	  alternative	  ways	  to	  fulfil	  the	  human	  right	  in	  question	  other	  than	  using	  the	  object	  of	  innovation?	  Can	  we	  reach	  the	  same	  goal	  through	  other	  means?	  Mostly	  this	  is	  the	  case.	  Even	  in	  the	  instance	  of	  health	  we	  can	  question	  whether	  medicines	  are	  the	  sole	  conduit	   to	  better	  health.	  With	  preventive	  measures,	  especially	  through	  improvements	  of	  sanitary	   infrastructures,	  we	  can	  often	  avoid	  having	  to	  rely	  on	  medicines.	  	  A	   common	   objection	   to	   this	   reasoning	   is	   to	   say	   that	  we	   are	   dependent	   on	   the	  object	   of	   innovation	   given	   the	   circumstances	   in	   which	   we	   find	   ourselves.	   The	  horrible	  state	  of	  deprivation	  in	  which	  a	  third	  of	  the	  world	  population	  lives	  makes	  us	  dependent	  on	  remedies	  and	  fixes.	  	  
	  
Urgency.	  While	   temporary	   for	   society	   as	   a	   whole,	   exclusive	   rights	   are	   often	  permanently	  exclusive	  for	  single	  individuals.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  medicines,	  late	  access	  can	   mean	   death,	   injury	   or	   inefficacy.	   Less	   dramatic	   cases	   involve	   situations	  where	  an	  invention	  could	  considerably	  improve	  people’s	  lives.	  We	  may	  think	  of	  innovation	  in	  water	  procurement	  methods	  that	  will	  make	  the	  carrying	  of	  water	  supplies	  over	  long	  distances	  redundant.	  This	  would	  increase	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  of	  women	   who	   are	   disproportionally	   burdened	   with	   this	   task.	   The	   need/want	  distinction	   is	  much	  more	   difficult	   to	  maintain	   than	  might	   appear	   at	   first	   sight,	  especially	  when	   there	   is	  no	  agreement	  on	  minimum	  welfare	  standards	  citizens	  are	  entitled	  to.	  
	  Besides	   asserting	   claims	   on	   the	   objects	   of	   innovation	   themselves,	   a	   fairer	  distribution	   in	   the	   targets	   of	   research	   efforts	   can	   be	   argued	   for.	   A	   possible	  interpretation	  of	   the	  right	  to	  benefit	   from	  the	  advancement	  of	  science	  amounts	  to	  an	  entitlement	  to	  a	  share	  of	  global	  research	  efforts.	  We	  are	  far	  from	  such	  a	  fair	  distribution.	  Prominent	   in	   the	   intellectual	  property	  and	  global	   justice	  debate	   is	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the	  so-­‐called	  10/90	  gap	  in	  pharmaceutical	  research371	  (other	  areas	  show	  similar	  inequalities)372.	   Herewith	   the	   deplorable	   situation	  where	   90%	  of	   global	   health	  resources	  are	  spent	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  of	  10%	  of	  the	  world’s	  population	  is	  called	   to	  attention.	   Implicit	   in	   this	   criticism	   is	   that	   there	   is	   such	   thing	  as	  a	   fair	  share	  of	  research	  time	  to	  be	  distributed	  globally.	  This	  can	  be	  interpreted	  to	  entail	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  dedication	  to	  a	  particular	  problem	  should	  be	  proportional	  to	  its	  urgency	  –	  a	  particular	  welfare	  issue	  has	  to	  be	  measured	  in	  number	  of	  people	  affected	   and	   intensity	   of	   the	   suffering	   or	   disadvantage	   involved.	   	   Allocation	   of	  research	   efforts	   has	   to	   be	   distributed	   accordingly.	   Another	   possible	  interpretation	   is	   to	   say	   that	   everyone	   is	   entitled	   to	   having	   a	   vote	   on	   which	  targets	   research	   should	  be	  aimed	  at.	  Related	   to	   this	   is	   the	  general	  question	  on	  how	  much	  has	  to	  be	  spent	  on	  science	  and	  technology	  development	  altogether.	  	  A	  general	   disagreement	   emerges	  when	  we	   ask	  ourselves	   in	  how	   far	   do	  people	  not	  only	  have	  a	   claim	  on	  what	   science	  provides	  but	  also	   in	  what	   science	  could	  plausibly	  provide	  for	  if	  research	  agendas	  and	  resources	  where	  directed	  to	  meet	  such	  targets.	  	  	  An	   additional	   factor	   that	   has	   to	   be	   brought	   to	   attention	   is	   that	   the	   exclusivity	  granted	  by	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   not	   only	   serves	   to	   recoup	   research	   and	  development	  costs,	  but	  also	  advertisement	  expenses.	  This	  calls	  the	  general	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  as	  a	  method	  to	  incentivize	  innovation	  into	  question.	  Money	  spent	  on	  marketing	  may	  pay	  better	  off	   than	  money	  spent	  on	   further	   innovation.	   It	   has	   been	   claimed	   that	   pharmaceutical	   companies	   are	  spending	   twice	   as	  much	   on	  marketing	   and	   administration	   as	   on	   research	   and	  development. 373 	  To	   these	   inefficiencies	   we	   have	   to	   add	   patent	   application,	  maintenance	   and	   litigation	   costs	   –	   all	   costs	   that	   reduce	   the	   budget	   of	   actual	  innovation.374	  	  The	  use	  of	  research	  monies	  for	  non-­‐scientific	  purposes	  can	  with	  good	  reason	  be	  condemned,	  especially	  keeping	  the	  urgent	  need	  for	  pro-­‐poor	  innovation	  in	  mind,	  which	  demands	  a	  more	  efficient	  use	  of	  resources.	  	  
(iii)	   Participation	  	  The	  most	  prominent	  readings	  of	  UDHR	  article	  27	  tend	  to	  ignore	  the	  participation	  in	   science	   component.	   However,	   especially	   the	   UNESCO	   has	   been	   eagerly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  371	  cf.	  Drugs	  for	  Neglected	  Diseases	  Working	  Group	  (2001)	  and	  Timmermann	  and	  Belt	  (2013)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  5]	  372	  Research	  in	  tropical	  agriculture	  has	  been	  similarly	  neglected,	  see	  De	  Schutter	  (2009)	  §34	  373	  see	  Angell	  (2004)	  p.	  1452	  374	  cf.	  Stiglitz	  (2008)	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promoting	  active	  participation	  possibilities.375	  Intellectual	  property	  rights	  affect	  scientific	  participation	  in	  multiple	  dimensions:	  	  	  
Openness.	   Intellectual	   property	   regimes	   may	   hinder	   openness	   in	   direct	   and	  indirect	  ways.	  Trade	  secret	  laws	  limit	  the	  freedom	  many	  scientists	  employed	  in	  industry	   have	   to	   discuss	   current	   findings,	   often	   even	   after	   employment	   ends.	  Patent	   requirements	   demand	   that	   knowledge	   on	   an	   invention	   has	   not	   been	  publicly	  disclosed	  prior	  to	  filing	  for	  exclusive	  rights,	  thus	  promoting	  a	  scientific	  culture	   that	   evades	   early	   disclosure	   of	   research	   results.	   Copyright	   laws	   allow	  also	  a	  publishing	  behaviour	  that	  is	  enormously	  restrictive	  in	  permitting	  access	  to	  literature	  and	  supporting	  datasets.	  	  Lack	  of	  openness	  impedes	  the	  possibility	  to	  give	  feedback;	  this	  applies	  to	   input	  that	  serves	  self-­‐interest	  as	  well	  as	  that	  which	  is	  altruistically	  motivated.	  	  	  
Relevance	   of	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art.	   The	   advantage	   break-­‐through	   science	   has	   over	  achievements	  made	   by	   incremental	   improvements	   has	   been	   criticized.376	  Here	  we	   have	   to	   distinguish	   between	   deserved	   advantages	   and	   benefits	   gained	   by	  external	   circumstances.	   It	   might	   be	   acceptable	   that	   people	   suffer	   some	  disadvantages	   from	   being	   antiquated	   or	   because	   they	   refuse	   to	   use	   new	  techniques,	  but	  suffering	  the	  full	  range	  of	  handicaps	  for	  not	  being	  able	  to	  adjust	  to	  new	  trends	  seems	  too	  hard	  a	  penalty.	  As	  a	   further	  factor,	  one	  has	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	   that	   people	   who	   continue	   autochthonous	   practices	   conserve	   tacit	  knowledge	   and	   are	   vital	   to	   recover	   past	   know-­‐how.	   Practising	   traditional	  medicine	   and	  partaking	   in	   seed	   exchange	  programs	  play	   an	   important	   role	   for	  the	   conservation	   of	   biodiversity.	   Society	   as	   a	   whole	   benefits	   from	   such	  undertakings.	  Intellectual	   property	   gives	   researchers	   who	   are	   able	   to	   match	   the	   novelty	  requirement	   of	   patentability	   a	   considerable	   advantage	   by	   giving	   them	   the	  opportunity	   to	   recoup	   reasonable	   research	   and	   development	   costs.	   And,	   as	  mentioned	   before,	   intellectual	   property	   rights	  make	   it	   also	   possible	   to	   recoup	  costs	  of	   extensive	  marketing	   campaigns	   that	   further	   increase	   sales.	  Those	  who	  cannot	  match	  this	  requirement	  are	  facing	  multiple	  disadvantages.	  	  
Malleability.	  Increasingly	  holders	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  dictate	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  object	  of	  innovation	  can	  be	  used	  or	  modified.	  This	  has	  created	  so	  much	  outrage	   in	   the	   software	   community	   that	   it	   helped	   to	   nurture	   the	   open	   source	  movement,	  which	  aims	  at	  restoring	  past	  freedoms.	  The	  effects	  those	  constraints	  have	  on	  scientific	  participation	  are	  multiple.	  Setting	  specific	  terms	  under	  which	  people	  are	  allowed	  to	  contribute	  may	  limit	  both	  the	  number	  of	  opportunities	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  375	  UNESCO	  (2009)	  and	  Timmermann	  (2013)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  3]	  with	  accompanying	  references	  376	  see	  Thompson	  (2010)	  for	  agricultural	  innovation.	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contribute	  and	  the	  number	  of	  potential	  contributors.	  Some	  innovators	  may	  also	  be	  deterred	  to	  contribute	  since	  the	  format	  their	  input	  has	  to	  be	  in	  does	  not	  suit	  their	  personal	  needs.	  Others	  may	  simply	  refuse	  to	  cooperate	  once	  the	  terms	  are	  unattractive	  or	  deemed	  unacceptable.	  	  A	  restriction	  on	  modification	  possibilities	   limits	   the	  users’	  control	  of	   the	  object	  (so	   that	   they	  are	  not	  able	   to	  change	  and	  modify	   it	  as	   they	  see	   fit)	  –	  while	  such	  control	  is	  something	  that	  is	  intrinsically	  valued.	  There	  is	  a	  widespread	  interest	  to	  own	   an	   object	   (as	   a	   piece	   of	   property),	   not	   merely	   lease	   it.	   Article	   17	   of	   the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Right	   identifies	   the	  right	   to	  own	  property	  as	  a	  fundamental	   human	   right.377 	  Liberties	   that	   are	   traditionally	   associated	   with	  property	  rights	  include	  the	  ability	  to	  modify	  or	  even	  destroy378	  an	  item,	  a	  liberty	  progressively	   undermined	   by	   licensing	   developments	   in	   the	  music,	  movie	   and	  software	  industry.	  Exclusive	  rights	  on	  industrial	  seed	  varieties	  expand	  this	  trend	  by	   limiting	   traditional	   farming	   practices	   such	   as	   the	   replanting	   of	   seeds	   from	  past	   harvests,	   informal	   seed	   exchanges	   and	   further	   attempts	   to	   improve	   these	  varieties.	  	  
Diversity	  of	   input	  possibilities.	   Inaccessibility	   of	   information	   is	   one	   of	   the	  many	  barriers	   the	   poor	   face	   when	   they	   want	   to	   cooperate	   in	   existing	   scientific	  endeavours.	   The	  digital	   divide	   and	   language	   barriers	   are	   still	   strong	   obstacles.	  More	   than	   natural	   language,	   technical	   jargons	   amount	   to	   a	   significant	   barrier.	  Patent	  documents	  have	   to	  be	  drafted	   in	  a	   specific	   scientific-­‐legal	   language	   that	  increasingly	  only	  a	  few	  legal	  experts	  master.	  Contributions	  to	  science	  also	  have	  to	  be	  made	  using	  a	  specific	  language.	  Patent	  offices	  only	  accept	  patent	  documents	  that	  are	  drafted	  in	  specified	  natural	  and	  technical	  languages.	  Some	  advocates	  of	  freedom	  of	  speech	  would	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	   consider	   this	  a	  method	   to	   limit	   the	   freedom	  to	  express	  oneself.	  Having	  such	  types	   of	   requirements	   are	   commonplace	   in	   the	   social	   and	   natural	   sciences.	  Certain	  standardizations	   facilitate	   the	  exchange	  of	   information	  between	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  individuals.	  What	  becomes	  harder	  to	  defend	  however	  is	   when	   particular	   groups	   of	   society	   are	   routinely	   hindered	   to	   partake	   in	   a	  dialogue	  because	  they	  lack	  the	  ability	  to	  communicate	  in	  the	  required	  language.	  This	   is	   the	   more	   unacceptable,	   when	   some	   of	   the	   remaining	   partners	   in	   the	  dialogue	  benefit	  from	  this	  lack	  of	  inclusion.	  	  	  	  
Reciprocity.	  Willingness	   to	   share	   and	  participate	   in	   certain	   endeavours	   is	   often	  affected	   by	   the	   perceived	   justness	   of	   a	   system.	   A	   successful	   cooperative	  enterprise	   demands	   that	   all	   partners	   are	   deemed	   worthy	   to	   cooperate	   with.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  377	  A	  right	  to	  own	  property	  has	  also	  wide	  support	  in	  philosophical	  quarters;	  e.g.	  people	  are	  entitled	  to	  hold	  property	  (land	  and	  movable	  goods)	  under	  Martha	  Nussbaum’s	  central	  human	  capabilities	  list,	  see	  Nussbaum	  (2011)	  p.	  34	  378	  cf.	  Strahilevitz	  (2005)	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Perceived	  unfairness	  or	  misconduct	  in	  the	  past	  have	  to	  be	  addressed	  before	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  regain	  widely	  shared	  enthusiasm	  for	  cooperation.379	  Exclusive	  rights	  by	  nature	  leave	  many	  individuals	  without	  the	  benefits	  of	  science,	  something	  that	  is	   difficult	   to	   assimilate	   with	   certain	   intuitions	   of	   justice,	   as	   the	   wide	   global	  public	   support	   to	  access	   to	  essential	  medicines	   clearly	  exemplifies.380	  The	  non-­‐rivalrous	   consumption	   of	   intellectual	   goods	   makes	   artificial	   scarcity	  objectionable.	  	  
(iv)	   Self-­‐determination	  	  Related	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  participation	  is	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination,	  a	  right	  that	  plays	  a	   central	   role	   in	  human	  rights	   law.	  The	   two	  Covenants	   (1966)	  concede	  a	  right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   to	   peoples	   in	   their	   first	   articles.	   It	   is	   alleged	   that	  opening	  up	  participation	  possibilities	   for	   scientific	  enterprises	  will	   foster	  more	  democratic	  decisions	  for	  research	  agendas.381	  In	  principle,	  democratic	  decision-­‐making	   for	   setting	   research	   agendas	   requires	   only	   a	   minimum	   scientific	  education	  and	  not	  necessarily	  active	  participation	  at	  the	  most	  advanced	  levels	  of	  research.	  Provided	  this	  is	  true,	  efforts	  to	  enable	  people	  to	  have	  a	  say	  in	  research	  agendas	   would	   not	   have	   to	   be	   linked	   to	   advocating	   more	   inclusive	   scientific	  research	   endeavours.	   Transparency	   in	   science	   and	   technology	   development	  would	  suffice.	  	  Self-­‐determination	   would	   however	   demand	   some	   type	   of	   decision-­‐making	  mechanism	   that	   includes	   votes	   of	   people	   from	   all	   social	   and	   geographic	  segments.	   As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   research	   agendas	   are	   nowadays	   primarily	  shaped	  by	  market	   incentives	   –	   in	   a	  world	  with	   such	  huge	   inequalities	   a	  highly	  undemocratic	  system.	  	  Further,	   some	  research	   that	   looks	  promising	   is	  often	  abandoned	  once	  research	  managers	   realize	   that	   exclusive	   rights	   cannot	   be	   obtained	   and	   this	   despite	  potential	  social	  benefits	  or	  utility.382	  Research	   institutes	  and	  private	  companies	  are	  continuously	  pushed	  toward	  delivering	  saleable	  patentable	  products;	  social	  utility	  and	  scientific	  freedom	  are	  rapidly	  relegated	  toward	  a	  secondary	  plane.	  	  Research	  spending	  per	  capita	  differs	  strongly	  among	  countries.383	  Discrepancies	  in	   research	   spending	   are	   defensible	   if	   contribution	   rates	   are	   set	   according	   to	  capacity	  to	  pay	  (discounting	  maybe	  special	  needs).	  However	  when	  countries	  in	  a	  similar	  position	  differ	  so	  drastically	  in	  the	  budget	  they	  allocate	  for	  research	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  379	  cf.	  Ooms	  (2010)	  380	  cf.	  Kapczynski	  (2008)	  381	  Shaheed	  (2012)	  382	  Lea	  (2008)	  	  p.	  46	  383	  e.g.	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  GDP	  Israel	  is	  spending	  over	  twice	  as	  much	  as	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  on	  research	  and	  development	  in	  science	  and	  technology,	  see	  UNESCO	  (2012)	  p.	  2	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development,	  giving	  citizens	  from	  different	  countries	  the	  same	  weighting	  of	  their	  votes	  becomes	  hard	  to	  justify	  on	  principles	  of	  fairness.	  	  	  
Strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  different	  proposals	  	  There	   is	   widespread	   agreement	   that	   current	   intellectual	   property	   regimes	  collide	   with	   ideas	   of	   justice	   and	   human	   rights	   on	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   issues.	  Unfortunately,	   beyond	   this	   shared	   conviction,	   there	   is	   little	   the	   different	  stakeholder	   groups	   are	   unanimous	   about.	   There	   is	   no	   conceptualized	   ideal	  solution	   that	   could	  serve	  as	  a	  yardstick	   from	  which	   to	  measure	  deviations.	  We	  can	   only	   hypothesize	   on	   how	   a	  world	  with	   a	   different	   incentive	   system	  would	  work.	  	  However,	  among	  the	  different	  groups	  that	  have	  drafted	  the	  alternative	  proposals	  to	   be	   discussed	   below,	   an	   additional	   commonality	   can	   be	   found.	   There	   is	   a	  certain	  consensus	  that	  we	  live	   in	  a	  world	  of	  extreme	  inequalities	  dominated	  by	  very	  powerful	  players	  to	  which	  some	  concessions	  have	  to	  be	  made.	  None	  of	  the	  depicted	   proposals	   can	   be	   considered	   completely	   utopian	   and	   unaware	   of	  current	   realities.	   The	   extent	   however	   to	   which	   these	   limitations	   are	   taken	   as	  intransigent,	  varies	  strongly	  among	  the	  different	  proponents.	  	  	  Proposals	  to	  alleviate	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  do	  generally	  not	  aim	  at	   tackling	   all	   the	   problems	   raised	   by	   the	   IP	   regime	   and	   existing	   global	  inequalities.	   Instead,	   we	   have	   a	   wide	   spectrum	   of	   solutions,	   some	   with	   very	  modest	  targets,	  others	  being	  only	  satisfied	  with	  a	  complete	  changeover.	  The	  aims	  of	   the	  proposals	  differ	  according	   to	  what	  advocates	  recognize	  as	  problems	  and	  the	   level	   of	   urgency	   that	   they	   assign	   to	   them.	   Addressing	   political	   feasibility,	  advocates	   grant	   concessions	   to	  make	   the	   various	   proposals	  more	   attractive	   to	  governments	  and	  industry.	  A	  further	  problem	  ensues	  from	  the	  circumstance	  that	  the	  discussion	  on	  what	  is	  feasible	  and	  what	   is	  not	   is	  highly	  polarized.	  This	   is	  due	   to	   the	  ambiguity	  of	   the	  concept	   of	   “feasibility”	   and	   its	   wide	   applicability.	   It	   allows	   to	   rule	   out	   certain	  proposals	   that	   cannot	   be	   implemented	   in	   practice,	   but	   also	   facilitates	  comparative	   assessment.384	  In	   how	   far	  we	   are	  willing	   to	   classify	   something	   as	  feasible	   or	   not,	   depends	   in	   part	   on	   what	   we	   consider	   an	   undeniable	  characteristic	   of	   political	   reality	   or	   essential	   to	   human	   nature.	   Since	   notions	  thereof	  are	  subjective,	  disagreements	  on	  what	  is	  feasible	  are	  inevitable.	  	  The	   room	   for	   disagreement	   is	   further	   expanded,	   if	   we	   consider	   that	   many	  proposals	  are	  feasible	  only	   if	  one	  expands	  one’s	  room	  for	  future	  capabilities	  by	  undertaking	  specific	  political	  strategies.385	  As	  this	  demands	  long-­‐term	  discipline,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  384	  cf.	  Gilabert	  and	  Lawford‐Smith	  (2012)	  385	  Gilabert	  (2009);	  Lawford‐Smith	  (2012)	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differences	  of	  opinion	  increase	  further.	  Long-­‐term	  commitments	  do	  not	  only	  fail	  because	   of	   lack	   of	   discipline,	   but	   also	   due	   to	   disputes	   on	  how	   far	  we	   can	  bind	  future	  freedoms	  to	  present-­‐day	  decisions.	  There	  are	  strong	  disagreements	  on	  the	  question	   if	   we	   are	   entitled	   to	   limit	   the	   freedom	   of	   those	  who	   are	   not	   present	  while	  we	  decide	  on	  future	  agendas.386	  Complexity	   is	  added	  in	  questions	  around	  climate	   change	   or	   pollution	   control,	   since	   lack	   of	   action	   today	   amounts	   to	  constrained	   room	   for	   action	   in	   the	   future.	   As	   a	   society	  we	   are	   accountable	   for	  both	  not	  having	  taken	  precautionary	  measures	  and	  bad	  planning.	  	  To	  gain	  an	  oversight	  of	  the	  different	  solutions	  supported	  by	  various	  stakeholder	  groups,	   six	   major	   proposals	   with	   their	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses	   will	   be	  sketched.	   I	   will	   briefly	   note	   how	   these	   proposals	   relate	   to	   the	   four	   conflicting	  human	  rights	  discussed	  earlier:	   the	  right	   to	  benefit	   from	  one’s	  own	   intellectual	  work,	   the	   right	   to	   benefit	   from	   science,	   the	   right	   to	   participate	   in	   the	  advancement	  of	  science,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  	  
(i)	   Health	  Impact	  Fund	  	  The	  idea	  behind	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  (HIF)	  is	  to	  gather	  a	  large	  sum	  of	  money	  to	   compensate	   developers	   of	   new	   medicines	   according	   to	   their	   capacity	   to	  increase	   quality-­‐adjusted	   life	   years	   (QALYs).387	  Companies	   or	   institutions	   that	  develop	  new	  medicines	  and	  provide	   them	  at	   cost	  price	  may	  opt	   for	   the	  Fund’s	  reward.	   Participating	   in	   the	   Fund	   is	   voluntary,	   although	   opting	   out	   is	   only	  possible	  after	  a	  certain	  time	  elapses.	  Patent	  holders	  are	  not	  required	  to	  give	  up	  their	  patents,	  thus	  retaining	  a	  certain	  control	  over	  follow-­‐up	  innovation.388	  	  The	  Health	   Impact	  Fund	   is	  designed	   to	   secure	  access	   to	  medicines.	  While	   later	  amendments	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  receive	  Fund’s	  rewards	  by	  proving	  the	  efficacy	  and	  adequate	  use	  of	   traditional	  herbal	  medicines,389	  the	  Fund	  has	  been	  drafted	  with	   the	  main	  purpose	  of	  promoting	  health	  with	  Western-­‐style	  pharmaceutical	  medicines.	  Based	  on	  the	  principles	  behind	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund,	  other	  types	  of	  funds	   have	   been	   suggested	   to	   propagate	   climate-­‐friendly	   technologies390.	   A	  similar	  fund	  to	  foster	  pro-­‐poor	  agricultural	  innovation	  is	  also	  conceivable.	  	  The	  HIF	  asks	  from	  innovators	  to	  pass	  a	  certain	  hurdle	  (among	  other	  conditions)	  to	   be	   able	   to	   claim	   the	   Fund’s	   rewards	   –	   in	   the	   case	   of	  medicines	   the	  market	  approval	   by	   a	   major	   biosafety	   regulation	   agency	   like	   the	   US	   Food	   and	   Drug	  Administration	   (FDA).391	  The	   cost-­‐effective	   measurement	   of	   QALYs	   requires	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  386	  cf.	  Gosseries	  and	  Meyer	  (2009)	  387	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  pp.	  18-­‐20	  388	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  p.	  22	  389	  Mendel	  and	  Hollis	  (2010)	  390	  Timmermann	  and	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2012a,	  2012b)	  [the	  latter	  here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  6]	  and	  Pogge	  (2010a)	  391	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2009)	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standardization	   and	   minimum	   variations	   in	   efficacy	   between	   medicines	   of	  different	  manufacturers,	  making	  industrial	  mass	  production	  mandatory.392	  The	  rewarding	  and	  financing	  mechanism	  of	  the	  HIF	  can	  only	  work	  if	  the	  system	  is	   transparent.	   However,	   exactly	   this	   has	   great	   potential	   in	   attracting	   the	  involvement	  of	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  research	  consortia,	  since	  transparency	  of	  capital	  inflow	  will	  increase	  trust	  among	  the	  different	  partners.	  We	  can	  also	  imagine	  that	  with	  an	  operative	  HIF	  companies	  will	  emerge	  that	  will	   focus	  solely	  on	  carrying	  out	   clinical	   trials	   for	   established	   consortia.	   Open	   innovation	  models	   that	  work	  with	   licenses	  that	  oblige	  their	  users	  to	  make	  modifications	  to	  the	  objects	   taken	  from	  the	  commons	  available	   to	  research	  partners	  could	  secure	   future	   funds	  by	  applying	  for	  the	  HIF	  rewards	  with	  their	  inventions.393	  	  	  	  The	  Health	   Impact	  Fund	  aims	  at	  making	   the	  benefits	  of	   scientific	  advancement	  more	   broadly	   accessible.	   It	   also	   works	   towards	   a	   fairer	   allocation	   of	   research	  effort	   in	   order	   to	   make	   medicines	   for	   neglected	   diseases	   available.	   The	  profitability	  of	  intellectual	  work	  in	  pharmaceutical	  research	  is	  maintained.	  	  	  
Criticism.	  Countries	  where	  neglected	  diseases	  are	  most	  prevalent	  will	  have	  direct	  access	   to	   pathogens,	   local	   knowledge	   on	   how	   the	   disease	   is	   propagated,	   and	  contact	  with	  affected	  populations.	  Advantages	  gained	  by	  this	  forerunner	  position	  might	   be	   easily	   lost	   when	   we	   consider	   the	   vast	   superiority	   of	   laboratories	  belonging	   to	   established	  pharmaceutical	   companies	  or	   their	   research	  partners.	  No	  guarantees	  are	  given	  to	  increase	  the	  participation	  of	  researchers	  from	  poorer	  countries.394	  The	   proposal	   is	   like	   the	   current	   patent	   regime	   a	   winner-­‐takes-­‐all	  system,	   thus	   leaving	   any	   creative	   worker	   that	   was	   somewhat	   behind	   empty-­‐handed.	  Democratic	   decision-­‐making	   on	   which	   research	   paths	   should	   be	   developed	  remains	   unaddressed.	   Thus	   little	   is	   done	   to	   improve	   people’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination.	  	  The	   huge	   sum	   needed	   to	   set	   up	   the	   Health	   Impact	   Fund	   is	   seen	   as	   an	  impediment.	  Kathleen	  Liddell	  compares	  the	  6	  billion	  dollars	  annually	  needed	  to	  set	  up	   the	  Health	   Impact	  Fund	  with	   the	   total	  United	  Nations	  operating	  budget,	  which	   is	   approximately	   30%	   less	   than	   what	   the	   fund	   needs	   and	   recalls	   the	  problems	  the	  United	  Nations	  faces	  to	  make	  countries	  pay	  their	  contributions.395	  	  	  
(ii)	   Prize	  systems	  -­‐	  Advanced	  market	  commitments	  	  In	  certain	  ways	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  can	  also	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  prize	  system,	  but	   there	   are	   other	   prize	   systems	   that	   have	   a	   completely	   different	   type	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  392	  The	  negative	  effects	  of	  this	  measure	  are	  described	  in	  Timmermann	  and	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2012b)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  6]	  393	  cf.	  Timmermann	  (2012a)	  394	  Timmermann	  and	  van	  den	  Belt	  (2012b)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  6]	  395	  Liddell	  (2010)	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architecture.	  Some	  prize	  systems	  work	  with	  pre-­‐identified	  targets,	  incentivizing	  companies	   to	   develop	   products	   with	   certain	   characteristics	   and	   functions.	  Advanced	  market	  commitments	  are	  one	  example	  of	   such	   type	  of	  prize	  systems	  and	  have	  already	  been	  put	  into	  practice	  for	  the	  development	  of	  some	  vaccines.396	  The	  idea	  behind	  advanced	  market	  commitments	  is	  that	  a	  central	  agency	  commits	  itself	   in	  advance	  to	  buy	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  end-­‐products	  that	  meet	  predefined	  characteristics.	  	  Another	   alternative	   is	   to	   stop	   providing	   patent	   protection	   for	   clearly	   specified	  research	  areas	  that	  are	  vital	  to	  secure	  human	  rights.	  The	  incentive	  to	  engage	  in	  research	  and	  development	  would	  be	  created	  by	  direct	  government	  funding.	  This	  strategy	  has	  been	  suggested	  for	  vital	  medicines.397	  A	  range	  of	  targets	  is	  identified	  and	  rewards	  set	  according	  to	  urgency	  and	  estimated	  development	  costs.	  	  Generally	   prize	   systems	   aim	   to	   make	   the	   benefits	   of	   scientific	   advancement	  accessible	   and	   to	   orient	   science	   toward	   making	   solutions	   for	   wider	   societal	  problems	   available,	   while	   recognizing	   that	   innovators	   should	   be	   fairly	  remunerated.	  Prize	  systems	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  increase	  the	  self-­‐determination	  of	   people.	   The	   characteristics	   and	   functions	   an	   invention	   should	   have	   can	   in	  principle	  be	  decided	  democratically.	  	  Prize	   systems	   can	   be	   designed	   to	   reward	   second-­‐	   or	   third-­‐ranked	   options,	  alleviating	  the	  problem	  of	  a	  winner-­‐takes-­‐all	  system.	  	  
Criticism.	   Having	   predefined	   targets	   comes	   with	   the	   cost	   that	   there	   is	   little	  incentive	   in	   developing	   a	   product	   that	   surpasses	   the	  minimum	   characteristics	  specified. 398 	  The	   agency	   specifying	   the	   requirements	   that	   the	   object	   of	  innovation	   must	   meet	   has	   to	   have	   a	   fairly	   good	   knowledge	   of	   what	   it	   can	  reasonably	  expect,	  thus	  making	  good	  estimates	  only	  feasible	  when	  the	  potential	  product	   is	   already	   in	   a	   later	   stage	   of	   development.	   Potential	   products	   whose	  research	  has	  been	  vastly	  neglected	  would	  be	  bad	  candidates	  for	  such	  a	  system.399	  The	  modularity	  of	  the	  different	  prize	  systems	  makes	  it	  also	  easy	  for	  governments	  and	   funding	   agencies	   to	   cancel	   individual	   periodical	   prize	   contests	   without	  evoking	  the	  resistance	  of	  large	  stakeholders	  groups.	  Prize	   systems	   do	   not	   actively	   encourage	   wider	   scientific	   participation,	   except	  when	   addressed	   to	   specific	   groups	   (e.g.	   young	   scholars’	   awards,	   municipal	  prizes).	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  396	  for	  a	  critical	  note	  see	  Birn	  and	  Lexchin	  (2011)	  397	  see	  Love	  and	  Hubbard	  (2007)	  398	  cf.	  Pogge	  (2012)	  p.	  549	  399	  Criticism	  based	  on	  the	  case	  of	  medicines	  is	  offered	  by	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008)	  p.	  106f.	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(iii)	   Open	  innovation	  models	  	  	  Open	  innovation	  does	  not	  consist	  in	  a	  single	  clearly	  defined	  proposal,	  a	  number	  of	  innovation	  models	  fall	  under	  this	  category.	  Here	  the	  concept	  will	  be	  used	  in	  an	  even	  broader	  manner	  by	  also	  including	  ideals	  prevalent	   in	  the	  open	  access	  and	  open	  source	  movement.	  As	  central	  to	  this	  trend	  we	  can	  identify	  the	  availability	  of	  at	   least	  one	  “kernel”	   that	   is	  openly	  accessible	  and	  works	  as	  a	  starting	  point	   for	  further	   innovation.	   The	   central	   aim	   is	   to	   facilitate	   outside	   contribution	  possibilities.400	  Following	   this	   basic	   principle,	   the	   “open—	   movement”	   can	   be	  ramified	  into	  different	  sub-­‐movements.	  	  	  One	   sub-­‐movement	   is	   the	  open	  access	   initiative.	  A	   series	  of	  public	   institutions,	  think	   tanks	   and	   NGOs	   have	   committed	   themselves	   to	   increase	   the	   number	   of	  freely	  available	  publications.401	  Not	  only	  the	  outrage	  triggered	  by	  rising	   journal	  subscription	   prices,	   but	   also	   an	   increasing	   acknowledgement	   that	   information	  should	   be	   accessible	   to	   all	   without	   discrimination,	   has	   made	   this	   movement	  increasingly	   popular.	   Two	   inventions	   have	   boosted	   the	   potential	   of	   this	  movement.	   One	   is	   technical	   –	   the	   Internet	   and	   its	   immense	   potential	   to	  make	  huge	  amounts	  of	  information	  accessible	  and	  identifiable.	  The	  second	  invention	  is	  of	   a	   legal	   nature,	   and	   consists	   in	   a	  wide	   array	   of	   newly	   developed	   licenses,	   as	  illustrated,	  for	  example,	  by	  the	  Creative	  Commons	  models.	  Those	  licenses	  allow	  authors	  to	  retain	  only	  the	  legally	  entitled	  rights	  they	  want	  to	  make	  use	  of.	  A	   diversity	   of	   opinions	   can	   be	   found	   regarding	   which	   rights	   one	   should	   be	  allowed	  to	  keep.	  Some	  groups	  allow	  all	  but	  commercial	  use,	  others	  don’t	  reserve	  any	   rights	   at	   all.	   Similarly	   with	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   creative	   work,	   opinions	  change	  in	  how	  far	  one	  may	  freely	  alter	  a	  created	  object.	  In	  how	  far	  one	  wants	  to	  have	   the	   created	   object	   attributed	   to	   one’s	   authorship	   is	   also	   an	   issue	   where	  opinions	  diverge.	  	  The	   movement	   has	   increased	   its	   outreach	   by	   making	   templates	   of	   different	  licenses	   publicly	   available.402	  Tutorials	   have	  made	   those	   licenses	   accessible	   for	  those	  who	  are	  not	  legally	  literate.403	  	  	  The	  second	  sub-­‐movement	  is	  the	  open	  source	  movement.	  Again,	  here	  a	  standard	  charter	  does	  not	  exist	  and	  we	  can	  identify	  great	  variations	  of	  this	  movement.	  We	  may	   say	   that	   this	   movement	   was	   sparked	   by	   people	   who	   are	   interested	   in	  inventing	  or	  in	  problem-­‐solving	  more	  generally,	  and	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  limited	  by	  intellectual	   property	   restrictions.	   Distinctive	   is	   that	   many	   advocates	   of	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  400	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  openness	  in	  general,	  see	  Benkler	  (2002)	  401	  cf.	  Budapest	  Open	  Access	  Initiative,	  February	  2002,	  Bethesda	  Statement	  on	  Open	  Access	  Publishing,	  June	  2003,	  and	  the	  Berlin	  Declaration	  on	  Open	  Access	  to	  Knowledge	  in	  the	  Sciences	  and	  Humanities,	  October	  2003,	  see	  Ress	  (2010)	  402	  see	  http://creativecommons.org/	  403	  ibid.	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movement	  tend	  to	  refer	  to	  it	  as	  a	  restoration	  of	  past	  standards	  and	  not	  so	  much	  as	   a	   revolution.404	  Not	   only	   a	   balance	   between	   private	   and	   public	   interests	   is	  aimed	  at,	  but	  also	  a	  balance	  between	  interests	  of	  initial	  and	  follow-­‐on	  innovators	  is	  sought	  for.405	  Open	  source	  models	  are	  especially	  keen	  in	  securing	  malleability	  of	  research	  outputs.	  The	   architecture	   of	   open	   source	   projects	   permits	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   sub-­‐	   or	  parallel	   workgroups.	   A	   project	   leader	   who	   does	   not	   fulfil	   the	   expectations	   of	  collaborators	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  losing	  contributors	  to	  side-­‐projects	  that	  do	  match	  common	   interests.	   Success	   of	   any	   project	   is	   dependent	   upon	   each	   project	  leader’s	  capacity	  to	  attract	  collaborators.406	  	  Somewhat	  different	   than	   in	  other	  movements,	  many	  open	  source	  collaborators	  identify	   themselves	   as	   part	   of	   a	   community.	   In	   how	   far	   users	   are	   expected	   to	  reciprocate	   by	   also	   sharing	   their	   contribution	   is	   something	   each	   open	   source	  platform	   decides	   on	   its	   own	   (either	   democratically	   or	   unilaterally).	   Some	  communities	  have	  developed	  policies	  that	  make	  the	  sharing	  of	  improvements	  to	  the	   community	   mandatory.	   This	   however	   generally	   counts	   only	   for	  improvements	   that	   have	   been	   made	   public.	   There	   are	   no	   duties	   to	   share	  improvements	   made	   for	   personal	   use	   only.	   Thus	   while	   aiming	   at	   certain	  standards	  of	  reciprocity,	  open	  source	  communities	  do	  not	  go	  as	  far	  as	  aspiring	  to	  fully	  share	  any	  improvement	  that	  came	  into	  existence.	  	  In	   how	   far	   inputs	   are	   rewarded	   or	   not,	   depends	   on	   the	   research	   entities,	   thus	  limiting	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  the	  possibilities	  to	  materially	  benefit	  from	  one’s	  work.	  	  	  	  In	  sum,	  the	  open	  innovation	  enthusiasm	  is	  chiefly	  about	  enabling	  participation.	  It	  is	   hoped	   that	   wider	   participation	   will	   also	   make	   the	   necessary	   innovation	  available,	   and	   a	   greater	   number	   of	   participants	   also	   increases	   the	   democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  innovation	  systems.	  	  	  	  	  
Criticism.	   Extreme	   inequality	   demands	   a	   system	   that	   delivers	   the	   products	   of	  innovation	  to	  the	  most	  needy.	  Open	  innovation	  could	  lead	  to	  technical	  solutions	  that	   are	   only	   apt	   for	   the	   technologically	   skilled.	   Open	   innovation	   advocates	  mainly	   freedom	   for	   research	   and	   development.	   The	   type	   of	   outcomes	   plays	   a	  secondary	  role;	  the	  emphasis	  is	  put	  on	  there	  being	  an	  outcome.	  Naturally,	  most	  innovators	  will	  tend	  to	  develop	  solutions	  for	  problems	  they	  encounter.	  However,	  those	  who	  have	  the	  liberty	  to	  innovate	  are	  most	  likely	  not	  the	  worst-­‐off	  and	  also	  encounter	  a	  different	  set	  of	  problems.	  An	  active	  engagement	  with	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  poor	  will	  still	  have	  to	  be	  separately	  incentivized.	  Similarly,	  openness	  alone	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  404	  cf.	  Nicolosi	  and	  Ruivenkamp	  (2012),	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  repossession	  see	  Kloppenburg	  (2010)	  405	  cf.	  Hope	  (2009)	  p.	  171	  406	  Hope	  (2009)	  p.	  181	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is	  not	  enough	  to	  allow	  the	  very	  poor	  to	  participate	  in	  science.	  Without	  access	  to	  basic	  infrastructure	  and	  education	  most	  people	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  participate.	  The	   flexibility	   innovators	   have	   to	  move	   further	   to	   other	   projects	   comes	   at	   the	  price	   that	  additional	   incentives	  will	  be	  needed	   to	  maintain	   interest	   in	   finishing	  tedious	   long-­‐term	  projects.	   This	  will	   require	   further	   resources,	   something	   that	  open	  innovation	  models	  in	  general	  have	  little	  capacity	  to	  sufficiently	  generate.	  	  The	  issue	  of	  accessibility	  remains	  insufficiently	  addressed.	  Not	  having	  to	  pay	  for	  expensive	   licenses	  will	   certainly	   reduce	   the	   price	   of	   the	   objects	   of	   innovation,	  however	   extreme	   poverty	   also	   demands	   that	   those	   objects	   are	   cheaply	  reproducible,	  which	  however	  has	  to	  be	  incentivized	  through	  other	  means.	  	  
(iv)	   South-­‐South	  partnerships	  	  Establishing	  networks	  that	  connect	  innovative	  capacities	  amid	  different	  regions	  of	   the	   Global	   South	   is	   another	   initiative	   to	   alleviate	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   the	  current	   intellectual	   property	   regime.	   People	  who	   live	   in	   similar	   environmental	  conditions	   share	   many	   of	   the	   same	   problems	   and	   often	   the	   same	   spare	  resources.	   Therefore,	   it	   seems	   natural	   that	   people	   who	   have	   been	   cognitively	  stimulated	  by	  comparable	  sets	  of	  problems	  have	  a	  great	  potential	  to	  learn	  from	  one	  another.	  Further,	   it	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  some	  people	  are	  so	  poor	  that	  they	  can	   only	   benefit	   from	   technological	   innovations	   if	   these	   can	   be	   reconstructed	  using	  spare	  local	  resources.407	  	  One	  of	  the	  networks	  that	  aim	  at	  making	  grassroots	  innovators’	  knowledge	  more	  widely	  known	  and	  recognized	  is	  the	  Honeybee	  Network	  in	  India.408	  Much	  can	  be	  learned	   from	   a	   network	   that	   has	   shown	   great	   success	   in	   a	   country	   with	   such	  enormous	  cultural	  diversity	  within	   its	  borders	  and	  amounting	   to	  a	   sixth	  of	   the	  global	   population.	   The	   Honeybee	   Network	   is	   far	   from	   representing	   a	   negative	  attitude	  towards	  Western	  technology.	  It	  primarily	  encourages	  local	  innovators	  to	  participate	   in	   technological	   innovation	   to	   offer	   alternatives.	  But	   the	   same	  goes	  for	   the	   use	   of	   local	   technologies;	   it	   invites	   industry	   and	   farmers	   to	   become	  acquainted	  with	  local	  innovation.	  It	  does	  however	  recognize	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  grassroots	   innovators	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  protecting	   their	  knowledge.	  Here	   legal	  counselling	   is	   offered	   to	   help	   indigenous	   innovators	   secure	   their	  material	   and	  moral	  interests.409	  While	  making	  sure	  that	  innovators	  receive	  their	  share	  in	  any	  monetary	  benefits	  raised	  by	  their	  intellectual	  creation,	  the	  Network	  also	  focuses	  on	   securing	   the	   moral	   interest	   of	   innovators.	   Names,	   pictures	   and	   origin	   are	  information	  often	  shared	  if	  the	  inventor	  so	  wishes.	  And	  this	  also	  in	  cases	  where	  little	  or	  no	  material	  benefits	  can	  be	  expected.	  We	  can	  identify	  a	  particular	  ideal	  in	  this	   initiative:	   the	  recognition	  and	  promotion	  of	   local	  expertise.	  To	  honour	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  407	  cf.	  Gupta	  (2010)	  408	  Gupta	  (2006)	  409	  Gupta	  (2006)	  p.	  57	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ideal	   a	   variety	   of	   outreach	   endeavours	   have	   been	   started,	   including	  computerized	  networked	  kiosks	  that	  allow	  inhabitants	  of	  rural	  areas	  to	  browse	  for	   innovations	   in	   multiple	   languages	   and	   an	   extensive	   radio	   and	   television	  coverage	  of	  local	  innovation.410	  	  This	   type	   of	   initiative	   seeks	   to	  make	   available	   solutions	   for	   people	  who	   are	   in	  similar	   conditions	  as	   the	   inventors.	  The	   chances	   that	   such	   innovations	  become	  accessible	  to	  those	  in	  need	  are	  thus	  far	  greater.	  Since	  the	  inventor/user	  divide	  is	  small	   or	   non-­‐existent,	   innovations	   are	  more	   focused	   on	  people’s	   urgent	   needs.	  Inventions	   for	   everyday	   matters	   that	   do	   not	   attract	   much	   attention	   by	   the	  international	  scientific	  community,	  like	  improvements	  in	  sanitation	  systems,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  developed.	  	  South-­‐South	   partnerships	   aim	   at	   empowering	   people	   who	   are	   currently	  underrepresented	   in	   the	   scientific	   community	   to	   be	   able	   to	   participate	   in	  scientific	   enterprises.	  Wider	   participation	   increases	   the	   chances	   that	   voices	   of	  now	  excluded	  people	  are	  heard.	  	  	  
Criticism.	   On	  moral	   grounds,	   there	   is	   little	   one	   can	   criticize	   about	   this	   type	   of	  initiative.	  Coexistence	  in	  harmony	  is	  aimed	  at,	  something	  that	  is	  a	  laudable	  goal,	  but	  this	  demands	  from	  victims	  of	  past	  injustices	  to	  move	  on	  often	  without	  having	  their	  disputes	  settled.	  	  Given	   the	   huge	   inequalities	   among	   rich	   and	   poor	   one	   might	   wonder	   if	   such	  networks	   will	   have	   sufficient	   power	   to	   rebalance	   losses	   suffered	   with	   the	  implementation	  of	   the	  TRIPS	  agreement.	  Especially	   innovations	   that	  demand	  a	  high	   level	   of	   expertise	   have	   still	   to	   find	   sufficient	   financial	   backers	   in	   the	  developing	  world.	  Except	  in	  the	  BRICS	  countries411,	  big	  science	  projects	  will	  still	  have	   to	   rely	   on	   a	   significant	   help	   from	   developed	   countries	   or	   resort	   to	   an	  alliance	   of	   a	   large	   group	   of	   developing	   countries.	   Large	   differences	  within	   the	  countries	  make	  such	  type	  of	  collaborations	  unlikely	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  
(v)	   Access	  to	  Knowledge	  (A2K)	  movement	  	  	  It	   will	   not	   come	   as	   a	   surprise	   that	   the	   central	   issue	   around	   the	   Access	   to	  Knowledge	  movement	  is	  to	  make	  knowledge	  accessible	  to	  people.	  The	  demand	  is	  to	  make	   knowledge	  more	   accessible	   for	   the	   fostering	   of	   scientific	   and	   cultural	  life.	   Currently,	   there	   are	   no	   obligations	   for	   copyright	   holders	   to	   make	   a	  publication	  available	  once	   it	  becomes	  out-­‐of-­‐print.	  The	  consequence	   is	   that	   the	  majority	  of	  works	  protected	  by	  copyright	  are	  insufficiently	  accessible.	  Archivists,	  educational	   institutions	   and	   libraries	   should	   have	   the	   liberty	   to	   make	   copies	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  410	  Gupta	  (2006)	  p.	  60	  411	  i.d.	  Brazil,	  Russia,	  India,	  China	  and	  South	  Africa	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available	   when	   works	   are	   not	   commercially	   exploited.412 	  The	   possibility	   to	  change	  protected	  content	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  accessible	  for	  people	  with	  certain	  disabilities	  is	  also	  an	  issue	  the	  movement	  advocates.413	  	  Patent	   documents	   may	   not	   include	   all	   necessary	   information	   to	   reproduce	   an	  invention.414	  Commitment	  to	  transfer	  know-­‐how	  should	  be	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  granting	  of	  a	  patent.415	  A	  general	  concern	  to	  make	  tacit	  knowledge	  available	  can	  also	  be	  identified	  in	  the	  draft	  treaty	  of	  the	  movement.	  	  In	  the	  A2K	  agenda,	  we	  can	  find	  some	  elements	  that	  have	  to	  do	  less	  with	  access	  to	  knowledge	  directly,	  but	  more	  with	  justice	  in	  general.	  Patents	  can	  only	  be	  granted	  if	  the	  source	  or	  origin	  of	  biological	  material	  utilized	  is	  disclosed.416	  Here	  we	  can	  recognize	   an	   attempt	   to	   limit	   biopiracy	   –	   a	   policy	   in	   favour	   of	   securing	  indigenous	  communities’	  moral	  and	  material	   interests.417	  Similarly	  measures	  to	  make	  publicly	   funded	   research,	   data	   and	  broadcasting	   accessible	   are	   specified.	  When	   applying	   for	   patents,	   inventors	   must	   disclose	   if	   they	   benefited	   from	  governmental	  funding.418	  Access	  to	  governmental	  information	  is	  also	  justified	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  transparency.419	  	  The	  movement	   also	   recognizes	   that	   the	   public	   domain	   is	   something	   that	   is	   in	  need	  of	  protection.420	  Ever	  more	  knowledge	  qualifies	  as	  protectable	  by	  exclusive	  rights	   and	   temporary	   exclusivity	   also	   becomes	   lengthier.	   Broadening	   exclusive	  rights	  can	   limit	   future	   innovation.	  Creative	  authors	  need	  materials	  on	  which	   to	  draw	   for	   further	   innovation.	   If	   the	   so-­‐called	   “building	   blocks”	   of	   further	  innovation	   are	   privatized,	   access	   cannot	   be	   guaranteed.	   Recognizing	   that	  inventions	   do	   not	   come	   out	   of	   the	   void,	   efforts	   to	   actively	   expand	   knowledge	  commons	  have	  to	  be	  undertaken.421	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  412	  Treaty	  on	  Access	  to	  Knowledge	  (draft	  9	  May	  2005)	  (hereinafter	  A2K	  treaty	  (draft))	  available	  at	  http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k_treaty_may9.pdf,	  art.	  3.1	  viii	  and	  for	  orphan	  works	  generally	  art.	  3.8	  413	  A2K	  treaty	  (draft),	  art.	  3.3	  	  414	  The	  TRIPS	  agreement	  art.	  29.1	  demands	  that	  the	  patent	  document	  should	  contain	  all	  information	  needed	  for	  somebody	  skilled	  in	  the	  art	  to	  reproduce	  the	  invention.	  This	  however	  is	  often	  not	  done	  precisely.	  415	  A2K	  treaty	  (draft),	  art.	  4.1	  (c)	  iv.	  	  416	  A2K	  treaty	  (draft),	  art.	  4.1	  (c)	  ii.	  	  417	  For	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  in	  international	  law,	  see	  Correa	  (2010)	  and	  Dutfield	  (2006)	  418	  A2K	  treaty	  (draft),	  art.	  4.1	  (c)	  iii.	  419	  A2K	  treaty	  (draft),	  art.	  5.5	  420	  for	  a	  general	  defence,	  see	  also	  Boyle	  (2008)	  421	  A2K	  treaty	  (draft),	  art.	  5.1.	  The	  importance	  of	  maintaining	  a	  commons	  from	  which	  everybody	  can	  draw	  for	  further	  innovation	  has	  also	  been	  ascertained	  for	  plant	  breeding	  by	  supporting	  easier	  access	  to	  genetic	  resources,	  see	  De	  Schutter	  (2011)	  pp.	  325-­‐327	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Additionally,	  the	  A2K	  movement	  recognizes	  that	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  can	  be	   abused	   and	   demands	   clarity	   about	   which	   licensing	   practices	   qualify	   as	  such.422	  The	  idea	  of	  abuse	  of	  rights	  is	  also	  present	  in	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement.423	  In	   relation	   to	   the	   above-­‐discussed	   threatened	   human	   rights,	   the	   Access	   to	  Knowledge	  movement	   seeks	   to	   address	   all	   four	   rights.	   The	   benefits	   of	   science	  should	   be	   accessible	   to	   all	   and	   people	   are	   to	   be	   equipped	   with	   the	   tools	   to	  participate	   in	   the	  advancement	   of	   science.	   It	   tackles	   the	   issue	   of	   self-­‐determination	  by	  seeking	  more	  transparency	  and	  empowering	  more	  people	  with	  a	   right	   to	   access	   to	   information.	   Some	   constraints	   are	  however	   set	   on	  how	   far	  people	   may	   exploit	   their	   creative	   work.	   A	   stricter	   balance	   between	   society’s	  interests	   and	   the	   interests	   of	   innovators	   is	   sought.	   Additionally,	   it	   plans	  measures	   to	  avoid	   illicit	  exploitation	  of	  other	  peoples’	   inventions,	  especially	  by	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  biopiracy.	  	  	  
Criticism.	   The	   A2K	   movement	   is	   a	   very	   ambitious	   movement,	   often	  underestimating	  current	  political	  realities.	  The	  urgency	  to	   include	  more	  people	  in	   scientific	   enterprises	   is	   something	   difficult	   to	   sympathize	   with	   before	  subsistence	   needs	   are	   widely	   secured.	   Addressing	   the	   current	   level	   of	  deprivation	  half	  of	  the	  world	  population	  lives	  in	  is	  something	  most	  people	  would	  prioritize.	  Others	  may	   also	  question	   the	  need	  of	   engaging	   in	  more	   science	   and	  technology	   development	   before	   the	   benefits	   of	   existing	   inventions	   are	   widely	  shared.	  	  	  
(vi)	   Compulsory	  licenses	  	  To	   label	   the	   wide	   use	   of	   compulsory	   licenses	   as	   a	   separate	   movement	   or	  proposal	  will	  most	  likely	  provoke	  objection.	  There	  are	  however	  good	  reasons	  to	  treat	   them	   here	   as	   one	   of	   the	   many	   proposals	   being	   discussed.	   Compulsory	  licenses	   recognize	   that	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   can	   be	   abused	   and	   that	   the	  way	   innovators	  may	   use	   these	   rights	  may	   run	   counter	   to	   public	   interests.	   The	  legal	   tool	   of	   a	   compulsory	   license	   entitles	   a	   government	   to	   override	   exclusive	  rights	  granted	  by	  a	  patent.	  States	  using	  compulsory	   licenses	  still	  agree	  that	   the	  patent	  holder	  is	  entitled	  to	  remuneration,	  but	  they	  reserve	  the	  right	  to	  establish	  what	  an	  adequate	  remuneration	  consists	  of.	  Having	   predecessors	   in	   national	   jurisdictions,	   this	   tool	  was	   also	   established	   in	  the	  TRIPS	   agreement,	   and	  has	  been	   reaffirmed	   in	   the	  Doha	  Declaration	  on	   the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  and	  Public	  Health,	  November	  2001.424	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  A2K	  treaty	  (draft),	  art.	  7.1	  	  423	  TRIPS,	  art.	  40.2	  424	  See	  TRIPS	  agreement,	  article	  31	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Using	  compulsory	  licenses	  can	  be	  decided	  democratically,	  but	  governments	  often	  have	   to	   fear	   retaliation	  measures	  by	   the	  patent	  holder’s	   country	  of	   origin.	  The	  decision	  can	  be	  affirmed	  or	  rejected	  by	  international	  arbitration.	  	  	  
Criticism:	   Compulsory	   licenses	   have	   some	   short-­‐term	   benefits,	   however	   when	  widely	   used	   or	   the	   threat	   of	   their	   use	   exists	   it	   discourages	   innovation	   in	   the	  affected	   field.	   The	   easiest	   escape	   from	   losing	   on	   research	   and	   development	  investment	   is	   to	   do	   research	   in	   areas	   where	   recouping	   one’s	   capital	   is	   safe.	  Companies	  can	  simply	  avoid	  doing	  research	  in	  areas	  that	  will	  provide	  solutions	  specially	  targeted	  for	  the	  needy.425	  Thus,	  in	  the	  long	  run	  compulsory	  licenses	  do	  not	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  access	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  science	  and	  may	  even	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  in	  aligning	  scientific	  agendas	  with	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  poor.	  	  Enhancing	  participation	  possibilities	   is	  generally	  not	  addressed,	  at	   least	   for	   the	  very	   poor.	   An	   exception	   occurs	   when	   exclusive	   rights	   on	   broad	   patents	   are	  revoked,	  thus	  enabling	  again	  follow-­‐on	  innovation	  by	  other	  companies	  as	  well.	  	  Little	   is	   gained	   for	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination.	   Compulsory	   licenses	   allow	  only	  choosing	  from	  what	  is	  already	  invented.	  	  	  
A	  brief	  overall	  assessment	  of	  the	  alternatives	  	  After	   examining	   the	   different	   proposals,	   the	   question	   is	   raised:	   which	   one	   of	  them	  should	  be	  favoured?	  This	  demands	  a	  clear	  assessment	  of	  the	  benefits	  and	  shortcomings	  of	  each	  one	  of	  them.	  Before	  this	  can	  be	  done,	  we	  have	  to	  recall	  that	  some	   of	   the	   disadvantages	   apparent	   in	   the	   proposals	   are	   actually	   deliberate	  concessions	  made	  toward	  political	  feasibility.	  The	  meaning	  of	  what	  concessions	  amount	  to	  is	  however	  also	  subject	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  interpretations.	  An	  example	  is	  Van	  Parijs’	  understanding	  of	  the	  term:	  “a	  concession	  does	  not	  consist	  of	  agreeing	  to	  receive	  less	  than	  one	  has	  an	  interest	  in	  obtaining,	  but	  rather	  in	  agreeing	  that	  one	  will	  receive	  less	  than	  what	  one	  regards	  as	  one’s	  entitlement.”426	  A	  proper	  use	  of	   the	  term	  would	  require	   from	  us	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  notion	   in	  regard	  to	  what	  we	  are	  entitled	  to.	  Unfortunately,	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  dispute	  on	  what	  our	  entitlements	  amount	  to	  (or	  to	  what	  we	  are	  obliged	  to	  provide	  others	  with),	  therefore	  making	  it	  inevitable	  that	  our	  understandings	  of	  what	  concessions	  are	  differ.	  Thus,	  three	  doctrines	   aiming	   at	   securing	   different	   sets	   of	   entitlements	   will	   be	   briefly	  discussed.	   Those	   are	   the	   basic	   rights	   idea,	   entitlements	   secured	   by	   the	  International	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  and	  notions	  defending	  rights	  of	  future	  generations.	  	  	  Having	   basic	   rights	   secured	   is	   a	  widely	   shared	   goal,	   a	   common	   consensus	   one	  could	   say.	   However,	   here	   some	   differences	   in	   opinion	   arise	   at	   an	   early	   stage.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  425	  Hollis	  and	  Pogge	  (2008),	  p.	  99f	  426	  Van	  Parijs	  (2012)	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Henry	  Shue	  defines	  the	  right	  to	  subsistence	  as	  one	  of	  the	  basic	  rights.	  He	  means	  by	  this	  that	  without	  the	  minimum	  securities	  to	  ensure	  subsistence,	  other	  rights	  cannot	  be	  enjoyed.427	  The	  rights	  that	  are	  usually	  considered	  as	  basic	  are	  some	  of	  those	  we	  can	  find	  in	  the	  ICESCR	  articles	  11.1	  and	  12	  –	  the	  right	  to	  health,	  shelter	  and	   food.	   In	   how	   far	   science	   and	   technology	   play	   an	   indispensable	   role	   in	  securing	  those	  rights	  is	  far	  from	  self-­‐evident.	  	  In	   relation	   to	   health,	   the	   link	   between	   taking	   a	  medicine	   and	   a	   certain	   health	  outcome	   is	   often	  undeniable.	  While	   food	   is	   often	   seen	   as	   an	   even	  more	  urgent	  necessity	  than	  medicines,	  the	  causal	  relationship	  between	  a	  specific	  agricultural	  innovation	   and	   food	   security	   is	   more	   difficult	   to	   establish.	   The	   target	   of	   food	  security	   can	   be	   achieved	   by	   other	   means	   than	   relying	   on	   the	   particular	  innovation	   in	   question.	   Additionally	   we	   have	   special	   local	   circumstances	   that	  alter	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   the	   needs	   that	   are	   considered	   more	   urgent	   for	   human	  survival	  than	  others.	  People	  living	  around	  the	  polar	  circles	  would	  argue	  that	  one	  cannot	  be	  deprived	  of	  proper	  clothing	  and	  shelter	  for	  even	  less	  time	  than	  of	  food	  and	  medicines.	  It	   is	  commonly	  acknowledged	  that	  innovation	  can	  play	  a	  role	  to	  make	   clothing	   and	   shelter	   better	   suitable	   for	   harsh	   environments,	   but	   the	  securement	  of	  those	  needs	  is	  even	  less	  dependent	  on	  a	  particular	  technological	  innovation.	  	  Thus,	  in	  how	  far	  a	  person	  tends	  to	  categorize	  an	  object	  as	  necessary	  for	  securing	  basic	  rights	  depends	  often	  on	  perceived	  vulnerabilities,	  and	  those	  vary	  according	  to	  multiple	   social	   and	   geographic	   factors.428	  Using	   the	   basic	   goods	   category	   to	  identify	   the	   objects	   of	   innovation	   that	   can	   be	   exploited	  without	  moral	   scruple	  would	  only	  make	  sense	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  if	  the	  objects	  falling	  within	  this	  category	  can	   be	   broadly	   bundled.	   The	   diversity	   of	   vulnerabilities	   obliges	   to	   offer	  correlative	   remedies	   and	   a	   prophylactics	   package.	   A	   strict	   hierarchy	   of	   which	  needs	  are	  more	  vital	  than	  others	  is	  impossible	  to	  defend	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  	  	  A	  number	  of	  technologies	  fall	  clearly	  out	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  is	  protected	  by	  the	  basic	   rights	   doctrine,	   but	   can	  nevertheless	   significantly	   help	   to	   achieve	   certain	  rights	  protected	  by	   the	   International	  Bill	   of	  Rights.	  The	   importance	  of	  many	  of	  the	   less	   urgent	   human	   rights	   cannot	   be	   completely	   ignored	   by	   basic	   rights	  advocates.	  Since	  we	  do	  not	  have	  institutions	  that	  redistribute	  resources	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	   that	  basic	   subsistence	  rights	  are	  more	  widely	  secured,	  people	  are	  compelled	   to	  do	  everything	   in	   their	  power	   to	  overcome	   local	   threats	   to	  health,	  food	   security	   and	   generally	   hazards	   coming	   from	   an	   exposure	   to	   a	   harsh	  environment.	  Having	  access	   to	   research	  networks	  and	  a	  basic	   infrastructure	   to	  undertake	  experiments	  enables	  people	  to	  seek	  for	  solutions	  on	  their	  own.	  Failing	  to	   continuously	   assist	   people	   as	   they	   fall	   into	   distress	   makes	   it	   mandatory	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  427	  Shue	  (1996)	  428	  For	  perceived	  vulnerabilities,	  in	  terms	  of	  identifying	  oneself	  in	  a	  position	  of	  disadvantage,	  see	  Wolff	  and	  De-­‐Shalit	  (2007)	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enable	   them	   to	   be	   able	   to	   provide	   for	   themselves.	   Securing	   possibilities	   to	  partake	   in	   science	   and	   technology	   development	   releases	   people	   from	   a	  relationship	  of	  dependency,	  a	  goal	  that	  is	  laudable	  in	  its	  own	  right.429	  Copyright	  limits	  access	  to	  the	  most	  recent	  scholarship	  and	  research	  in	  the	  social	  and	  natural	  sciences,	  having	  the	  effect	  that	  many	  people	  are	  not	  informed	  about	  the	   newest	   development	   in	   fields	   that	   concern	   their	   daily	   lives.	   Being	  misinformed	  or	  having	   scarce	  access	   to	   information	  makes	   citizens	  vulnerable.	  Democratic	  citizenship	  demands	  access	   to	   information	  and	   the	   tools	   that	  make	  knowledge	  more	  widely	  accessible	  and	  permit	  a	  more	  open	  dialogue.	  This	  is	  vital	  for	  self-­‐determination.	  	  Lastly,	   technologies	  shape	  not	  only	  our	  current	  society	  but	  also	   the	  way	   future	  people	   will	   live	   their	   lives.	   Most	   likely	   the	   next	   generations	   will	   build	   up	   on	  technologies	  we	  have	  developed,	  as	  we	  have	  continued	  to	  develop	  technologies	  our	  ancestors	  made	  available.	  Science	  technologies	  are	  not	  neutral	  in	  the	  ethical	  assessment	   and	   we	   are	   accountable	   for	   the	   direction	   research	   agendas	   have	  taken.	   Failing	   to	   develop	   an	   innovation	   incentive	   system	   that	   allows	   us	   to	  democratically	   steer	   research	   agendas	   is	   a	   major	   omission,	   which	   makes	   the	  current	  generation	  responsible	  for	  the	  direction	  it	  allowed	  science	  to	  lead.	  	  	  The	   situation	   of	   extreme	   scarcity	   in	   which	   half	   of	   the	   world	   population	   lives,	  makes	   it	   difficult	   to	   abandon	   a	   prioritarian	   position.	   The	   suffering	   caused	   by	  malnutrition	   and	   disease	   is	   so	   devastating,	   that	   access	   to	  medicines	   and	  work	  toward	  food	  security	  simply	  have	  to	  be	  prioritized.	   It	  makes	  therefore	  sense	  to	  follow	  the	  drafters	  of	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  and	  offer	  an	  incentive	  system	  that	  addresses	  at	  least	  one	  of	  those	  major	  problems.	  However	  sticking	  to	  addressing	  subsistence	  needs	  only	  will	  never	  erase	  the	  stigma	  of	  strict	  dependency	  from	  the	  global	   poor.	   Stimulating	   South-­‐South	   collaborations	   is	   a	   great	   path	   to	   a	  world	  where	  people	  assists	  each	  other	  mutually	  through	  innovation.	  	  	  	  As	  a	   final	  remark,	  emphasising	  the	  role	  technology	  could	  play	  should	  not	  make	  us	  neglect	  wider	  social	  problems.	  While	  knowledge	  and	  the	  accessibility	  of	  new	  innovation	   may	   help	   us	   achieve	   a	   variety	   of	   social	   goals,	   extreme	   inequality	  undermines	  much	  of	  the	  potential	  benefits	  we	  can	  harvest	  from	  innovation.	  As	  a	  world	  of	  extreme	  equalities	  undermines	  incentives	  to	  excel,	  a	  world	  of	  extreme	  inequalities	  undermines	  the	  achievements	  of	  those	  who	  have	  excelled.	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  429	  cf.	  Timmermann	  (2013)	  [here	  reproduced	  as	  Chapter	  3]	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  In	   this	   thesis	   we	   have	   examined	   the	   complex	   interaction	   between	   intellectual	  property	   rights,	   life	   sciences	   and	   global	   justice.	   Science	   and	   the	   innovations	  developed	   in	   its	  wake,	   as	  we	   saw,	   have	   an	   enormous	   effect	   on	   our	   daily	   lives,	  providing	  countless	  opportunities	  but	  also	  raising	  numerous	  problems	  of	  justice.	  	  	  The	  complexity	  of	  a	  problem	  however	  does	  not	  liberate	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  from	  moral	  responsibilities.	  Our	  intellectual	  property	  regimes	  clash	  at	  various	  points	  with	   human	   rights	   law	   and	   commonly	   held	   notions	   of	   justice,	   as	   chapters	   2,	   3	  and	  8	  revealed.	  After	  having	  exposed	  the	  most	  common	  ethical	  theories	  used	  to	  justify	   pro-­‐poor	   innovation	   in	   the	   second	   chapter,	   I	   have	   developed	   the	  moral	  framework	  used	  throughout	  the	  thesis	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  The	  main	  supporting	  arguments	   for	   my	   position	   come	   from	   the	   capabilities	   approach,	   the	   human	  rights	  discourse	  and	  recognition	  theories.	  Facilitating	  participation	  possibilities	  in	  science	  is	  essential	  to	  ensure	  full	  human	  functioning	  and	  reduce	  relationships	  of	  extreme	  dependency.	  More	  inclusive	  innovation	  systems	  give	  also	  science	  and	  technology	  development	  a	  more	  democratic	  character.	  	  To	   gain	   an	   insight	   in	   the	   amplitude	   of	   the	   questions	   at	   issue,	   I	   have	   added	   a	  conference	  report	  presenting	   the	  current	  state	  of	   the	  debate,	  which	  constitutes	  chapter	  4.	  Here	  key	  societal	  problems	  were	  discussed	  in	  relation	  to	  food	  security	  and	   global	   health.	   The	   importance	   of	   safeguarding	   the	   survival	   of	   small	   and	  medium-­‐sized	  enterprises,	  of	  fulfilling	  development	  goals	  commitments,	  halting	  genetic	   erosion	  and	  establishing	  a	  global	  knowledge	  economy	  were	  among	   the	  debated	  subjects.	  The	  huge	  problems	  raised	  by	  the	  intellectual	  property	  regimes	  and	  the	  growing	  awareness	  of	  the	  missed	  opportunities	  to	  provide	  technological	  solutions	  for	  the	  needy	  have	   called	   the	  attention	  of	   a	  number	  of	   institutions	  and	   individuals.	  As	  we	   saw,	   a	   variety	   of	   proposals	   and	   movements	   have	   emerged	   to	   counter	   the	  problems	  of	  the	  current	  regimes,	  chapters	  5,	  6	  and	  7	  analysed	  three	  of	  them:	  the	  Access	   to	  Knowledge	  movement,	   the	  Health	   Impact	   Fund	   and	   open	   innovation	  models.	  Benefits	  and	  shortcomings	  were	  discussed	  with	  regard	  to	  three	  problem	  fields:	   access	   to	   medicines,	   climate-­‐friendly	   technologies	   and	   traditional	  knowledge.	  The	   last	  major	   chapter	  wrapped	  up	   the	  previous	   three	   chapters	  by	  offering	  an	  assessment	  of	  six	  prominent	  proposals	  using	  a	  human	  rights	  framework.	  Having	  pinpointed	  which	  human	  rights	  are	  affected	  by	  intellectual	  property,	  we	  saw	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  elements	  of	  each	  amendment	  proposal.	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  We	   can	   now	   examine	   if	   we	   have	   found	   satisfactory	   answers	   for	   the	   research	  questions	  stated	  in	  the	  introduction.	  Let	  us	  recall	  those	  questions:	  	  
1. What	  are	  the	  main	  ethical	  theories	  that	  justify	  fairer	  access	  to	  innovation?	  	  
2. Should	   one	   consider	   scientific	   participation	   possibilities	   as	   a	   luxury	   to	   be	  
left	   aside	   until	   subsistence	   rights	   for	   the	   great	   majority	   of	   people	   are	  
secured?	  	  
3. Should	  extreme	  inequalities	  in	  research	  capacities	  between	  the	  Global	  South	  
and	   the	   Global	   North	   be	   fought	   even	   when	   the	   objects	   of	   innovation	   are	  
made	  accessible	  worldwide?	  	  
4. What	  are	  the	  benefits	  to	  be	  expected	  from	  research	  and	  innovation	  and	  how	  
do	   we	   judge	   that	   the	   international	   system	   of	   science	   and	   technology	   is	  
working	  properly?	  	  
5. How	   can	   we	   secure	   the	   moral	   and	   material	   interests	   of	   indigenous	  
innovators	  using	  the	  current	  intellectual	  property	  regimes?	  	  
6. Is	   there,	   among	   the	   various	   proposals	   that	   have	   been	  brought	   forward	   to	  
enhance	   the	   global	   justice	   of	   the	   international	   intellectual	   property	   and	  
research	  system,	  any	  amendment	  proposal	  that	  should	  be	  clearly	  favoured?	  	  In	   addition	   to	   those	   research	   questions,	   four	   major	   problems	   raised	   by	   the	  intellectual	  property	  regimes	  were	  also	  identified	  in	  the	  introduction:	  	   (a) Intellectual	  property	  rights	  impede	  access	  to	  objects	  that	  are	  essential	  for	  human	  welfare,	  such	  as	  medicines.	  	  (b) Market	   incentives	   for	   innovation	   shift	   research	   attention	   to	   satisfy	   the	  desires	  of	  the	  rich,	  while	  solutions	  needed	  to	  alleviate	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  poor	  remain	  unavailable	  or	  are	  insufficient.	  (c) Intellectual	   property	   rights	   are	   highly	  unevenly	  distributed	   between	   the	  Global	  South	  and	  the	  Global	  North.	  (d) Intellectual	   property	   affects	   negatively	   good	   scientific	   practice	   and	  distorts	  a	  fair	  appraisal	  of	  research	  efforts.	  	  Taking	   those	   four	   problems	   into	   the	   evaluation,	  we	  will	   examine	   one	   research	  question	  at	  the	  time	  starting	  with	  the	  first	  one.	  When	  asking	  “what	  are	  the	  main	  
ethical	  theories	  that	  justify	  fairer	  access	  to	  innovation?”	  I	  set	  forward	  the	  need	  to	  briefly	   expose	   the	   main	   moral	   arguments	   prevalent	   in	   the	   global	   justice	   and	  intellectual	   property	   rights	   debate.	   This	  was	   done	   in	   the	   second	   chapter.	  Here	  arguments	  to	  make	  innovation	  for	  the	  poor	  accessible	  were	  given.	  I	  also	  argued	  for	  the	  necessity	  to	  allocate	  research	  efforts	  to	  make	  solutions	  for	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  poor	  available.	  The	  chapter	  concluded	  by	  emphasising	  the	  importance	  of	  taking	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  inequalities	  into	  consideration	  before	  making	  any	  ethical	  assessment.	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  The	   second	  question	   focuses	  on	   the	   issue	  of	   establishing	  priorities:	  Should	  one	  
consider	   scientific	   participation	   possibilities	   as	   a	   luxury	   to	   be	   left	   aside	   until	  
subsistence	   rights	   for	   the	   great	   majority	   of	   people	   are	   secured?	   Achieving	   food	  security	  and	  improving	  global	  health	  are	  noble	  aims;	  many	  freedoms	  can	  only	  be	  enjoyed	   if	   subsistence	   is	   secured.	   However	   we	   have	   encountered	   sufficient	  evidence	   that	   proves	   that	   we	   do	   not	   live	   in	   a	   world	   of	   such	   extreme	   scarcity	  where	   we	   have	   to	   abide	   by	   a	   very	   minimum	   level	   of	   human	   flourishing	  possibilities.	   Global	   poverty	   and	   hunger	   can	   be	   eradicated	   with	   existing	  resources.	  Further,	  chapter	  3	  discussed	  in	  detail	  why	  participating	  in	  science	  is	  a	  goal	  people	  may	  want	  to	  pursue	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  Participating	  in	  science	  helps	  some	   people	   find	   meaning	   in	   their	   lives	   by	   including	   their	   input	   in	   solving	  problems	  that	  affect	  society	  and	  develop	  their	  capabilities.	  Besides	  contributing	  to	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   the	   human	   right	   to	   participate	   in	   cultural	   life	   (including	  scientific	  life),	  making	  scientific	  enterprises	  more	  inclusive	  allows	  securing	  other	  human	   rights.	   Having	   more	   people	   from	   diverse	   cultural	   backgrounds	  participating	   in	   science	   increases	   the	   chances	   that	   the	   developed	   technologies	  are	  also	  socially	  acceptable	  –	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  availability	  (problem	  b).	  In	  the	  same	  manner,	  wider	  participation	  gives	  science	  agendas	  a	  more	  democratic	  character,	  something	  that	   is	   in	   line	  with	  the	  human	  right	   to	  self-­‐determination.	  Assigning	   a	   higher	   value	   to	   scientific	   participation	   makes	   it	   more	   difficult	   to	  relinquish	   inclusion.	   Wider	   participation	   also	   ensures	   a	   fairer	   assessment	   of	  research	  efforts	  (problem	  d).	  Herewith	  we	  have	  provided	  a	  number	  of	  arguments	  that	   speak	   against	   blindly	   prioritizing	   subsistence	   rights	   over	   increasing	  scientific	  participation	  possibilities.	  	  	  The	  third	  question	  targets	  bringing	  up	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  extreme	  inequalities	  in	  research	  capacities:	  Should	  extreme	  inequalities	  in	  research	  capacities	  between	  
the	   Global	   South	   and	   the	   Global	   North	   be	   fought	   even	   when	   the	   objects	   of	  
innovation	   are	  made	   accessible	  worldwide?	   Especially	   in	   chapter	   6	   it	   is	   argued	  that	   such	   inequalities	   should	   be	   fought.	   Societies	   that	   do	   not	   have	   a	   sufficient	  scientific	  infrastructure	  will	  be	  dependent	  on	  solutions	  developed	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  and	  will	  often	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  innovations	  that	  are	  less	  suitable	  for	  their	  own	  needs	  or	  inadequate	  for	  their	  cultural	  background	  (see	  also	  chapter	  3).	  Such	   a	   divide	   has	   also	   a	   negative	   impact	   on	   the	   economy	   of	   the	   poorest	  countries.	   By	   having	   to	   acquire	   technologies	   from	   the	   developed	   world,	   a	  constant	   outflow	   of	   money	   occurs	   in	   only	   one	   direction.	   The	   revenues	   from	  natural	  resources	  exploitation	  are	  often	  not	  sufficient	  to	  recover	  the	  money	  that	  leaves	   the	   country.	   Agriculture,	   one	   area	   where	   many	   countries	   are	   able	   to	  compete	   with	   the	   developed	   world,	   is	   increasingly	   dependent	   upon	   farming	  inputs	   covered	   by	   intellectual	   property	   law,	   such	   as	   seed	   varieties,	   pesticides,	  fertilizers	   and	  herbicides.	   Financial	   gains	   from	  exports	   are	   thus	  proportionally	  reduced	  by	  the	  costs	  of	  importing	  agricultural	  inputs.	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Chapters	  5	  and	  6	  give	  some	  examples	  of	  the	  variations	  in	  needs	  faced	  by	  people	  living	   in	   different	   environments.	   Especially	   when	   the	   needs	   of	   people	   who	  produce	   innovations	   do	   not	   match	   those	   who	   are	   dependent	   upon	   these	  innovations	   shortfalls	   occur.	  The	   concept	  of	  neglected	  diseases	   epitomizes	   this	  circumstance.	   This	   is	   a	   significant	   challenge	   when	   research	   capacities	   are	  concentrated	   in	   only	   a	   small	   part	   of	   the	   world.	   Since	   the	   developed	   world	  strongly	  relies	  on	  intellectual	  property	  to	  incentivize	  innovation,	  this	  mechanism	  will	   strongly	   influence	   what	   is	   considered	   as	   scientific	   (problem	   d)	   and	   thus	  leave	  much	  of	  the	  creative	  effort	  made	  by	  indigenous	  communities	  unrecognized.	  	  
	  Let	  us	  move	  on	  with	  research	  question	  four:	  What	  are	  the	  benefits	  to	  be	  expected	  
from	  research	  and	  innovation	  and	  how	  do	  we	  judge	  that	  the	  international	  system	  
of	  science	  and	  technology	  is	  working	  properly?	  In	  a	  world	  dominated	  by	  economic	  modes	   of	   thinking,	   production	   systems	   are	   primarily	   measured	   in	   terms	   of	  efficiency.	  Science	  and	   technology	  development	  are	  no	  exemption.	  Efficiency	   in	  research	  output	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  different	  ways.	  Nowadays	  scientific	  output	  is	   often	   measured	   in	   terms	   of	   number	   of	   patents	   granted	   or	   peer-­‐reviewed	  articles	  published	  –	  such	  type	  of	  measurement	  focuses	  clearly	  on	  break-­‐through	  science	   and	   this	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   small-­‐scale	   incremental	   research.	   However,	  efficiency	   can	   also	   mean	   the	   capacity	   to	   transform	   research	   resources	   into	  socially	  beneficial	  products.	  And	  even	  here	  we	  encounter	  important	  differences;	  products	   that	   perform	   similarly	  well	   in	   fulfilling	   a	   certain	   task	   (e.g.	   improving	  harvest	   yields)	   can	   have	   completely	   different	   complementary	   benefits.	   In	   the	  case	   of	   climate	   change	   mitigation,	   some	   innovations	   primarily	   benefit	   the	  developed	   world	   industry,	   other	   inventions	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   bring	  considerable	   additional	   benefits	   for	   the	   Global	   South	   (as	  we	   saw	   in	   chapter	   6	  with	   the	   case	   of	   biochar).	   A	  more	   inclusive	   innovation	   system	  will	   also	   add	   to	  more	  diversity	  in	  research	  outputs.	  An	  international	  incentive	  system	  for	  science	  and	  technology	  development	  is	  working	  properly	  when	  innovation	  addresses	  its	  specified	  targets	  while	  bringing	  the	  greatest	  amount	  of	  positive	  externalities.	  	  	  A	   question	   of	   a	   distinct	   nature	   is	   research	   question	   number	   five:	  How	  can	  we	  
secure	  the	  moral	  and	  material	  interests	  of	  indigenous	  innovators	  using	  the	  current	  
intellectual	  property	  regimes?	  This	  issue	  is	  particularly	  important	  for	  maintaining	  diversity	  in	  knowledge	  production	  systems.	  In	  chapter	  7	  we	  discussed	  an	  option	  that	   is	   compatible	   with	   the	   current	   intellectual	   property	   regimes:	   open	  innovation	  models.	  While	   these	  models	   are	   not	   the	   best	  method	   to	   secure	   the	  material	  needs	  of	  innovators,	  they	  have	  great	  potential	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  at	  least	  the	  moral	   interests	  of	   these	   innovators	   remain	  protected.	   In	  order	   to	   state	   the	  importance	   of	   securing	   the	   latter	   rights,	   I	   introduced	   the	   concept	   of	   fair	  competition	  of	   ideas,	  building	  on	  work	  done	  by	  Rafael	  Ziegler.	  Here	   I	   stipulate	  that	   once	   a	   person	   assumes	   the	   effort	   to	   pass	   her	   knowledge	   to	   others	   a	  minimum	   concern	   to	   the	   fate	   of	   this	   knowledge	   is	   shown,	   which	   we	   should	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honour	   by	   undertaking	   at	   least	   a	  minimum	   effort	   to	   not	   let	   the	   knowledge	   be	  unjustly	   forgotten.	  Departing	   from	  the	   traditional	   legal	  understanding	  of	  moral	  interests,	  I	  have	  argued	  to	  broaden	  this	  concept	  and	  also	  include	  a	  fair	  evaluation	  of	   research	   output	   as	   something	   individual	   inventors	   have	   a	  moral	   interest	   in.	  Building	  up	  the	  necessary	  infrastructure	  to	  facilitate	  open	  innovation	  models	  for	  indigenous	   communities	   can	   help	   to	   balance	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   highly	  uneven	  distribution	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  (problem	  c),	  by	  preventing	  to	  a	   certain	   degree	   biopiracy	   and	   generally	   by	   keeping	   knowledge	   accessible.	  Through	   transparency	   a	   fairer	   assessment	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	   and	   other	  inventions	  not	  subject	  to	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  becomes	  feasible	  (problem	  
d).	  	  The	   sixth	   and	   last	   question	   examines	   if	   there	   is	   a	   proposal	   to	   alleviate	   the	  negative	  effects	  of	  intellectual	  property	  regimes	  that	  should	  be	  clearly	  favoured.	  It	   became	   clear	   during	   the	   examination	   that	   the	   extreme	   heterogeneity	   of	  environments	   and	   needs,	   together	   with	   extreme	   inequalities,	   makes	   it	  impossible	   to	   clearly	   favour	   a	   single	   proposal	   above	   all	   others.	   In	   order	   to	   be	  politically	   realizable	   the	   examined	   proposals	   make	   vast	   concessions	   to	   gain	  support	   from	   industry	  and	   the	  business	  sector.	  However,	   something	   that	  many	  are	  more	  than	  willing	  to	  give	  up,	  amounts	  to	  an	  unjustifiable	  concession	  toward	  political	  feasibility	  for	  others.	  The	  ambitious	  plan	  of	  ranking	  the	  single	  proposals	  in	   accordance	   to	   their	   compatibility	   to	   human	   rights	   law	   failed	   due	   to	   the	  enormous	  differences	  in	  needs	  and	  wants	  among	  people	  in	  the	  world.	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  realize	  that	  there	  is	  significant	  room	  for	  improvements	  within	  the	  parameters	  set	  by	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement.	  Changes	  in	  this	  direction	  are	  already	  under	   way.	   Major	   pharmaceutical	   companies	   are	   starting	   to	   learn	   about	   the	  benefits	  of	  hosting	  open	  labs	  allowing	  them	  to	  harvest	  input	  from	  a	  much	  wider	  community,	   as	   was	   mentioned	   at	   the	   end	   of	   chapter	   4.	   The	   Indian	   Honeybee	  Network	  has	  achieved	  great	  results	  in	  the	  promotion	  of	  grassroots	  innovation	  –this	   in	   harmony	   with	   the	   intellectual	   property	   regimes	   and	   by	   using	   the	  advantages	  of	  modern	  communication	  technologies	  (see	  chapter	  7).	  At	  the	  time	  of	  this	  writing	  a	  major	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  limited	  the	  extent	  patents	   over	   the	   use	   of	   genetic	   material	   can	   acquired.430	  We	   will	   very	   soon	  realize	   the	   extensive	   effects	   of	   such	   a	   court	   ruling.	  While	   those	   changes	   raise	  hope	  that	  matters	  will	  change	  for	  the	  good,	  the	  relentless	  increase	  in	  the	  wealth	  gap	  between	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  poor	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  such	  deep	  moral	  concern,	  that	  it	  obscures	  the	  optimism	  brought	  by	  the	  latest	  societal	  achievements.	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  of	  the	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Issues	  in	  need	  for	  further	  research	  	  There	   are	   three	  unresolved	   issues	   to	  which	   I	  will	   dedicate	  my	  attention	   in	   the	  near	   future.	   Those	   are	   the	   problems	   of:	   antibiotics	   and	   the	   patent	   bargain,	  forbidding	   freeriding	   on	   inventions,	   and	   making	   open	   access	   publishing	   for	  research	  mandatory.	  	  
Antibiotics	   and	   the	   patent	   bargain.	   As	   mentioned	   in	   chapter	   2,	   antibiotic	  resistance	  undermines	  the	  patent	  bargain	  for	  society.	  This	  phenomenon	  does	  not	  limit	  itself	  to	  antibiotics.	  Plants,	  bacteria,	  fungi,	  and	  many	  other	  living	  organisms	  develop	  resistance	  against	  active	  agents	  introduced	  to	  combat	  them.	  The	  rational	  market	   practice	   of	  maximizing	   sales	   for	   antibiotics	   is	   fatal	   for	   their	   long-­‐term	  efficacy.	   If	   the	   patented	   antibiotics	   become	   useless	   once	   exclusive	   rights	   over	  them	  elapse,	   the	  public	   is	  missing	  their	  quid	  pro	  quo	   in	  return	  for	  the	  favour	  of	  recognized	  exclusive	  rights.	  	  
Freeriding	   on	   inventions.	   Brian	   Barry	   once	   defined	   freeriding	   as	   “taking	   the	  benefits	  …	  while	  failing	  to	  do	  one’s	  part	  in	  sustaining	  the	  practice	  when	  it	  is	  one’s	  turn	  to	  do	  so”431.	  Arguably	  under	  such	  a	  definition,	  freeriding	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  inventions	   brought	   up	   by	   others	   would	   translate	   to	   not	   contributing	   to	   their	  creation.	   Here	   we	   have	   multiple	   issues	   that	   have	   to	   be	   addressed.	   First,	   the	  inventor	  rarely	  grants	  freedom	  on	  how	  acquirers	  of	  innovation	  are	  to	  contribute	  to	   sustain	   the	   practice	   of	   innovating.	   Contribution	   possibilities	   are	   usually	  limited	  to	  paying	  fixed	  monetary	  sums.	  Second,	  when	  thinking	  about	  freeriding	  the	  distinction	  between	  unwillingness	  to	  pay	  and	  inability	  to	  pay	  is	  rarely	  made.	  Third,	  a	  balance	  between	  preventing	  freeriding	  and	  a	  “recklessly	  suboptimal	  use	  of	  resources”432	  has	  to	  be	  struck.	  	  	  
Obligations	   to	  make	   research	   publications	   openly	   accessible.	   Disclosure	   reduces	  needless	   repetition	   of	   research	   efforts,	   contributing	   to	   the	   efficient	   use	   of	  resources.	  The	  easier	  publications	  or	  datasets	  are	  to	  find,	  the	  less	  likely	  the	  same	  type	  of	  work	  will	  be	  repeated.	  This	  demand	  is	  weightier	  if	  experiments	  involving	  human	   or	   animal	   suffering	   are	   concerned.	   Financial	   barriers	   set	   through	   high	  journal	  subscription	  prices	  are	  unjust	  hurdles	  for	  poorer	  would-­‐be	  contributors.	  There	   is	   however	   an	   under-­‐theorized	   difference.	   Sharing	  with	   some	   is	   not	   the	  same	  as	  sharing	  with	  all.	  Publishing	  in	  a	  specific	  venue	  makes	  one	  vulnerable	  to	  criticism	   coming	   only	   from	   a	   particular	   group.	   Under	   freedom	   of	   speech	   we	  generally	  allow	  selective	  disclosure.	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In	  the	  long	  term	  I	  want	  to	  concentrate	  on	  the	  broader	  issue	  of	  global	  contributive	  justice.	   The	   idea	   of	   contributive	   justice	   suggests	   that	  work	   should	   not	   only	   be	  distributed	   fairly	   in	   terms	   of	   general	   burdens	   but	   also	   that	   tedious	   and	  interesting	  tasks	  have	  to	  fairly	  shared	  as	  well.433	  Meaningful	  work	  allows	  people	  to	  further	  develop	  their	  cognitive	  capacities	  and	  abilities.	  It	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  recognize	  the	  worker	  as	  an	  autonomous	  agent	  who	  can	  take	  decisions	  and	  is	  able	  to	  follow	  her	  own	  initiatives.434	  One	  type	  of	  work	  where	  people	  find	  meaning	  is	  science	  and	  technology	  development	  as	  we	  amply	  discussed	  in	  the	  third	  chapter	  of	   this	   thesis.	   General	   norms	   established	   by	   the	   scientific	   community 435 ,	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  and	  migration	  laws	  limit	  the	  chances	  people	  have	  in	  contributing	  to	  scientific	  enterprises.	  Here	  I	  want	  to	  analyse	  on	  a	  much	  broader	  extent	   how	   international	   laws	   and	   standards	   should	   be	   shaped	   to	   support	   a	  scientific	  environment	  that	  welcomes	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  participants.	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Summary	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   human	   right	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   advancement	   of	   science	   is	   frequently	  overlooked	  in	  the	  intellectual	  property	  and	  global	  justice	  discourse.	  This	  thesis	  is	  a	  contribution	   to	  efforts	   that	  aim	  at	   filling	   this	  gap	   in	   the	  overall	  discussion	  on	  proper	  incentives	  for	  the	  life	  sciences.	  	  	  Three	   distributive	   justice	   problems	   are	   raised	   by	   our	   intellectual	   property	  regimes	   (cf.	   DeCamp	   2007).	   First,	   high	   prices	   make	   objects	   of	   innovation	  inaccessible,	   even	   in	   those	   cases	   where	   the	   object	   is	   urgently	   needed	   (i.e.	   the	  accessibility	  problem).	  Second,	  research	  efforts	  concentrate	  primarily	  in	  fulfilling	  the	  wishes	  of	  richer	  customers.	  This	  has	  lead	  to	  the	  10/90	  gap	  in	  pharmaceutical	  research,	   the	   situation	   where	   90%	   of	   the	   resources	   are	   destined	   to	   solve	   the	  problems	  and	  desires	  of	  10%	  of	  the	  world	  population.	  The	  consequence	  thereof	  is	  that	  research	  and	  development	  addressed	  to	  make	  available	  solutions	  for	  the	  needy	   is	   insufficient	   (i.e.	   the	   availability	   problem).	   Third,	   the	   distribution	   of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  themselves	  is	  highly	  imbalanced	  between	  the	  Global	  South	  and	  the	  Global	  North.	  This	  brings	  with	  itself	  a	  huge	  transfer	  of	  resources	  from	   the	   developing	   to	   the	   developed	  world	   and	   it	   gives	   intellectual	   property	  owners	   a	   considerable	   amount	   of	   control	   over	   follow-­‐up	   innovation.	   The	   first	  two	  problems	  have	  attracted	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  scholarly	  work	  and	  policy	  studies.	   Therefore	   I	   have	   concentrated	  my	   attention	   to	   the	   third	   problem	   and	  identified	   a	   fourth	   issue	   that	   is	   in	   need	   of	  more	   careful	   analysis:	   the	   influence	  intellectual	   property	   has	   on	   scientific	   conduct	   and	   scientific	   participation	  possibilities.	  	  	  The	  thesis	  starts	  with	  two	  introductory	  chapters,	  the	  second	  briefly	  exposes	  the	  different	   arguments	   that	   justify	   pro-­‐poor	   innovation:	   utilitarianism,	  compensatory	  duties,	  the	  basic	  rights	  doctrine,	  the	  human	  rights	  and	  capabilities	  discourse,	   recognition	   theories,	   cooperative	   justice	   arguments,	   the	   need	   to	  (re)claim	  the	  commons	  and	  uphold	  shared	  scientific	  values.	  In	  the	  same	  manner	  arguments	   for	  restricting	  access	  are	  discussed	  before	   listing	  some	  of	   the	   issues	  that	  make	  life	  sciences	  special	  in	  relation	  to	  intellectual	  property.	  	  	  The	  third	  chapter	  defends	  the	  ethical	  standpoint	  sustained	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  Using	   the	   capabilities	   approach	   it	   is	   argued	   that	  being	  able	   to	  actively	   care	   for	  others	  should	  not	  only	  apply	  to	  efforts	  made	  through	  physical	  work,	  but	  also	  that	  one	  should	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  help	  others	  by	  using	  one’s	  intellectual	  capacities.	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With	   the	   help	   of	   recognition	   theories	   the	   relation	   of	   technological	   dependency	  between	   the	   Global	   South	   and	   the	   Global	   North	   is	   criticized.	   People	   should	   be	  able	   to	  mutually	   influence	  each	  other	  and	  be	  able	   to	  assist	  one	  another.	  Those	  two	   main	   ideas	   are	   used	   to	   justify	   a	   right	   to	   partake	   in	   the	   advancement	   of	  science	  as	  a	  peer.	  	  	  After	   having	   set	   out	   the	   moral	   framework	   used	   in	   the	   thesis,	   the	   state	   of	   the	  debate	   is	   presented	   through	   a	   report	   on	   a	   stakeholder	   conference	   held	   in	  Brussels	   in	   September	   2011	   on	   the	   ethical	   and	   social	   aspects	   of	   intellectual	  property	  in	  the	  life	  sciences.	  This	  report	  constitutes	  the	  fourth	  chapter.	  	  	  	  A	   series	   of	   proposals	   and	   alternatives	   have	   been	   put	   forward	   to	   alleviate	   the	  negative	  effects	  of	  intellectual	  property	  regimes.	  In	  this	  thesis	  three	  of	  these	  are	  analysed	   in	   terms	  of	   their	   strengths	  and	  weaknesses:	   the	  Access	   to	  Knowledge	  movement,	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  and	  open	  innovation	  models.	  In	  order	  to	  gain	  a	   clearer	   insight,	   these	   alternatives	   are	   evaluated	   by	   contrasting	   them	   to	   a	  particular	   problem.	   First,	   the	   Access	   to	   Knowledge	   movement	   is	   analysed	   in	  terms	  of	  its	  capacity	  to	  improve	  global	  health.	  Then,	  it	  is	  examined	  how	  the	  idea	  behind	   the	  Health	   Impact	   Fund	   could	   be	   used	   to	   promote	   the	   development	   of	  climate-­‐friendly	   technologies.	   Lastly,	   open	   innovation	   models	   are	   tested	   in	  regard	   to	   their	   potential	   to	   conserve	   and	   incentivize	   innovation	   in	   indigenous	  communities.	  	  	  Chapter	  five	  analyses	  the	  access	  to	  medicines	  movement	  during	  the	  last	  twenty	  years,	   describing	  how	   the	  movement	   changed	   from	  being	  one	   about	   corporate	  social	   responsibility	   towards	  being	  a	  matter	  of	   justice.	  The	  situation	  where	   the	  Global	   North	   is	   developing	   nearly	   all	   the	   essential	   pharmaceuticals	   has	   some	  drawbacks	  for	  the	  poor.	  Medicines	  are	  mainly	  developed	  to	  be	  effective	  against	  pathogens	   prevalent	   in	   the	   Global	   North	   and	   little	   attention	   is	   paid	   that	  medicines	   are	   still	   effective	   in	   resource	   poor	   settings.	   In	   addition,	   market	  incentives	   make	   the	   development	   of	   “me-­‐too	   drugs”	   lucrative	   and	   generally	  encourage	   researchers	   to	   enclose	   their	  work	  which	  often	   leads	   to	  unnecessary	  repetition	   of	   research	   efforts.	   The	   chapter	   ends	   with	   a	   spark	   of	   optimism	   by	  presenting	  some	  new	  initiatives	  that	  work	  with	  “open	  laboratories”,	  thus	  making	  science	  a	  more	  inclusive	  endeavour.	  	  	  Chapter	  six	  critically	  examines	  the	  potentials	  and	  shortfalls	  of	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund.	  The	  criticism	  concentrates	  around	  the	  failure	  to	  tackle	  the	  strong	  research	  divide	  between	  the	  Global	  North	  and	  the	  Global	  South.	  The	  chapter	   is	  sceptical	  about	   the	   opportunities	   to	   overcome	   this	   divide	   even	   after	   considering	  modifications	   to	   the	  original	  proposal.	  The	  application	  of	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	   Health	   Impact	   Fund	   for	   propagating	   climate-­‐friendly	   technologies	   is	   even	  more	  problematic	  than	  its	  original	  use	  in	  the	  context	  of	  medicines.	  Technologies	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that	  help	  mitigate	  climate	  change	  may	  have	  considerable	  positive	  side-­‐effects	  for	  its	  users.	  Incentivizing	  the	  fuel	  efficiency	  for	  luxury	  boats	  or	  the	  improvement	  of	  stoves	   that	  also	  reduce	   the	  exposure	   to	   fumes	   in	  crowded	  households	  are	  very	  different	   things	  –	  having	  chosen	  one	  strategy	   instead	  of	   the	  other	   is	  something	  that	  one	  has	  to	  be	  able	  to	  morally	  defend.	  The	  example	  of	  biochar	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  chapter.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  politically	  feasible,	  the	  drafters	  of	  the	  Health	  Impact	  Fund	  make	  too	  broad	  concessions	  to	  major	  players	  of	  the	  political	  arena.	  	  The	   next	   chapter	   discusses	   the	   third	  movement.	   Open	   innovation	  models	  may	  not	  be	  the	  best	  alternative	  to	  secure	  the	  material	  needs	  of	  indigenous	  innovators.	  However,	   they	   have	   great	   potential	   in	   protecting	   the	   moral	   interests	   of	   these	  creative	  minds.	  Here	  the	  idea	  of	  moral	  interest	  is	  understood	  in	  a	  broader	  sense	  than	   the	   one	   specified	   by	   law.	   Not	   only	   do	   innovators	   have	   an	   interest	   in	  attribution	  of	   authorship	  and	   retaining	  a	   control	  of	   the	   integrity	  of	   their	  work,	  but	   also	   in	   a	   fair	   evaluation	   of	   their	   invention.	   Being	   unjustly	   forgotten	  contradicts	   this	   interest.	   Platforms	   that	   make	   indigenous	   innovation	   visible	   –	  especially	  among	  people	  living	  in	  similar	  conditions	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  –	  have	  a	  great	  potential	  in	  addressing	  this	  latter	  interest.	  	  	  Chapter	  eight	  offers	  a	  critical	  assessment	  of	  how	  six	  prominent	  proposals	  relate	  to	   the	   International	  Bill	  of	  Rights.	  After	  providing	  an	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  how	  intellectual	  property	  affects	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  protected	  by	  human	  rights	  law,	  the	  three	  above	  mentioned	  alternatives	  are	  examined	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  wide	  use	  of	   compulsory	   licences,	   prize	   funds	   and	  promoting	   South-­‐South	   collaborations.	  During	  this	  assessment	  human	  rights	  are	  not	  understood	  in	  the	  purely	  juridical	  sense,	  a	  lay	  assessment	  is	  offered	  instead.	  The	  purpose	  being	  that	  with	  such	  type	  of	  understanding	  the	  origin	  of	  much	  confusion	  can	  be	  understood.	  The	  result	  of	  this	  assessment	   is	   that	   the	  heterogeneity	  and	  diversity	  of	  needs	  we	   find	   in	   the	  world	  requires	  a	  much	  more	  complex	  solution.	  Some	  affected	  parties	  will	  often	  interpret	  concessions	  catalogued	  as	  minor	  by	  one	  section	  of	  the	  world	  as	  being	  major.	  A	  single	  major	  amendment	  will	  be	  far	  from	  solving	  this	  complex	  problem	  in	  its	  totality.	  	  	  Throughout	  the	  thesis	  I	  have	  been	  keen	  to	  state	  the	  need	  of	  making	  science	  and	  technology	   development	   a	   more	   inclusive	   endeavour.	   Here	   I	   share	   the	   same	  spirit	   with	   many	   other	   political	   philosophers	   in	   persistently	   claiming	   that	  participation	  is	  crucial	  for	  a	  well-­‐functioning	  society.	  In	  the	  realm	  of	  science	  and	  technology	   development	   participation	   can	   only	   be	   meaningful	   if	   systematic	  discrimination	  is	  absent	  and	  sufficient	  possibilities	  to	  learn	  the	  needed	  skills	  are	  present.	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(thesis	  summary	  in	  Dutch)	  	  	  	  	  Een	  van	  de	  mensenrechten	  is	  het	  recht	  van	  ieder	  mens	  om	  deel	  te	  nemen	  aan	  de	  vooruitgang	   van	   de	   wetenschap.	   Dit	   mensenrecht	   wordt	   vaak	   over	   het	   hoofd	  gezien	  in	  de	  discussie	  over	  intellectueel	  eigendom	  en	  mondiale	  rechtvaardigheid.	  Dit	  proefschrift	  levert	  een	  bijdrage	  om	  deze	  lacune	  op	  te	  vullen	  in	  deze	  discussie	  met	  name	  over	  de	  vraag	  hoe	  de	  levenswetenschappen	  op	  ethisch	  verantwoorde	  wijze	  kunnen	  worden	  gestimuleerd.	  	  	  De	  huidigde	   stelsels	  van	   intellectueel	   eigendoms	   leiden	   tot	  drie	  problemen	   ten	  aanzien	   van	   een	   eerlijke	   verdeling	   van	   objecten	   van	   innovatie	   (vgl.	   DeCamp	  2007).	  Ten	  eerste	  worden	  deze	  objecten	  ontoegankelijk	  door	  hoge	  prijzen,	  zelfs	  wanneer	   er	   dringend	   behoefte	   is	   aan	   het	   betreffende	   object	   (het	  toegankelijkheidsprobleem).	   Ten	   tweede	   concentreren	   onderzoeksactiviteiten	  zich	  primair	  op	  het	  voldoen	  aan	  de	  wensen	  van	  rijke	  afnemers.	  Dit	  heeft	  geleid	  tot	   de	   10/90-­‐kloof	   in	   farmaceutisch	   onderzoek,	   ofwel	   de	   situatie	   waarin	   90%	  van	   de	   middelen	   bestemd	   is	   om	   de	   problemen	   op	   te	   lossen	   van	   10%	   van	   de	  wereldbevolking.	  Gevolg	  is	  dat	  onderzoek	  en	  ontwikkeling	  die	  gericht	  zijn	  op	  het	  beschikbaar	   maken	   van	   oplossingen	   voor	   de	   meest	   hulpbehoevenden,	  ontoereikend	   zijn	   (het	   beschikbaarheidsprobleem).	   Ten	   derde	   is	   de	   verdeling	  van	   intellectuele	   eigendomsrechten	   tussen	   het	   noordelijk	   en	   het	   zuidelijk	  halfrond	  uitermate	  onevenwichtig.	  Hierdoor	  ontstaat	  er	  een	  omvangrijk	  proces	  van	   overdracht	   van	   hulpbronnen	   van	   de	   ontwikkelingslanden	   naar	   de	  ontwikkelde	  landen	  en	  hebben	  houders	  van	  intellectuele	  eigendomsrechten	  een	  grote	  mate	  van	  macht	  over	  het	  vervolg	  van	  het	  innovatieproces.	  De	  eerste	  twee	  problemen	   hebben	   reeds	   geleid	   tot	   een	   aanzienlijke	   hoeveelheid	  onderzoekswerk	   en	   beleidsstudies.	   Daarom	   is	   mijn	   aandacht	   vooral	   uitgegaan	  naar	  het	  derde	  probleem.	  Tevens	  heb	  ik	  een	  vierde	  kwestie	  aangekaart	  die	  een	  meer	  diepgaande	  analyse	  vereist:	  de	  invloed	  die	  intellectueel	  eigendom	  heeft	  op	  wetenschappelijk	  gedrag	  en	  de	  mogelijkheden	  voor	  deelname	  aan	  de	  beoefening	  van	  wetenschap.	  	  	  Het	  proefschrift	  begint	  met	  twee	  inleidende	  hoofdstukken,	  waarvan	  het	  tweede	  in	  het	  kort	  de	  verschillende	  argumenten	  opsomt	  die	   innovatie	  ten	  behoeve	  van	  de	  armen	  rechtvaardigen:	  utilitarisme,	  compensatieplichten,	  de	  doctrine	  van	  de	  grondrechten,	   de	   discussie	   over	   mensenrechten	   en	   ‘capabilities’,	  erkenningstheorieën,	   argumenten	   van	   coöperatieve	   rechtvaardigheid,	   en	   de	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noodzaak	  om	  het	   gemeenschappelijke	  domein	   (terug)	   te	   vorderen	  en	  gedeelde	  wetenschappelijke	  waarden	   opnieuw	   te	   bevestigen.	   Op	   dezelfde	  manier	  wordt	  ingegaan	   op	   argumenten	   voor	   het	   beperken	   van	   de	   toegang	   tot	   innovatie	   via	  eigendomsrechten,	   waarna	   een	   overzicht	   wordt	   gegeven	   van	   de	   kwesties	  waarmee	   levenswetenschappen	   zich	   onderscheiden	   met	   betrekking	   tot	  intellectueel	  eigendom.	  	  	  In	   het	   derde	   hoofdstuk	   worden	   de	   ethische	   standpunten	   ontwikkeld	   en	  gerechtvaardigd,	   die	   gedurende	   het	   proefschrift	   worden	   aangehouden.	   Met	  behulp	  van	  de	  ‘capabilities’	  benadering	  wordt	  beargumenteerd	  dat	  het	  vermogen	  om	  actief	  te	  zorgen	  voor	  anderen	  niet	  alleen	  van	  toepassing	  is	  op	  inspanningen	  op	   basis	   van	   fysieke	   arbeid,	   maar	   dat	   men	   ook	   in	   de	   positie	   moet	   zijn	   om	  anderen	   te	   helpen	  met	   behulp	   van	   intellectuele	   capaciteiten.	   Aan	   de	   hand	   van	  erkenningstheorieën	  wordt	  de	  relatie	  van	  technologische	  afhankelijkheid	  tussen	  het	  noordelijk	  en	  het	  zuidelijk	  halfrond	  bekritiseerd.	  Mensen	  moeten	  in	  staat	  zijn	  elkaar	  wederzijds	   te	   beïnvloeden	   en	  moeten	   elkaar	   kunnen	   helpen.	  Deze	   twee	  kernideeën	  worden	  gebruikt	   om	  het	   recht	   te	   verdedigen	  om	  als	   gelijke	  deel	   te	  nemen	  aan	  de	  vooruitgang	  van	  wetenschap.	  	  	  Na	  het	  uiteenzetten	  van	  het	  ethisch	  kader	  van	  het	  proefschrift	  wordt	  de	  toestand	  van	  het	  debat	  beschreven	  aan	  de	  hand	  van	  een	  verslag	  van	  een	  conferentie	  van	  ‘stakeholders’	  (belanghebbenden)	  in	  Brussel	  in	  september	  2011	  over	  de	  ethische	  en	   maatschappelijke	   aspecten	   van	   intellectueel	   eigendom	   in	   de	  levenswetenschappen.	  Dit	  relaas	  vormt	  het	  vierde	  hoofdstuk.	  	  	  Er	   wordt	   een	   reeks	   voorstellen	   gedaan	   en	   alternatieven	   geboden	   om	   de	  schadelijke	   effecten	   van	   stelsels	   van	   intellectueel	   eigendom	   te	  beperken.	   In	  dit	  proefschrift	  worden	  drie	  daarvan	  onderzocht	  op	  hun	  sterke	  en	  zwakke	  punten:	  de	  'Access	  to	  Knowledge'-­‐beweging,	  het	   ‘Health	  Impact	  Fund’	  en	  modellen	  voor	  open	   innovatie.	   Om	   een	   zo	   duidelijk	   mogelijk	   beeld	   te	   krijgen,	   worden	   deze	  alternatieven	   beoordeeld	   in	   het	   licht	   van	   een	   specifiek	   probleem.	   Allereerst	  wordt	   geanalyseerd	   in	   hoeverre	   de	   'Access	   to	   Knowledge'-­‐beweging	   het	  vermogen	   heeft	   de	   mondiale	   gezondheid	   te	   verbeteren.	   Vervolgens	   wordt	  onderzocht	   hoe	  het	   idee	   achter	   het	   ‘Health	   Impact	   Fund’	   kan	  worden	   gebruikt	  om	   de	   ontwikkeling	   van	   klimaatvriendelijke	   technologieën	   te	   bevorderen.	   Ten	  slotte	   worden	   de	   modellen	   voor	   open	   innovatie	   getest	   op	   hun	   potentieel	   om	  innovatie	  in	  inheemse	  gemeenschappen	  te	  behouden	  en	  te	  stimuleren.	  	  	  In	  hoofdstuk	  5	  wordt	  de	  beweging	   ter	  bevordering	  van	   toegang	   tot	  medicijnen	  gedurende	   de	   afgelopen	   twintig	   jaar	   geanalyseerd.	   Beschreven	   wordt	   hoe	   de	  beweging	  evolueerde	  van	  een	  beweging	  gericht	  op	  maatschappelijk	  verantwoord	  ondernemen	  tot	  een	  beweging	  gericht	  op	  mondiale	  rechtvaardigheid.	  De	  situatie	  dat	   bijna	   alle	   essentiële	   medicijnen	   worden	   ontwikkeld	   op	   het	   noordelijk	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halfrond,	   heeft	   een	   aantal	   nadelen	   voor	   armen	   mensen.	   Medicijnen	   worden	  voornamelijk	  ontwikkeld	  om	  actief	   te	  zijn	   tegen	  de	  ziektes	  die	  veel	  voorkomen	  op	  het	  noordelijk	  halfrond	  en	  er	  wordt	  relatief	  weinig	  gedaan	  om	  te	  zorgen	  dat	  de	  medicijnen	  ook	  doelmatig	  zijn	  voor	  arme	  mensen	   levend	  in	  een	  heel	  andere	  context.	   Bovendien	  maken	   de	  marktprikkels	   de	   ontwikkeling	   van	   zogenaamde	  'me-­‐too	   drugs'	   lucratief.	   Tegelijk	   kiezen	   onderzoekers	   er	   vaak	   voor	   hun	   werk	  niet	  openbaar	  te	  maken,	  hetgeen	  ertoe	  leidt	  dat	  onderzoeksactiviteiten	  onnodig	  worden	  herhaald.	  Het	  hoofdstuk	  eindigt	  met	  een	  sprankje	  optimisme:	  er	  wordt	  een	  aantal	  nieuwe	  initiatieven	  gepresenteerd	  die	  werken	  op	  basis	  van	  een	  'open	  laboratorium',	  waardoor	  wetenschap	  een	  meer	  inclusieve	  activiteit	  wordt.	  	  	  In	   hoofdstuk	   6	   worden	   het	   potentieel	   en	   de	   tekortkomingen	   van	   het	   ‘Health	  Impact	  Fund’	  nader	  onderzocht.	  De	  kritiek	  richt	  zich	  vooral	  op	  het	  onvermogen	  van	  dit	  voorstel	  om	  de	  sterke	  verdeling	  op	  het	  gebied	  van	  onderzoek	  tussen	  het	  noordelijk	   en	  het	   zuidelijk	  halfrond	  weg	   te	  nemen.	   In	  dit	   hoofdstuk	  wordt	   een	  sceptische	  houding	  aangenomen	  met	  betrekking	  tot	  de	  mogelijkheden	  om	  deze	  verdeling	   te	   overwinnen,	   zelfs	   als	   er	   aanpassingen	   op	   het	   oorspronkelijke	  voorstel	   worden	   overwogen.	   Het	   gebruik	   van	   een	   aangepaste	   versie	   van	   het	  ‘Health	   Impact	   Fund’	   om	   klimaatvriendelijke	   technologieën	   te	   propageren,	   is	  zelfs	   nog	   problematischer	   dan	   het	   oorspronkelijke	   gebruik	   in	   de	   context	   van	  geneesmiddelen.	   Technologieën	   die	   bijdragen	   aan	   inperking	   van	   de	  klimaatverandering	  kunnen	  aanzienlijke	  positieve	  neveneffecten	  hebben	  voor	  de	  gebruikers.	   Het	   stimuleren	   van	   brandstofefficiëntie	   voor	   luxejachten	   of	   het	  verbeteren	   van	   fornuizen	   die	   tevens	   de	   blootstelling	   aan	   dampen	   in	   volle	  huishoudens	  reduceren,	  zijn	  twee	  totaal	  verschillende	  dingen.	  De	  keuze	  voor	  de	  ene	   strategie	   in	   plaats	   van	   de	   andere	   moet	   ethisch	   verdedigbaar	   zijn.	   In	   dit	  hoofdstuk	   wordt	   het	   voorbeeld	   van	   Biochar	   besproken.	   Ter	   wille	   van	   de	  politieke	  uitvoerbaarheid,	  hebben	  de	  opstellers	  van	  het	   ‘Health	  Impact	  Fund’	  te	  grote	  concessies	  gedaan	  aan	  belangrijke	  spelers	  in	  de	  politieke	  arena.	  	  In	   het	   hoofdstuk	   daarna	   wordt	   de	   derde	   beweging	   besproken.	   Modellen	   voor	  open	  innovatie	  zijn	  mogelijk	  niet	  het	  beste	  alternatief	  om	  de	  materiële	  behoeften	  van	  inheemse	  innovators	  veilig	  te	  stellen.	  Ze	  hebben	  echter	  wel	  veel	  potentie	  als	  het	  gaat	  om	  het	  beschermen	  van	  de	  morele	  belangen	  van	  creatieve	  geesten.	  Hier	  wordt	  het	  concept	  van	  moreel	  belang	  in	  ruimere	  zin	  geïnterpreteerd	  dan	  zoals	  in	  de	   wetgeving	   gespecificeerd.	   Vernieuwers	   hebben	   niet	   alleen	   belang	   bij	   het	  toekennen	  van	  auteurschap	  en	  het	  behoud	  van	  controle	  over	  de	   integriteit	  van	  hun	  werk,	  maar	  ook	  bij	  een	  eerlijke	  beoordeling	  van	  hun	  uitvinding.	  Onterecht	  vergeten	   worden	   druist	   in	   tegen	   dit	   belang.	   Platforms	   waarop	   inheemse	  innovatie	   zichtbaar	   wordt	   –	   met	   name	   onder	   mensen	   die	   onder	   vergelijkbare	  omstandigheden	   in	   andere	   delen	   van	   de	   wereld	   leven	   –	   hebben	   een	   groot	  potentieel	  om	  aan	  dit	  laatste	  belang	  tegemoet	  te	  komen.	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Hoofdstuk	   8	   bevat	   een	   kritische	   beoordeling	   van	   zes	   prominente	   voorstellen	  over	   intellectueel	   eigendom	  met	  betrekking	   tot	   de	   internationale	   regels	   inzake	  mensenrechten.	  Na	  een	  uitgebreide	  analyse	  van	  de	  manier	  waarop	  intellectueel	  eigendom	  van	  invloed	  is	  op	  de	  rechten	  en	  vrijheden	  die	  worden	  beschermd	  door	  de	  mensenrechten,	  worden	  de	  drie	  voornoemde	  alternatieven	  onderzocht	  in	  het	  licht	  van	  het	  wijdverbreide	  gebruik	  van	  verplichte	  vergunningen,	  prijsgelden	  en	  samenwerkingsverbanden	   binnen	   het	   zuidelijk	   halfrond.	   Bij	   deze	   beoordeling	  worden	   mensenrechten	   niet	   in	   puur	   juridische	   zin	   opgevat,	   maar	   wordt	  daarentegen	   uitgegaan	   van	   een	   lekenoordeel.	   Het	   doel	   daarvan	   is	   dat	   aan	   de	  hand	   van	   een	   dergelijk	   inzicht	   de	   oorsprong	   van	   veel	   verwarring	   kan	  worden	  begrepen.	   De	   uitkomst	   van	   deze	   beoordeling	   is	   dat	   de	   heterogeniteit	   en	  diversiteit	   van	   de	   behoeften	   die	   wereldwijd	   worden	   aangetroffen,	   een	   veel	  complexere	   oplossing	   vereist.	   Sommige	   getroffen	   partijen	   interpreteren	   de	  concessies	  die	  door	  het	  ene	  deel	  van	  de	  wereld	  als	  relatief	  onbelangrijk	  worden	  beschouwd,	  vaak	  als	  van	  groot	  belang.	  Een	  enkele	  ingrijpende	  wijziging	  kan	  dit	  complexe	  probleem	  nooit	  in	  zijn	  geheel	  oplossen.	  	  	  In	   dit	   proefschrift	   wil	   ik	   de	   noodzaak	   verdedigen	   dat	   wetenschap	   en	  technologische	   ontwikkeling	   een	   meer	   inclusieve	   aangelegenheid	   worden.	  Daarom	  heb	  ik	  in	  dezelfde	  geest	  gewerkt	  als	  veel	  andere	  politieke	  filosofen	  die	  er	  op	   hameren	   dat	   participatie	   cruciaal	   is	   voor	   een	   goed	   functionerende	  samenleving.	  Op	  het	  gebied	  van	  wetenschap	  en	  technologische	  ontwikkeling	  kan	  participatie	   echter	   alleen	   zinvol	   zijn	   als	   er	   geen	   systematische	   discriminatie	  bestaat	   en	   als	   er	   voldoende	   mogelijkheden	   voorhanden	   zijn	   om	   de	   vereiste	  vaardigheden	  op	  te	  doen.	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   2009-­‐10	   6	  Summer	  School	  “Ethics	  and	  Economics”,	  Netherlands	  School	  for	  Research	  in	  Practical	  Philosophy	  (OZSE)	   2010	   6	  “Contemporary	  Theories	  of	  Justice”,	  Netherlands	  School	  for	  Research	  in	  Practical	  Philosophy	  (OZSE)	   2010	   6	  Winter	  School	  “Ethical	  Theory	  and	  Moral	  Practice”,	  Netherlands	  School	  for	  Research	  in	  Practical	  Philosophy	  (OZSE)	   2011	   6	  “Trusting	  Information:	  Technology,	  Truth	  and	  Transparency”,	  IT	  University	  Copenhagen	   2011	   5	  PhD	  seminars	  (6x)	  Netherlands	  School	  for	  Research	  in	  Practical	  Philosophy	  (OZSE)	   2011-­‐13	   3	  	   	   	  	   	   	  
Teaching	   	   	  Food	  Ethics	  Applied	  Philosophy,	  Wageningen	  University	   2009-­‐13	   	  Ethics	  and	  Social	  Science	  Applied	  Philosophy,	  Wageningen	  University	   2010-­‐12	   	  Ethics	  and	  Biotechnology,	  Applied	  Philosophy,	  Wageningen	  University	  	   2012	   	  Analyse	  van	  een	  Probleemveld:	  Rampen	  en	  resilience	  Disaster	  Studies,	  Wageningen	  University	   2012	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  
Total	  number	  of	  credits	  	  (minimum	  27	  ECTS)	   	   32	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	   212	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  dissertation	  is	  result	  of	  a	  research	  project	  of	  the	  Centre	  for	  Society	  and	  the	  Life	  Sciences	  in	  The	  Netherlands,	  funded	  by	  the	  Netherlands	  Genomics	  Initiative.	  	  	  Chapter	  8	  was	  written	  as	  a	  visiting	  researcher	  at	  the	  Brocher	  Foundation.	  	  
